January-February - Air Defense Artillery

26
Considering the fact that the area to be patrolled was so
\'ast and the number of men a\'ailable for this task was so
small, it could not be expected that the region could be as
thoroughly searched as it had been previously. Although
on the date that Colonel Hochle assumed command I7.ISO
Japs had been killed and 457 had been captured, it was
e\'ident that a laroe number of enemy fugjti\'es were still at
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large and were roaming more or less freely over the island.
Accordingly the commanding oflicers of the two attached
antiaircraft battalions were made sub-sector commanders
and the North Sector was divided into three parts. In mak-
ino these di\'isions, existino road nets and trails ,,'ere used
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as sector boundaries thus enabling patrols to avoid moving
beyond the limits of their assigned sectors.
It must be remembered that this region was a plateau
with exceedingly few distinguishing landmarks and that it
was co\'ered with thick jungle growth. In many places it
was so thick and tangled that it could be almost considered
impenetrable except for a man crawling on all fours. Know-
~
ino this, it can be more readilv understood wi1\' it afforded
/:) .
such a wonderful refuge for these enemy fugitives.
Each component element of the three battalions was as-
sioned a number of smaller areas and each was charged with
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the mission of patrolling these smaller sectors at least once
a week. These small patrol sectors were numerically designated
on overlavs furnished bv the 64th Antiaircraft Artillerv
Gun Battalion to subordi~ate and attached units. The
ch~ice of sectors to be patrolled on any particular day was
left to the discretion of the sub-sector commanders. Patrol
schedules were then forwarded to and coordinated by the
North Sector commander.
The number of men making a patrol varied from time to
time, but twelve was the usual average. Due to the particular
type of terrain, it was necessary to vary patrol tactics
occasionally. There were few well-beaten paths through
the jungle and, of those that did exist, almost all were extremely
narrow and winding. Consequently, the patrol
THE COAST [\RTILLERY JOUR~AL
leader, in order to maintain contact, was forced to keep the
Patrol point and rear ouard relatively close to the main bodv
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of the patrol. In most instances, it was impossible to assign
men as £lank guards because the denseness of the adjacent
growth would have prevented them from keeping up with
the main bodv. This of course increased the danger of an
enemy ambush, but in most cases, there was no alternative.
The time of day for patrolling was continually varied:
The Jap, by studying the movements of early patrols, established
their characteristic habits and took evasive tactics bv
foraging for food at times when the patrols were least e;pected.
\Vhen this fact became known through interrogation
of prisoners of war, countermeasures
patrols changing their starting times.
were taken, with
No night patrol work was conducted but infrequent night
ambushes were tried and met with mild success. These
were usually set up when a trail showed recent evidence of
having been frequently used by Japs or when Jap marauders
were continually attempting to raid food stores of various
camps and other installations. Since the enemy remnants
were so widely dispersed. it did not appear feasible to wait
for hours at one point for one or more Japs to pass by except
in specific instances.
s n aooressive enem\' bands
were \'ery much the exception. rather than the rule.
tors contributing to this \\'ere many. In almost all inst
the Jap was strongly motivated by a desire to escape l'
than to stand and fight. He fully realized that he faced
rule an enemy who was superior both in numbers a
wea]Jons. He also possessed an amazinolv strono belief I'
O. /:) .
the Jap Heet would return to retake the island and effe
rescue. This was evident from diaries captured months
the island was secured. Of course this hope must
progressively faded as the weeks and months went by.
further ,discourage his hopes in that direction, leaHets
scattered o\'er the island informino him of the latest reI
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suffered by the Jap Aeet and the Imperial army. Thoug
may have read these news summaries with some skepti
he must ha\'e believed them to a partial extent.
Encounters with enen1\' individuals and oroulJS were
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mally of a short duration due principally to the natu
the terrain and the characteristic attempts at flight ma
the enen1\'. Contacts always had to be made bv utilizin.
element ~f surlJrise. Bv e;lllJlovino a stealtll\; advance r
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trois were often able to approach within a few yards
hidden Jap bivouac before an enemy alarm was sou
. /:)
The Jap almost invariablv did one of the two thinos. E 8
he reached for a weapon if he had one or made a mad
for the cover and concealment afforded by the dense ju
In either case he was cut down bv small-arms fire. Atte \
by patrols to capture unwoundee! Japs always ended in
crable failure. They simply refused to surrender to a
even when they must have realized that they would be
down if they ~ttempted to flee. Obviousl); they pref
death to the disgrace which the Japanese attach to surre
On a number of occasions, wounded Japs committed su'
with their ever-present grenade when patrol members cl
in. Jap soldiers have always been taught that they woul (
tortured and killed after capture and consequently a
ferred a quick death to one which might be lingering
excruciatingly painful. Added to this was their belief
if captured they could never return to Japan because of
dishonored status. In the eyes of those at home they
nonentities and had ceased to exist as an individual.
spired by such teachings, one can understand more r
whv thev chose the course of action that they did.
\Vhil~ fire fights were more the exception r~ther than
rule, there were a number of instances Where an aggres
enemy did attempt to inflict casualties upon our pal
In most cases, however, the alertness and quick actio
patrol members prevented the Jap from achieving his
To cite an example, on several occasions a wounded
tossed a grenade at patrol members, but fortunate.!r in
case, the denseness of the jungle cover provided a s
sufficient to enable the patrol to escape injury. On
rare occasions when enemy individuals or small group'
tempted to return riRe fire they were usually so conf
and surprised by the suddenness of the patrols' attack
thev were annihilated before they could inRict anv ha
Only on one occasion was a patrol forced to with'draU'
the face of enemy resistance. One morning a patrol of
men encountered a well-armed enemv force of unkn
size along a rugged cliff section of th~ island. The p
point, consisting of two men, sighted three ~ips thr
the underorowth .ust as the latter wee in the act of se