Hangaasuu Bilisummaa Journal Volume 1 - ULFO

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agenda only after an exhaustive debrief on the last negotiation and agreement. Hence, somber and yet frank debrief on the last round of agreement took place. No flaws in the merger process have been identified. AWO was found categorically responsible for the derailment of the agreement. Stern criticism has been leveled at AWO for failing to honor the agreement. AWO’s delegates admitted the mistakes of their organization, and they apologized on behalf of their organization and pledged to move forward and positively and constructively contribute in building tokkummaa of all forces. For the interest of ultimately forging a solid unity, without any lingering hard feelings, delegates of all organizations accepted AWO’s apology and moved on to discussing the agenda of merger. Again after thorough deliberation on the agenda, a unanimous understanding has been reached to the effect that the Oromo liberation struggle desperately needs a unified national organization and leadership. For the realization of such an organization and leadership, they all agreed to pave the groundwork and scheduled the next Assembly of Delegates to take place at the beginning of year 2009 to further look at and conclude the merger as they see fit. In the interim period, they named a working group that would help facilitate in all aspects of the unification process. The Essence of Tokkummaa Defiled VOLUME 1 SPRING 2010 With so much hope to finalize the merger agreement, the working group diligently created amicable environment for all parties to ease into merger, planned and organized venues and logistical needs, and prepared and got all necessary documents ready for the Assembly of Delegates held in January 2009. In a two-day session that took place at the end of January, delegates of all organizations including that of a newly accepted member of ULFO, the OLF-Transition (T), participated with such a heightened expectation. At the end of the session, all but the OLF(T) fully endorsed an agreement of merger to take effect immediately. The OLF(T), rightly so, had a reservation on the immediate merger. It clearly stated that it would need sometime to work with and get confidence on ULFO member organizations before agreeing to merge with them. Accepting in principle the idea of uniting all Oromo forces under one strong national organization and leadership and commending the efforts of other organizations to unite soon, the OLF(T) unequivocally expressed its wish to temporarily work on bilateral or multilateral basis under ULFO on common national initiatives or projects until such time that there is a natural need and confidence to fully integrate and form one national front. Fully understanding and respecting the reservation of the OLF(T), the remaining ULFO member organizations embarked on the merger process. They left the door open for any Oromo liberation force wishing to join them at any given time. At the background of such a positive move of ULFO members, the whirlwind of ‘change’ that had ripped apart the OLF- Shanee(S) and created a third faction [the OLF- Change (C)] was at work in dislodging the painstakingly framed unity of Oromo political forces. The disintegration of the OLF into three different entities in and by itself is a profound political drawback for our national struggle. It is an abhorrent political fiasco that genuine Oromo nationalists hardly fathom and come to term with. That as it may, to add insult to injury, other organizations were targeted to sustain a similar havoc of split the OLF(C) created within the OLF circle. For no intelligent political reason, the OLF(C) was bent on working on all other organizations to become faction ridden. This mission of the OLF(C) did severely hamper the crystallization of the merger of ULFO members. At its inception, the OLF(C) looked and sounded as an agent of change that would profoundly transform the Oromo national liberation struggle in various aspects. One of the aspects that it claimed it would primarily deal with was tokkummaa of liberation forces. In this front, sure enough, it launched a vigorous and relentless campaign. However, it was all done in haste without assimilating the challenges of Hangaasuu Bilisummaa 10
internal dynamics hinging on unity, without due process of consultation with all parties, without giving due consideration to the essence of tokkummaa as articulated by founding fathers of ULFO, and without giving due regard to an already existing institution (venue) - ULFO- where tokkummaa should be cultivated. By categorically rejecting and by-passing ULFO, the OLF(C) essentially embarked on what amounts to re-inventing the wheel – “building tokkummaa of liberation forces”. At the outset, this move of the OLF(C) was rebuked. Given the unprecedented effort and time spent on creating ULFO, the Oromo public had hardly any appetite for another cycle of recreating a united front. Nonetheless, in a grandstanding approach and crude method, the OLF(C) patched together few rouge and weakest link elements from all Oromo political forces and proudly called it a historic unity in October 2009. In effect it poked in the affairs of every organization in an attempt to render them dysfunctional and eventually put them out of the political scene. This ain’t unity but a like of Demolition Derby. All this not so much to bring about a genuine and lasting unity but to get a bit of an edge in the political skirmish in the home turf, particularly within the circle of the OLF spin-offs. By employing such a self-serving approach for unity, the OLFC(C) has defiled the essence of tokkummaa – one that ought to be forged on a level plain field of The Essence of Tokkummaa Defiled VOLUME 1 SPRING 2010 inclusiveness, respect, equality, open and transparent democratic process to truly advance the cause of the Oromo nation. Nearly two decades have elapsed since the effort of uniting Oromo political forces first began. Opportunities to unite our forces have come and gone untapped. Consequently, the Oromo public has repeatedly experienced hope followed by despair during this long and arduous struggle to unite nationalist forces. With no integration but disintegration of forces creeping from time to time, frustration, growing apathy, and helplessness have hit the Oromo public; so much so that the public now thinks that uniting the Oromo forces is a farfetched and futile exercise. It requires no brainer that unity of the Oromo liberation forces is one of the key factors for the success of the liberation of Oromiyaa. It is also pretty apparent that what gave strength to the colonizing forces of the Wayane regime is the fractured state of the Oromo forces. By any stretch, the inherent strength of Wayne is not at all capable of containing a united Oromo liberation forces backed by its people. While this is the case, the failure of Oromo forces to put their acts together for so long and challenge the Wayane in unison is quite abhorrent and exceedingly irresponsible. 3. The Remedies What are the remedies? To build the quintessential tokkummaa of the Oromo political forces, to emerge from the current state of disunity, and to embark on fully engaging the enemy forces in all fronts, it is highly expected of Oromo organizations and nationalists at large a change in attitude and approach and a profound leap in ingenuity and commitment for unity that would help expeditiously achieve the ultimate goal of the Oromo national liberation struggle – bilisummaa /walabummaa. In this respect, the following are critical points for consideration: 1. All Oromo political forces must sincerely believe that their tokkummaa has hefty political weight. They must cease giving just a lip service to unity because the Oromo public demands it. 2. A difference of ideological leaning remains a grave problem to forge tokkummaa of political forces. More so, ideological dualism has caused factions and become a bottleneck for unity. First and foremost, Oromo political organizations must unequivocally state the political objective of their respective organizations: that is, whether they are struggling to decolonize Oromiyaa or “democratize Ethiopia”. Ambiguity on this issue has so far precluded tokkummaa of Oromo political forces to evolve. It is hence imperative that each organization be up front with the Oromo public regarding Hangaasuu Bilisummaa 11
Page 1: Contributions by Idries Jemal Taj
Page 4 and 5: Hangaasuu Bilisummaa Journal Volum
Page 6 and 7: Hangaasuu Bilisummaa Journal Volum
Page 8 and 9: Hangaasuu Bilisummaa VI
Page 10 and 11: The organizational behavior of Orom
Page 12 and 13: this goal to succeed, they put in p
Page 14 and 15: incessant simmering that is debilit
Page 16 and 17: The organizational framework of ULF
Page 20 and 21: its ultimate political goals. It is
Page 22 and 23: Saamichalafa Oromoo Saamicha Lafa O
Page 24 and 25: uqqisuun alagaa wajjin saamaa jiran
Page 26 and 27: kutannoon dura dhaabate san akka ho
Page 28 and 29: Naannolee Oromiyaa birootti jechuun
Page 30 and 31: The basis of Mushrooming Factions w
Page 32 and 33: The basis of Mushrooming Factions w
Page 34 and 35: Biyya Oromoo Laalistuu VOLUME 1 SP
Page 40 and 41: Rooting out the Oromos and exposing
Page 44: Volume 1 Spring 2010

Hangaasuu Bilisummaa Journal Volume 1 - ULFO

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