03.07.2013 Views

Debt Analysts' Views of Debt-Equity Conflicts of Interest

Debt Analysts' Views of Debt-Equity Conflicts of Interest

Debt Analysts' Views of Debt-Equity Conflicts of Interest

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sinking fund provisions, etc.). Hence if, for example, analysts were to issue a negative view <strong>of</strong> a<br />

conflict event, they may perceive these protective features as insufficient.<br />

On one hand, because debt-equity conflicts have the potential to meaningfully affect debt<br />

holders’ wealth, we expect debt holders to demand information on these events and for debt<br />

analysts to meet this demand. If the potential conflict is material, whether or not it has been<br />

anticipated, debt analysts are likely to monitor, analyze, and discuss its effect on the value <strong>of</strong><br />

outstanding debt securities in their reports. In particular, we expect conflict discussions to<br />

distinguish debt analysts’ from equity analysts’ reports. If the contents <strong>of</strong> the former were limited<br />

only to an analysis <strong>of</strong> a firm’s fundamentals, such as the level <strong>of</strong> EBITDA or earnings, the<br />

distinction between equity and debt analysts’ reports would be blurred because we would expect<br />

both types <strong>of</strong> analysts to monitor and evaluate the firm’s performance. Therefore, our prediction<br />

is that the tone <strong>of</strong> debt analysts’ conflict discussions is relevant for debt investors and generates<br />

debt market reactions. Given the pay<strong>of</strong>f function <strong>of</strong> debt securities, which are fixed claims<br />

against the borrowing firm and have limited upside potential, we expect debt holders to have an<br />

asymmetric demand for negative information. As a result, we predict that debt market reactions<br />

will be stronger if debt analysts have negative views about conflict events. Empirically, we<br />

measure debt market reactions by changes in secondary market CDS spreads and bond trading<br />

volume and by the level <strong>of</strong> bonds’ yield to maturity on new bond issues in the primary market.<br />

Our primary market setting reinforces the economic importance <strong>of</strong> conflict discussions because<br />

yields on new issues represent real effects on a company’s cost <strong>of</strong> debt financing.<br />

On the other hand, the extent and economic importance <strong>of</strong> such conflicts to debt holders, as<br />

documented by extant studies, is far from clear. Parrino and Weisbach (1999), discussed above,<br />

is one example. In the case <strong>of</strong> spin-<strong>of</strong>fs, Hite and Owers (1983) and Schipper and Smith (1983)<br />

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