WAR- CHRONICLE

During the course of a later conversation Lieut.-Colonel Barnardiston
assured me, that he had never received any confidential
information regarding our army from other military attachés. He
then gave the numerical Data as to the English forces; we could
count on the fact, that in 12 or 13 days, 2 army corps, 4 cavalry
brigades, and 2 brigades of mounted infantry could be landed.
He requested me to study the question of transporting these
forces, to which-ever part of the country they would be most useful,
and promised to give me a detailed list of the expeditionary forces.
He went back to the question of the actual strength of our
field army and insisted that no detachments should be branched off
for Nainur and Liittich, as these places had garrisons which were
strong enough. He asked me to pay attention to the fact, of the
necessity of allowing the English army to share in the privileges
which the règlement provides for war-feats. At last he insisted on
the question of the head-command.
I answered him that I could give no answer on this last mentioned
point and promised him to look into the other questions
carefully.
Later on the English military-attache confirmed his former
taxation: It would take at least 12 days to carry out the landing
on the French coast. A much longer time would be necessary (1 to
2 1 j.i months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp.
On my interposing that it would be unnecessary to wait for
the termination of the landing, to begin with the railway transports,
and that it would be better to carrv them out according to arrival
on the coast, Mr. Barnardiston promised to give me exact data as
to the number which could be landed each day.
As to the feats of war, Mr. Barnardiston was informed by me
that this question could easily be arranged.
The further progress which the English general-staff's plan made,
the clearer were the single items of the problem. The Colonel assured
me that half the English army could be landed in a week,
the rest by the end of 12 or 13 days, with the exception of the
mounted infantry, which could only be sent later.
In spite of that, I felt myself obliged to insist on knowing
exactly the numbers which could be landed each day, so as to
be in a position to make arrangements for the railway transport
daily.
The English military attaché conversed further with me about
different other points :
1. The necessity of keeping all operations secret and to ensure
the absolute secrecy of the Press.
2. Advantages which might be derived if each,English generalstaff
was given a Belgian officer, each commander of troops an interpreter,
and each unit of troops gendarmes, to assist the English police
forces.
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