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26th Ann. Int’l Computer Software
and Applications Conf., IEEE, 2003,
pp. 622-627).
Thus, regardless of the technical
measures used, law and policy must
be in place to guide defenders as
they craft responses to cyberattacks.
Although a response might be legal,
policy dictates the latitude in applying
the law, taking into consideration
such factors as the impact on society,
diplomatic relations, and even
privacy concerns, such as a given
response’s level of intrusiveness. The
currency of the topic of cyberpreparedness
is evidenced by the recent
front-page news account of the legal
and policy discussions that ensued
prior to the cyberattack sponsored
by the US Department of Defense to
dismantle an online forum used by
terrorists to plan kinetic attacks on
US troops (E. Nakashima, “For Cyberwarriors
Murky Terrain; Dismantling
of Saudi-CIA Web Site Illustrates need
for Clearer Cyberwar Policies,” The
Washington Post, 19 March 2010, pp.
A1 and A16). Policy issues included
the impact on US-Saudi relations and
whether the response should be conducted
as an intelligence or military
operation.
In addition, techniques for conducting
principled analyses must be
ready to help minimize legal uncertainty
about cyberincidents and allow
the most complete range of effective
responses. Whether the response is
conducted via kinetic or cyber means,
it must be lawful (T. Wingfield, The
Law of Information Confiict: National
Security Law in Cyberspace, Aegis
Research Corp., 2000).
LEVERAGING THE
LEGAL CELL
We propose merging the three
dimensions of cyberpreparedness
by adding a new type of virtual cell
to cybersystems: the legal cell.
Virtual cells within such systems
serve as dynamic virtual
communities in which cyberopera-
tors can interact in support of making
informed decisions. Cyberoperators
encompass subject-matter experts
in cyberoperations along with the
related communities of the diplomatic
corps, intelligence analysts, the
military, politicians, legal authorities,
law-enforcement agents, economists,
and those responsible for creating
and maintaining the national critical
infrastructure. Cyberoperators can
create, join, leave, and even dissolve
cell instantiations.
The legal cell provides cyberoperators
with the means to obtain
advice from experts in information
operations (IO) law. Within cyber C2/
BM systems, cells subscribe to infor-
We propose merging
the three dimensions
of cyberpreparedness
by adding a new type
of virtual cell to cybersystems:
the legal cell.
mation and the system publishes it
continuously in a digestible format.
This differs from the information-pull
approach incorporated into most of
today’s C2/BM systems when used in
conjunction with kinetic warfare.
Through the legal cell, IO experts
can maintain a current picture of the
cyberspace situation and provide
advice as needed. This is an important
capability, given the rapid tempo
of cyberbattles and the high degree
of space compression, which asserts
that the physical distance from a
target does not matter as it would
with kinetic weapons and that a
flattened command structure is necessary
for conducting cyberwarfare.
On instantiation of a legal cell, the
system populates it with presumptions
and algorithms. In this context,
presumptions follow black-and-white
if-then rules automatically enacted by
mobile agents, whereas algorithms
involve more complex data processing
than with production rules but,
like presumptions, are processed
without human intervention and
whose results trigger a course of
action.
These three elements—the law,
presumptions, and algorithms—are
what Tikk and Wingfield refer to as
the “pyramid,” representing decision
making along a continuum of
operational speed and the inherent
limitations on what types of problems
computers solve in support of decision
making.
ATTACK RESOLUTION
Given the unpredictability and
quickness of cyberattacks, a rapid
response is critical, necessitating
use of at least some autonomic
systems. According to a report by
the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) outlining a
smart grid cybersecurity strategy
and requirements (http://csrc.nist.
gov/publications/drafts/nistir-7628/
draft-nistir-7628_2nd-public-draft.
__
pdf).
Ultimately, the cyberoperation
leader will ascertain the effect of
the attack’s automated response,
particularly in the military because
a commander cannot delegate
responsibility for the actions of their
command. While a commander may
delegate the authority to execute
certain actions on to a subordinate
within the command, the commander
still retains full and complete responsibility
for the outcome of those
delegated actions, for good or bad.
Some defensive systems that involve
using kinetic weapons require extensive
automation, such as those used
for ballistic missile defense, in which
the duty cycle for core functions of
the so-called “kill chain”—detect,
track, assign weapons, engage, and
assess outcome—cannot be performed
by humans swiftly enough to
achieve the desired levels of operational
effectiveness.
APRIL 2010
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