The Nation's Responses To Flood Disasters: A Historical Account
The Nation's Responses To Flood Disasters: A Historical Account
The Nation's Responses To Flood Disasters: A Historical Account
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<strong>The</strong> Nation’s <strong>Responses</strong> to <strong>Flood</strong> <strong>Disasters</strong>: A <strong>Historical</strong> <strong>Account</strong><br />
“<strong>The</strong> <strong>Flood</strong>plains of Rivers,” published in Forum, XI, stated that “as population has<br />
increased, men have not only failed to devise means for suppressing or for escaping this<br />
evil [flood], but have with singular short-sightedness, rushed into its chosen paths.” 31<br />
Harlan H. Barrows. In a report on the evolution of federal flood control policy, Moore<br />
and Moore state that the concepts that would eventually alter national approaches to flood<br />
problems probably began in the 1920s with the work of Harlan H. Barrows. 32 Barrows, a<br />
professor of Geography at the University of Chicago and a member of the Public Works<br />
Administration’s Mississippi Valley Committee (which would later become the Water<br />
Resources Committee) had the widest possible view of the geography and espoused a<br />
need for interdisciplinary research. He inspired his students to look at the world in a<br />
similar fashion.<br />
As one of two non-engineers on the Roosevelt administration’s 12-member<br />
Water Resources Committee (WRC) in the late 1930s, Barrows had ample opportunities<br />
to promote his belief that good planning required linking land and water use. He<br />
expressed his views in a report 33 prepared by the WRC for the President in 1938. With<br />
one notable exception, all sections of the drainage report reflected the engineering<br />
orientation of most of its authors and generally endorsed structural solutions to water<br />
problems. <strong>The</strong> exception was the section submitted by the Ohio-Lower Mississippi<br />
Regulation Subcommittee, which Barrows chaired. <strong>The</strong> report stated “if it would cost<br />
more to build reservoir storage than to prevent floodplain encroachment, all relevant<br />
factors considered, the latter procedure would appear to be the best solution.” Reuss 34<br />
described this section of the report as containing some remarkable language. Reuss goes<br />
on to state that:<br />
for the first time, an official government document recommended<br />
something other than building dams, floodwalls, and levees to protect life<br />
and property. Barrows’ subcommittee (which included the Chief of<br />
Engineers) recommended the consideration of zoning laws and<br />
relocation. It warned that flood control reservoirs simply promoted the<br />
occupation of previously flood-prone lands, and this inevitably produced<br />
new demands for protection. <strong>The</strong> WRC’s receptivity to the<br />
subcommittee report must have encouraged Barrows. <strong>The</strong> full<br />
committee explicitly noted that most of the subcommittee<br />
recommendations applied equally to other basins and were ‘essential<br />
elements in a sound national flood-control policy.’ Barrows was not<br />
content to publish his views in the drainage report. He looked for a<br />
definite change in policy. When President Roosevelt forwarded to the<br />
31 McGee, W. J., “<strong>The</strong> <strong>Flood</strong>plains of Rivers,” Forum, XI(1891), p. 221.<br />
32 Moore and Moore, p. 35.<br />
33 Water Resources Committee, Drainage Basin Problems and Program, (National Resources Committee, 1938).<br />
34 Reuss, “Coping With Uncertainty: Social Scientists, Engineers, and Federal Water Resources Planning,” Natural Resources Journal, 32(Winter 1992), p.<br />
119.