public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
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PART 4<br />
CRITICISMS AND PROPOSALS: THE CONDUCT<br />
ELEMENT<br />
PUBLIC NUISANCE<br />
Abolishing the offence<br />
4.1 Arguments for abolishing the offence of <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong>, as advanced by<br />
Spencer, fall under the following heads.<br />
(1) Vagueness of definition.<br />
(2) Incompatibility with the constitutional requirement of the rule of law.<br />
(3) Problems of compatibility with the European Convention on Human<br />
Rights.<br />
(4) Redundancy, as having been superseded by statutory <strong>nuisance</strong> <strong>and</strong><br />
other modern statutory offences <strong>and</strong> mechanisms.<br />
Vagueness of definition<br />
4.2 Spencer argues that, historically, the factual element of <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong> was<br />
extremely fluid <strong>and</strong> virtually indistinguishable from the now defunct offence of<br />
<strong>public</strong> mischief, 1 <strong>and</strong> that both offences could be extended to criminalise anything<br />
the judges disliked. Such freedom of judicial law-making is not acceptable in a<br />
modern democracy. 2<br />
4.3 In Rimmington 3 it was acknowledged that this criticism would have force if the<br />
offence was interpreted so widely as to cover unlocalised <strong>and</strong> individually<br />
focused mischiefs such as the making of obscene telephone calls or the sending<br />
of hate mail (as in the actual case), whatever the cumulative <strong>public</strong> effect. A<br />
series of authorities suggesting that these were <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong>s was therefore<br />
overruled. 4 The House of Lords accepted that this wide interpretation of the<br />
offence was tantamount to reviving the offence of <strong>public</strong> mischief. 5<br />
4.4 However, they clearly did not accept Spencer’s argument 6 that the overall<br />
definition of the offence was so platitudinous as not to be a definition at all, so<br />
that there was no certainty in relation to any branch of the offence. On the<br />
contrary, Lord Bingham observed: 7<br />
1 Held not to exist by the House of Lords in DPP v Withers [1975] AC 842.<br />
2 [1989] CLJ 55 at pp 78-9.<br />
3 [2006] 1 AC 459 (HL).<br />
4 Rimmington, paras 23 to 27, 37, 46 to 48: see paras 2.26 <strong>and</strong> 2.27 above.<br />
5 Spencer pp 62, 79; Rimmington para 37.<br />
6 At pp 65-66.<br />
7 Rimmington, para 36; see para 2.17 above.<br />
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