public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
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PART 5<br />
CRITICISMS AND PROPOSALS: THE FAULT<br />
ELEMENT<br />
5.1 In this Part, we make the case for provisionally proposing that the fault element,<br />
both for <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong> <strong>and</strong> for <strong>outraging</strong> <strong>public</strong> <strong>decency</strong>, should be intention or<br />
recklessness. The prosecution should have to show either<br />
(1) that D intended to cause a <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong>, or to outrage <strong>public</strong> <strong>decency</strong>,<br />
or<br />
(2) if that cannot be shown, that D was reckless as to whether his or her<br />
conduct would cause a <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong>, or outrage <strong>public</strong> <strong>decency</strong>.<br />
So far as the latter possibility is concerned, what must be shown is that D was<br />
aware that his or her conduct might cause a <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong>, or lead to <strong>public</strong><br />
<strong>decency</strong> being outraged, <strong>and</strong> yet unjustifiably went on to take the risk of that<br />
happening. 1<br />
OFFENCES IN GENERAL AND FAULT REQUIREMENTS<br />
5.2 Fault elements attached to criminal offences vary very considerably, both at<br />
common law <strong>and</strong> in statute. It has been argued that this in itself blights the<br />
system as a whole, <strong>and</strong> that greater narrowness of focus <strong>and</strong> uniformity should<br />
be brought to the treatment of fault in English criminal law as a whole. For<br />
example, in an earlier edition of their work Smith <strong>and</strong> Hogan argued (approving of<br />
English law as they believed that it stood before the decision in Caldwell 2 ) that:<br />
Before Caldwell it could be said that…in crimes requiring mens rea,<br />
as distinct from negligence, intention or recklessness as to all the<br />
elements of the offence was mens rea or the basic constituent of it. 3<br />
5.3 Even if this was the ‘pre-Caldwell’ position (which, with respect, we doubt), it<br />
trades for its plausibility on an ambiguity in the notion of ‘mens rea’. If ‘mens rea’<br />
means ‘mental’ element then Smith <strong>and</strong> Hogan’s claim has, perhaps, some<br />
degree of plausibility; but if ‘mens rea’ means, as we will take it to mean, ‘fault’<br />
element, then Smith <strong>and</strong> Hogan’s claim cannot be substantiated. It has long been<br />
understood that ‘negligence’ is a kind of fault element. 4 Not only can homicide be<br />
committed by (gross) negligence, but there is also a negligence basis to liability in<br />
rape, even though rape is a very serious crime respecting which great stigma<br />
follows conviction. 5 Further, few now argue for subjective recklessness to be re-<br />
1<br />
We mean here to invoke the authoritative underst<strong>and</strong>ing of recklessness given in G [2003]<br />
UKHL 50, [2004] 1 AC 1034.<br />
2 [1982] AC 341.<br />
3 Smith <strong>and</strong> Hogan, Criminal <strong>Law</strong> (7 th ed, 1992) at p 70.<br />
4 For a recent discussion, see AP Simester, ‘Can Negligence be Culpable?’, in Jeremy<br />
Horder (ed) Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 4 th Series (2000).<br />
5 See now the Sexual Offences Act 2003 s 1.<br />
57