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public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission

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instated as the fault element in what is now the offence of ‘dangerous driving’,<br />

even though conviction for that crime too carries considerable stigma. 6<br />

5.4 Having said that, there is a still a strong case for saying that the same or very<br />

similar fault requirements should be employed where two or more of the following<br />

criteria are met:<br />

The offences are of a broadly similar nature;<br />

The offences are at about the same level of gravity; <strong>and</strong><br />

The offences may in many instances interchangeably be charged on<br />

the same facts.<br />

5.5 This is in a way a very simple <strong>and</strong> easily met dem<strong>and</strong>. If met, it means, so far as<br />

the fault element is concerned, that differences of definition where there need be<br />

none have been avoided, making the law easier to underst<strong>and</strong> for all concerned.<br />

It also makes choice of charge a more straightforward matter for the prosecution,<br />

by enabling a concentration of focus on how well the facts fit the conduct element<br />

of a given crime, in determining whether there is a reasonable prospect of<br />

conviction.<br />

5.6 This is where Smith <strong>and</strong> Hogan’s focus on intention or recklessness, as key fault<br />

terms in criminal law, can still have an important bearing. There are a number of<br />

offences broadly comparable to <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>outraging</strong> <strong>public</strong> <strong>decency</strong> in<br />

point of gravity. For these offences, the fault element is either intention or<br />

recklessness (or malice or awareness) as to the occurrence of the conduct<br />

elements (even if fault is not required respecting all the elements 7 ), as<br />

recommended by Smith <strong>and</strong> Hogan in 1992. 8<br />

5.7 In that regard, the definition of intention is now settled by the case of Woollin. 9 In<br />

law, intention involves a desire to bring something about, a desire which may be<br />

inferred from proof that the person in question foresaw that the event in question<br />

was virtually certain to come about if they acted in a certain way (which they went<br />

on to do).<br />

5.8 Recklessness, in law, now follows the meaning set out in the Draft Criminal<br />

Code:<br />

A person acts recklessly ... with respect to —<br />

(i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist;<br />

(ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur;<br />

6 Even if the concept of ‘dangerous’ driving is, for some, less acceptable than a st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />

that can take greater account of blameworthiness, such as ‘negligent’ driving. For a<br />

comprehensive review of driving offences involving the causing of death, see Sally<br />

Cunningham, ‘Punishing Drivers who Kill: Putting Road Safety First’? (2007) 27 Legal<br />

Studies 288.<br />

7 See paras 5.24 <strong>and</strong> following, below.<br />

8 Above, n 3.<br />

9 [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL).<br />

58

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