public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
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instated as the fault element in what is now the offence of ‘dangerous driving’,<br />
even though conviction for that crime too carries considerable stigma. 6<br />
5.4 Having said that, there is a still a strong case for saying that the same or very<br />
similar fault requirements should be employed where two or more of the following<br />
criteria are met:<br />
The offences are of a broadly similar nature;<br />
The offences are at about the same level of gravity; <strong>and</strong><br />
The offences may in many instances interchangeably be charged on<br />
the same facts.<br />
5.5 This is in a way a very simple <strong>and</strong> easily met dem<strong>and</strong>. If met, it means, so far as<br />
the fault element is concerned, that differences of definition where there need be<br />
none have been avoided, making the law easier to underst<strong>and</strong> for all concerned.<br />
It also makes choice of charge a more straightforward matter for the prosecution,<br />
by enabling a concentration of focus on how well the facts fit the conduct element<br />
of a given crime, in determining whether there is a reasonable prospect of<br />
conviction.<br />
5.6 This is where Smith <strong>and</strong> Hogan’s focus on intention or recklessness, as key fault<br />
terms in criminal law, can still have an important bearing. There are a number of<br />
offences broadly comparable to <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>outraging</strong> <strong>public</strong> <strong>decency</strong> in<br />
point of gravity. For these offences, the fault element is either intention or<br />
recklessness (or malice or awareness) as to the occurrence of the conduct<br />
elements (even if fault is not required respecting all the elements 7 ), as<br />
recommended by Smith <strong>and</strong> Hogan in 1992. 8<br />
5.7 In that regard, the definition of intention is now settled by the case of Woollin. 9 In<br />
law, intention involves a desire to bring something about, a desire which may be<br />
inferred from proof that the person in question foresaw that the event in question<br />
was virtually certain to come about if they acted in a certain way (which they went<br />
on to do).<br />
5.8 Recklessness, in law, now follows the meaning set out in the Draft Criminal<br />
Code:<br />
A person acts recklessly ... with respect to —<br />
(i) a circumstance when he is aware of a risk that it exists or will exist;<br />
(ii) a result when he is aware of a risk that it will occur;<br />
6 Even if the concept of ‘dangerous’ driving is, for some, less acceptable than a st<strong>and</strong>ard<br />
that can take greater account of blameworthiness, such as ‘negligent’ driving. For a<br />
comprehensive review of driving offences involving the causing of death, see Sally<br />
Cunningham, ‘Punishing Drivers who Kill: Putting Road Safety First’? (2007) 27 Legal<br />
Studies 288.<br />
7 See paras 5.24 <strong>and</strong> following, below.<br />
8 Above, n 3.<br />
9 [1999] 1 AC 82 (HL).<br />
58