public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
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problematic. 5 There is force in Spencer’s argument that this formula is suitable<br />
only as a generic description of a category of offences, or even of a power of<br />
creating offences, <strong>and</strong> not of an actual offence. 6 It is not clear whether the law<br />
<strong>and</strong> duty in question refer to identifiable legal duties that do not themselves<br />
depend on the law of <strong>nuisance</strong>, <strong>and</strong> the definition could be circular. Were the<br />
Archbold definition enacted in statutory form, one of two things would happen.<br />
(1) The whole definition could be taken seriously, <strong>and</strong> every case would<br />
require detailed investigation of whether the act was truly unlawful or<br />
what duty had been omitted, as in the Canadian case of Thornton. 7 This<br />
would complicate the law rather than simplifying it.<br />
(2) Alternatively, the first part of the definition could be taken as a rhetorical<br />
generality, serving only as a hook for the requirement of <strong>public</strong> injury <strong>and</strong><br />
an acknowledgment of a defence of specific statutory justification. This<br />
would in effect leave the question of whether a <strong>nuisance</strong> exists to be<br />
resolved as it was at common law, <strong>and</strong> codification would perform no<br />
function (but also do no harm).<br />
6.7 We consider on balance that it would be preferable to explore alternative<br />
definitions. The purpose of any such definition would be to preserve the<br />
requirement of common injury while keeping the scope of the act or omission<br />
causing that injury as wide as possible.<br />
Provisional proposal<br />
6.8 We provisionally propose:<br />
(1) to restate the offence in statutory form, while altering the fault<br />
element as proposed above; 8<br />
(2) for this purpose, to explore definitions alternative to that given in<br />
Archbold.<br />
6.9 Consultees are asked for their views on how the offence of <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong><br />
should best be defined by statute to give effect to the above proposal.<br />
Sentencing<br />
6.10 If the offence of <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong> is restated in statutory form, it may be desirable<br />
to consider at the same time whether to alter the sentencing powers, for example<br />
by providing for a fixed maximum sentence. This is a matter to be considered by<br />
the Government department sponsoring any legislation resulting from our<br />
proposals.<br />
6.11 We envisage that the offence of <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong>, with the strengthened fault<br />
element as proposed, will be used mainly for instances of wilful <strong>and</strong> serious<br />
5 Para 2.9 above.<br />
6 Para 2.10 above.<br />
7 Para 2.67 above.<br />
8 At para 5.44.<br />
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