public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
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offence. Examples might be where D brings a personal dispute with a local<br />
authority to <strong>public</strong> attention by spreading a foul-smelling <strong>and</strong> potentially harmful<br />
liquid on the pavement outside the Town Hall, or where D persistently engages in<br />
hoaxes that lead gullible members of the <strong>public</strong> unwittingly to engage in<br />
dangerous or demeaning conduct.<br />
5.39 As we said at the outset, we are not challenging the applicability or usefulness of<br />
the crime of <strong>nuisance</strong> in such cases. However, what we do believe is that it is no<br />
longer appropriate that <strong>nuisance</strong> retains its negligence-based fault element. That<br />
is an echo of its life as a kind of ‘<strong>public</strong> tort’, or as an old-fashioned catch-all<br />
substitute for regulatory offences (many of which employ such ‘objective’ fault<br />
elements).<br />
5.40 We are not convinced that there is any need for absolute identity between the<br />
requirements for the tort <strong>and</strong> the crime of <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong> because of the identity<br />
of name. The offence of assault, for example, is equally closely associated with<br />
the tort of trespass to the person, but the courts have experienced no difficulty in<br />
holding that criminal assault requires full intention or recklessness while<br />
negligence is sufficient for trespass to the person. 43 Another dual-character<br />
wrong is false imprisonment, where the tort is one of strict liability 44 while the<br />
crime must be “intentional or reckless”. 45<br />
5.41 We have no intention of altering the existence or ingredients of the tort or the<br />
basis on which the Attorney-General <strong>and</strong> local authorities can apply for an<br />
injunction to stop a <strong>nuisance</strong>. Nor do we believe that altering, or even abolishing,<br />
the offence would have this effect. 46 The reasoning in cases in which injunctions<br />
are sought always appears to be based on <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong> as a tort rather than<br />
as a crime. 47 In Zain, 48 it had to be clarified that a local authority had power to<br />
restrain a <strong>nuisance</strong> although it also amounted to a crime <strong>and</strong> local authorities<br />
have no general duty of suppressing criminality. In other words, the tort is<br />
fundamental: the availability of criminal proceedings <strong>and</strong> the availability of<br />
injunctions are two parallel outgrowths from it, neither of which depends on the<br />
other. The requirement of damage peculiar to an individual in tort cases is a<br />
purely pragmatic restraint designed to avoid multiplicity of actions, <strong>and</strong> affects<br />
only an individual’s right to sue for damages, <strong>and</strong> not the existence of the tort as<br />
such.<br />
5.42 As explained in Part 2 49 instances of <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong> can be divided broadly into<br />
environmental <strong>and</strong> behavioural categories. The environmental cases may be<br />
43 A claim for negligent injury that is direct <strong>and</strong> forcible can be framed in trespass, though the<br />
limitation provisions are the same as those for negligence: Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB<br />
232. See Clerk <strong>and</strong> Lindsell on Torts para 1.46.<br />
44 R v Governor of Brockhill Prison ex parte Evans [1997] QB 443.<br />
45 Rahman (1985) 81 Cr App R 349, 353.<br />
46 In this we differ from Spencer, p 80, who says that “if the crime of <strong>public</strong> <strong>nuisance</strong> were<br />
completely abolished, with it would also go the possibility of obtaining an injunction to stop<br />
one”.<br />
47 Attorney General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169, Nottingham City Council v Zain<br />
[2001] EWCA Civ 1248, [2002] 1 WLR 607.<br />
48 [2001] EWCA Civ 1248, [2002] 1 WLR 607.<br />
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