public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
public nuisance and outraging public decency - Law Commission
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PART 6<br />
RESTATING THE OFFENCES IN STATUTE<br />
PUBLIC NUISANCE<br />
6.1 We consider that the arguments set out above show that there is no clear case<br />
for either abolishing the offence or significantly restricting or altering its conduct<br />
element, but that the fault element should be revised to require at least<br />
recklessness. The question arises whether this should be done by a simple<br />
statutory provision to that effect or whether we should use this opportunity to put<br />
the whole definition of the offence into statutory form.<br />
6.2 We are strongly of the view that defining the offence by statute is desirable in<br />
principle. Restating the offence in statutory form will aid any ultimate codification<br />
of criminal law, an important part of the <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>’s long-term aims. 1<br />
Taking such a step would also remove or avoid any doubt about the constitutional<br />
legitimacy or human rights desirability of perpetuating the results of judicial lawmaking.<br />
2 Not to codify the offence now is to leave the same question for a later<br />
project in which full codification is envisaged.<br />
6.3 The argument against codification is that there are technical difficulties in<br />
restating the existing law in statutory form <strong>and</strong> that any such restatement might<br />
reduce the breadth <strong>and</strong> flexibility of the offence, which prosecutors find<br />
convenient. One answer to that is that, if the flexibility of the offence were so<br />
great as to make codification technically impossible, that very fact would show<br />
that the existing offence falls foul of the constitutional <strong>and</strong> human rights<br />
requirements of legal certainty. As argued above, 3 flexibility beyond a certain<br />
point becomes an undesirable luxury.<br />
6.4 The next question is whether to follow the textbook definition of the offence, for<br />
example the form found in Archbold, or to try to find an alternative.<br />
6.5 The argument for using the textbook definition is that it has been accepted by the<br />
House of Lords in Rimmington as an authoritative statement of the law, <strong>and</strong> that<br />
similar definitions have been used with no adverse consequences in other<br />
Commonwealth countries. 4 While the present project does not form part of a<br />
programme of full codification, the simplicity of the definition makes placing this<br />
particular offence in statutory form an easily achieved aim in a programme of<br />
simplification.<br />
6.6 The argument against using the textbook definition is that it would not increase<br />
the certainty of the offence. The debates in Rimmington would have been little if<br />
at all shorter had a definition in that form already been enacted. Further, the<br />
formula “act not warranted by law or omission to perform a <strong>public</strong> duty” is<br />
1 <strong>Law</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>s Act 1965 s 3(1).<br />
2 Paras 4.8 to 4.10.<br />
3 Para 4.7.<br />
4 Except possibly Canada: see the discussion of Thornton in paras 2.67 <strong>and</strong> 6.6(1).<br />
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