Iran Sanctions - Foreign Press Centers

Effect on Nuclear Negotiations
Iran Sanctions
There is a consensus that U.S. and U.N. sanctions have not, to date, accomplished their core
strategic objective of compelling Iran to agree to verifiably limit Iran’s nuclear development to
purely peaceful purposes. This assessment was included in testimony by the Director of National
Intelligence James Clapper before the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 31, 2012, and
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 16, 2012.
U.S. officials, including President Obama in March 2012, have said that the effects of sanctions
on the Iranian economy are sufficiently strong that Iranian leaders might yet reassess their
negotiating stance. He has used this assertion to argue that more time should be left for diplomacy
and for sanctions to pressure the Iranian leadership before military action against Iran’s nuclear
facilities be considered. In February 2012, Iran formally responded to an EU invitation for new
talks, and on March 6, 2012, the P5+1 accepted another round of talks. The date of April 13,
2012, reportedly has been agreed, but not the venue. Others see Iran as using talks to play for
time to further develop its nuclear program.
Counter-Proliferation Effects
A related issue is whether the cumulative sanctions have directly set back Iran’s nuclear efforts by
making it difficult for Iran to import needed materials or skills. In a speech on November 22,
2011, National Security Adviser Tom Donilon said:
The effect of these sanctions has been clear. Coupled with mistakes and difficulties in Iran,
they have slowed Iran’s nuclear efforts. Sanctions and export control efforts have made it
more difficult and costly for Iran to acquire key materials and equipment for its enrichment
program, including items that Iran cannot produce itself. 45
Others, however, say that there is not clear evidence that sanctions are slowing Iran’s program.
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports have consistently said that Iran’s stockpile
of low-enriched uranium continues to expand, as do its holdings of 20% enriched uranium. Iran is
now enriching uranium to 20% at its hardened facility at Fordow, near Qom, according to the
February 24, 2012, IAEA report. 46
General Political Effects
The international community has hoped that international sanctions might provoke a leadership
debate in Iran and strengthen those in Iran who might argue that Iran’s nuclear program is
carrying too high a cost. There are growing indications of splits in the Iranian leadership—
particularly between President Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader—to the point at which there
has been open discussion in Iran’s parliament since June 2011 of impeaching Ahmadinejad.
Factions loyal to Ahmadinejad and to the Supreme Leader, although all are hardline, competed
against each other in March 2, 2012, Majles elections and returns suggest that supporters of the
Supreme Leader won about 75% of the 290 seats. However, these splits do not appear to be
driven primarily by differences over how to react to international sanctions.
45 Speech by National Security Adviser Tom Donilon at the Brookings Institution. November 22, 2011.
46 http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/IAEA_Iran_Report_24February2012.pdf
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