Haiti Earthquake Reconstruction Knowledge Notes from ... - GFDRR

Rebuild or Relocate | 25
Rebuild or Relocate in History (continuation)
• 1906 – San Francisco (U.S.) totally destroyed
by earthquake and fire. Despite pre-earthquake
new City Beautiful urban plan by Daniel
Burnham, city rebuilt exactly the same, due
to difficulties in changing existing property
rights.
• 1907 – Kingston (Jamaica) heavily damaged,
rebuilt in same location with height limits imposed
on buildings.
• 1923 – Tokyo (Japan) largely destroyed by
earthquake and fire, rebuilt as before.
• 1967 – Caracas (Venezuela) heavily damaged
and rebuilt in the same location.
• 1972 – Managua (Nicaragua) largely destroyed
by earthquake, city center remains
largely abandoned today.
• 2004 – Aceh (Indonesia) 60 percent destroyed
by tsunami, largely rebuilt in same place.
• 2005 – Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans
(U.S.), as of 2009, population only 60
percent of pre-Katrina.
■ ■ Economics drive the recovery. Basically, was
the economy of Port-au-Prince thriving and robust
before the disaster? Will creating a new
“growth pole” as a capital city be affordable
and worth the risks? The political economy
of the costs, almost always underestimated, is
front-loaded while benefits begin trickling in
much later. This also pertains to donor commitment
and perseverance. It should be noted
that in cases where capitals have been moved,
it has taken the better part of a decade. San
Francisco in 1906 was the “Queen of the
West” with good reason, and had plenty of
financial vigor to quickly rebuild. New Orleans
was a declining city before Hurricane Katrina
and has rebounded very slowly.
For Haiti, is there a vital economic reason for
Port-au-Prince to be where it is? Does Haiti
have the economic vigor to discard its existing
investment in infrastructure in Port-au-Prince?
Or, does the port stay, and can governmental
and most economic functions occur as well
elsewhere?
■ ■ Livelihoods. If a major urban region is created
elsewhere, where will the jobs come from?
Port-au-Prince at least has the port. What
economic drivers exist or can be created to
sustain the population in a new location?
■ ■ Hazards. The primary reason for considering
moving Port-au-Prince is that it is located in a
very high hazardous location, not only adjacent
to the major Enrequillo Plantain Garden Fault
zone but founded in part on soft soils and also
at a low elevation, thus subject to flooding and
storm surge. Moreover, a significant portion of
the building stock lies on unstable hillsides. In
the north of Haiti, the Péninsule du Nord is the
Septentrional Fault has many of the same problems.
Midway between, however, is the Haut
Arbonite Valley and the city of Hinche, located
on seismically stable soils, with good water resources
(as opposed to Port-au-Prince). This area
has many attractions as a site for a new city—
significantly lower hazards, sufficiently buildable
area, and good water resources and climate.
Higher hazard sites, such as Port-au-Prince, can
still be made adequately safe with good seismic
design and construction (i.e., greater capital investment),
as compared with sites having lower
hazard but higher transport costs. What are
the trade-offs between hazard and transportation
costs at a different site?
■■
Transport. Haiti’s transport system is an obstacle
to its development. It no longer has a railroad
and has only 4,000 km of road (and, only
1,000 km of paved road). However, Hinche has
recently had major road improvements and is
now only about two hours from Port-au-Prince
over a good road. Relocating the capital now
may be significantly more feasible than previously.
Haiti cannot afford to build new trans-