Haiti Earthquake Reconstruction Knowledge Notes from ... - GFDRR

48 | Haiti Earthquake Reconstruction
tion, assistance received, and access routes to the
villages in the area. It was designed to allow the
Pakistani government, army relief operations, donors,
and non-government organizations to add or
update information through text messages, faxes,
emails, and phone as assistance was implemented.
The database helped coordinate the massive relief
efforts by numerous organizations working in an
affected area.
Conduct a quick assessment of existing safety
nets and programs that can be augmented
to implement livelihood support. The existing
Community Driven Development and UN or NGOrun
programs in Haiti could facilitate the implementation
of new social assistance programs. The
following should be assessed: (i) the overlap of
social assistance programs with the earthquake-affected
areas; (ii) the extent to which local program
capacities are depleted post disaster; (iii) the types
of interventions (i.e., cash grants, public works) for
which existing programs could be quickly adapted
to serve; and (iv) the auditing mechanisms that
could monitor fund flows and ultimate effectiveness
of livelihood support programs.
If the choice of support is the cash grant program,
conduct a quick assessment of implementation
challenges. Targeting decisions are
important but may lead to implementation challenges.
The urgent need to quickly reach a large
population implies that cash transfers should be
granted to everyone in an affected region. However,
more sophisticated targeting at the household
level may provide better protection to the most vulnerable
across a wider geographic area. If household
targeting is chosen, important challenges to
address are: (i) the process to identify vulnerable
households; (ii) the means to deliver cash; and (iii)
the monitoring of inclusion/exclusion. In addition,
a very clear and enforceable exit strategy should
be present from the first payment to avoid undue
subsidy dependence.
If a public works program is chosen, work to
ensure design and implementation capacity.
A carefully designed and efficiently implemented
public works program can rebuild infrastructure
while providing income in the immediate aftermath
of a disaster. Nevertheless, it is important to assess
the political feasibility of setting a wage rate that
self-selects the most vulnerable (poor) and does
not crowd out longer-term employment opportunities.
In addition, the local capacity of a community
to participate in and deliver on a public works
program is a very important consideration, as is the
capacity to properly supervise the program.
Cash transfers and public works are not
“either-or” considerations. In the context of a
short- to medium-term social protection strategy,
a cash transfer program also could effectively transition
to a public works program. For example,
after four to six months, able-bodied cash-grant
recipients could be required to work for continued
payments. A graduated effort to provide support
in Haiti could even inform a more permanent social
protection strategy. How such a process would
evolve would hinge on an assessment of longerterm
local requirements by the authorities. Lastly,
cash grant and cash-for-work programs can, importantly,
coexist given sensible and complementary
targeting mechanisms, eligibility criteria, and
benefit levels.
NOTE
i
CIDA used these to transfer money to cover
schooling costs.