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indexes is an unfortunate decision, usually made by the fund<br />
issuer. Fortunately, it is easy for an investor to avoid funds<br />
that are based on non<strong>com</strong>pliant indexes and that, consequently,<br />
conceal the quality of their portfolio management<br />
process. If you already own shares in a non-RIC-<strong>com</strong>pliant<br />
index fund and prefer not to change, suggest to the fund’s<br />
manager that they consider changing to a RIC-<strong>com</strong>pliant version<br />
of the index.<br />
Optimized Portfolios Designed<br />
To Reduce Trading Costs<br />
Many ETFs based on a large number of stocks such as U.S.<br />
total market funds and multicountry funds often have portfolios<br />
that are optimized or sampled to reduce custodial costs<br />
and the administrative costs involved in handling a creation<br />
or redemption basket that might otherwise include as many<br />
as several thousand securities. While there is no universal<br />
pattern for optimized portfolios, they often underweight<br />
the smaller-capitalization stocks in the index. If small-caps<br />
are underweighted, the fund will outperform the benchmark<br />
when the small-cap <strong>com</strong>ponents under-perform the balance<br />
of the index. When small-cap stocks outperform the large-cap<br />
stocks in the benchmark, the optimized fund will under-perform<br />
the benchmark. Some issuers of funds with a large number<br />
of issues in their benchmark resort to <strong>com</strong>pletion baskets<br />
or <strong>com</strong>pletion swaps covering the small-cap portion of the<br />
portfolio to improve tracking while simplifying fund management<br />
and reducing the cost of creation and redemption.<br />
Small And Illiquid Index Components<br />
A number of backtested “concept” indexes have been<br />
designed solely to serve as ETF templates. The resulting ETFs<br />
are often sold based on a <strong>com</strong>bination of good backtested<br />
performance and an investment concept that suggests rapid<br />
future growth. The indexes—and the ETF portfolios—often<br />
include some small and illiquid issues. If the backtested fund<br />
succeeds in attracting substantial assets, the portfolio manager<br />
may—for reasons that include (1) the risk or difficulty<br />
of trading large positions in illiquid stocks, and (2) position<br />
reporting requirements—decide not to increase the fund’s<br />
position in a small <strong>com</strong>pany beyond 5 or 10 percent of the<br />
<strong>com</strong>pany’s outstanding shares as the assets of the ETF grow.<br />
If the portfolio manager does not hold shares in these positions<br />
at the index weighting, the performance of the fund<br />
will diverge from the performance of the index.<br />
The Lazy Portfolio Manager<br />
Lazy portfolio managers are probably the greatest single<br />
reason for index fund tracking errors that are consistently<br />
more favorable (positive) when the market is weak, and<br />
unfavorable (negative) when the market is strong. One of the<br />
important differences between investment <strong>com</strong>pany ETFs and<br />
mutual funds is that the ETF portfolio manager does not need<br />
to hold cash balances to meet cash redemptions. The ETF<br />
portfolio manager who wants to manage cash aggressively<br />
can be invested down to the fund’s last few dollars each day<br />
without any unusual cash flow management problems. In fact,<br />
however, many ETF portfolio managers do not invest their<br />
cash aggressively. Many funds show a pattern of returns that<br />
suggests the manager consistently holds excess cash. During<br />
years when the market rises, these funds lag the performance<br />
of their benchmark index because interest on cash balances is<br />
not keeping up with the return on positions in the index. The<br />
same index funds will look too good to be true in a year like<br />
2008 when their cash balances earned modest positive returns<br />
while portfolio positions performed poorly. In retrospect, a<br />
cash balance would not have been a bad idea in 2008, but<br />
the long-term question is what the portfolio manager in an<br />
index ETF should be doing. Clearly, an important part of the<br />
mandate for an index fund manager is to deliver a return representative<br />
of the index. If the portfolio manager’s mandate<br />
is asset allocation or market timing (in the sense of reducing<br />
or increasing equity exposure to anticipate the direction of<br />
the market), then a cash balance is certainly appropriate—at<br />
times. In most index ETFs, however, holding cash balances all<br />
the time is not part of the portfolio manager’s job description.<br />
Figure 1 shows some suspiciously “lazy” returns in two<br />
strong market years and two weak market years.<br />
Figure 1 shows tracking error calculations for a group of<br />
29 U.S. ETFs that have been in existence since at least the<br />
beginning of 2002. These funds all have domestic U.S. stock<br />
portfolios. While the S&P 500 annual performance indicated<br />
at the top of the column for each year studied may not be<br />
representative of the portfolio in each fund, it is a fair surmise<br />
that 2002 and 2008 were down years for all of these<br />
funds, and 2003 and 2006 were up years. As the column<br />
totals and the average tracking error for each fund in these<br />
years indicates, the tracking errors were smaller in the down<br />
years. In 2008, the average ETF even had a small positive<br />
tracking error. In the up years of 2003 and 2006, every one<br />
of the ETFs had a negative tracking error, and the size of<br />
the negative tracking error was usually greater than the size<br />
of the negative tracking errors in the <strong>com</strong>parable funds for<br />
2002 and 2008. The only reasonable interpretation of these<br />
results is that, on balance, these funds carried significant<br />
cash balances in all four years.<br />
Leveraged Long And Leveraged Inverse Funds<br />
These funds track their leveraged benchmarks pretty well<br />
on a day-to-day basis, as they are designed to do. Tracking<br />
is not close when the funds’ performances are measured<br />
against a simple leveraged multiple of the target benchmark<br />
for periods longer than one day. This issue is explored<br />
in depth elsewhere, including in Joanne Hill and George<br />
Foster’s article in the September/October 2009 issue of the<br />
Journal of Indexes.<br />
Apart from showing how intensively an index fund manager<br />
is keeping your money at work, tracking error can be a<br />
useful framework for measuring how an active portfolio manager<br />
is doing. Breaking the total tracking error measure of<br />
the return difference between an index and a fund into positive<br />
and negative elements can be a useful way to evaluate<br />
what is going on in an actively managed fund and how well<br />
or poorly the fund’s investment process works. In that spirit,<br />
I turn next to analysis of differences in performance between<br />
50<br />
January/February 2010