Preventive Action for Refugee Producing Situations

Luise Drüke
Preventive Action for Refugee
Producing Situations

Preventive Action for Refugee Producing Situations
With a Foreword by Poul Hartling, UN High Commissioner
for Refugees 1978-1985

European University Studies
Europäische Hochschulschriften Publications
Universitaires Européennes
Luise Drüke
Series XXXI
Political Science
Reihe XXXI Serie XXXI
Politikwissenschaft
Sciences politiques
Vol./Bd. 150
Preventive Action for Refugee
Producing Situations
With a Foreword by Poul Härtung,
UN High Commissioner for Refugees
1978-1985
The views expressed in this book
are the personal views of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views
of the United Nations of UNHCR
PETER LANG
Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • New York • Paris • Wien
PETER LANG
Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • New York - Paris • Wien

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Drüke,
Luise:
Preventive action for refugee producing situations / Luise Drüke.
With a foreword by Poul Hartling. - 2., veränd. Aufl. -Frankfurt am
Main ; Berlin ; Bern ; New York ; Paris ; Wien : Lang, 1993
(European university studies : Ser. 31, Political science ;
Vol. 150)
ISBN 3-631-44603-9
NE: Europäische Hochschulschriften / 31
"So eine Arbeit wird eigentlich nie fertig,
man muss sie für fertig erklären,
wenn man nach Zeit und Umständen
das Mögliche getan hat."
D 89
ISSN 0721-3654 ISBN 3-
631-44603-9
© Verlag Peter Lang GmbH, Frankfurt am Main 1990
2nd altered edition 1993
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Foreword
It is a pleasure to welcome a book dealing with a topic which is so actual
and important as this thesis for the doctorate.
It tackles the modern refugee problems and especially the problem
on how to prevent that new situations arise and above all how to change
situations where refugees are exploited as a weapon in a political strife.
A Persian poet has said: A theorist without practice is a tree without
fruit; and a devotee without learning is a house without an entrance.
In this book you will meet with an author who is not only a theorist,
as she has been a devoted practician in refugee work for many years.
And in fact her tree is full of fruits, good to look at and worth tasting.
Poul Hartling
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. 1978 -1985.

Preface to the second edition
When I learned that my publisher wanted to issue a second edition of this
book, I wondered what parts of it would be so obsolete that I would need
to delete or rewrite them. It is only two years since the publication of
"Preventive Actions for Refugee Producing Situations", but many changes
have brought about a new international climate. Some of the things I said
must have become irrelevant or outdated.
But on the whole Part I about empirical examination of actions for
preventing refugee producing situations is still valid in most parts and can
safely be left for its historical value. As for the analytical discussion, the
comments on refugee causes still remain, sadly, unchanged. The actions
taken by UNHCR and the Secretary-General for the International
Conferences on behalf of Vietnamese and Central American refugees
which led to the processes of the CPA (Comprehensive Plan of Action)
and the CIREFCA (International Conference on Refugees in Central
America) would deserve a separate book to do justice to their
significance. They are significant because both Conferences triggered
precisely the political will and financial support to deal with old and
prevent new refugee problems. Many Vietnamese are now returning with
international reinsertion aid. Most Central American refugees and all
Nicaraguan refugees, have been home for some time starting life afresh
with the help of international and EC aid.
In order to place Part II in the new international context, and
considering problems which have provoked unprecedented humanitarian
crises, we made an assessment of general UN conflict prevention efforts
and their prospects in Chapter 4, The end of the Cold War enabled both
member states and the UN Security Council as well as the Secretary-
General on the one hand and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on
the other hand to play more active roles for proposing and actually
implementing new approaches. Security and political considerations have
led member states in December 1991, after intensive discussions in the
General Assembly, to adopt a pragmatic framework for establishing and
operating the Department for Humanitarian Affairs in the UN
Headquarters, functioning since March 1992. Prevention and early
warning are some of the guiding principles established for this new

10
office. The Under Secretary-General responsible has already
undertaken several missions using the political authority of the
Secretary-General for mediating between countries of origin of new
massive refugee situations such as Burma/ Bangladesh and the Horn of
Africa.
The creation of this new Department and the strengthening of
UNHCRs role in country of origin information and preventive
protection has gone hand in hand.
Early warning information seemed, even at the time of writing
four years ago, a task falling totally outside UNHCR's activities. Now
it is well recognized to be an important tool for identifying developing
refugee situation emergencies, not only for preparedness but also for
prevention through mediation and conflict resolution. In 1989/1990, I
was responsible for coordinating the drawing up of the initial elements
to warn the Office about possible refugee flows so that appropriate
measures could be taken, which were integrated into UNHCR's
Refugee Emergency Alert System (REAS). Simultaneously
preparations were made for UNHCR to start cooperating within an
inter-agency framework on developing a UN early warning
mechanism. Around the same time the internal UNHCR Task Force on
Early Warning was set up, which is now chaired by the Deputy High
Commissioner.
In an evaluation of UNHCR's protection, an internal working
group suggested that, in view of the importance of early warning for
the development of preventive strategies, UNHCR should strengthen
its capacity for early warning and devote adequate resources for this
purpose. It also recommended that the UNHCR Task Force on Early
Warning should examine how the current reporting system and
organizational structure of the Office could be better used for the
collection, analysis, and dissemination of country of origin information
by UNHCR on potential refugee flows as well as on internal
displacement. The group added that UNHCR should continue to
promote the development of an appropriate early warning mechanism
for refugee flows within the UN System.
I am happy to report that the realization of the policy propositions
go beyond what I had projected as feasible four years ago. Of course,
it is too early to make an evaluation of the long-term effectiveness of
these new approaches. Nevertheless, these are some initial new models
of interaction and intervention with regard to refugee-producing
situations. I have rewritten Chapter 4 entirely in order to reflect the
slowly emerging cooperative mechanisms between peace-keeping,
peacemaking, political and humanitarian endeavours for preventing
new and treating existing
conflict and refugee situations.
Chapter 5 with the legal justification remained the same. In this
chapter, I confronted the often incredibly misused concept of state
sovereignty with the protection of human rights and refugees. The
legal analysis of the international community's capacity to intervene
for preventing new refugee situations documents the erosion since
World War II of domestic jurisdiction over human rights abuses. The
use of peace-keeping forces for protecting humanitarian operations,
such as in former Yugoslavia and Somalia, a new approach, which is
discussed in
chapter 4.
The message of the book remains unchanged. The international
community should move forcefully now, while almost global
cooperation is possible, since the vanishing of the East-West Conflict,
to institutionalize new preventive and interventionist approaches to
save human lives, prevent future abuses and forced population
displacement. The Cold War may have ended. But wars, internal and
crossborder, are
still very much alive.
For 1993 I plan to write a new book, which will focus on Europe
and new approaches for refugee policies and preventive action.
11

Abstract
This study, the outcome of more than 15 years in practical refugee work
worldwide and research at universities in Germany, France, Chile and the
United States of America, examines in the first part, initiatives and
actions with potentials to prevent refugee-producing situations, and in the
second part new approaches and policies for preventive action.
It provides a brief overview of three selected completed initiatives.
The results of these initiatives include the following relevant elements: In
the case of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on International
Cooperation to Avert new Flows of Refugees, that states recognized the
primacy of international obligations over national interest with respect to
policies and conditions that create refugees and proposed that the
Secretary-General use more fully his competence regarding refugeeproducing
situations. The Rapporteur on Human Rights and Mass
Exoduses through his report confirmed the link between human rights
violations and massive refugee flows and recommended humanitarian
observers, early warning and special representatives of the Secretary-
General for early action at the source of the problem. The initiative to
establish an Office of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has
not yet come to fruition. In the context of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), however, the post of High Commissioner
for Minorities was decided at the summit meeting in 1992 in Helsinki.
In ongoing projects, the Refugee Policy Group has been providing
forward thinking useful for preventive action, including the
conceptualizing approaches to refugee early warning work. The Office for
Research and Collection of Information (ORCI), created in 1987 in the
UN Secretariat in New York, had been selected as an example, as it
established a communication link between UN policy makers at the
highest level and humanitarian endeavors in the field. Even though
services of this office, at the time of revising this book, were integrated
into other departments, the section discussing ORCI was not revised as
the restructurization is still in process. The Independent Commission for
Humanitarian Issues has brought a global perspective to the refugee
problem within the context of the New International Humanitarian Order.
Its report "Winning the Human Race", which summarizes the essence of
its work in three parts: The challenge, the victims and the hope, provides
advance thinking for years to come.
The analysis of refugee causes in Chapter 3, following a general
consideration of the subject, intends to illustrate in the selected examples,
which factors have contributed to turning people into refugees. It is
suggested that the Orderly Departure Programme was a safe alternative for
people who left Vietnam in this manner, as otherwise they might have fled
by boat risking their lives. At the 1979 Meeting on Vietnamese Refugees,
the Vietnamese authorities acknowledged some of their responsibility
for producing refugees, accepting to implement some improvements in the
treatment of their citizens so that they would not need to flee. But is was
only with the 1989 Meeting, after the completion of this study, that the
Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA) was established, which provided a
general framework for a screening procedure in the camps in South East
Asia, resettlement for recognized refugees and return to Vietnam for those
wishing to return and those not qualifying for refugee status. The example
of the Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras is intended to show, factors that
contributed to the refugee producing conditions, in which people were
trapped and used for political purposes. Political changes in the home
country and the CIREFCA process, which started at the International
Conference on Refugees in Central America, finally enabled all
Nicaraguan refugees to safely return home in the late eighties. The
Vietnam War, at times, for strategic purposes, produced 10.5 million
refugees and displaced persons during the period of 1965 to 1973. Efforts
have existed and are described, which intended to alleviate or prevent the
plight of these victims.
Part II discusses policy and legal considerations. Chapter 4 has been
entirely rewritten, both because of substantial changes in the international
political climate and progress towards realizations of the policy
propositions made. After the revival of the United Nations in the Post
Cold War time, its experience and perspective of conflict prevention are
examined, considering the UN's potential to contribute to solving old and
preventing new refugee producing situations through peacemaking,
peace-keeping and peace-building, conflict resolution and mediation. The
new Department for Humanitarian Affairs is discussed, which the
Secretary-General created in 1992. Here some of the functions of the
former Office for Research and Collection, such as refugee early
warning, are planned to be integrated. The Office of the UN High
Commissioner has made substantial progress in the implementation of
most of the policy proposals made. It has further developed its country of
13

14
origin information work, with a new service now responsible for this
function, it has created rudimentary elements for early warning work
within the organization and is cooperating in a UN interagency
mechanism for this purpose. In addition, the High Commissioner is
receiving increased support from member states to focus on preventive
protection, with which is meant prevention of circumstances which force
people to leave, as another aspect of solutions.
Chapter 5 explores the anticipated objection to international
preventive actions. The objections are rebutted on the grounds that the
policy proposals do not foresee forcible intervention but are meant to help
persecuted people in distress before they are forced to become refugees.
The following three elements are invoked as a legal/political basis for
supporting the new approaches and policies: (1) the consensus of states on
the primacy of international obligations over national interests with
respect to policies and circumstances that create refugees; (2) the
development that massive violations of human rights are becoming
increasingly a matter of international concern; and (3) the recognition that
massive refugee flows can threaten international peace and security.
The study concludes that the international community should move
forcefully now, while almost global cooperation is possible, and the Cold
War over, to further strengthen the institutionalizing of new preventive
and interventionist approaches and policies to save lives, prevent future
abuses and forced population displacement.
Acknowledgments
I would like here to thank those without whose encouragement and support
this dissertation would not have been completed.
First of all, my thanks goes to my "Doktorvater" Jürgen Seifert, whose
support and judicious criticism have been a source of inspiration
throughout. He has shared his theoretical knowledge of and practical
commitment to the quest for change in the name of justice. I am grateful to
my other dissertation readers: David Kennedy, for his constant encouragement
that enabled me to persevere and Christian Riechers, for his
valuable suggestions. I am indebted to Rosemarie Rogers, for her
thoughtful comments. My appreciation for stimulation for the dissertation
goes to my professors before and during my five semesters at Harvard that
ultimately led to this dissertation.
Since a doctorate is the culmination of a long educational process -not
merely the end of graduate work but for me also a mid-career reflection -I
would like to thank all those, who, though they may not be aware of the
research I have been doing over the years, have nonetheless stimulated my
interest at critical junctures of my life long learning experience. So many
have inspired me in exchanges of ideas and discussions over the past years
of my academic and professional endeavors. I am indebted to many persons
who encouraged and helped me throughout this project and my career,
particularly those who generously granted me their time and their thoughts
in personal interviews. I gratefully acknowledge here the valuable
contributions of the interviewees, whose names are listed individually in the
Appendix. I would like especially to mention Theo van Boven, Lance
Clark, Guy Goodwin-Gill, Michel Moussalli, Berti Ramcharan, Zia Rizvi,
and Brian Urquhart. They have been most influential in the evolution of my
understanding and thinking about individual chapters of the dissertation.
My special thanks goes to Henry Steiner, Director of the Harvard Law
School Human Right Program (HLS/HRP), and Jack Tobin, its
Administrative Director for their encouragement to focus on the link of
human rights and refugee law during my time as Visiting Researcher at the
HLS/HRP; to Samuel Huntington, Director of the Center for International
Affairs, and Les Brown, Director of the CFIA Fellows Program and their
colleagues for their support, which allowed me to carry out my

16
responsibilities as chairman of the 1987/88 Fellows while writing the dissertation,
as well as to my fellow Fellows for our enlightening debates; to
UNHCR, for granting me the necessary leave; and, last but not least, to
the University of Hannover, for awarding me the "Graduierten Förderung,"
a doctoral grant.
For any errors in fact or judgment, I alone am, of course,
responsible.
Luise Drüke
CONTENTS
Part I
"Initiatives and Actions: A Historical Perspective"
1. Introduction
1.1. Political Context 21
1.2. General Outline 28
1.3. Research Design 41
2: Empirical Examination: Actions with Potentials to
Prevent Refugee-Producing Situations 43
2.1. Past Initiatives 43
2.1.1. UN Group to Avert Refugee Flows 46
2.1.2. Human Rights and Mass Exoduses 49
2.1.3. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 52
2.2. Current Projects 54
2.2.1. Refugee Policy Group 55
2.2.2. Research and Collection of Information 61
2.2.3. Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues 66
3: Analytical Discussion: Analysis of Refugee
Causes and Selected Examples 71
3.1. Factors Producing Refugee Flows 71
3.1.1. Social Change and Refugees 71
3.1.1.1. Flight, Tolerable Price to Death? 73
3.1.1.2. Make Flight a Viable Option 74
3.1.1.3. Refugees - Political 'Pawns'? 76
3.1.2. Selected Examples 77
3.1.2.1. The ODP, the 1979 and 1989 Meeting and the CPA 78
3.1.2.2. Nicaraguan Refugees in Honduras and CIREFCA 107
3.1.2.3. Uprooting People in the Vietnam War 126

18
Part II
"New Approaches and their Legal Justification"
4: New Approaches and Policies 143
4.1 International Conflicts and Refugees 143
4.1.1. UN Conflict Prevention: Experience and Prospects 145
4.1.2. New Department for Humanitarian Affairs 176
4.1.3. Country of Origin Information and Preventive
Protection of UNHCR 179
Appendices
Memoranda of Understanding (Vietnam & UNHCR) 241
Interviews conducted for the thesis 244
G.A. Resolutions extending UNHCR's Mandate 246
Selected Bibliography 249
19
5: Legal Justification 191
5.1. Objection of States 191
5.2. Rebuttal of States' Objection 195
5.3. Legal Basis for Preventive Action 203
6: Concluding Remarks 223
Tables
UNHCR Statistics on Refugee Population 226
List of States Party to the 1951 UN Convention and/or the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 227
UNHCR 's Refugee Statistics 229
Refugees in Honduras 230
Refugees during the Vietnam War 232
Figure
The Structure of the United Nations 234
Institutional Mechanisms for Refugees 235
UNHCR Expenditures for Refugees (1967-91) 236
U.N. Bodies dealing with Human Rights 237
Growth of NGO's Compared with IGO's 248
Maps
Refugee Locations, Mosquitia of Honduras 239
Refugee Locations, Southeast & East Asia 240

CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1. Political Context
Developments in the eighties provided new possibilities for Prevention in
the nineties. Since the Final Act of Helsinki of 1975, economic and
ecological interests, as well as human rights and refugee questions have
moved to the top of the international agenda. As is well-known, most of
the refugees producing situations are man-made: wars, ethnic conflicts,
massive human rights abuses, civil strife. Governments have long
recognized that their policies are a major cause of forced movement
across international borders. The Group of Governmental Experts to
Avert New Flows of Refugees stated this explicitly in its final report in
1986:
Causes of new and massive flows of refugees throughout the world resulting in
great human suffering (include) policies and practices of oppressive and racist
regimes, as well as aggression, colonialism, apartheid, alien domination,
foreign intervention and occupation. ... 1
In the early eighties, of the total of 108 countries generally regarded as
"Third World," 51 states were ruled either directly or indirectly by
military powers. Since 1950, there have been 105 armed conflicts
worldwide, including many civil wars. 2 In 1978 alone, 36 conflicts
occurred that involved the death of more than one thousand persons
each. 3 In minority conflicts, innocent bystanders suffer more and more
_____________________________
1 UN doc. A/41/324,13 May 1986, p.5. The report was adopted by consensus of the
UN General Assembly by A/Res/41/70,11 December 1986.
2 Charles Humana, World Human Rights Guide, (New York: The Economist, 1986),
p.l.
3 See James Sutterlin, "Strengthening the Role of International Organizations in
Dealing with Regional Conflicts," Draft Paper (New York, 1988), p. 2. Sutterlin
states that fewer than ten percent of these conflicts were between national armies.
The majority of them resulted from ethnic or religious tensions, or from domestic
political strife, which often has social or economic origins.

22 Chapter 1
the consequences instead of the fighting forces. Such conflicts can be
exploited to support, for example, a governmental decision to relocate
whole segments of its population from one area of the country to another,
or to justify new policies. Even without the pretext of protecting national
security or territorial integrity, governments have engaged in severe abuses
of the human rights of their citizens, making flight the only escape or hope
for survival.
In situations of massive population flows, the individual determination
of refugee status by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) has become difficult and impractical; it is replaced
by recognizing new arrivals prima facie as persons of concern to UNHCR.
A large majority of refugees seeking shelter from general armed violence
and war rather than from individual persecution are often called
"humanitarian refugees". This category often remains unprotected under
codified international law as they usually do not qualify for Convention
refugee status. 4 Refugees have been defined according to the following
instruments, which spell out the scope of the mandate of the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and define the term
"refugee": The Statute of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, 5 the Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees of 28 July 1951 [hereinafter 1951 UN Convention], 6 the Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967, 7 the OAU
Convention of 10 September
_______________________
4 See Kay Hailbronner, "Non-Refoulement and Humanitarian Refugees: Customary
International Law or Wishful Thinking?" Virginia Journal of International Law,
26, No. 4 (1986), p. 857.
5 Chapter II A defines as a refugee: i) Any person who has been considered a
refugee under the Arrangements of 12 May 1926 and of 30 June or under the
Convention of 28 October 1933 and 10 February 1938, the Protocol of 14
September 1939 or the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization,
ii) Any person who, as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality..."
6 The 1951 UN Convention defined refugees in its Article 1 according to four
characteristics: (1) They are outside their country of origin; (2) they are unable or
unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country, or to return there;
(3) such inability or unwillingness is attributable to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted; and (4) the persecution feared is based on reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership or a particular social group, or political opinion. See
Guy S. Goodwill-Gill, The Refugee in International Law (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1983), p. 13.
7 Given its various limitations, the 1951 UN Convention definition only covered
Introduction 23
1969 governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa
[hereinafter referred to as 1969 OAU Convention], 8 and the Declaration
of Cartagena of 1984. 9 Many of the refugees who are currently crossing
international borders do not satisfy requirements for refugee status under
the 1951 UN Convention. Therefore, the term "refugee" is used here in a
broad sense, to include not only those falling into the categories defined
in these instruments but also those involuntarily uprooted from their
homes. Our definition of "refugee" includes all forced movements across
borders (excluding victims of natural disasters) and other displaced
persons having suffered massive human rights abuses by government or
other forces, who are unable to rely on the protection of their
governments, and who for not falling under existing legal categories,
cannot be adequately protected by any existing body. Bodies for
responding to refugee situations have been in existence since 1921,
beginning with the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Institutions such as the Nansen Office and the International Refugee
Organization are predecessors of the current Offices of the U.N. Relief
and Work Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East and of the
refugees produced before the event of 1951. Many states relied upon
Recommendation E of the Final Act of the Conference of Plenipotentiaries
that states should apply the Convention beyond its contractual scope to
other refugees within the territory in the case of refugees produced by
events after 1 January 1951. The 1967 Protocol expressly removed the
temporal limitation. Sec Goodwin-Gill, 1983, ibid., p. 13.
8 The OAU Convention of 1969 covers persons who, "owing to external
agression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing
public order in either part or the whole of his country...".
9 The Cartagena Declaration of 1984 acknowledges UNHCR's competence
in Central America. It was the first step to fill the gap between the Central
American reality and the applicability of existing refugee instruments.
Although it was adopted unanimously, it is not a formally binding legal
instrument, but rather indicates the political will of the member states to
follow certain practices. In addition to the provisions in the 1951
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the Cartagena Declaration is to cover
"persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom
have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal
conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which
have seriously disturbed public order." "Asylum and Protection in Latin
America: the Cartagena Declaration of 1984," Dossier, Refugees (Geneva:
UNHCR, October 1987), p. 32.

24 Chapter 1
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. 10 The refugee mechanisms consist
of the UN, the intergovernmental system (covering specific or geographic
regions), and nongovernmental organizations. These agencies work
together with varying degrees of cooperation. The various United Nations
bodies - except for the principal organs, 11 the specialized agencies and
other autonomous organizations within the system, 12 and other United
Nations organs, 13 have a nonpolitical mandate to perform their work.
Many nongovernmental agencies, however, in addition to their
humanitarian aims, are also guided by political, religious, ethnic, cultural
or other ideals, which causes governments at times to be suspicious of
their efforts. The nongovernmental agencies involved in assisting persons
in need of protection in their home countries have developed considerable
professional expertise, expanding the range and scope of their activities as
the need for their help has grown. They must be credited with significant
achievements in easing the plight of the distressed and persecuted at home
and abroad, and in bearing a substantial share of the burden in grassroots
efforts by nationals to improve their own living conditions. Moreover,
these nongovernmental entities act as watchdogs over governments'
performance in the sphere of human rights. Many of them represent the
only voice of the oppressed that might carry sufficiently to influence
public opinion and policymakers, both in the home countries and abroad.
Dramatic conditions threaten the lives and safety of millions of people in
their home country. Therefore a consensus has developed among some
governments, such as Canada, Australia, and the Federal Republic of
Germany, and many organizations that merely helping the refugees is not
enough. When refugee problems were considered a transient
______________________
10 Zia Rizvi, "The Problem of Refugees and the International Response," discussion
paper, presented to a Conference on Human Rights and the Protection of
Refugees under International Law, Montreal, 29 Nov.-2.Dec. 1987. (Montreal:
Canadian Human Rights Foundation and Institute for Research on Public Policy,
in press). See chart in the Appendix.
11 General Assembly, Security Council, Secretariat, Economic and Social Council,
International Court of Justice, and Trusteeship. See Werner J. Field and Robert
S. Jordan, with Leon Hurwitz, International Organizations: A Comparative
Approach (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 56.
12 IAEA, Gatt, ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, IDA, IBRD, IFC, IMF, ICAO, UPU,
ITU, WMO, IMCO, and WIPO. See Field and Jordan, p. 56.
13 UNRWA, UNCTAD, UNICEF, UNHCR, Joint UN/FAO World Food Program,
UNITAR, UNDP, UNIDO, UNEP, UNU, United Nations Special Fund, and
World Food Council, Field and Jordan, p, 56.
Introduction 25
phenomenon, they could be dealt with as they arose, in an ad hoc manner.
But with the increasing occurrence of large-scale transnational and
transcontinental population movements, it is no longer realistic to regard
them as temporary byproducts of social and political changes. In accepting
that refugee-producing problems are chronic, governments and
organizations have recognized the need for more advanced planning in order
to predict developing crises and act to forestall or prevent the immediate
conditions that produce refugees. The growing consensus for doing
something beyond the traditional remedial measures has sparked efforts to
develop new approaches. Since the late 1960s, various actions have been
taken for more effective promotion and protection of human rights, such as
setting up working groups and Special Representatives for specific human
rights violations. 14
The inadequacy of the existing legal framework has also triggered
initiatives to explore more effective ways of dealing with these situations.
In 1981 the U.N. Commission appointed a Special Rapporteur to investigate
the connection between human rights abuses and mass population
exoduses. 15 The completed study proposed a number of concrete measures,
including updating refugee, nationality, and labor law in the context of the
New International Humanitarian Order (NIHO), 16 introducing an early
warning system, and appointing a Special Representative for Humanitarian
Questions. The recommendations of the Rapporteur's Study still remain
valid and continue to influence policy planning in interested circles. During
the same period, following a proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany,
the United Nations General Assembly established the Group of
Governmental Experts to study all aspects of the refugee problem. In April
1986, at the end of its study, the group submitted its recommendations,
which included the following:
______________________
14 See Sarah Meselson & Laurie Wiseberg "United Nations bodies with Responsibility
in me Field of Human Rights," in Human Rights Internet Reporter, 12, No. 3 (July
1988), Reproduced in the Appendix, p. 234.
15 Sadruddin Aga Khan, Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms in Any Part of the World, with Particular Reference to Colonial and
Other Dependent Countries and Territories: Study on Human Rights and Massive
Exoduses, UN Doc.6 E/CN.4/1503, Economic and Social Council, 31 December
1981.
16 Proposed by His Royal Highness Crown Prince Hassan Ibn Talal of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan, on Monday, 28 September 1981 in his speech to the UN
General Assembly, Official Records of the Thirty-Sixth Session, 15th Plenary
Meeting, UN Doc. A/36/PV.15, p. 294.

26 Chapter 1
[To] call upon member States, for the purposes of averting new massive flows of
refugees, to respect in particular the following obligations... contained in the Charter:
[to] use peaceful means [to] refrain from creating or contributing by their policies to
causes and factors which generally lead to refugees... 17
The group further suggested to the Secretary-General to make full use of his
competencies by giving continuing attention to the question of averting new
refugee flows, ensuring timely and fuller information in the Secretariat, and
improving the coordination of information needed to make early
assessments, in consultation with the states directly concerned. 18 The
Secretary-General translated these suggestions into action, along with a
recommendation made by another group to consolidate several political
affairs offices, 19 by creating a central Office for Research and the Collection
of Information (ORCI), which he established in March 1987. 20 This latter
move, ironically, received its primary impetus from the well-documented
financial crisis in the United Nations in the mid eighties which necessitated
the consolidation of overlapping departments. The Secretary-General made
a virtue of necessity by peremptorily creating ORCI without undertaking
extensive consultations with member states. The ORCI was to centralize the
collection and dissemination of publicly available data, monitor factors
related to possible refugee outflows, identify threats to peace at an early
stage, 21 keep the Secretary-General informed about developing crises, and
carry out adhoc research and make pertinent assessments for the immediate
attention of the Secretary-General. 22 At the time of revising this book for the
second edition, ORCI after having faced considerable challenges, both from
within the Secretariat and from outside has been disolved in March 1992
and its functions were integrated into the New
________________________
17 U.N. Doc. A/41/324,13 May 1986, P. 17.
18 UN Doc. A/41/324, p. 18.
19 Report of the Group of High-Level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the
Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Nations,
UN Doc. Supplement No.49 A/41/49, (New York: United Nations, 1986), p. 13.
20 ST/SGB/225,1 March 1987.
21 Reform and Renewal in the United Nations: Progress Report of the Secretary-
General on the implementation of the General Assembly resolution 41/213, U.N.
Doc. A/42/234, (New York: United Nations, 1987), p. 9.
22 United Nations, Secretary-General's Bulletin, UN doc. ST/SGB/225, 1 March
1987, Office for Research and the Collection of Information. (New York: United
Nations, 1987).
Introduction 27
Departments for Humanitarian Affairs and for Political Affairs. 23 In
seeking information and drawing on analyses prepared by outside
researchers and nongovernmental bodies, ORCI was the first political
office in the Secretariat to use outside contacts in carrying out its regular
functions. 24 In order to function successfully, it would have needed more
support within the UN system and from member states. Despite the many
positive UN efforts, the problem of political will remains. International
preventive action cannot be achieved solely by adding yet another office
to the UN system; the member states themselves must play a greater role.
One of the most important stumbling blocks is still, of course» the
unresolved tension between states' sovereignty and the protection of the
individual, making intervention in refugee-producing situations difficult.
Revolutionary changes in the international climate will provide for new
opportunities in refugee prevention. The study, in its rewritten parts shows
how new approaches and policies are emerging as models of international
interaction and non-intervention with reference to refugee producing
situations.
1.2. General Outline of the dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze ways in which situations
causing refugee flows might be more effectively dealt with in order to
diminish the consequences in human suffering. 25 Flowing from the
empirical and analytical discussions, the book shows in Chapter 4 that
there is a new cooperative mechanism emerging between political affairs,
peace-keeping, peace-making and refugee matters. The international
community, through UNHCR, with the support of governmental and
_________________________
23 Chapter 2.2.2. discussing the activities of the ORCI Office, has not been revised,
as the changes under the new Secretary-General Boutros- Boutros Ghali arc
still is process.
24 James Jonah, "Monitoring Factors Related to Refugee Flows and Comparable
Emergencies: the Role of the Secretary-General's Office for Research and the
Collection of Information," paper presented at the '7. Internationale Fachtagung
zum Asylrecht, zur Flüchtlings- und Ausländerproblematik vom 28. bis 31.
Januar 1988 in Florenz' organized by the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung, p. 9.
25 The thesis focuses on those situations that might be remediable, leaving aside
those in which the only way for the persecuted to survive is by fleeing. In such
cases, international preventive action is probably impossible and in any case
undesirable, since every effort must be concentrated on facilitating quick exit
and safe refuge.

28 Chapter1
nongovernmental agencies, provides international protection and care for
more than 17 million refugees. For many persons, a crisis of displacement
has evolved into a long-term condition. Extended camp life, despite
material assistance and technical support, is unacceptable costly in human,
economic, and political terms. The cost of protection and care in the
current refugee crisis is not, however, the sole motivation in the search for
international preventive measures. Increasing concern about political
destabilization under the current system has inspired various governments
to direct their attention toward preventing situations that generate
refugees, which is a necessary development if preventive actions are to
have any prospect of success. Continuing disagreement, however, over the
means of achieving this without infringing on the national sovereignty of
states is inhibiting real progress. The organization that seems to be in the
best position to help is UNHCR, but it is hindered by an inherent
contradiction between its mandate and the potential scope of preventive
actions, which includes imposing obligations on sovereign states. In
addition, the 1950 Statute of the Office of the UNHCR limits its work to a
humanitarian mandate for refugees. 26 On the other hand, a 1986 General
Assembly resolution calls for addressing the factors that cause refugees as
part of UNHCR's work of searching for durable solutions to the
problem. 27 Moving to remedy such factors could lead UNHCR to
interventive action, which is not permitted under a strictly humanitarian
mandate. In renewing the mandate of UNHCR for five further years in
1987, 28 the General Assembly did not equip the organization with the
authority to address refugee causes; neither did it seem to recognize the
challenge that the organization faces in handling the increasingly
multifaceted problems of today's coerced migratory flows.
Through its network of more than 120 offices around the world,
_______________________
26 "The work of the High Commissioner shall be of an entirely non-political
character; it shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups
and categories of refugees." Statute of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Chapter 1, Art. 2, Annex to the GA res. 428 (V),
14 December 1950 (Geneva: United Nations, 1950).
27 "The General Assembly ... recognizes the importance of finding durable
solutions to refugee problems and recognizes also that the search for durable
solutions includes the need to address the causes of movements of refugees and
asylumseekers from their countries of origin..." UN GA res. 41/124,4 December
1986.
28 UN GA res 42/108,7 December 1987.
Introduction 29
many of which are in or near the countries of origin of potential refugee flows,
UNHCR is in a uniquely advantageous position to obtain critical information
on refugee movements. Even though UNHCR obtains comprehensive firsthand
knowledge about potential new refugee flows, the organization has
normally refrained from involving itself in activities connected with
predictions, including taking preventive actions. Only a few exceptions exist,
such as particularly courageous individual UNHCR officials, 29 and the then
Deputy UN High Commissioner, Dale de Haan, in the case of the Orderly
Departure Programme. 30 In practice, predicting refugee flows has entailed
making contingency plans for the predicted situation should it occur, but
remaining passive vis-a-vis the point of origin of the refugees. Prediction
would appear to be less objectionable to sovereign states than preventive
action; the latter presupposes an active effort to avoid potential refugee
situation at the point of origin, which would probably be seen as unwelcome if
not controversial, and as an intervention in its domestic affairs. The mandate of
UNHCR has now been extended far beyond its original scope by the
1969 OAU Convention, the 1984 Cartagena Declaration, and resolutions of the
General Assembly to encompass not only refugees with a. well-founded fear of
persecution but, in specific situations, also returnees and displaced persons
within their homeland, 31 a group of persons who number about
_______________________
29 Nicolas Morris was UNHCR Representative in Sudan when he forecast in December
1984 that as many as 300,000 new refugees from Ethiopia could be expected in
eastern Sudan. "This very rare statement, perhaps the first of its sort from UNHCR,
gave rise to protest from Ethiopia. His forecast was also incorporated in an appeal for
additional funds, sent to governments by UNHCR. Morris is quoted by a Dutch
journalist as saying [translation by Leon Gordenker]: "We certainly made a political
declaration, but it was also objective. You surely know that if there is a growing lack
of food in Ethiopia, the people will come here to get something to eat'"See:Leon
Gordenker, Refugees in International Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 123.
30 De Haan pursued the establishment of the program with particular vigor. See Kumin,
"Orderly Departure from Vietnam : A Humanitarian Alternative?" Diss., The Fletcher
School of Law and Diplomacy, 1987, p 25.
31 The "displaced persons" category meant initially to deal with new problems such as the
situations of countries divided in fact, if not in law, which included countries split by
civil war, as for example the Sudan and Vietnam before 1975. Whereas the "good
offices" category had made it possible for UNHCR to provide assistance with a prima
facie eligibility, the "displaced persons" came to mean UNHCR action on the ground -
providing humanitarian assitance to those displaced persons within the country
divided by war or insurgency. In the case of Vietnam, this required UNHCR to deal
with three different parties: the North

30 Chapter 1
20 million according to recent research. 32 UNHCR has come also to assist
victims of man-made disasters 33 and "persons in refugee-like situations." 34
This extension of the scope of persons of concern to UNHCR,
however, highlights the organization's paradoxical position: governments
have extended the mandate without necessarily being prepared to meet
Vietnamese, the South Vietnamese, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government.
In this very example, protection was of secondary concern; humanitarian assistance
proved to be the primary need. Guy Goodwin-Gill, "Refugees: The Expanding
Mandate of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees," [hereinafter cited as
"UNHCR's expanding mandate"] draft paper, p. 8.
32 UN GA resolution 32/67, 32/68, 32/69, 8 December 1977; UN GA 33/26, 29
November 1978; 34/60, 29 November 1979 (refugees and displaced persons of
concern to UNHCR); 35/41, 25 November 1980 (including disparate and divergent
reference to refugees and displaced persons in the matter of protection, solution, and
assistance); 35/135, 11 December 1980 (refugee and displaced women); 36/125, 14
December 2981 (including also the protection of asylum-seekers in large-scale
influx); 37/195,18 December 1982 (refugees, returnees and displaced persons of
concern to the Office); 37/196,18 December 1982 (providing international protection
and assistance to refugees and displaced persons of concern, and promoting
permanent solutions to their problems); 38/121, 16 December 1983 (refugees and
displaced persons of concern; continued violations of basic rights of persons of
concern; safety and welfare of refugees and asylum-seekers); 39/105, 14 December
1984 (UNHCR's role regarding voluntary returnees, refugees, displaced persons in
Ethiopia); 39/140, 14 December 1984 (refugees and displaced persons of concern
continue to face distressingly serious problems; violations of the basic rights of
persons of concern; voluntary repatriation of return the most desirable solution for
refugees and displaced persons; rights and safety of refugees and asylum-seekers);
40/118, 13 December 1985 (similarly, including reference to international protection
in respect to special problems of refugee and displaced women and children);
41/124, (rights and safety of refugees and asylum-seekers; durable solutions for
refugees and displaced persons of concern); 42/109, 7 December 1987 (similarly).
See Goodwin-Gill, "UNHCR's Expanding Mandate," p. 9.
33 ECOSOC Res. 2011 (LXI), 2 August 1976, and UN GA Res. 31/35,30 November
1976. Goodwin-Gill, "UNHCR Expanding Mandate," p. 7.
34 In 1980, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program expressed
its concern about the increasingly large-scale movements of uprooted individuals
and groups seeking refuge and reiterated the leading responsibility of UNHCR in
emergency situations that involve refugees in the sense of its Statute or of General
Assembly resolution 1388 (XIV) (which authorizes the UNHCR, in respect of
refugees who do not come within the competence of the U.M., to use his good
offices) and its subsequent resolutions. Report of the 31st session: UN doc.
A/Ac.96/588, paras. 29.A(c), 29.B(c) (e) (f). See Goodwin-Gill, "UNHCR's
Expanding Mandate," p. 12.
Introduction 31
the ensuing obligations imposed by that mandate. Since states have
explicitly recognized the need to address refugee causes, there is some
justification for their making resources available for this purpose; but it is
always easier to find money to clean up after a disaster than to prevent it
from happening in the first place.
The examination of empirical evidence in Chapter 2 first analyzes
initiatives and second describes projects with potentials for preventive
action in refugee producing situations. The selection of the examples is
based on first hand knowledge of the writer rather than on their
reprcsentativity. Other important initiatives and projects include the
development of an international network in and by the human rights
community worldwide through the HURIDOCS systems. An important
number of human rights groups, including those specialized in minority
questions have joined in this initiative. In 1985 UNHCR took the
initiative in bringing together governments and UNHCR for informal
consultations on refugees and asylum seekers in Europe and North
America. In this forum both sides, the humanitarian and the political side,
expresses their concerns and explores feasible policy options. Among the
many voluntary agency projects are the International Alert and the
International Peace Research Institute, who have been bringing together
government and UN officials, human rights experts, researchers and
representatives from the media to examine realistic possibilities for the
purpose of early warning and conflict resolution as well as other projects of
preventive character. We selected three innovative attempts to prevent
refugee producing situations: 1) International cooperation to avert new
flows of refugees, proposed by the Federal Republic of Germany; 2) a study
by Saddrudin Aga Khan, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and
Mass Exoduses; and 3) the creation of an office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, which so far has not come to fruition.
Despite their limited practical effect, at least up to now, two of these
initiatives have contributed to an international recognition of the means -
legal, diplomatic, humanitarian - that are available in the international
community for taking preventive steps. Finally, in a study of projects in
progress we review efforts with potential to contribute actively to
preventing refugee producing situations. The first of these projects is the
Refugee Policy Group (RPG), located in Washington, D.C.. This
independent center for policy analysis has been one of the most important
actors in gathering and analyzing information on refugee causes, early
warning about pre-flow situations, and actual refugee conditions around the
world. Through training workshops and consulting

32 Chapter 1 Introduction 33
activities, the RPG offers valuable advice to the U.N. and other
organizations, especially on how to increase institutional early warning
capabilities. This organization deserves increased financial and
organizational support so that it may continue its work and widen its scope
for even greater impact.
The second entity is the Office of Research and the Collection of
Information (ORCI), established in 1987 by the Secretary-General to
strengthen the Secretariat's early warning capabilities, to monitor factors
that can lead to refugee flows which was abolished in 1992, provide adhoc
assessments of critical situations that require the Secretary-General's
immediate attention. This office planned to use modern technologies for
gathering and analyzing information in order to boost the effectiveness of
the UN's preventive diplomacy efforts. By including nongovernmental
organizations, academics, independent researchers, and the media as sources
of information, ORCI should have been able to build a broader network on
which to draw its information. This office would have needed the close
cooperation and support of all parties concerned to fulfill its intended role of
improving preventive actions by the United Nations.
The third project is the Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues
(IBHI), formerly the Independent Commission for International
Humanitarian Issues (ICIHI). The impetus for the establishment of this body
grew out of a proposal for the "New International Humanitarian Order,"
advanced by Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan (in cooperation with the
former U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Saddrudin Aga Khan). 35
Since its establishment in 1983, this independent commission
commissioned and published reports on refugees and displacement, modern
wars, street children among others, under the leadership of its Secretary-
General Zia Rizvi. The final report of the three years work of the
Commission makes important future-oriented recommendations, which will
be discussed in chapter 2.
The analytical discussion in Chapter 3 reinforces my contention that an
understanding of the situations that force people to become refugees must
be the basis for formulating policy and implementing appropriate action.
Thus, the chapter, while drawing from secondary sources and available
research, will concentrate on analyzing the main refugee-producing
situations from the four examples empirically presented in Chapter 3.
___________________
35 A/36/PV.15, UN General Assembly Official Records, p. 294.
The Orderly Departure Program (ODP)
In May 1979, the then Deputy High Commissioner Dale de Haan
accomplished a unique agreement that came into being as the
Memorandum of Understanding between Vietnam and UNHCR for
allowing Vietnamese nationals to leave the country for family reunification
and other humanitarian reasons. 36 This legal alternative for leaving the
country may have obviated the flight, by boat or land, of hundreds of
thousands of persons who were able, through the ODP, to depart in a safe
and orderly manner from Vietnam.
The 1979 Meeting on Refugees in Southeast Asia.
Two months after the conclusion of the ODP agreement, the UN Secretary-
General, on the suggestion of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, convened
a meeting in Geneva to confront the problem of the "big boat trade." This
problem had resulted from a policy of massive exporting of Vietnamese
citizens of ethnic Chinese origin from Vietnam. At that conference, the
representative of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam "[undertook] to limit
refugee outflow for a reasonable period of time." 37 The meeting produced a
number of tangible results, which gave some people involved in the
situation the false impression that the crisis was "over" by late 1979 - an
impression reinforced by the drop in the number of arrivals in first-asylum
countries from 54,500 in June to 2000 per month by the end of that year.
Even though we are now in the fourteenth consecutive year of a dramatic
outflow of people from Vietnam, it must be admitted that, considering the
unprecedented nature and unpredictable dimensions of crises that could
have arisen, the international preventive actions of 1979 nevertheless
worked to some extent. Meanwhile the second conference on Vietnamese
Refugees was held by UNHCR in June 1989, which resulted in the
Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). The CPA forsees a screening
system, resettlement
___________________
36 Kumin, Diss. 1987: p. 255. See Memorandum of Understanding between the
Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) concerning the
Dep?rture of Persons from the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Department of
State Bulletin, 79, No. 2031 (November 1979), p.9, reprinted in the
Appendix, p. 241.
37 Milton Osbome, "The Indochinese Refugees: Cause and Effects,"
International Affairs, 56 (1980), p. 47.

34 Chapter 1 Introduction 35
abroad for those found refugees and return to Vietnam for those not
qualifying for refugee status. To describe the complete Plan would require a
full new chapter which will be available elsewhere. Here this development
is only mentioned for the record and to show that it was finally
political/humanitarian action, which lead to the situation that in 1992 there
have been practically no new arrivals from Vietnam.
The second group of examples in this chapter will discuss two
instances in which, at the cost of much human misery, no specific
preventive actions were taken. The United Nations, in coordination with
interested governments and perhaps with competent nongovernmental
agencies, could probably have taken steps to alleviate, if not prevent, the
serious repercussions on the victims of these tragic situations.
The Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras and the International Conference
on Refugees in Central America (CIREFCA)
Between the beginning of 1982 and 1986, Nicaraguans of Miskito, Sumo,
and Rama ethnic origin crossed into Honduras from the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua, many of them involuntarily. 38 The problem of "induced asylum"
has continued over the years to varying degrees, but became particularly
acute in early 1986 with a new wave of about 8,500 "refugees," the largest
group ever to cross the border.
Despite the available evidence about this incipient movement obtained
in interviews with Miskito Indians who had just arrived in the refugee
locations, no specific action was taken on the conditions that were forcing
people to move.
___________________
38 The U.S.-based human rights organization Americas Watch undertook a
field study in early 1986 to establish the facts behind the movements of
Nicaraguan Miskito Indians into Honduras. Upon rumors that KISAN (the
and Sandinista indigenous armed forces operating in the Mosquitia) planned
to "move all people living on the Nicaraguan side of the Rio Coco into
Honduras," Americas Watch interviewed the first vanguard of entering
Miskito Indians in early April and found that everyone was going to leave
the Rio Coco: "Every last one ("toditos") they said, no one will be left."
Americas Watch also confirmed that the Miskito Indians wanted to stay in
their homes in Nicaragua and would not move lightly, but believed that they
were pressured into doing so by KISAN because the "U.S. Congress, which
was to vote on contra aid in the spring of 1986, would consider very
seriously the flight of a large number of Miskito refugees." See "Americas
Watch Committee. With the Miskitos in Honduras, (New York and
Washington, D.C.: Americas Watch Committee, 11 April 2986), pp. 13-14.
The purpose of this study is to show that for more than five years, and
most clearly in early 1986 with the last large movement, people were
uprooted time and again often against their will and often without
knowing the real reason for crossing the border into Honduras. Since
completing this book, the CIREFCA took place in 1989 which mobilized
political and material support for many refugees to be able to return home
in peace. All Nicaraguan refugees are now home and the UNHCR Office
in Honduras is almost closed.
Vietnam Before 1975
Alarmed by the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam from the
early 1960s, U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy undertook a personal initiative
in 1966 to obtain humanitarian assistance on behalf of refugees and
displaced persons within Vietnam from the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, which were great untapped sources of assistance
with trained personnel experienced in humanitarian activities." 39
Unfortunately, his contacts with the Secretary-General and other heads of
agencies, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, failed to
produce concrete results.
Disregarding the overwhelming strain placed on Vietnamese and U.S.
assistance mechanisms by massive waves of internal refugees forcibly
relocated, uprooted, and displaced, the U.S. Armed Forces Commanders
went on generating refugees regardless of what would become of them. 40
The International community had reason to be concerned about the fate of
the many millions of innocent Vietnamese civilians who became victims
of policies that have long since been condemned.
Chapter 4 has been rewritten. It is the heart of the thesis. This Chapter
is intended to show that only in the last four years, since the completing of
the first edition, revolutionary changes have contributed to new
approaches and policies for refugee prevention.
The first part on the UN Conflict Prevention documents forty years
of experience much of which has indirectly had an impact on the
39 U.S. Senate. A Report to the Committee on the Judiciary. Refugee
Problem in South Vietnam. Subcommittee to Investigate Problems
connected with Refugees and Escapees. 89th Cong., 2nd sess., March
4,1966, p. 11-14.
40 Louis Wiesner, Victims and Survivors, Displaced Persons and Other
War Victims in Vietnam, 1954-1975, (New York: Greenwood Press,
1988), in press.

36 Chapter 1
preventive efforts. Without the United Nations' work in the area of
mediation, conciliation peace-keeping and peace-building, there would
probably have been many more refugees. Then we briefly present an
initial assessment of the Department for Humanitarian Affairs, which the
Secretary-General created in March 1992 into which some of the
activities of the office of ORCI, discussed in Chapter 2, have been
integrated.
Lastly, we report on the progress made in UNHCR in the area of
country of origin information, including early warning and preventive
protection; the latter especially in the context of the humanitarian crisis
in the former Yugoslavia.
The legal justifications for international preventive action that
support the validity of the policy proposals are discussed in Chapter 5.
Individual nations are likely to resist challenges to their sovereign rights,
and so any infringement on national jurisdiction must be grounded as
firmly as possible in practical precedents, legal instruments, and moral
authority. The United Nations has a duty to intervene within a country
by limited, non-military means if the lives and security of a large
number of people are at stake, in order to avert external border crossing.
Though the precedents for such action are at an incipient stage, they will
gain strength through their acceptance, exercise, and a general
recognition of their useful effects. International legal standards of
human rights provide only a general framework for preventive action
within sovereign nations. It is the states' political will and good faith that
permits the implementation.
Despite the weak foundation of preventive action, international
human rights law and the Helsinki process provide new points of
reference. These Human Rights Laws include the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 41
and the Proclamation of Teheran, proclaimed by the International
Conference on Human Rights at Teheran on 13 May 1968, which states
that the existing human rights instruments
have created new standards and obligations to which States should conform [and
it] urges all peoples and governments themselves to the principles enshrined in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to redouble their efforts to
provide for all human beings a life consonant with freedom and dignity and
conducive to physical, mental, social and spiritual welfare (Article 3).
___________________
41 General Assembly res. 2106 A (XX), 21 December 1965.
Introduction 37
If these prescriptions are violated, other instruments and resolutions
should be invoked, such as General Assembly res. 32/130 on Alternative
Approaches and Ways and Means within the United Nations System for
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, could be invoked. 42 The standards defined in the prevailing
instruments have their origin in the International Bill of Rights, which is
composed of (1) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, 43
(2) International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 44
(3) International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, 45 (4) the
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 46 and (5) the Provisional Rules of Procedure for the
___________________
42 This resolution of 16 December 1977 reiterates giving "priority to the search
for solutions to mass and flagrant violations of human rights of peoples and
persons affected by situations such as those resulting from apartheid, from all
forms of racial discrimination, from colonialism, from foreign domination and
occupation..." (Paragraph l(e)).
43 1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, adopted and
proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948,
includes the following articles:
Article 13
(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each State.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to
his country.
Article 14
(1) Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.
(2) This right may not be invoked in the case of persecutions genuinely arising
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles
of the United Nations.
Article 15
(1) Everyone has the right to nationality.
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
44 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General
Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entry into force: 3
January 1976, in accordance with article 27.
45 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession by General
Assembly resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entry into force: 23
March 1976, in accordance with article 49.
46 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General
Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Entry into force: 23

38 Chapter 1
Consideration of Communications Received under the Optional Protocol. 47
The Economic and Social Council resolution 1296 of 1977, concerning
arrangements for consultations with nongovernmental organizations
recognized the significance of the role of nongovernmental organizations in
international relations. 48 The United Nations itself, on the basis of its
purposes and principles has the mandate for preserving international peace
and security.
As shown in Chapter 5, the justification for my proposals on
international preventive action rests on three pillars: 1) the United Nations
consensus on the need for international cooperation to avert new refugee
flows; 2) the abdication of national jurisdiction over massive human rights
abuses (a major cause of refugees), and 3) the destabilizing effects of
massive refugee flows on international peace and security, which the UN
Secretary-General is mandated to maintain.
In Chapter 6 the study concludes that the basis for preventive action
will have been solidified with the convergence of interests of states on the
need for early action. Reconciling national sovereignty with human rights,
as well as restructuring international mechanisms without paralyzing them,
and securing constructive media support are remaining challenges to
successful action. Policy shifts of the major powers will be important
factors in dealing with regional conflicts. As Mikhail
___________________
March 1976, in accordance with article 9.
47 Transmission of communications to the Committee (Rules 78-94).
48 Resolution 1296 (XLIV) of the Economic and Social Council of 23 May 1968
states in Part I, Article 4:
"The organization shall be of representative character and of recognized
international standing; it shall represent a substantial proportion, and express
the views of major sections, of the population or of the organized persons
within the particular field of its competence." Part VII, Article 34 confirms
that "the Council may invite nongovernmental organizations in category I and
n (general and special consultative status) or on the Roster to take part in
conferences calles by the Council under Article 62, paragraph 4, of the
Charter of the United Nations. The organizations shall be entitled to the same
rights and privileges and shall undertake the same responsibilities as at
sessions of the Council itself, unless the Council decides otherwise."
Part X, Article 45 asserts: "The Secretary-General may request organizations
in categories I and n and those on the Roster to carry out specific studies or
prepare specific papers, subject to the relevant financial regulations."
Introduction 39
Gorbachev indicated, for example, at the summit meeting in May 1988 49 that
...the newly discovered truth that it is no longer possible to settle international
disputes by force of arms... The idea of resolving today's problems solely by
political means is gaining increasing authority. 50
The world is at a historical stage in which states seem to take better
advantage of existing international mechanisms, including the United
Nations. The first forty years of that organization's existence carried bitter
lessons for both the Soviet Union 51 and the United States. 52 The arms race
has proved costly, and proxy wars have become disadvantageous even
domestically, let alone in foreign policy.
Increasing shifts in international relations show that negotiations and
economic and technological interests are gaining a new significance over
___________________
49 "The world is looking to us, Mr. President, for responsible judgments on other
complex issues of today, such as the settlement of regional conflicts,
improving international economic relations, promoting development,
overcoming backwardness, poverty and mass diseases, and humanitarian
problems [emphasis added]. "Transcript of Reagan and Gorbachev
Statements," New York Times, 30 May, 1988.
50 Gorbachev goes on: "We advocate the establishment of a comprehensive
system of international security as a condition for the survival of mankind.
Linked with this is also our desire to revive and enhance the role of the United
Nations [emphasis added] on the basis of the original goals which the Soviet
Union and the United States, together with their allies, enshrined in the charter
of that organization. Its very name is symbolic - united in their determination to
prevent new tragedies of war, to banish war from international relations..."
Reagan and Gorbachev Toast: Peace and Freedom' and -Man's Survival, 1 " New
York Times, 31 May, 1988.
51 "Soviet foreign policy specialists asserted that the 'new thinking 1 represents a
genuine, sweeping reappraisal of the proper and possible Soviet role overseas...
[and] that the Kremlin seeks to use its influence to remove the East-West
overlay to regional conflicts and to encourage dependent Mends to ease
themselves out of military entanglements." "Soviet Union asserts shift to role
as peace-maker in the Third World," Boston Globe, 8 August, 1988.
52 "We embark in this decade on a new postwar strategy, a forward strategy of
freedom a strategy of public candor about the moral and fundamental
differences between statism and democracy, but also a strategy of vigorous
diplomatic engagement." "Exerpts From President's Address on U.S.-Soviet
Relations, New York Times, 4 June, 1988.

40 Chapter 1 Introduction 41
military intervention. 53 These developments challenge traditional ways of
interaction and show that new approaches and policies are feasible and
implemented through changes in international relations and make east-west
relations more a geographical rather than political notion. For both the UN
and the UNHCR fresh opportunities for preventive action are opening up.
This is especially prompted by the aftermath of the Gulf War and due to the
unprecedented crisis in former Yugoslavia.
The High Commissioner Mme Ogata in her statement on 25 November
1992 in Brussels said that there is "a greater willingness on the part of the
international community to collectively address the threat to international
security posed by internal conflict and large-scale population
displacements, as in the Former Yugoslavia and Somalia". For the first
time, in its 42 years of existence, UNHCR was invited in November 1992
to address the Security Council. This was no mere coincidence, because the
humanitarian regime has entered into a new phase of complexity in which
refugees have become a part of the global agenda for security and peace.
Now the High Commissioner added "UNHCR has become the
humanitarian arm of the UN's peace-keeping efforts. Seeking to reduce or
contain displacement, buying time and space in which the political process
can continue; as in Somalia or former Yugoslavia. This is what I call a
'preventive role.'"
The humanitarian strategy of today does not concentrate only on
asylum, but more and more also on prevention and solutions in the country
of origin. 54
________________________
53 Former Under Secretary-General Brian Urquhart, one of the most
experienced and high-level UN officials, shares his experience in saying
that there has been a shift away from the cynical use of the UN toward
something more deeper and more serious, which has been strengthened by
the growing trust between the United States and the Soviet Union. "The
improvement in the general international climate has had an enormous
effect on the other members of the UN whether they admit it or not. If
you're the Secretary-General and you have to spend half your time
tiptoeing around the ideological differences of the US and the USSR, you
don't have much time to do anything else. The UN is a very covenient
institution to help governments get out of muddles when they can't get out,
for various political reasons, by themselves." "The rise of the United
Nations," Boston Globe, 3 August 1988.
54 Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, at the Royal Institute for International Relations, Brussels 25
November 1992, p. 3.
1.3. Research Design
1.3.1. Sources Consulted
Throughout this dissertation, I shall rely on primary documentation, such as
statements and reports of the United Nations. The analysis on the work of the
UN Group of Governmental Experts on International Cooperation to Avert
New Refugee Flows is based on resolutions, working papers and reports on
public record. Unless otherwise stated, for quotations I relied on public
record information. I drew on reports, and documentation from other
international organizations, governments, the nongovernmental sector,
especially human rights organizations. In some instances persons from the
refugee and human rights community who contributed information requested
not to be named.
I have branched out to related subjects and fields of studies undertaken in
different countries, and relied on as much material on public record as
possible. Where appropriate, draft papers, articles, and other contributions of
noted scholars and practitioners were used. A number of conference-,
seminar- and meeting papers served to document developments. Mission
reports and field studies, including those for committees and subcommittees
of the U.S. Congress are used as well.
Finally, I relied on publications in scholarly journals, the specialized
media and daily newspapers, as well as on first hand information collected
by other scholars and myself on refugee situations in Europe, West Africa,
Southeast Asia, and South and Central America.
1.3.2. Time Period
The focus is on the years between the 1960s and the 1990s, for three primary
reasons:
1) In 1960, the General Assembly, pursuant to its earlier resolutions,
noted that governments and nongovernmental organizations were starting to
pay increasing attention to the problems of refugees not falling under the
immediate jurisdiction of the United Nations. 55 In the intervening period,
nongovernmental agencies have developed an important international
network, helping indigenous voluntary agencies and
_________________________
55 UN GA res. 1499(XI), 5 Dec. 1960: rpt. in Goodwin-Gill, "UNHCR's
? xpanding Mandate."

42 Chapter 1
grassroots efforts in the developing world to "empower people to help
themselves," with a people-to-people, bottom-to-top approach. 56
2) During this period, the progress of international human rights law
has contributed to a solid foundation for the protection of human life,
dignity, and integrity. Notwithstanding the slow development of human
rights law from the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights to the
1966 Covenants, with regional instruments dating from the late 1940s
until today, a consolidation in customary international law is now.
providing a stronger basis for international preventive action to address
situations likely to produce refugees.
3) This period is marked by a shift toward multilateralism in which
both superpowers have seen the need to compensate for the high political
cost, in terms of domestic tranquility, of their Vietnam and Afghanistan
adventures. 57
All of these factors hold a promise of success in developing a new,
less obstructive means of addressing conditions that force people to
become refugees.
______________________
56 "Anthony Kozlowski, "The Growing Significance of Voluntary
Agencies in International Development Cooperation," Lecture,
Harvard University, 22 April 1988.
57 Elliot L. Richardson, "Multilateral Cooperation: The Realistic
Alternative," Washington, D.C.: Institute of Peace, 1988, p.3.
Chapter 2
Empirical Examination: Actions with Potentials to Prevent Refugee-
Producing Situations
2.1. Past Initiatives
In the absence of a more systematic approach for responding to situations
that do not fall strictly within its mandate, the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has often been forced to react to
emergencies in an ad hoc manner, obtaining in most cases ex post facto
approval for its action from the General Assembly. The result has been a
gradual expansion of its mandate. According to the 1951 UN Convention,
the UNHCR was to provide assistance and durable solutions to individual
refugees. Over time, UNHCR has extended its work so that in practice it
now frequently assists nationals in their own countries. The three major
precedents in this area have been aid to Sudanese returnees and displaced
persons in 1972, 58 to internally displaced Vietnamese in 1974-75, 59 and to
Central Americans fleeing, among other ills, massive violations of human
rights. 60
In a speech in November 1986 at Oxford, the UN High Commissioner
himself spoke of the need for refugee law to encompass the refugee
problem as a whole. He suggested that today's refugee problem be brought
into the mainstream of international concern so that instead of just falling
back on remedial measures, efforts might also be focused on attenuating the
causes of refugee movements, such as persecution or violence:
_________________________
58 UN ECOSOC res. 1655 (LII). 1972.
59 UN GA res. 3455 (XXX), 9 December 1975.
60 The Declaration of Cartagena on Refugees of 22 November 1984, which was
adopted unanimously, elaborated a concept of "refugee" for use in the region of
Central America. It proposed that this concept, in addition to containing the
elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol on the Status of
Refugees, should include "persons who have fled their country because their
lives, safety or freedom have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign
aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other
circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order." "Asylum and
protection in Latin America: the Cartagena Declaration of 1984," REFUGEES
(October 1987), p. 32.

44 Chapter 2
Humanitarian interventions with governments on behalf of refugees are no longer
enough, if made without reference to the political situations which gave rise to
their flight.61
Humanitarian objectives and the political will of governments to address
root causes of refugees must converge. In addition, countries must be
willing to examine their own behavior as well as monitoring that of others.
Fortunately recent foreign policy initiatives by Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev seem to reflect a more positive approach also to humanitarian
issues. Initiatives to facilitate the political management of regional conflicts
will be of substantial benefit to both the Soviet Union and the USA. Once
both superpowers accept this as a matter of their common interest, they will
recognize that "the UN is uniquely well situated to serve as their buffer and
go-between."62 Regional organizations will be in a better position to play
an active role in regional peacekeeping and tential peacemaking activities.
The Office of the Secretary-General can then play the role that governments
themselves wish him to play in facilitating such initiatives.
Before significant initiatives can be implemented with some
reasonable prospect of success, the limits of current institutional structures
and legal provisions need to be taken into account.
Traditionally, U.N. preventive international diplomacy and action has
been geared primarily toward situations affecting the peace and security
interests of member states, and only marginally to addressing specific refugee
producing situations. Starting in the early 1980s, committed advocates
in the U.N., and governmental and nongovernmental circles have been able
to focus their attention on the study of the link between human rights
violations and the production of refugee flows.
Scholarly studies on aspects of pre-refugee flow situations have revealed
a striking disparity between the international reaction to persons as refugees
outside their countries and the response to potential refugees still inside
their national boundaries.63 Legally and institutionally, not everybody "on
the move" for survival, safety, and the fulfillment of their
____________________
61 Jean-Pierre Hocke, Beyond Humanitarianism: The Need for Political Will to Resolve
Today's Refugee Problem. Joyce Pearce Memorial Lecture, Oxford, United
Kingdom. Queen Elizabeth House, Refugee Studies Programme, 1986, p. 7.
62 Richardson, "Multilateral Cooperation: The Realistic Alternative," p. 3.
63 Gervais J. Coles, "Pre-Flow Aspects of the Refugee Phenomen." Background
pa- per prepared for the International Institute for Humanitarian Law, San
Remo, Italy, April 1982.
Empirical Examination 45
basic rights and needs is eligible for UNHCR's international protection.
Originally, only those qualified who were fleeing persecution as defined in
the 1951 Convention due to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, being outside the country of nationality and
unable or, unwilling to avail of the protection of that country. Through the
precedent of actual practice, UNHCR mandate has been expanded to
include displaced persons in a "refugee-like" situation. 64 Although the legal
concept of what constitutes a refugee has been enlarged, the existing legal
provisions still do not include persons who leave their home for purely
economic reasons; persons fleeing natural disasters such as famine, drought
and floods (provided this is the only reason for their flight); and generally,
ordinary internally displaced persons.65
UNHCR's role was basically extended ad hoc, in response to increasingly
large-scale flows of people who have found themselves forced to cross
international borders. This extension of UNHCR's role is significant for two
reasons. First, it has legitimized the involvement of the U.N. in matters
taking place within a country's borders. Second, and more important for the
discussion that follows, it has established precedents for preventive
international action at the formative stage of a refugee flow, rather than to
take remedial measures until the mass exodus has taken place.
Despite UNHCR's progress, international response to refugee problems
has mostly been oriented toward the symptoms - refugees -rather than
toward the underlying causes that produce them. The various bodies in the
international machinery need to work out a coordinated plan of preventive
action. This comprehensive plan envisages
___________________
64 Even for this category, "the institutional competence of UNHCR does not
seem to be in question. In 1980, for example, the Executive Committee noted
with concern the continuance of large-scale movements of uprooted
individuals and groups seeking refuge from man-made disasters, stressed the
necessity for co-ordination among UN bodies concerned with man-made
emergencies involving refugees and displaced persons in refugee-like
situations, and 'emphasized ... the leading responsibility of (UNHCR) in
emergency situations which involve refugees in the sense of its Statute or of
General Assembly resolution 1388 (XIV) and its subsequent resolution. ,
Report of the 31st session: UN doc. A/AC.96/588, paras. 29. A(c), 29. B(c) (e)
(0, cited in Goodwin-Gill, "UNHCR's Expanding Mandate," p. 12.
65 Joachim Henkel, "The International Protection of Refugees and Displaced
Persons: A Global Problem of Growing Complexity," U.S. Committee for
Refugees, December 1985, p. 2.

46 Chapter 2
international intervention from the time of first indication of a possible
outflow to the long-term development work for the period after the exodus
has ceased.
An increasing number of governments have begun to recognize that
the consequences of humanitarian crises generating massive refugee flows
are not only a question of human suffering, but can also become a threat
to national or regional security if not dealt with in a timely manner. One
threat to political stability comes from the inability of governments to
absorb unlimited numbers of refugees. Internal constraints in developed
nations, are increasingly hindering the acceptance of an growing number
of asylum seekers from different countries on their territories. In
particular, the massive flows of refugees from Indochina has prompted
governments in the industrialized world to think about new ways of
dealing with humanitarian crises.
Three major initiatives that included provisions for containing potential
refugee-producing situations were taken by the international community
through the U.N. during the past two decades. Each of them is briefly
examined below.
2.1.1. The UN Group of Governmental Experts on International
Cooperation to Avert New Flows of Refugees (UN Group).
Following a suggestion to the General Assembly by the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG) in 1980 to include the item of international cooperation
to avert new flows of refugees on its agenda, the General
Assembly invited governments of member states to forward their
suggestions on this subject to the Secretary-General. On the basis of the
responses he received, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
calling for the Secretary-General to appoint a U.N. group of
governmental experts to under-take a comprehensive review of the
problem and present recommendations for action. 66
The U.N. Group, comprising experts from twenty-five governments,
presented its final report in May 1986 after 128 meetings. The Group
concluded that the effectiveness of the U.N. System in averting new
refugee flows is seriously diminished because states do not fully observe
the principles of international law. The Group suggested that the General
Assembly should call upon member states to honor their obligations un-
__________________
66 UN GA res. 36/148,16 December 1981.
Empirical Examination 47
der the UN Charter, to use peaceful means of resolving disputes, and to
refrain from pursuing policies that generate new flows of refugees. 67
The UN Group further requested the General Assembly to encourage
the Secretary-General to make full use of his competencies; to give continuing
attention to the question of averting new massive refugee flows;
to ensure that timely and fuller information on potential refugeeproducing
problems be available within the Secretariat; to improve coordination
within the Secretariat for collecting and analyzing early information
on situations that can cause refugee flows; and to help improve
cooperation among the UN organs and specialized agencies and
concerned member states for timely and more effective action. 6 »
The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) had originally envisaged that
this initiative would set out both guidelines for the conduct of states 69
and practical preventive measures. The FRG specified such preventive
measures because there was no preexisting mechanism in the U.N. for
preventive international action to deal with international border-crossing
refugees.
In working on the proposals that the FRG had outlined, the UN Group
found that there was no existing competent institution within the UN
system that could carry out the functions of observation, coordination,
and consultation, which are crucial to preventive action. 70 The Group,
without making a formal recommendation, encouraged the establishment
of such a body. But the Soviet Union and some Western states as well,
especially the U.S. were concerned about creating more U.N. bodies,
which would risk a paralyzing duplication of efforts. The final result
contributed to the creation of ORCI, whose mandate strictly limits its
functions to carrying out the instructions of the Secretary-General and
the General Assembly.
In its deliberations, the UN Group also took into account, to some extent,
fundamental human rights principles. Even so, observers remained
______________________
67 UN doc. A/41/324, 13 May 1986: Report of the Group of Governmental Experts
on International Co-operation to Avert New Flows of Refugees, Note by the
Secretary-General. (New York, 1986), pp. 16-18.
68 UN DOC. A/41/324,1986, p. 18.
69 Siegwart Böhm, "Grenzüberschreitende Flüchtlingsströme, Präventive Behandlung
im Rahmen der Vereinten Nationen," Vereinte Nationen, 2 (1982), pp.
49-50. Bohm asserted that the foundation of the ten guidelines for the conduct
of states are particularly the UN Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights,
and the Declaration on the friendly relations among states.
70 Böhm, "Flüchtlingsströme," p. 50.

48 Chapter 2
concerned that it did not sufficiently consider such principles as the right to
leave one's country and the freedom from compulsion to return to a country
where one's personal safety would be in jeopardy.
In its final report, established by consensus among the twenty-five
participating country representatives, the UN Group spelled out specific
obligations of all member states, 71 and gave specific recommendations for
action to the UN main organs 72 and the Secretary-General. 73 These
recommendations transcended purely humanitarian actions and moved into
the political realm, at the same time establishing innovative approaches for
preventive measures.
Although the governmental experts could not fully overcome the deeply
rooted political differences among their views, the group was nevertheless
able to bring about a consensus in concluding its work. Whereas the experts
from Western nations and the developing world favored strengthening the
authority of the Secretary-General to prevent conflicts, the USSR
representative maintained that the UN political organs already had
sufficient means at its disposal to avert new refugee flows. The USSR
expert reaffirmed the responsibility of the Security Council for this task,
attempting at the same time to block the investment of greater authority in
the Secretary-General. 74
In general, both superpowers were long reluctant to recognize any
significant authority of the U.N. in resolving major political conflicts.
Gorbachev's recent statement in support of strengthening the prestige of
_________________
71 These include respecting the principles contained in the UN Charter, using
peaceful means to resolve international conflicts, doing all within their means
to prevent new massive flows of refugees, refraining from creating causes that
lead to refugee flows, and cooperating with each another to prevent future
massive flows of refugees. UN doc. A/41/324,13 May 1986, pp. 16-17.
72 The major United Nations bodies were counseled to make fuller use of their
respective competencies under the Charter for the prevention of new massive
refugee flows. UN doc. A/41/324,13 May 1986, p. 17.
73 The Secretary-General was urged to give continuing attention to the question
of averting new massive flows of refugees, to ensure timely and fuller
information on potential refugee situations, to improve the coordination within
the Secretariat on situations which might give rise to refugee flows, and
improve the coordination, within the Secretariats, of the efforts of the United
Nations organs and specialized agencies and of concerned member states for
timely and more effective action. UN doc. A/41/324,13 May 1986, p. 18.
74 Peter J. Opitz, "Refugee Policy and the German Initiative," Forty Years of the
United Nations: Peace- keeping and Peace-making Activities. The Role of the
Federal Republic of Germany. Hamburg: Interpress Verlag (1985), p. 324.
Empirical Examination 49
the United Nations represents, however, a shift in the USSR position, which,
if maintained, can provide new momentum for preventive action. 75 By virtue
of joining the consensus achieved in the U.N. Group's final report, the USSR
agreed to recognize states' obligations to respect principles of international
law as spelled out in the recommendations of the report.
This concession is one indicator of "glasnost." Another sign of the
USSR's increased interest in human rights and refugee questions is that for
the first time there was a USSR observer at the 1987 Meeting of the
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program [for Refugees]
in Geneva. 76
Overall, this FRG initiative accomplished more than just providing an
international forum for experts from refugee-producing, refugee-resettling,
and refugee program-funding countries to pursue their own interests in
reducing their share of the burden caused by refugee problems. To have so
many governments reach a consensus on positive recommendations for
action provides an important basis for furthering governmental commitment
to preventing refugee producing situations.
2.1.2. Rapporteur for Human Rights and Mass Exoduses
The phenomenon of mass movements, which involved more than 10 million
people by 1980, causes not only economic and social problems but also
political tensions and conflict. For the victims of forced migration and
displacement, the three traditional solutions - resettlement elsewhere,
settlement in the country of first asylum, and voluntary repatriation - are
increasingly difficult to find. Therefore many governments feel a need to
study mass exoduses in the context of human rights in the hope that curbing
human rights violations will help limit refugee flows.
____________________
75 Mikhail Gorbachev, speech at the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution,
November 2,1987.
76 A number of further indications could be cited here that indicate a distinct
shift in the USSR's position toward humanitarian, human rights, and refugee
issuees. They include avantgardist publications on these issues, which are
increasingly translated and published in the USSR. See The Report of the
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues (ICIHI),
Winning the Human Race, (London: Zed Books, 1988), p. 205; and ICIHI,
Refugees: Dynamics of Displacements, (Russian ed., Moscow: International
Relations Publishing House, 1987).

50 Chapter 2
In 1981, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights designated a Special
Rapporteur for Human Rights and Mass Exoduses. 77 Since several
governments encouraged this move by the Commission, the Secretary-
General appointed Prince Saddrudin Aga Khan, the former UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, as Special Rapporteur. The Secretary-General
directed him to prepare a study on human rights and mass exoduses,
aimed at contributing to the containment, if not prevention, of the evergrowing
problem of displacement of millions of people. 78 The study has
become a reference document, and the number of fresh concepts elaborated
in it has made it an inspiration not only to researchers, but also to
policymakers. For the support it received from Canada, this study is considered
as a Canadian initiative. Its aim is to uphold respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms by eliminating the causes of refugee
flows that are motivated by human rights abuses. The Canadian initiative
reinforces the U.N. Group report in that it hopes to avert new massive refugee
flows, but restricts its concern to mass exoduses and forced displacements
caused by human rights violations. Moreover, although in
concept the Canadian initiative was principally humanitarian and remedial,
it also reflects an implicit preventive goal, even if its concern is limited
to a single cause of refugee flows - that of human rights violations."
79
The U.N. Commission, through the Special Rapporteur, turned its attention
for the first time to investigating the possible link between
human rights violations and international refugee flows. The
Commission authorized the Rapporteur to approach a wide variety of
organizations in conducting his study, including many whose primary
concerns were neither refugees nor human rights:
The Special Rapporteur in carrying out his Study may seek and receive
information mainly from United Nations agencies or departments concerned,
and governments, as well as specialized agencies, intergovernmental
organizations and non-governmental organizations in consultative status with
the Economic and Social Council. 80
The Special Rapporteur was asked by the Commission to keep in mind
that "large exoduses of persons and groups are frequently the result of
___________________________
77 U.N. Commission on Human Rights res. 29 (XXXVII), 11 March 1981.
78 United Nations Chronicle (February 1983), p. 97.
79 Böhm, "Flüchtlingsströme," p. 51.
80 Aga Khan, Human rights and mass exoduses, p. 5
Empirical Examination 51
violations of human rights." 81 The Secretary-General, however, cautioned
him to maintain a broader view of the problem:
The root causes of situations involving mass exoduses are often complex. They
may relate to political or military conflicts, internal or external, to civil strife,
persecution, or other forms of violation of human rights, be they civil and political
or economic, social, and cultural rights. 82
Using the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a framework for his
study, the Special Rapporteur presented innovative concepts and recommendations
for action to the Commission on Human Rights. Three of these
recommendations will be discussed here for their value as points of
reference for future preventive international responses.
(1) Humanitarian observers who would consist of men and women
experienced in humanitarian questions. These observers, by bringing a UN
presence into a given violent situation, might have a calming effect. This
suggestion dovetails with an earlier recommendation of the Secretary-
General, from his 1980 Annual Report: "Member States might consider the
possibility of extending in some form the organization's very considerable
experience of peace-keeping into humanitarian emergencies." 83 The
Rapporteur suggested that a "corps of humanitarian observers" be set up, to
be sent out on short-term field missions, with the consent of concerned
governments, into situations of mass exodus. The Rapporteur recalled that in
1971 UNHCR had promoted the idea of stationing small teams of
humanitarian observers on both sides of the border of then East Pakistan.
Though India did not at that time accept this proposal, a small team was,
nonetheless placed in East Pakistan.
(2) An Early Warning System would impartially gather information on
issues underlying the flows of refugees, including ethnic, economic, political,
and social problems. The information would come from proved
sources such as governments, U.N. officials in the countries concerned, and
other informed parties. After analysis and evaluation the available data
would provide the Secretary-General and competent intergovern-
________________________
81 UN res. 30 (XXXVI), of 11 March 1980, Aga Khan, Human rights and mass
exoduses, p. 5.
82 UN doc. E/CN.4/ 1440, 27 January 1981, in Aga Khan, Human rights and
mass exoduses, p. 6.
83 Saddrudin Aga Khan, op. cit., p. 51.

52 Chapter 2
mental organs with the means of assessing different alternative scenarios
for possible future development.
Using his executive power, the Secretary-General could decide on what
course of action to take, such as initiating discussions with one or more
concerned governments and humanitarian agencies. If warranted,
appropriate regional organizations (such as the Arab League, Council of
Europe, Organization of African Unity, or the Organization of American
States) might be solicited to help achieve regional containment and prevent
internationalization of the problem.
(3) Special representatives for humanitarian questions could monitor
situations that could give rise to new refugee flows and forewarn the Secretary-General,
where necessary, to depoliticize humanitarian crises, to
carry out functions barred to humanitarian bodies owing to institutional
and mandatory constraints, and to serve as a mediator between concerned
parties. 84
Six years later, the Secretary-General translated some of the above recommendations
into action by establishing the Office for the Research
and the Collection of Information (ORCI) within the Secretariat to carry
out newly defined tasks in the area of special political affairs. 85
2.1.3. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR)
The Establishment of the post of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human
Rights has long been a high priority of human rights organizations and
advocates. Many member states, however, are reluctant to give the green
light to the creation of any post at the Commissioner level, especially in
an area as politically sensitive as human rights. The struggle for a High
Commissioner for Human Rights has been going on for nearly 25 years
without yet coming to fruition.
Costa Rica took the fürst initiative in March 1965 by proposing the
creation of a U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to oversee the
promotion of human rights. Two years later, after a fair amount of divi-
______________________
84 Khan, Human rights and mass exoduses, p. ii, (Recommendation 8).
85 ST/SGB/225,1 March 1987: Secretary-General's Bulletin to the Members of
the staff on the establishment of the Office for Research and the Collection
of Information (ORCI). See also ST/SGB/Organization, Section ORCI, 3
October 1988: "A description of the functions and organization of THE
OFFICE FOR RESEARCH AND THE COLLECTION OF
INFORMATION," Organization Manual, pp. 1-6.
Empirical Examination 53
sion of opinion among member states, 86 the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) of the UN furthered the recommendation to the entire
U.N. General Assembly. 87 The original objectives of this post were to
keep a watchful eye on the implementation of human rights and to act as
a factfinder and conveyor of good offices. The item was on the agenda of
the Third Committee of the General Assembly for more than four years.
There were difficult debates, especially over whether the creation of the
UNHCHR would be an appropriate technique for promoting human
rights. In addition, this proposal was seen by some countries as a potential
violation of the U.N. principle of nonintervention into the internal
affairs of member states (Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter). It became
clear that if any advance was to be made in the creation of this post, it
must be done by convention, which would be binding on the signatories,
rather than by a simple resolution of the General Assembly. 88
In 1971, at the end of that year's UN sessions, the Canadian representative
raised the familiar complaint that too little time had been allocated
to discuss the creation of the post of UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, but asserted that widespread support among interested member
states had materialized over the year. On behalf of Afghanistan, Canada,
Costa Rica, Iran, Lesotho, Madagascar, the Netherlands, the Philippines,
and Uruguay, Sweden had introduced a new draft resolution at the beginning
of the session. Although this new resolution addressed some of objections
previously raised, considerable opposition remained, especially
from the Socialist bloc. 89 The 52-40 vote (with 25 abstentions) in the
plenary to postpone consideration of this item until the next session of
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights effectively put the initiative into
limbo. 90
______________________
86 M.S. Rajan, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the United Nations (Bombay,
1982), p. 102.
87 UN ECOSOC res. 1237 (XLII), June 6, 1967. See analysis of the view
submitted by governments and specialized agencies on that resolution and
amendments thereto in "Report to the Secretary-General on the Creation of the
Post of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights" (UN doc.
A/8035, August 28, 1970), cited in R. St J. Macdonald, Q.C. "A United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: The Decline and Fall of an
Initiative," Canada Yearbook of International Law, 10, (1972), p. 48.
88 Macdonald, p. 48.
89 Rajan, p. 103.
90 Macdonald, pp. 58,63.

54 Chapter 2
Prof. Theodoor van Boven, the former Director of the U.N. Division
for Human Rights from 1977 to 1982 [now U.N. Centre for Human
Rights] and a scholar widely renowned for his invaluable contributions
in the field of human rights within and outside the United Nations, fears
that after the long years of fruitless discussion, the creation of the post of
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights is not likely to be
forthcoming in the near future, even though he feels that such a post
would be highly appropriate and effective: 91
Mon expérience aux Nations Unies m'a convaincu plus que jamais que la
création d'une autorité pour les droits de l'homme qui exerce ses fonctions avec
objectivité et impar-tialité, mais aussi avec vigueur et dévouement est une
nécessité vitale. 92
This post, Van Boven believes, should be established on a permanent basis,
ready to initiate action and control the protection of human rights by
the United Nations without depending on a political mandate. Ever since
1971, the last intensive debate on the matter, the initiative has emerged
periodically in informal United Nations discussions without making it
onto a formal agenda. Canada has been one of the strongest supporters of
the creation of this high-level post for human rights, and there are grounds
for hope that this country might be instrumental in reviving the initiative
for consideration in the near future.
2.2. Current projects
In this section we will discuss three initiatives that have been turned into
ongoing projects. We have selected them from among a number of significant
projects that have potentials for contributing to international preventive
action, for two main reasons. First, their achievements so far are
relevant to our discussion. Second, they represent different sectors contributing
to gathering knowledge and analyzing solutions on refugee-producing
situations. The Refugee Policy Group (RPG) is a nongovernmental
public interest organization in Washington; the Office for Research and the
Collection for Information (ORCI) is a newly created United Nations
Office, close to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in New
York; and the Geneva-based Independent Bureau for Humanitarian
______________________
91 Theodoor C. van Boven, "Menschenrechte: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen," p. 98.
92 Theodoor van Boven, "Les Nations Unies et les droits de l'homnie," Annales
de Droit de Louvain, 43, No. 3 (1983), pp. 174-75.
Empirical Examination 55
Issues, though completely independent from governments and the United
Nations, represents a link between nongovernmental and United Nations and
governmental endeavors.
2.2.1. Refugee Policy Group
The Refugee Policy Group (RPG) in Washington is an independent center for
policy analysis and research on international and U.S. refugee issues. This
Center has been providing UNHCR and other interested organizations with
advice and studies on a variety of refugee-related issues. The RPG has been
one of the most active organizations in the quest for better international
preventive action regarding refugee outflows. The RPG has made especially
significant contributions in concepts to improve early warnin g capabilities,
which it defines as "early information and better strategic planning." 93 Among
other tasks, it has undertaken to:
(1) describe past refugee influxes (such as into Northwest Somalia),
analyzing conditions in the home country that gave rise to the movement
of refugees and factors that may affect the future rate of exodus; (2)
assist the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues
in a study of early warning capabilities; and (3) offer a training program,
run by the University of Wisconsin in cooperation with UNHCR, to
increase the number of trained UNHCR and nongovernmental
organization staff who can be sent quickly into the field to handle new
refugee emergency situations. 94
The focus of our discussion of the RPG's work will be on approaches to
improving the international response to emerging refugee crises.
Since the early 1980 the RPG has been actively studying causes of refugee
flows, and has included significant amounts of field work and interviews with
refugees and field officials in its research.
The RPG considers early warning information on probable refugee flows
from different sources to formulate governmental (or U.N.) action;
__________________
93 Lance Clarke, "Early Warning: An Analysis of Approaches to Improving the International
Response to Refugee Crises," (Washington, B.C.: The Refugee Policy
Group), May 1983, p. 2.
94 Clark, "Early Warning: Improving the International Response to Refugee Crises,"
p. 12.

56 Chapter 2
it endeavors to verify that the information comes from reliable sources in
or near the country of occurrence by collecting it from refugees themselves.
The RPG has been primarily concerned with ameliorating situations
that might give rise to refugee flows, and with contingency planning for
protection and emergency relief.
One of its most significant findings is that the number of people on the
move for survival within a country is much greater than the number of
those, who actually become international refugees, especially in situations
where causes such as famine are a dominant factor.
The RPG researched the situation at the Horn of Africa in great detail.
During the massive famine in 1984-85, when more than one million people
reportedly died of starvation, hundreds of thousands among the survivors
were compelled to cross into Sudan thus becoming refugees, in
search of food. When a new famine began in 1987 to threaten two million
people 95 in 8 of the 14 provinces of Eritrea and Tigre, where separatists
and liberation movements have been fighting the central government in
Addis Ababa for 25 years, 96 the government sought to restrict the flow of
food to rebel-occupied areas; but the RPG found that this time early
warning and cross-boder relief operations have managed to keep people
fed without their having to cross the border into Sudan.
On the basis of other recent in-depth research, as for example an early
warning case study on the 1985-86 influx into Somalia, the RPG has been
able to provide important insights into the timing, the motives, the
patterns and the composition of the flow of refugees, and also make projections
about possible future influxes.
The RPG found barriers to recognizing (and thus being able to solve)
problems that are similar to those we have found in our work and
research. These impediments include a lack of systematic data on the refugees'
experience, misunderstandings about the nature of a given influx,
poorly coordinated information from those working inside a refugee producing
country, and a lack of international media coverage. 97
The causes that motivate people to move and to cross international
borders are complex and can rarely be traced to one element alone. The
RPG has categorized the factors that provoke refugee flows into root cau-
_________________________
95 "Violence of famine reemerges in Africa: Starvation is called a deliberate
weapon of war," Boston Globe, 1 May 1988.
96 Der Spiegel, No. 49,1988.
97 Lance Clark, "Early Warning Case Study: The 1985-86 Influx into
Northwest Somalia," Working Paper # 1 (Washington, B.C.: Refugee Policy
Group, June 1988), pp. 21-33.
Empirical Examination 57
ses, intervening factors (which also can be proximate events), and triggering
events. 98
Root causes, as defined by the RPG, are fundamental underlying
problems that go far back in time, such as long-standing border disputes or
difficulties in building a nation-state within artificially created borders.
Proximate events, though related to root causes, are closer to the actual
cross-border movement, as for example when a long-standing border
problem erupts into open warfare. Intervening factors come in to play in
"coming in between so as to modify [or determine]" the size and timing of
movements within the context of choices available to the people concerned.
Triggering events would be those that motivate the most severely affected to
pick up and leave. The RPG distinguishes in its analysis between changes in
root causes that turn them into triggering events, such as a new type of
person affected by the refugee-producing situation or the spread of the
problem to wider geographical locations, and changes in intervening factors
that turn them into triggering events, such as the exhaustion of coping
behavior, major changes in the viability of flight, the expected reception at
the point of asylum, patterns of decision making, and seasonal conditions."
It is of crucial importance to avoid letting any action of early warning
backfire and become counterproductive; a lifesaving outflow might be
blocked at the national border, or potential refugees might have sold all their
stored food in the expectation of being provided for until the next harvest in
the feeding center on the other side of the border. Instead of dealing with the
problems motivating people to leave, some governments have in the past
used military force to seal their borders against people's leaving or arriving
at a safe haven, thus making flight a life-threatening undertaking.
In earlier recommendations for improving international response to
refugee-producing situations, the RPG made several important proposals.
For the most efficient way to collect, validate, and share "early warning"
information necessary for initiating international actions, the RPG advocated
the creation of an independent human rights-oriented entity composed of
several experts in the field, to be modeled after a nongovernmental
organization such as Amnesty International. The RPG also called for
increased reliance on regional structures. As most refugee-
_________________________
98 Lance Clark, "Early Warning of Refugee Flows," (Washington, D.C.: Refugee
Policy Group, June 1988), pp. 9-16.
99 Lance Clark, "Early Warning of Refugee Flows," pp. 9-20.

58 Chapter 2
producing conflicts take place in the context of regional disputes, the RPG
judged that such regional bodies as the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the
Organization of American States, and the Council of Europe could provide a
significant contribution in terms of diplomatic strategies, relief work, and
long-range political solutions. 100
The RPG further recommended that an international citizens' commission
for humanitarian affairs be set up, to function as a watchdog and an early
warning system in refugee producing situations. Composed of prominent
persons from various countries (with access to high-level policy-makers),
this group would have a small but well-trained staff to monitor information
from a range of private and public sources and to perform on-site
verification of facts.
In its ongoing work, the RPG points out the failure of governments and
international organizations to take fuller advantage of international networks
of specialists, including historians and anthropologists, who are either
located in the countries where refugee flows could originate or who
otherwise have a rich knowledge of the area. For example, a nonprofit,
private organization such as Cultural Survival would be in a good position
to provide well-researched background information on a developing refugee
crisis. 101
There are an increasing number of projects geared toward mobilizing
international preventive action to address refugee-producing situations,
particularly those in which famine plays a central role. 102 The RPG has
_________________________
100 Lance Clark, "Early Warning" - Improving the International Response to
Refugee Crises," pp. 28-33.
101 Lance Clark, "Early Warning - Improving International Responses to
Refugee Crises," A Working Paper, (Washington, D.C.,: Refugee Policy
Group, n.d.), pp. 34-43.
102 Various organizations have set up specific early warning systems. The Food
and Agriculture (FAO) did set up a system in 1975 for food; the Agency for
International Development's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is
funding a disaster early warning technical assistance program through the
NOAA/NESDIS Assessement and Information Services Center, whose
innovative feature lies in enhanced satellite data combined with data packages,
which NOAA uses to forecast harvest size. Two more significant systems have
been in operation: the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), operated by the
Tulane University School of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, was
established in August 1985 to focus on health and nutritional data; and among
the nongovernmental Famine Early Warning Systems, OXFAM has for some
years already informally operated an early warning system for famine in
Oxford, which collects and analyzes existing world figures (from FAO,
NOAA and FEWS systems) for rainfall in problem
Empirical Examination 59
focused most of its efforts on early warning with a view to improving
emergency responses; where possible it has examined possible responses
that might help alleviate refugee-producing situations. The RPG's work in
early warning is particularly critical in famine-related refugee flows,
because quick action is imperative once a crisis erupts. Whereas people can
tolerate delays in achieving political goals (such as statehood), they cannot
wait indefinitely for food. In light of its achievements and its increased
recognition among nongovernmental organizations, international
organizations, and even governments, the RPG has a significant potential to
contribute to preventive action.
The RPG has been undertaking studies in consultation with UN officials
to examine ways in which the United Nations (specifically UNHCR), with
its nonpolitical mandate to protect and assist refugees, could make use of the
rich information it receives in discharging its ongoing functions. UNHCR
has been developing training modules for its staff that include early warning
issues, with advice and assistance from the RPG. 10 3 Under contract with
UNHCR, the RPG has been compiling existing data on the subject of early
warning about mass refugee flows and has transformed this material into
practical guidelines for UNHCR staff to use in training and analysis. 104
As part of the groundwork for this project, the RPG produced a series of
analytical papers on problem spots that UNHCR staff members had
identified in their work. For example, almost every official in UNHCR's
service faces the risk of feeling overwhelmed by the challenges of his or her
assignment. The natural response to such pressure is to develop a "tunnel
vision," which can impede the consideration of one's work within the
broader global context. Among the other UNHCR problems that the RPG
helped address were:
_________________________
areas. Though OXFAM has not been attempting to provide a globalized early
warning data system as have the others, it has the advantage of providing a
link between problem identification and response. See Margaret Dyer
Chamberlain, "Lessons to be learned from Famine Early Warning Systems,"
Draft Working Paper, (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, September
1986), pp. 1-4.
103 See Program of the UNHCR Emergency Managers Training Workshop,
University of Wisconsin - Madison, November-December 1988,
UNHCR/EMTP Madison 88,25 October 1988, p. 1.
104 United Nations Contract No. 87/030: Institutional or Corporate Contractor
with the Refugee Policy Group, Washington, for the period 1 November 1987-
31 December 1988.

60 Chapter 2
* lack of systematic collection of information from refugees, who are
themselves the best sources for reporting about the conditions that led
them to cross the border;
* lack of systematic reporting between UNHCR field staff and headquarters,
which may be partly due to the absence of confidential channels;
* use of incorrect or irrelevant models in collecting and interpreting information;
* mistimizing of early warning messages to UNHCR headquarters
causing them to be ignored or reprimanded, to the discouragement of future
efforts;
* dilution or delay by supervisors of messages from field workers to
headquarters, thus greatly inhibiting htir effectiveness. 105
During the 1987 UNHCR Emergency Training Programmes, the RPG
developed material on early warning for seminars to be held on Emergency
Planning Skills. 106 For the future Emergency Training Workshops,
the RPG has begun to collect basic information about all major refugee
flows since 1977, doing more detailed studies of a smaller sampler of
them. 107 This cutoff date was selected in such a manner as to include such
major refugee flows as Afghans into Pakistan, Ethiopians into Somalia,
Cambodians into Thalland, and Vietnamese boat people into various
countries in Southeast and East China. 108
The RPG's information-collecting activity is a pilot project, which is
still dependent on the availability of funding. It plans to gather information
about refugee inflows in the past decade, to complete ten in-depth
case studies, to monitor early warning signs across a region of Africa,
_________________________
105 Lance Clark, "Selected Constraints on Early Warning Actions by UNHCR
(And What To Do About Them)," (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy
Group, 1988), pp. 1-7.
106 UNHCR Emergency Management Training Programmes (EMTP), for
1987, (Geneva: UNHCR, 1987).
107 Lance Clark, "Early Warning of Refugee Mass Influx Emergencies,"
UNHCR Emergency Training Seminar at the University of Wisconsin,
1985, (Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, n.d.), p. 1.
108 Report of the Refugee Policy Group Study of Early Warning, n.d., p.8.
Empirical Examination 61
and to establish a quick response team for conducting field visits to
countries that would potentially produce and receive new refugee flows. 1 «»
On 30 November 1988 Lance Clark of the RPG made a presentation, at
an Emergency Management Workshop on his most recent findings about
UNHCR's possibilities early information collecting and reporting. Although
the information system studied here is still designed primarily for the
purpose of emergency planning for refugee emergencies once they have
developed, the RPG's recommendations may in due course benefit
UNHCR's ability to continue moving further into the terrain of preventive
action. 110
2.2.2. Office of Research and the Collection of Information (ORCI)
In a first attempt to improve information gathering on incipient refugee
flows within the UN system, the Secretary-General requested the UN
agencies in a letter of 23 November 1983 to inform him on an urgent basis
of any situation which could give rise to a major humanitarian refugee crisis.
All agencies were to report through the UN Centre for Human Rights in
Geneva, which the Secretary-General had designated for carrying out the
task of centralizing the information thus gathered. Some agencies, including
UNHCR, responded that their nonpolitical mandate prevented them from
cooperating in such an the effort, and so this initia tive could never produce
the results hoped for.
During the following two years, the climate changed in two significant
ways: the UN itself underwent a financial crisis, and member states who had
been acting as resettlement and donor countries began to experience
"compassion fatigue" in accepting new refugees.
Prompted by the threat of losing a large percentage of operating funds, in
1986 a Group of 18 High-level Intergovernmental Experts reviewed the
structure and the functioning of the U.N. Secretariat Among other
suggestions, the Group recommended eliminating duplication and increasing
productivity, reducing fragmentation and undue complexity,
_________________________
109 Lance Clark, Letter to Philip Sargisson, 6 February 1986, pp. 1-2.
110 Personal interview with Lance Clark on November 16, 1988 in Cambridge.
Also see "Training with UNHCR," No. 1 (April 1988), Summary of UNHCR
Training Courses for 1988.

62 Chapter 2
in order to arrive at a leaner and more efficiently run Secretariat. 111 This set
the stage for the establishment of a centralized office for collecting information.
Faster and more efficient communication was also a concern of
U.N. member states overburdened by uncontrolled refugee flows, and so the
streamlined flow of information emerged as a priority in the 1986
recommendations of the UN Group of Governmental Experts on International
Co-operation to Avert New Refugees Flows, which the General
Assembly endorsed in the same year.
Finally, in March 1987 the Secretary-General, established a special Office
for the Research and the Collection of Information to provide support for his
general efforts in preventive diplomacy, headed by the Assistant Secretary-
General, Mr. James O.G. Jonah, and reporting directly to the Secretary-
General. Its specific purpose was to centralize the collection, analysis, and
dissemination of political information and dissemination within the
Secretariat 112
The Secretary-General charged ORCI with important political functions,
of which the following three relate directly to refugee-producing situations:
* To provide early warning of developing situations requiring the Secretary-
General's attention
* To monitor factors related to possible refugee flows
* To carry out ad hoc research for the immediate needs of the Secretary-General 113 .
In his progress report on the implementation of the recommendations of the
Group of 18, the Secretary-General stressed that the purpose of this
_________________________
111 UN Doc. 49 (A/41/49), 15 August 1986, Report of the Group of High-Level
Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and
Financial Functioning of the United Nations, General Assembly Official
Records, p. 13: Recommendation 18: "There is a duplication of efforts with
regard to the dissemination of news and political analysis activities in various
departments, namely, the Office for Field Operational and External Support
Activities, the Department of Political and Security Affairs, the Department of
Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization and die Department of Public
Information. These activities should be rationalized and co-ordinated with a
view to achieving substantial savings and better utilization of resources."
112 UN. doc. ST/SGB/225,1 March 1987: Office for Research and the Collection of
Information, p. 1.
113 James O.C. Jonah, "Monitoring Factors Related to Refugee Flows and Comparable
Emergencies: The Role of the Secretary-General's Office for Research and
the Collection of Information," Speech, Florence, Italy, 29 January 1988, p. 7.
Empirical Examination 63
office is to centralize, not overextend, preexisting information-gathering activities:
The collection and dissemination of publicly available data previously performed in various
offices have been consolidated and a structure created to take full advantage of the
Secretariat's capacity to identify threats to peace at an early stage. 114
The Secretary-General reaffirmed these goals and the progress toward them in his
1987 and 1988 Annual Reports, pointing out that he is continuing to improve
coordination among the organization of the United Nations system as
recommended by the Group of 18. 115
In the Organization Manual of October 1988, the Secretary-General confirmed
ORCI's function to strengthen the institutional basis for United Nations efforts in
preventive diplomacy. 116 With ORCI firmly established, the United Nations can
now take on a more active role by better predicting problems that could threaten
peaceful international rela tions and give rise to new refugee flows, thus working
beyond the scope of its traditional diplomatic efforts.
To achieve its goals, ORCI plans to use new technological tools for
systematically gathering, processing and analyzing data to facilitate the resolution
of current and potential conflicts. ORCI proposes to establish reliable and
systematic channels of information, as well as a sound qualitative or quantitative
analysis. Presented in a coherent framework, such
_________________________
114 UN doc. A/42/234, 23 April 1987: "Reform and renewal of the United Nations:
progress report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of General As sembly
resolution 41/213," p. 9.
115 UN doc. 1 (A/42/1), Report of the Secretary-General of the Work of the Organization,
Official Records of the General Assembly, 9 September 1987, p. 8; and UN
doc. A/43/1*, 14 September 1988, (advance version of the report of the Secretary-
General), p. 20.
116 In addition to the three above mentioned functions related to refugee flows ORCI's
five other functions are: "To asses global trends; to prepare country, regional,
subregional and issue-related profiles in close consultation with officers dealing with
negotiation and conflict resolution functions in the Secretariat; to maintain current
information in data systems, consulting with inside and outside data banks, as
appropriate; to receive, consolidate and distribute political information from the
media and from the United Nations information centres on developments related to
peace and security for the use by the Secretary-General; to prepare and edit drafts of
the Secretary-General's public statements, messages and reports." UN Secretariat,
doc. ST/SGB/Organization Section: ORCI, 3 October 1988: "A description of the
functions and organization of The Office for Research and the Collection of
Information," Organization Manual, p.l.

64 Chapter 2
data could be an "essential tool for breaking down to barriers the peace
making." 117
One of the models that ORCI developed illustrates the framework of
major aspects of its work for UN political data gathering, processing and
utilization. 118
In its efforts to pinpoint potential conflicts, ORCI has been studying
computer models for crisis management in the context of UN conflict resolution
and prevention. It is currently refining its theoretical guidelines,
including indicators for establishing its early warning work and drawing up
comprehensive country profiles. 119 In order to identify trouble spots, ORCI
analysts could, among other choices, draw on GASCON HI (Com-puteralded
Systems for Information on Local Conflicts), a computerized database
developed by Professor Lincoln Bloomfield at M.I.T.'s Center for
International Studies. Professor Bloomfield's system is a computerized spinoff
from a major research project carried out by the MIT Center for
International Studies since the mid-1960s. 120
Although it has been a slow process, ORCI is now established and
equipped as planned. Assistant Secretary-General James O.C. Jonah oversees
the Office's three major functions:
1. The Planning and Early Warning Service, which includes a Planning and
Research Coordination & Development Unit and two Data Units (one on Africa
and Asia and the other on the Americas and Europe)
__________________________
117 Tapio Kanninen, "New Prospects at the United Nations to Utilize Research and
Technology Related to Data on International Relations," Background Paper for
participants at the Conference on New Technologies for the Codification, Storage,
Retrieval and Analysis of International Events Data, held at the M.I.T., 13-15 November
1987, p. 6.
118 Kanninen, "New Prospects," p. 4. Kanninen presented in that paper a theoretical
model for UN political data gathering, processing and utilization, to illustrate
the framework of major aspects of its work.
119 Tapio Kanninen, "Monitoring and Early Warning for Preventive Diplomacy of the
Secretary-General," Paper, 7 April 1986, p. 3 and appendix.
120 Professor Bloomfield mentioned in his description of the CASCON system that MIT
Prof. Nazli Choucri used 45 CASCON cases in her pathbreaking work on Population
Dynamics and International Violence to examine the relationship between conflict
behavior and factors of population, resources, and technology in developing countries.
At the end of this study, she concluded that CASCON "can ... be employed as an early
warning system for detecting the development of conflict situations based on pattern
recognition ... in order to assess potential consequences." Lincoln P. Bloomfield,
"Computers and Foreign Policy: The CASCON System," unpublished paper, n.d., p, 6.
2. The News Distribution Section
3. The Drafting Service.121
Empirical Examination 65
The Planning and Research Coordination & Development Unit among
several other tasks, establishes and maintains contacts with outside
research institutions and individuals, to develop systems best suited for the
key responsibilities of the Office; the Data Units gather information on
potential crisis situations that might require the attention of the Secretary-
General. The News Distribution Section issues a political information
bulletin three times a day, focusing on current trouble spots and sensitive
political issues. The Drafting Service prepares public statements and
reports for the Secretary-General on all topics, including those rela ted to
refugee problems.
Provided governments and other relevant governmental organizations
support the work of ORCI as an international focal point for the collection
and analysis of information, the Office may function as a catalyst to bring
about progress. Naturally, given the tasks ahead, one organization or office
cannot carry out comprehensive preventive action alone. However, there is
currently no central international structure other than ORCI for centralizing
and analyzing information. Though organizational capabilities have been
developed by different subsidiary UN organs, specialized agencies, and
other organizations, they cannot always be used to maximum effect
because they lack an integrated coordinating mechanism.
It will be the challenge of ORCI to obtain first-hand information from
organizations working directly for the protection of human rights and refugees,
to ensure that its assessments reflect the real situations of refugee
causes around the globe. ORCI will no doubt encounter the reluctance that
nongovernmental organizations have developed for sharing their own
information with other bodies of the United Nations.
Given UNHCR's experience and expertise in humanitarian work for
refugees, its cooperation seems to be of crucial importance for providing
general information and guidance to ORCI. UNHCR has made significant
progress in the past few years in predicting new refugee flows in order to
prepare contingency plans for emergency situations.
Although cooperating with ORCI for preventive action would not conflict
with statutory limitations that govern the actions of UNHCR as a
humanitarian organization, it would obviously not be advisable for
_______________________
121 UN doc. ST/ SGB/Organization Section, ORCI, 3 October 1988: Organization
Manual, "A description of the functions and organization of the Office for
research and the Collection of Information," p. 6.

66 Chapter 2
UNHCR to provide detailed reasons for what is causing refugee flows,
which could be interpreted as assigning responsibility or blame. On the
other hand, UNHCR does not have to withdraw completely from the
prospect of sharing information with ORCI. Its attitude should be one of
impartiality rather than noninvolvement. When UNHCR has a sufficient
basis on which to predict the worsening of a given situation that could
give rise to massive new refugee flows, it might do so in a confidential
communication to the Secretary-General and ORCI, so that the Secretary-
General's Office might undertake appropriate action to prevent the
escalation or even an internationalization of the problem. In that way
UNHCR can continue to carry out its humanitarian functions, while letting
ORCI and the Secretary-General's office handle the political aspects.
2.2.3. Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues
This office succeeds the Independent Commission for International Humanitarian
Issues (ICIHI) in Geneva, which had been established in 1983
by an international group of eminent persons, including Robert McNamara
and Susana Agnelli, to enhance public awareness of pressing humanitarian
issues, many of which produce refugee flows.
In his 1981 statement to the U.N. General Assembly, Crown Prince
Hassan Ibn Talal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had proposed to
the Assembly "the promotion of a new international humanitarian order
parallel to the efforts being made in economic and other fields." 122 During
the same session, the General Assembly adopted by consensus the first
resolution relating to the New International Humanitarian Order, in which
it recognized:
The importance of further improving a comprehensive international framework
which takes fully into account existing instruments relating to humanitarian
questions as well as the need for addressing those aspects which are not yet
adequately covered... Institutional arrangements and actions of governmental
and nongovernmental bodies might need to be further strengthened to respond
effectively in situations requiring humanitarian action. 123
With the objective of translating the concept of the new international
humanitarian order into reality, the General Assembly adopted a resolu-
_______________________
122 A/36/PV.15,28 September 1981, UN General Assembly, Thirty-Sixth
Session Official Records, General Debate, Agenda item 9, p. 294.
123 UN Ga res A/36/136,14 December 1981.
Empirical Examination 67
tion a year later in which it noted the proposal to establish an Independent
Commission on International Humanitarian Issues. The Commission,
composed of leading personalities in the humanitarian field or those with a
wide experience in government or world affairs, was to operate outside the
United Nations framework. 124
Following the first plenary meeting of the Independent Commission in
1983 in New York, the General Assembly passed another resolution, noting
the establishment of the Commission and requesting the Secretary-General
to "remain in contact with governments as well as the Independent
Commission to provide a comprehensive report on the new international
humanitarian order." 125
In 1985 the Secretary-General presented his report on the new international
humanitarian order to the General Assembly, along with comments
received from governments. The General Assembly took note of the
activities of the Commission and expressed interest in seeing the final
outcome of the Commission's efforts. 126 Finally, in December 1987, the
General Assembly, on the basis of a draft final report of the Commission,
noted the efforts of the Independent Commission to promote public awareness
of humanitarian issues, analyzing its relatively neglected aspects and
identifying alternative approaches for resolving humanitarian problems. In
addition, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to remain
in contact with governments, relevant specialized agencies and programs of
the United Nations system, and concerned nongovernmental organizations,
in order to report, at the 1988 session, on the basis of information available
to him, on the progress made in the humanitarian field. 127 The Commission
having served its three year life-span, its future role in these activities was
to be undertaken by the Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues. In
1988 the Commission's final report was published in various parts of the
world, and it is now being translated into several languages. As stated in the
report, the purpose of the Commission was to:
• study specific humanitarian issues that have been inadequately dealt with to
date, or call for solutions in line with new realities;
_______________________
124 UN Ga res 37/201,18 December 1982.
125 UN Ga res A/38/125,16 December 1983.
126 UN GA res A/40/126,13 December 1985.
127 UN GA res A/C.3/42/L.57,16 November 1987. See also Independent
Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, final report, Winning the Human
Race, (London: Zed Books, 1988), p. 201.

68 Chapter 2
* identify opportunities for more effective action by the international
community and make practical, action-oriented proposals that promote the
well-being of people;
* enhance public awareness of the conditions that create and perpetuate human
suffering, and increase support for changes that will make the world a more
humane place. 128
In its work the Commission focused on three broad areas of concern:
humanitarian norms, including dangers to the mostly civilian victims of
armed conflicts; disasters, natural and manmade, a topic embracing the
development of early warning systems based on social and economic indicators;
and vulnerable groups, refugees and displaced persons as well as
indigenous populations at risk and street children.
The Commission contracted scholars and institutions for specialized
research, and published the results in individual reports on urgent issues
of our time, such as famine, modern wars, and refugees and population
displacement. 129 Its final report, although it draws the reader's attention to
the main challenges facing humanity today and tomorrow, concludes with
a message of hope.
In this constructive spirit, the Commission recommended a number of
important innovative measures, which, if implemented, would assertively
contribute to containing refugee-producing refugee situations:
1. Establish for a period an Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues,
to complete the publication of sectorial reports and carry out follow-up
activities with governments, international and regional organizations and
nongovernmental agencies in an effort to translate the Commission's
achievements into humanitarian policies and practices.
2. Establish Independent National Commissions, which could be the
starting point for a humanitarian movement to complement the existing
bodies and on-going efforts in humanitarian law and practice.
3. Create a Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs or a special department near
the head of state or government's office, to integrate humanitarian
concerns in the policy process. The benefit to governmental offices of a
rigorous and systematic analysis of humanitarian issues would materially
affect the well being of the people living in the country.
_______________________
128 The Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues,
Winning the Human Race?, pp. 209-10.
129 Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, Refugees:
Dynamics of Displacement, (London: Zed Books Ltd., 1986).
Empirical Examination 69
4. Support increased funding for the protection of human rights.
5. Establish a U.N. Central Office for Humanitarian Issues, close to the
Secretary-General's office in New York, in the same fashion as has been
done for economic and development issues. Among other functions, this
Central Office would also serve as the principal interlocutor before governments
in humanitarian emergencies, especially in those areas so far
covered inadequately or not at all by existing bodies. This Office would
have to pay greater attention to root causes and the structural changes that
could eliminate them, in an effort to concentrate international efforts on
prevention rather than cure.
6. Establish a universal Right to Humanitarian Assistance, while
respecting sovereign prerogatives of states, by setting up "mercy corridors"
to reach humanitarian victims speedily, especially children, women,
and the aged.
7. Elaborate a Declaration of minimum humanitarian principles, based
on universally accepted values common to world cultures, movements,
and religions. 130
More and more individuals and institutions are searching for innovative
solutions to today's increasingly complex global problems. To provide a
complete survey of their initiatives and contributions would be beyond
the scope of this section.
Critically analyzed, the efforts invested during the past few decades
have not produced corresponding results. However, considering the complexity
of the problem, more people and institutions are recognizing the
need for dealing with the problem beforehand and not only once it has
occurred. The international community can do better than that. Because
increasing capacities exist to predict massive exoduses of populations,
some of these flights could be contained without infringing on the rights
of people to leave their country.
In response to growing refugee flows, the industrialized countries have
shown an increasingly restrictive attitude toward asylum seekers. But they
have rarely used their diplomatic and economic power to directly address
the causes that motivate these flows. On the contrary, at times
international relief actions have had the effect of contributing to or even
perpetuating the conditions that cause people to move. A major reo-
_______________________
130 The Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, Winning
the Human Race'?, pp. 194-99.

70 Chapter 2
rientation of foreign and economic policies in both the Northern and the
Southern Hemisphere is needed. 131
Considering that the United Nations is not a vested sovereign power
and has no international authority except that of the Security Council,
which is subject to the consensus of the five permanent members, it can
only rely on the process of negotiation, persuasion, and consensus to accomplish
its purposes. 132
The recently created Office for Research and the Collection of Information
(ORCI) within the UN Secretariat, working in collaboration with
qualified and experienced entities such as the nongovernmental Refugee
Policy Group and the Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues, may
be the beginning of an international effort to gather and analyze information
and develop strategic proposals for preventive measures on a more
global international level.
The accomplishments of the RPG and the ICIHI, and the establishment
of ORCI, might serve as an inspiration for more future-oriented action.
International preventive action to contain refugee-producing situations is
conditioned by the factors that cause people to flee. As many
contemporary flows have been motivated by a combination of political,
ethnocultural, and ecological factors, it is clear that today's refugee causes
need more study to design new strategies. An energetic approach to
causes could help determine innovative ways of responding to current incipient
refugee situations, for which the traditional approach, designed to
respond to post-World War n refugee flows, is no longer adequate.
_______________________
131 Saddrudin Aga Khan, "Une crise aggravee par 1'attitude des pays riches,"
Le Monde Diplomatique (1987), p. 31.
132 In his book on Dag Hammarskjold, Brian Urquhart highlighted the active
style of quiet diplomacy that proved so successful in a series of seeemingly
hopeless situations. In improvising instruments of multilateral preventive
diplomacy, UN peace-keeping forces, observer groups, UN "presences," and
various experiments in "good offices," Hammarskjold showed the potential
of the Office of the Secretary-General as a political organ of the United
nations, which could act when intergovernmental organs, especially the
Security Council, were frustrated by the conflicting interests of disputing
powers. Brian Urqhuart, Hammarskjold, (New York: Harper & Row, 1972),
p. 596. On the other hand, the power of the UN to influence refugeeproducing
situations is not unlimited: "Poverty and power politics are the
main reasons that people by the millions have felt compelled to leave their
homes and their countries to seek a semblance of security on foreign soil."
See Aue Grahl-Madsen, "Identifying the World's Refugees," Annals,
AAPSS, 467 (May 1983), p. 12.
Chapter 3
Analytical Discussion: Analysis of Refugee Causes and Selected
Examples
3.1. Analysis of refugee-producing factors
My policy proposal rests on an analysis of causes that force people to become
refugees. With the hypothesis in mind that many refugees are exploited
in political strife, we will focus our analysis on refugee producing
situations that were actuated or escalated by forces outside national
boundaries for their own motives, not necessarily those of the country of
origin - big powers, antigovernmental forces and hostile nations. To show
this we have selected the examples of Vietnam and Nicaragua. Actors in
the political arena have potentials to respond to diplomatic and political
measures, which is where the policy proposal is concentrated.
Before we analyze the main causes in the examples, we will first examine
the historical connection between refugees and social change.
3.1.1. Social change and refugees
Is a preventive approach to addressing refugee-producing situations
naive? Noted scholars observe:
As the history of refugee movements demonstrates, refugees are a by-product of
social change, and only one item on a much broader canvas of suffering and
progress. Orientation towards the fate of refugees must be tempered by awareness
of tins larger picture. A revolution, for instance, should not be equated merely by
the tragic but historically necessary fact that it produces refugees. 133
_______________________
133 Astri Suhrke, "Toward A Better International Refugee Regime," in Aristide R.
Zolberg, Astri Suhrke and Sergio Aguayo, Escape from Violence:The Refugee
Crisis in the Developing World, Forthcoming; Oxford University Press, 1989,
p. 10 of Chapter 10 of Draft.

72 Chapter 3
In addition to Suhrke's concern, humanitarian organizations and individuals
devoted to helping with the results of social change - refugees -
complain that states pursue their interests without much regard to whether
their action produces refugees and what could become of them. 134
We organized situations that generate refugees into two main categories:
First, people are made refugees, internal or external, through the actions
of those who hold political power over them. This exercise of authority
usually has ulterior motives in a political strife. The recent history of
Vietnam and Central America falls under this category. Second, the
people themselves initiate resistance to policies of their rulers. Their quest
for social change may put them at risk of persecution, torture, or even
death, as for example in Chile.
This study conceptualizes international preventive action for the first
category. Preventive action for the second category of situations seems
inappropriate because
to avert flows would be the equivalent of trying to oppose social change.
In the aggregate, this of course is impossible; in particular cases it may be
undesirable. To stifle change may freeze a repressive social order or
contribute to systemic social inequalities. 135
Civil strife, wars of liberation movements, revolutionary movements in
semi-feudal societies, and violent resistance to oppressive, totalitarian regimes
may all be necessary to bring about social or political change. No
doubt, in these situations the flight of certain activists is both crucial to
the success of the quest for change and indispensable to save their lives.
_______________________
134 Louis Wiesner said: "The U.S. Forces went on generating refugees in
Vietnam with little regard to what would become of them." Victims and
Survivors, Draft of last chapter, p. 598, forthcoming, (New York:
Greenwood Press, 1988).
135 Zolberg et al, Escape from Violence, Ch. 10, p. 10. There might be
circumstances where violent change is a necessary process toward a more
just social order. With the rationale of stressing "law and order" and
national security concerns, many regimes have been legitimizing repressive
and and arbitrary actions against their citizens (Chile, Paraguay, Greece,
German Democratic Republic, Soviet Union, Vietnam).
3.1.1.1. Flight, tolerable price to death?
Analytical Discussion 73
Is leaving the country where conditions have became unbearable for an
individual or group always inevitable? Not necessarily. Two primary factors
determine whether flight is feasible at all: the availability of refuge and the
likelihood of safe escape.
On the one hand, if people have no place to go, which is largely determined
by the governmental policies of receiver countries, they will not leave. (This
does not, however, mean that governments or other forces are influenced in
their persecution or human rights violations by whether there is a place for
their oppressed citizens to escape to or not.)
[T]he availability of a place of refuge may in some cases determine whether
persecution wül lead to the formation of a refugee flow or to some other
outcome, such as mass murder, which can be thought of as a form of extreme
persecution that does not produce refugees. 136
A case in point would be the conditions in Kampuchea under the Pol Pot
regime: though a few managed to escape into bordering Vietnam and Thailand,
the treatment of the people did not result in a massive outflow but rather in
mass murder, which is well documented.
Second, the ability to leave the country that engages in persecution
determines whether there will be an outflow or not. Even if governmental
policies of other states make available entry visas to those who seek to flee,
they may not be able to leave and avail themselves of the offer. 137
_______________________
136 Zolberg refers to the case of the European Jews during the Nazi era, and submits that
undoubtedly the original objective of the Nazis with respect to Jews in Germany, and later
within the Europe they controlled, was expulsion, and that it was the unwillingness of
liberal democracies to take in Jewish refugees that fostered the shift to the "Final Solution."
See Aristide R. Zolberg and Astri Suhrke, "International Factors in the Formation of
Refugee Movements," International Migra tion Review 20, No. 2 (1986), p. 154.
137 Examples of these cases would be Soviet Jews who had a place of refuge in either Israel or
the USA, but until a few years ago were unable to get to it According to the US Department
of State, 1987 saw some change in the Soviet handling of dis sidents. Jewish, ethnic German,
and Armenian emigration increased markedly, in contrast to the last several years. The
Department also states: "In January new Soviet regulations for travel abroad went into effect
In making family reunification the only legal basis for emigration, the regulation codified
Moscow's long-standing refusal to recognize the right to leave, a right included in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which was incorporated into the Helsinki Act. U.S.
Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights and Practices for 1987,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt Printing Office, 1988). See also Natan Sharansky,

74 Chapter 3
This has happened in Vietnam, where people continue to suffer hardship
for political, economic, religious, and other reasons partly because, until
recently, Vietnam did not recognize the right to leave. Therefore the only
possible way out, if orderly departure falls, is clandestine escape. We will
now explore problems of asylum seekers in reaching safe shores, often
under adverse circumstances, if flight turns out to be the necessary price
of social change.
3.1.1.2. Make flight a viable option
Despite continuous efforts to assist asylum seekers at sea and on land to
arrive safely at a place of refuge, tragic incidents multiply. 138 The incidence
of piracy attacks has been one of the most gruesome chapters in the
modern history of refugees. 139 In an effort to tackle this sensitive problem,
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), with the
support of several states 140 and the Secretary-General, did set up an antipiracy
program, which had a limited success. 141
______________________
"Glasnost May Be Glasnost, but Prison Is Prison: For Most Jews and Some Political
Prisoners, Little Has Changed," The New York Times, 25 May 1988.
138 In Thailand in 1981 a total of 12,526 Vietnamese boat people arrived in Thailand in
about 357 boats. At least 289 boats with 985 people were attacked by pirates. There
were 646 known deaths, 199 abductions, and 583 rape victims." "Gulf Piracy Report
False - Prasong," Bangkok Post, March 13, 1982; cited in Citizens Commission
Report, January 1985, p. 102.
139 Teodor Schweitzer, who had been Head of the UNHCR Office in Songhkla did risk
his own life to save victims out of the hands of the pirates until he himself needed to
be evacuated as his life was threatened by many of those whom he had either
identified as pirates or supporters of them bringing them before the Thai courts. See
"Seul Contre Les Pirates de I'De de Kra," Document in L'Evénement du Jeudi 9 au
15 Janvier 1986. See also Pascal Dupont, Pirates d'aujourd' hui Editions Ramsay, p.
52.
140 In July 1982, UNHCR organized an international anti-piracy fund. The U.S. government
contributed $2 million and eleven other governments made available an
additional $1.7 million. Thailand was given three patrol crafts, three trawlers, and
three decoy boats. See Citizens Commission Report, p. 105.
141 "In May 1983 the Secretary-General sent a note verbale to 17 countries (the 12
donor countries contributing to the Royal Thai Navy's Anti-Piracy Program funded
through UNHCR, plus Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand)
asking for suggestions on possible courses of action, in particular at the regional
level, to promote decisive efforts towards the suppression of piracy," UNHCR,
"Anti-Piracy Assessment Team Report," July 1983, p. 1.
Analytical Discussion 75
Another initiative of UNHCR was the creation of Guidelines for
Disembarkation of Refugees, to inform shipmasters, agents, and shipping
companies about the necessary steps to be taken for speedy rescue, especially
in piracy-penetrated areas and in major distress points in the South
China Sea, and efficient disembarkation. The Guidelines also addressed the
issue of reimbursement for the care and maintenance on board of the rescued
refugees prior to landing. 142
Despite the acceptance of non-refoulement as a general principle of
international law, 143 serious incidents of refusing to let asylum seekers reach
safe shores are still taking place. Dramatic circumstances occurred in 1979
when the then Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, Dr. Mahathir Mohammed,
made the infamous statement on June 15 that the country would "shoot on
sight" refugees landing on the country's shores. In the same month,
Indonesian authorities organized a naval blockade ("Operation Lightening")
to intercept Vietnamese refugees and refuse them entry. In a probably not
unrelated move, the Thal government returned 40,000 Cambodians in
1979. 144 The reason given for expelling these Kampucheans, who had been
camping along the Thai border since the invasion of Vietnam, was that they
were economic migrants. 145 In addition, Thal border authorities tried to
prevent large groups coming directly from Kampuchea from entering the
country. More recently, refoulement of new arrivals by Thai authorities has
resulted in a new international wave of concern and outcry for action:
At least 170 Vietnamese boat people have died off the Thai coast since the end of
January after their boats were pushed off or intentionally rammed by Thai police,
navy or fishing vessels.... The violation of basic human rights has continued
unabated during the past year. In 1988 these protection problems have reached
crisis proportions. 146
_______________________
142 UNHCR/8012/A. Guidelines for Disembarkation of Refugees, May 1984.
143 1951 UN Convention, Art. 33.
144 Dyer/ Clark, "Vietnamese Boat People Crisis," pp. 9-10.
145 International Migration Policies and Programmes: A World Survey, Department of
International Economic and Social Affairs, Population Studies, No. 80. New York:
United Nations, 1982), p. 94. Lionel Rosenblatt, former Refugee Coordinator in
Thailand for the U.S. Government states "Protection against involuntary repatriation is
the most fundamental of the rights which refugees are accorded by the
convention....thousands of Khmer were sent back into Cambodia over a cliff in the
northeast section of Thailand," Quoted in Peter Rose ed., Working with Refugees, (New
York: Center for Migration Studies, 1986), p. 13.
146 Henry Kamm, "U.N. Attributes 170 Deaths to Thai Refusals of Refugees," The New
York Times, 6 April 1988.

76 Chapter 3
In other situations in which safe arrival in the bordering country of refuge
is attempted in the face of deadly risks, UNHCR has set up ad hoc protection
mechanisms on flight points. Two examples are the reception
centers La Guarita and La Virtud on the border between Honduras and El
Salvador. Following difficult negotiations with the Honduran authorities,
UNHCR obtained their consent to have roving field protection officers
regularly patrol border crossing points, under the surveillance of Honduran
security personnel. This operation is designed to provide international
protection to asylum seekers from El Salvador on their arrival at a reception
center in the border area and through their transfer to one of the near
by refugee camps (Colomoncagua, Mesa Grande, or San Antonio); 147 the
presence of U.N. officials helps restrain the Honduran security troops
from shooting or otherwise harming refugees seeking refuge on Honduran
soil. Other arrangements have been necessary, however, in places such as
the Horn of Africa and the front-line states of South Africa, where
military attacks on flight routes and reception centers have been
jeopardizing safe passage and refuge.
3.1.1.3. Refugees - political 'pawns'?
Refugees usually do not choose to uproot themselves unless conditions
force them to do so. "Refugees - victims of persecution - are political
pawns," declared the former Deputy UNHCR High Commissioner for
Refugees, Dale de Haan.ns "These refugees, poor devils, are being
slaughtered. They are being kidnapped. [What can we do, particularly
when] the countries are exporters and importers of refugees at the same
time?" 149 Fundamental to solving refugee problems is doing something
_______________________
147 See HCR/HON/6/88, "Documento de Informacion: Situation del Programa de Refugiados
en Honduras," April 1988.
148 Rose, Working with Refugees, p. 4.
149 Zia Rizvi further suggests that at the beginning of UNHCR assistance was conceived
of as a means to an end: The end was then finding permanent solutions. Since the
1960's and 1970's, particularly in the Third World, the means have become the end;
"relief perpetuates the problem. "The do-gooders, the donors, are able to buy time,
and are able to respond to public outcry by being quite selective and giving here and
there, not in order to cure, but just in order to keep it going, to keep a lid on. The net
result: there are no solutions to refugees problems.... In the last two decades, except
for voluntary repatriation - which was a political matter, not humanitarian in most
cases- there haven't been any political solutions." Rose, Working with Refugees, p.
20.
Analytical Discussion 77
about the conditions that turn people into refugees. Unless the political
climate exists in the country of origin for addressing the causes that compell
people to leave, refugee problems have little prospect of solution. By
the same token, if refugees cease to serve a political purpose for either the
refugee-producing or the receiving countries, then people might be less at
risk for becoming political pawns.
3.1.2. Selected Examples
Rather than present an exhaustive list, I intend to concentrate on dynamic
factors - conditions developing over time that cause people to leave their
homeland. In a world of interdependence, countries can hardly stay isolated
for a long time, producing refugees under static circumstances. External
political forces play an important role in the conditions leading to mass
exodus. For example, the diplomatic isolation into which most of the major
resettlement countries placed Vietnam after 1975 had a major impact on
Vietnam's refugee production. I believe that by maintaining diplomatic or at
least economic relations with Vietnam, some of these countries might have
been able to address certain causes that led to the refugee outflow.
Instead of focusing on preventive measures within the refugee producing
country, or attempting to work with the country directly, the world
community emphasized remedial actions and relied on the United Nations
to take the initiative. We have selected examples on the basis of existing
evidence that outside forces played a major role in the generation of
refugees: Vietnam before and after 1975 and Nicaragua in 1986.
We will start our analysis with the aftermath of the Vietnam war. It was
during this troubled period that, through multilateral efforts, UNHCR set up
the Orderly Departure Program (OOP) and the Secretary-General convened
the 1979 international meeting on refugees in Southeast Asia.
I intend to demonstrate how the international community was partially
responsible, even if unintentionally, for perpetuating the exodus of Vietnamese
citizens from their country. I also hope to show that, perhaps in
recognition of this responsibility, states did eventually cooperate with the
United Nations as a face-saving device, adopting some preventive measures
to contain, if not reduce, the exodus.

78 Chapter 3
3.1.2.1. The OOP (Orderly Departure Program), the 1979 and the 1989
Meeting and the CPA
Introduction
The major cause of the exodus from Vietnam was the fall of Saigon in
April 1975, which, following a strong, two- decade-long American involvement,
resulted in the restructuring of the economic and political
system in South Vietnam.
This analysis cannot provide a complete account of the causes that
motivated nearly one and a half million persons 150 to leave their homeland,
often under life-threatening circumstances en route to asylum. It focuses
rather on those factors that have perpetuated the outflow of refugees
over the past thirteen years, even though they could to some extent have
been addressed. I will also examine the long-term impact of the Orderly
Departure Program (ODP) and the 1979 Geneva Meeting on Refugees
and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia, on July 20 and 21, and explore
the question of whether new policies and actions would be more effective
in view of the developments of the past decade.
Background
The Orderly Departure program was originally intended by UNHCR only
to facilitate family reunification. Following strenuous negotiations with
the Vietnamese authorities, UNHCR agreed to expand the program to
include "other humanitarian cases." 151 Although the ODP was not
intended to remedy the causes of the exodus from Vietnam, and has not
done so, UNHCR stepped beyond its usual functions of offering protec
_______________________
150 Between May 1975 and May 1987, 1,486,136 Indochinese Refugees
(including Khmer and Laotians) departed from the camps in Southeast Asia:
792,871 to the USA and 693,265 to other resettlement countries (excluding
the Orderly Departure Program). See US Congress, Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Midyear Consultation on Refugee Programs: Hearing Before
the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs, 100th Congress, 1st
sess. June 30, 1987, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office), 1987,
p. 109.
151 See Milton Osbome, "The Indochinese Refugees: Cause and Effects,"
International Affairs, 56 (1980), pp. 39-40.
Analytical Discussion 79
tion and assistance to refugees onto the new terrain of initiating the prevention
of refugee flows.i 52
The official start of the ODP took place at a consultative meeting in
December 1978, at which the government of Hanoi agreed, with some
exceptions, to grant exit visas to all Vietnamese who wished to leave. 153 On
the basis of the personal initiative of the then Deputy High Commissioner,
Dale De Haan, to keep negotiating this issue persistently with the
government in Hanoi, the Vietnamese authorities and UNHCR reached an
understanding to operate the ODP. The official record of the agreement
says:
In furtherance of a conclusion of the Consultative Meeting held in December
1978, UNHCR signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of
Vietnam on 30 May 1979, concerning the orderly departure of family reunion and
other humanitarian cases from that country. It is hoped that an early
implementation of this programme will ease the situation in some measure. 154
The ODP established a new precedent for UNHCR in its approach to the
management of refugee problems by engaging the Office in a long-range
activity to stem an outflow of refugees. The program is also a rare example
of international cooperation in which preventive action worked, because of
the converging interests of the three major parties involved. 155 The country
of origin rid itself of elements who did not want to stay and in whom it was
not interested; the first-asylum countries could control their influx; and the
resettlement countries were able to choose their candidates in the country
of origin rather than in a camp.
One of the OOP's most important features is that it established a legal
channel for initiating a change in Vietnam's policy prohibiting the right
_______________________
152 Barry Wain, "The Indochina Refugee Crisis," Foreign Affairs, 58 (Fall
1979), p. 161, as quoted in Kumin, p. 7.
153 Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam, quoted in Kumin, Annex III. 12 January 1979, p. 254.
154 Background note dated 9 July 1979, prepared by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees for the Meeting on Refugee and Displaced
Persons in Southeast Asia, p. 5, in (UN Doc. A/34/ 627), 7 November 1979.
United Nations. Secretary-General. Report of the Secretary-General on the
Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South East Asia. Geneva, 20
and 21 July 1979, and subsequent developments, Annex I, p. 5.
155 In the Report on the work of the organization, the Secretary-General pointed
out that the peaceful resolution of problems depends more than anything on a
convergence of interests and that such convergence now exists on important
issues confronting the world, p. 18. A/42/1,9 September 1987.

80 Chapter 3
to leave. After nine years of allowing at least a limited number of people to
emigrate under the ODP, neither could Vietnam stop this practice nor could the
third countries suddenly close their doors to the immigration of Vietnamese.
Considering that an unknown but probably significant proportion of the people
who have so far safely arrived in a third country under the ODP might otherwise
have left by boat, risking pirate attacks, drowning, and push-offs, ODP should be
seen as a humanitarian measure, 156 even though such a managerial device to
reduce refugee flows might be criticized as legitimizing Vietnam's violation of
the fundamental right to leave one's country. 157
Unless it is integrated into a global approach for solving the problems causing
refugee flows, a program such as ODP will be insufficient to remedy the
problem of refugee production, and might even unwittingly help to perpetuate it.
To its credit, however, the ODP has "set a precedent for the UNHCR to move
candidly into the domain of action to avert refugee flows." 158
____________________
156 Vietnamese Boatpeople (Arrivals in First Asylum Countries) and Orderly
Departure: 1979 -1987
Year
1979:
1980:
1981:
1982:
1983:
1984:
1985:
1986:
1987:
1988:
Boat Arrivals
202,121
71,123
74,671
43,676
27,794
24,777
22,204
19,527
28,056
39,356
472,305
Orderly Departures
1,979
4,706
9,815
10,057
18,978
29,154
24,940
18,418
12,961
15,123
146,123
TOTAL:
1979 Orderly Departure
figure is for 1 June - 31 December only, that is, from the establishment of the program
on. 1988 figures are through 30 September. In Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva, Resettlement Section, "Statistics and Charts
Concerning Refugees from Indo-China in South East Asia for the Month of September
1988," Geneva: UNHCR, October 1988.
157 Leon Gordenker, Refugees in International Politics, Croom Helm, London &
Sydney 1987, p.161. Gordenker also warns that "orderly departure programs might
legitimize the claim of a possible repressive government that it has the right to
retain subjects who may feel threatened and want therefore to leave" (p. 162).
158 Kumin.p. 248.
Analytical Discussion 81
The Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in Southeast Asia
originated as did the ODP, in the consultative meeting of December 1978,
which the UN High Commissioner convened mainly because of the increasing
concerns about the "big boat trade." 159 Large ocean going ships 160 were making
huge profits by exporting huge numbers of people, in collusion with the
government of Vietnam. By the end of 1978 "the problem had reached
alarming proportions," 161 but the outflow of boat people was to rise even
higher, reaching 54,483 in June 1979 as compared to 4,924 in June 1978. 162
In May 1979, the Secretary-General had visited Thailand where the plight
of Vietnamese boat people had dramatically worsened due to the invasion of
Cambodia by Vietnamese armed forces and the subsequent massive outflow of
"new Kampuchean" refugees 163 . In the light of the
______________________
159 Keith St. Cartmail, Exodus Indochina (Auckland: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 98-99:
"Behind the racket are senior members of the Hanoi government and Mafia-like
syndicates set up to coordinate the operation outside Vietnam.... According to reports,
the Hanoi Government appointed a politburo member, Nguyen Van Linh,
answerable only to the Prime Minister, Pham Van Dong, to organize the traffic....
The main objective underlying the traffic was to flush out Vietnam's 1.2 million
ethnic Chinese, to obtain substantial amounts of gold and foreign currency. ... When
China closed its frontier with Vietnam in mid-1978, also in light of the conflict with
China in February-March 1979, [the ethnic Chinese] were systematically being:
forced to leave Vietnam by the public Security Bureau's Office of alien affairs, who
used 'shadowy go-betweens' in their negotiations with the international racketeers.''
160 Ships
# of Persons Country Year:
Southern Cross 1,220 Indonesia 1978
Hai Hong
2,500 Malaysia 1978
Huey Fong
3,318 Hongkong 1979
Skyluck
2,664 Hongkong 1979
Sen On
1,400 Philippines 1978
Tung An
2,318 Philippines 1979
161 A/34/627, 7 November 1979: Meeting on Refugees and Displaced Persons in South-
East Asia, convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at Ge neva on 28
and 21 July 1979, and subsequent developments, "Report of the Secretary-General, p.
3 (hereinafter cited as A/34/627, "1979 Meeting on Refugees in SEA."
162 Kumin.p.2.
163 The term "new Kampucheans" was used to distinguish the new arrivals from those
Cambodian refugees who had arrived in Thailand subsequent to the fall of Phnom
Penh in 1975. Whereas the old Cambodian refugees were under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of the Interior, and eligible for third country resettlement, the "new

82 Chapter 3
steady deterioration of asylum practices by some Southeast Asian states,
the Secretary-General appealed on his return to the heads of concerned
governments for their help and cooperation. 164 The Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom responded in a letter of 31 May 1979 to the Secretary-
General, proposing that he convene an international conference to deal with
the problem. 165 In addition, the Tokyo Economic Summit Conference of
industrialized countries issued a statement on 28 June 1979 confirming
their commitment to increase their support for relief and resettlement of
Vietnamese refugees, and also requesting the Secretary-General to convene
a conference to attain concrete results.
In response, the Secretary-General convened a meeting for 20 and 21
July 1979. Sixty-five governments attended, including Vietnam, as well as
observers from several other governments and a number of interested
intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The
meeting resulted in a significant increase in the amount of financial support
and the number of resettlement places offered by countries throughout the
world. 166 One of the demands by the states of the Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) had been not to be left with a huge residual
caseload of refugees with no other place to go. Both Thailand and Malaysia,
who had been faced with the largest number of refugees, had made
declarations in mid-1979 that no new boat people would be allowed to land
on their shores. Indonesia followed their example, just at the same time as
the Thai authorities were pursuing a policy of returning Kampuchean
refugees who had crossed into Thalland after the Vietnamese invasion. 167
During the July Meeting in Geneva, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
agreed to a proposal, originally put forward by France, 168 to "limit refu-
Kampucheans" remained under the prerogative of the Military Supreme Command,
and were in principle excluded from resettlement abroad.
164 A/34/627," 1979 Meeting on Refugees in SEA," p. 3.
165 A/34/627, "1979 Meeting on Refugees in SEA," p. 4.
166 The final results were: 1.) An increase in resettlement places from 125,000 in
May 1979 to 260,000 at the end of the meeting; 2.) Announcements of
pledges for approximately $160 million in cash and in kind contributions; 3.)
A proposal to set up a $25 million fund to search for durable solutions: 4.) An
offer to accommodate 50,000 refugees in refugee-processing centres; and 5.)
An expansion of the ODP and practical arrangements regarding the problem
of rescue at sea. See A/34/627, "1979 Meeting on Refugees in SEA," p. 7.
167 Milton Osborne, "The Indochinese Refugees: Cause and Effects,"
International Affairs, 56 (1980), p. 47.
168 Gordenker, Refugees in International Politics, p. 158.
Analytical Discussion 83
gee outflow 'for a reasonable period of time.'" 169 With Vietnam consenting
to a moratorium on forced expulsion of its citizens, and other countries
agreeing to pick up the refugee slack, the main actors dealing with the
refugee situation in Southeast Asia forecast a speedy end to the crisis - as
early as the end of 1979. The numbers of arrivals in first asylum countries
did indeed drop dramatically from nearly 55,000 in June to about 2000 per
month by the end of 1979. The ethnic composition of the arrivals reversed
as well, from more than 80 percent Vietnamese of Chinese ethnic origin
before the July meeting to barely 20 percent in September 1979. 17 °
Interviews with each group of Vietnamese boat people newly arriving in
Singapore after being rescued at sea showed that during the period between
the July Geneva Conference and
end of September, most of the refugees arriving in Singapore were ethnic
Vietnamese and only a small percentage ethnic Chinese, a statistic that offers
further strong evidence that the exodus of refugees of Vietnam has been an exodus
controlled by Hanoi and designed to expel Vietnam's Chinese population. 171
With 132,845 departures for resettlement countries during 1979, the
Vietnamese refugee camp population stood at 140,436 in December of that
year. 17 2 Considering how easily the crisis could have degenerated into an
unprecedented and unpredictable situation, jeopardizing regional political
and security interests, the results obtained from the 1979 Geneva Meeting
helped contain the flow of refugees to manageable proportions and defuse
serious tensions. The meeting resulted in international preventive actions
that worked. Even though Vietnam seems to have honored at least for the
"reasonable period of time" its commitment not to generate refugees in
1979, the outflow still continues. It has motivated various governments and
international organizations to keep the situation under close scrutiny, with a
view to developing new responses to it. Among other studies, a survey by
Senator Edward Kennedy's office on the occasion of a mission to Thalland
in 1984 examined the motives for leaving of 471 Vietnamese who had
arrived in Thalland by boat between
__________________
169 Osborne, p. 51.
170 On the hand file of the author.
171 St. Cartmail, p. 234.
172 Margaret Dyer Chamberlain, "Vietnamese Boat People Crisis - Case Study",
(Draft), Lance Clark (ed.) [hereinafter cited as Chamberlain/Clark, "Boat
People Crisis,"] Refugee Policy Group, September 1986, p. 8.

84 Chapter 3
December 1983 and January 1984. The data showed that the outflow had
shifted to a
migratory movement composed of some refugees, a growing number of family
reunification cases, and a large number of economic migrants. The international
community, and particularly the UNHCR, must begin to acknowledge this shift
by developing new alternatives such as repatriation, UNHCR screening and local
settlement without any longer relying only on third country resettlement 1 7 3
Even though the 1979 Geneva Meeting represents only limited international
preventive action, it features unique elements of international political
management of potential and actual refugee situations. Since the
Secretary-General organized the meeting under his auspices, it was possible
for the first time to bring together the refugee-producing country
with receiving countries to search jointly for ways of dealing with the
situation. By attending the meeting, Vietnam acknowledged "some responsibility
for the flight of refugees from the territory under its control."
174 Never before had the Secretary-General become so actively involved
in an ongoing refugee situation. Without his intervention and engagement,
the international cooperation needed to manage and contain the
flow of refugees would probably not have been possible. Humanitarian in
its conception, the meeting nevertheless had political importance and
international security implications. It also dramatized "the possibilities of
international community actions and put attending governments under a
certain moral obligation to act." 17 5
The Vietnamese government, however, had hoped to obtain something
in return for its cooperation in ceasing to expel Vietnamese citizens of
Chinese origin. Vietnam had clearly hoped to improve bilateral relations
with the United States, win more economic assistance from Western
countries and international organizations, and finally emerge from its political
isolation. The expectations for all three of these goals have
remained unfulfilled even today. The few Western bilateral aid programs
established after 1975 were curtailed with the invasion into Cambodia
after December 1978. Likewise, prospects for reestablishing diplomatic
___________________
173 US Congress. "Refugee and Migration Problems in South East Asia: 1984.
A Staff Report, for the use of the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Refugee Policy, Committee on the, Judiciary, United States Senate, 98th
Contr., 2nd Sess., August, 1984, p. iii.
174 Report of the Indochinese Refugee Panel, Department of State Publication
9476, Bureau for Refugee Programs, April 1986, p. 2.
175 Gordenker, Refugees in International Politics, p. 102-03.
Analytical Discussion 85
relations with the USA - and the aid expected to follow - disappeared after
Vietnam's intervention into Cambodia. 176
Vietnam's unfulfilled expectations might be one reason that there is still
an outflow trickling from that country to remind the international
community of its unmet needs. This situation clearly calls for international
action, both outside and within Vietnam.
In recognition of this necessity, a number of meetings have been held
among interested states and organizations, especially since early 1988.
Taking a leadership role, UNHCR organized and held an international
consultation on 27 and 28 October 1988 in Bangkok. These meetings were
attended by seventeen governments of ASEAN and resettlement countries,
as well as a representative of the European Economic Community. The
additional presence of Vietnam and Laos indicates a new readiness on
Vietnam's part to discuss the problems caused by those who flee its
hardship, following Hanoi's willingness to repatriate groups of its own
citizens. 177
Analysis of the causes that motivated Vietnameses to leave Vietnam
Instead of organizing the reasons that people have been leaving Vietnam
into political, economic, racial, or other factors, I have divided them into the
two following categories:
a) "push" factors, which are conditions within Vietnam that motivate people
to leave; and
b) "pull" factors, which are improved circumstances which the persons
expect to find after their escape from their countries.
Push factors include:
1. Family reunification
2. Racial discrimination
3. Reeducation policies
4. Economic zones and policies
5. Mandatory military conscription
6. Incompetence of government officials
7. Lack of freedom of opinion and religion
8. Deliberate change in social and economic policies
_____________________
176 Kumin, p. 6.
177 Steven Erlanger, "Vietnam and Laos Finally Join Talks on Refugees," The
New York Times, 30 October 1988.

86 Chapter 3
Principal pull factors are:
1. Resettlement in the West
2. No right of return to Vietnam
3. No screening and no voluntary repatriation
4. Hope for rescue at sea by international vessels
5. United Nations aid in camps in neighboring countries
6. Overseas Vietnamese lobby for aid and resettlement
a) Push factors
Push factors are problems that may eventually compel people to leave the
country. 178 In the recent history of Vietnam, we have identified the following
as the most important push factors.
1. Family reunification
In Asian cultures, where extended families are common, the integrity of the
family unit is crucial. For UNHCR, the reunification of refugees with their
families is a generally accepted principle; family members, especially
spouses and dependents, are entitled to be reunited with their relatives
living as refugees outside the country of origin. During the years before the
ODP was set up, UNHCR operated a limited family reunion program. 17 9
The more Vietnamese who escaped, however, the greater the number of
people staying behind in Vietnam who also wanted to leave.
Although on 26 February 1988 the Chairman of the Council of Ministers
issued a decision authorizing Vietnamese citizens to leave the
_______________________
178 Clark, "Early Warning of Refugee Flows," (Draft) Refugee Policy Group,
Washington, June 1988, p. 9.
179 The Executive Committee of the UN High Commissioner's Programme
adopted specific Conclusions on this subject. The first is No. 9 (XXVIII) of
1977: "The Executive Committee
(a) Reiterated the fundamental importance of the principle of family reunion;
(b) Reaffirmed the co-ordinating role of UNHCR with a view to promoting
the reunion of separated refugee families through appropriate interventions
with Governments and with intergovernmental organizations;
(c) Noted with satisfaction that some measures of progress has been achieved
in regard tothe reunion of separated families through the efforts currently
undertaken by UNHCR." A second Conclusion (No. 24 (XXXII)) of 1981
elaborates the previous one. Among others, Para. 4 this Conclusion
recognizes the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own to
join the refugee abroad.
Analytical Discussion 87
country for a specified period of time to settle personal affairs, this is not likely
to reduce the stream of people wishing the to join their family members abroad.
Besides, few if any countries are likely to provide visitor visas, suspecting the
applicants (probably correctly) of using this avenue as a way to enter their
country permanently. 180
2. Racial discrimination
Of a population of three million living in the South Vietnamese capital after
1975, there were more than one million ethnic Chinese living in the Cholon
section of the capital. Many of the ethnic Chinese had become Vietnamese
citizens as a means of avoiding legalized discrimination against their commercial
activities. Their communities were like a state within a state, never really a part
of the Vietnamese community. The estimated ethnic Chinese population of North
Vietnam was 300,000, of whom some 250,000 crossed into China during 1978
and 1979.
The sudden change from the artificial wartime prosperity in Saigon, with a
growing urban population depending on American financial backing to survive,
was most sharply felt by the large ethnic Chinese community. Its members had
dominated commerce of all kinds throughout the colonial and postcolonial
periods. 181 In the spring of 1978 governmental troops confiscated gold, jewelry,
rice, and vegetables -much of the property of the Chinese Vietnamese in Cholon
- and sent some 700,000 of them to New Economic Zones. This prompted them
to leave in large groups, a practice the government unofficially tolerated and
even encouraged, as became clear in negotiations for the definition of persons to
182
qualify for the Orderly Departure Program. Whereas UNHCR and
resettlement countries wanted the ODP for family reunion cases, the Vietnamese
authorities insisted on broadening the categories to
180 "Government Issues Decision on Foreign Travel," BK291544 Hanoi Domestic
Service in Vietnamese, FBIS- EAS- 88-040,1 March 1988.
181 See Osborne, pp. 39-40.
182 Depending on the place of departure (Vungtau or the Mekong Delta), the price for
flight to an uncertain point of arrival has been some US $2,000 when the "big boat
trade" in ethnic Chinese refugees started in 1978. Seven years later, the cost to
leave by boat was still between 540,000 and 630,000 Dong in gold (equivalent to
US $1,500-2,000). See Jürgen Dauth, "Aus der täglichen Not in eine Ungewisse
Zukunft, In Südostasien droht eine neue Fluchtwelle der Vietnamesen über das
Sudchinesische Meer", quoted in Fluchtmotive: Vietnam, Äthiopien, Sri Lanka,
ZDWF Schriftenreihe No. 23, (Bonn: Zentrale Dokumentationsstelle für Flüchtlinge
der Freien Wohlfahrt, 1987), pp. 30-38.

88 Chapter 3
include "other humanitarian cases." 183 A number of Chinese managed to
leave under the ODP or through the government-abetted "big boat trade."
Many thousands, however, in the face of discriminatory measures such as the
threat of being sent to the New Economic Zones, were pushed toward a
clandestine departure.
3. Reeducation policies
Former government and USA employees, and people who were in
disagreement with the new political directions, were placed in camps to
indoctrinate them in the ideology of the new regime after 1975. 184 In 1975 an
estimated 200,000 Vietnamese were in reeducation camps: 185 by 1984-
85,10,000 were believed to be still incarcerated as former political
prisoners. 186 According to information provided by the Hanoi government, in
February 1987 the authorities released 1,014 former officers, security agents,
politicians, priests, and others who were involved with the
___________________
183 The list of these "other humanitarian cases" did look like the telephone book of
Cholon. Differing interpretations of who these cases should be (for the USA, they
included inmates of re-education camps) plagued the ODP negotiations from the start.
Dale de Haan, then UNHCR Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees had pursued these
negociations, after the model of the 1965 Memorandum of Understanding between the
United States and Cuba, which was familiar to him from his time as staff director to
Senator Edward Kennedy's Subcommittee. UNHCR could not agree to Vietnam's
proposed numerical guarantee that governments accept one Vietnamese identified by
Hanoi (without family ties abroad) in exchange for every family reunion case allowed to
depart. It could not make such a commitment on behalf of governments, and it did not
want to appear to be cooperating with Vietnam in the expulsion of its unwanted
population. See Kumin, pp. 47,52.
184 "Im Jahre 1975 wurden die ehemaligen Angehörigen der Streitkräfte, der Verwaltung
und der Regierung Süd Vietnams zur 'Umerziehung' in Lagern interniert.
Sie sollten entlassen werden, sobald man glaubte, sie erfolgreich erzogen zu haben
und sie in die sozialistische Gesellschaft integrieren zu können. Nach maximal drei
Jahren sollten die 'Unverbesserlichen' dann vor ein ordentliches Gericht gestellt
werden. Dies ist jedoch nur in wenigen Füllen geschehen. Noch heute werden nach
Angaben von Regierungsstellen rund 10,000 Personen in 'Umerzie-hungslagern'
festgehalten, ohne daß Anklage gegen sie erhoben ist." See Amnesty International,
Zur Lage der Menschenrechte in der Sozialistischen Republik Vietnam:
Umerziehung, in ZDWF Schriftenreihe 23, Bonn: Zentrale Dokumentationsstelle
der Freien Wohlfahrtspflege für Flüchtlinge e.V. (hereinafter ZDWF), 1987, p. 36.
185 Dyer/ Clark, "Vietnamese Boat People Crisis", (Draft), p. 9
186 Frank Snepp, Decent Interval, p. 569, as quoted in Dyer/Clark "Vietnamese Boat
People Crisis," (Draft) p. 8.
Analytical Discussion 89
South Vietnamese authorities before 1975. The government also stated that
159 people were still being held pending the completion of their "reeducation."
187 At the same time Hanoi indicated that "the government would
allow 11,000 former reeducation camp inmates and 40,000 of their relatives
to emigrate to the United States." 188 Reeducation in Vietnam has induced
citizens to flee for several reasons, primarily because of a fundamental
disagreement with its objectives and anxiety over the often inhuman
hardship connected with its implementation. The system also brought social
hardship by separating heads of households from their families, leaving
their dependents without a breadwinner and saddling them with a social and
political stigma. People left the country either upon completing their "reeducation,"
on escaping from re-education camps, or when faced with the
threat of undergoing the process.
4. New Economic Zones (NEZ)
Radical policies were established by the Vietnamese authorities after 1975
to increase agricultural production. Substantial war damage to the
transportation and communication infrastructure and the devastation of
much South Vietnam's agricultural land by widespread defoliation programs
during the war made productive fanning virtually impossible, 189
Inexperienced city dwellers were sent to remote, unfamiliar territories and
expected to perform pioneer farm labor, often in extremely primitive
conditions and with little or no training or assistance. Some of these economic
zones were located in areas close to the border between Kampuchea
and Vietnam, where the Pol Pot regime complicated matters with steppedup
border raids. Traces of large-scale bombing and droughts jeopardized
both the survival of the people and the anticipated increase in production.
Inundations on 750,000 hectares of agricultural land destroyed 1.5 million
tons of rice in September 1978, which forced a reduction in monthly rice
rations from 11 kg to 4 kg.
______________________
187 "Pact on prisoners reported by Hanoi, Vietnam Says Accord Allows Detained
Saigon Backers to Leave for the U.S.," The New York Times, 18 July 1988.
188 "Hanoi says 50,000 are free to go to the US," Boston Globe, 17 July 1988.
189 Osborne, p. 40. See also "Elmo Zumwalt 3d, 42, of Navy; Victim of
Defoliation," New York Times, August 14,1988 Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr.
commanded naval forces in Vietnam from 1968-70, and then served as the
Chief of Naval Operation until 1974, "said that he ordered Agent Orange
sprayed over the Mekong Delta to kill vegetation and drive 'the Viet Cong
back 1,000 yards off the water's edge.'"

90 Chapter 3
These and the general conditions of hardship caused large groups to
flee the New Economic Zones to Ho CM Minh City, where many, having
no home, lived on the streets. In order to avoid being sent back to the
NEZ, many saw themselves without any other viable option than to flee
the country. 190
5. Mandatory military conscription
By the end of the 1970s, the desertion rate from the Vietnamese Army
neared 20 percent in Saigon The situation worsened with the border wars
between Vietnam and China in early 1979. 191 This meant that from 1979
on there was a high percentage of "draft evaders," young single males,
among the boat people fleeing from Vietnam. The military invasion of the
Vietnamese armed forces into Cambodia in 1979 also necessitated
military conscription. Today there are still 150,000 troops stationed there
(even though the current Vietnamese authorities have announced their
withdrawal.) 192 Today young single men still escape in large numbers to
avoid being drafted.
6. Incompetence in government 193
Officials with shortcomings in management abilities drove out many of
their South Vietnamese predecessors, who were then given inferior positions
in public administration, teaching, and other government services.
Many of these former top officials had initially hoped to be able to stay
____________________________
190 ZDWF, Schriftenreihe 23, p. 31.
191 Dyer/Clark, "Vietnamese Boat People Crisis" Draft September 1986, p. 10.
192 "Hanoi Plans 50,000-Man Pullout from Cambodia", The New York Times,
26 May 1988.
193 "A government that is quite incapable of making or implementing decisions
or of controlling its administrative apparatus ... may be deemed
incompetent... . Property will be seized and families disrupted...Refugees,
sometimes in very large numbers, will result from this sort of breakdown.
Even if it does not involve a great deal of violence, such a situation will
impel people to leave in order to es cape the predictable decline in the quality
of life and - in poor countries - famine." Gordenker, Refugees in
International Politics, 1987, p.76. Though Gordenker does not refer directly
to Vietnam, the analysis is pertinent in this context. The recently announced
acute food shortage in the Northern provinces underlines real possibilities of
famine and other serious economic problems, which are compelling the
Vietnamese authorities to review their policies. See "Vietnam Picks New
Premier; Food Shortages Are Reported," New York Times, 23 June 1988.
Analytical Discussion 91
but felt that their abilities and experience were under-utilized to do so. 194 At
the same time, factories are operating at 40 percent capacity.
Collectivization of farms in the southern part of Vietnam was a measure
widely rejected by South Vietnamese fanners. But already in 1981,
approximately 31 percent of the country had been organized in collective
farms.195 Among the boat people, there were many who had been initially
optimistic about the prospects of staying, living, and working with some success.
But large groups of people became discouraged by the incompetence and
underutilization of the country's human and natural resources. In recognition of
these shortcomings, the new Vietnamese regime has put into place experienced
and competent economic advisors who have been developing reforms in banking,
fiscal policy, and investment and strategies for economic development. 196
Should these reforms materialize, this factor might induce fewer people to escape
from Vietnam than up to now, and offer even reasonably bright prospects for the
eventual return of persons not found eligible for refuge status in case a screening
process starts.
7. Lack of freedom of political opinion and religion
Upon arrival in the country of first asylum, UNHCR would interview each
family, or at least the head of the family unit, for registration for resettlement.
The registration form contains a section on the reason for flight. Most
interviewees would respond: "We cannot say what we think and what we like,
we cannot live under the Communists, we have no freedom for our religion. " 197
_______________________
194 Interview of a human rights worker with Vietnamese refugees in Malaysia in 1978.
195 ZDWF, p. 31.
196 Dr. Nguyen Xuan Oanh (Chief of the Bureau of Economic Research and Planning,
People's Committee Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam), Lecture at Harvard University, 3
October 1988. Mr. Oanh, a trained economist at Harvard in 1954, was Acting Prime
Minister of Vietnam in 1965/66, and became involved with the new government
after 1975 as economic advisor before assuming his current position.
197 See St Cartmail, Exodus Indochina, Exeter, 1983, p. 233-34. Reports about the
questionnaires that each arriving group had to respond to on arrival in Singapore,
which had the purpose to ask specifically what they did not like about the regime and
how they felt their freedom of opinion and religion had been jeopardized. More than
two thirds of the arrivals in Singapore between August 1978 and July 1981 indicated
that they had suffered serious curtailment of their political and religious (both
Catholic and Buddhist) freedom.

92 Chapter 3
This reason was given by the overwhelming majority of the respondents,
to the point where it became somewhat meaningless. It is important
to note, however, that the short time usually allotted for resettlement
registration probably contributed to what seemed a standardization
of this statement.
8. Deliberate change of social and economic policies
The political upheavals in Vietnam endangered the livelihood of people in
all professions and occupations disrupted the social fabric as well.
Children have been set to spy on their parents, not only reporting to the
authorities on their political activities but also on their incomes, for taxation
purposes. Distrust in private, professional, and public circles is widespread.
Not only academics and professionals but also farmers and
fishermen have suffered the deprivation of their usual social support
structure along with economic opportunities.198 In the early 1980s, the
Vietnamese authorities appeared, however, to have begun to realize the
devastating result of these social and economic policies. 199 With the new
law on foreign investment, which had been awaited for years and is said
to be the most liberal in the Communist world, the authorities now hope to
create conditions for an economic opening to the West. 200 In addition, in
return for its cooperation for the release of former U.S. detainees,
Vietnam hopes to break out of its isolation and obtain "humanitarian" assistance
from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, or other
Western organizations. Since the 1979 Meeting in Geneva, Vietnam has
been hoping to reestablish relations with the USA. This is an issue,
_____________________
198 "But over time the authorities in the Indochinese states must come to
realize the political and diplomatic costs they run in ignoring their social
and economic responsibilities to their own people." Jonathan Moore (U.S.
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs), Speech at the IRAC Conference on First
Asylum in Southeast Asia, 6 June 1988, p. 4.
199 "Vietnam Economy is Ravaged by Monetary Crisis," The New York Times,
10 April 1988.
200 "Capital investment was to be encouraged by a liberal foreign investment
code enacted in December [1987] to permit 100 percent foreign owner ship,
use of foreign staff in key posts, repatriation of capital and profits, and
guarantees against confiscation. The switch reflected greater appreciation
for the failure of ideological economic policies over the previous decade.
Inflation had risen to 700%. See Alan J. Day and Verena Hoffman, eds. The
Annual Register: A Record of World Events 1987, Vol. 229, (Longman,
1987), p. 323.
Analytical Discussion 93
however, on which the current U.S. administration has been absolutely
obdurate: 201
The United States, with some success, tries to maintain an aid and trade boycott of
Vietnam by Western nations ... [and] Reagan Administration officials insist that Hanoi
can and must do better to create 'a proper climate' for better relations. 202
b) Pull factors
We will use the term pull factors to mean circumstances which potentially offer
an improvement over conditions people face at home. The Refugee Policy
Group in Washington has developed a general framework to analyze causes of
flight: alternatives to international flight; obstacles to international flight;
expected reception in the asylum country; patterns of decision-making; and
seasonal factors. 203 Inspired by this analytical framework we have developed
categories as pull factors, some of which might come in as intervening factors
discussed the section on the RPG. Resettlement opportunities, inability to return
after having left clandestinely (now changing probably), the absence of
individual screening for refugee status, the impossibility of voluntary
repatriation, the likelihood of being rescued at sea, United Nations aid in camps
pending resettlement, and efforts by overseas Vietnamese to keep their plight in
the center of international interest.
1. Resettlement in the West
For those Vietnamese escaping between mid-1975 and mid- 1977 in
small boats 204 and over land through Cambodia, 205 the option of re-
_________________________
201 During his recent visit to Asia, the Secretary of State George Shultz again made
clear, the Reagan Administration's "long-standing policy of barring diplomatic
relations with Vietnam until it withdraws from Cambodia, despite moves in Congress
to open interests sections in each country's capital." See "Shultz Begins 18-
day Visit to 7 Asian Lands and Hong Kong", The New York Times, 7 July 1988.
202 "Vietnam, in Flurry of Moves, Pushes for Better Ties to U.S.," The New York
Times, 17 October 1988.
203 Clark, "Early Warning of Refugee Flows," Washington, June, 1988, pp. 10-11.
204 The following groups arrived in this period:
1975: 377,000
1976: 5,644
1977: 15,633

94 Chapter 3
settlement was a decisive factor in their decision to escape. At that time,
UNHCR was only beginning to establish a resettlement program; by the
end of 1976, 2,678 people were able to leave for permanent resettlement
countries in the West. The departure rate for 1977 rose to 9,265.200
Things changed, however, in 1978, when it became known in Vietnam
that the only solution to the problem of Vietnamese displaced persons in
Southeast Asian refugee camps was resettlement, and that resettlement
programs were being expanded as rapidly as possible. By that time many
of the evacuees had come to establish themselves in the USA, and sent
letters, photographs, and affidavits to their relatives back in Vietnam.
Between 1978 and 1979 the number of arrivals more than doubled, to increase
to high levels again in 1988, which strained resettlement countries'
capacity to absorb them. 207 Countries of first asylum resorted to
unprecedented practices of refoulement. The Malaysians, as widely reported
by the international news media, towed out to sea some 10,000
Vietnamese boat people in February 1979, approximately 25 percent of
those who landed. By June 1979 they were refusing landing possibilities
to more than half the boats nearing Malaysian waters.
See Dyer/Clark "Vietnamese Boat People Crisis."
205 From 1975 to 1985, the following groups arrived in Thailand:
1975 - 4,374
1976- 2,586 1981 - 4,133
1977- 792,000 1982 - 152,000
1978- 2,517 1983 - 1,789
1979- 4,232 1984 - 91,000
1980- 4,942 1985 - 1,921
UNHCR statistics, as quoted in Dyer/Clark, "Vietnamese Boat People
Crisis," p.6.
206 UNHCR statistics, as quoted in Dyer/ Clark, "Vietnamese Boat People
Crisis," p. 9.
207 From 1978 to 1987, the arrivals in countries of first asylum were as follows:
1978- 86,373 1984 - 24,865
1979- 202,158 1985 - 22,918
1980- 71,451 1986 - 19,575
1981- 74,749 1987 - 10,221
1982- 43,807 1988 - 45,530
Statistics for 1978 - 1985 from Dyer/Clark, "Vietnamese Boat People
Crisis," p. 4, for 1986-31 May 1987 Kumin, p. 271, for 1988 see the
UNHCR FactSheet, South East Asia, May 1989, Vol. 3, No. 2.
Analytical Discussion 95
According to refugee accounts, these "human deterrence" measures were
not significant in reducing the outflow from Vietnam. 208 On the contrary,
ironically, these tactics, which cost the life of several hundred Vietnamese,
evoked an overwhelming response from other countries willing to resettle
refugees. On July 19, simultaneously with the meeting in Geneva, the Citizens
Commissions on Indochinese Refugees, composed of distinguished private
personalities who played a major contribution in informing the American and
international public about the plight of the Indochinese refugees, participated
in a candlelight march and vigil of some 12,000 persons at the White House.
Reporting on this event the following day, the press mentioned also that
President Carter had made a surprise announcement to the protesters:
He was allowing the U.S. Navy to "find and pick up" the refugees stranded in the
waters around Indochina on frequently unseaworthy boats. He also noted that the
government would double the number of refugees it would accept from 7,000 to
14,000 [per month] . 209
Carter's upgraded offer represented a 64 percent share of the world Indo-
Chinese refugee resettlement quota that had emerged as one of the results of
the 1979 Geneva meeting. 210 This generous response, however, started a
snowball effect: the more resettlement offers, the more people would leave
Vietnam, and the more people would press for obtaining resettle ment.
Resettlement criteria were well known in Vietnam in interested circles. 211
_____________________________
208 Interviews with refugee workers on the hand file on the author.
209 Washington Star, 20 July 1979, as quoted in: Report of the Citizens Commission
on Indochinese Refugees, January 1985, p. 35. The objectives of the Citizens
Commissions, formed on the initiative of the International Rescue Committee
with the support of the US State Department and other organizations in 1977,
were to gather data on the plight on the Indochinese refugees situation, create a
better informed public opinion to support governmental policies of assistance,
assure that countries of first asylum would receive international economic
support for the care of refugees until their permanent resettlement, and develop
viable policies for permanent resettlement Report of the Citizens Commission
on Indochinese Refugees, p. 2.
210 Bruce Grant, The Boat People. An 'Age' Investigation. (London: Penguin Books,
1979), as quoted in Dyer/Clark, "Vietnamese Boat People Crisis," p. 10.
211 Without going into technical details of the criteria of the major resettlement countries
where the majority of the Vietnamese refugee hoped to be resettled, it is useful
to highlight briefly the main points of the U.S. refugee admission process,
which without the Indochinese refugee crisis would probably not have been regu-

96 Chapter 3
2. No right of return to Vietnam
So far, the Vietnamese authorities have regarded those whom they wished to
see leave and those who attempted or have succeeded in fleeing as enemies of
the state, unwanted at home. Their refusal to readmit anyone who left the
country clandestinely has given hope to Vietnamese who decide to escape that
once they make it out alive to a country of first refuge, nothing can stop them
on their way to the "golden West."
The 1975 precedent of a voluntary return of 1,500 persons from Guam to
Vietnam - most of whom were detained on arrival, and some of those executed
- left a bad memory in the minds of many Vietnamese. With these memories
in mind, most Vietnamese refugees have stated that they would not consider
returning home anyway, unless substantial political changes occur. 212
Many Vietnamese had hopes of being able to benefit from the OPD
Program, but not all met the program's criteria. Those who did suffered
various kinds of reprisals - losing work, food rations, or good education
lated by the Refugee Act of 1980. Before 1980, entry into the USA was achieved on
the basis of legislation contained in Section 212(d) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, as amended, which permitted the Attorney General to authorize the
issuance of a "parole" (conditional entrance) to those refugees deemed qualified.
Under this "parole" system four categories, which were defined to establish priorities
among those qualifying for admission into the USA: Category I: Persons seeking
reunification with immediate family members in the USA; Category II: Persons who
had been closely associated with, or employed by, the USA during the Vietnam war;
Category III: Persons who had served in the military or civil administration of their
own government during the War; and Category IV: Persons warranting special
humanitarian considerations. See Citizens Commission Report, p. 9. The Refugee Act
of 1980, however, provides a permanent and fair framework for admitting refugees
according to the refugee status definition of the 1951 Convention. See Edward M.
Kennedy, "Refugee Act of 1980," International Migration Review, 15, Nos. 1-2,
(Spring-Summer 1981), p. 155. 212 In the turmoil of the evacuation in April 1975, a
few hundred people were among the evacuees in Guam, and were therefore given a
ship to sail back to Vietnam without a previous agreement with the authorities. Their
fate has never been confirmed, but the rumors about what happened to them are still
vivid in the memories of many Vietnamese. Personal interview with Shephard
Lowman, a former U.S. Foreign Service Official who was directly involved in the
evacuation operation, 19 August 1988. For the evacuation to Guam from Vietnam,
see, G.S. Mom-son and Felix Moos, "Halfway to Nowhere: Vietnamese refugees on
Guam," in Art Hansen and Anthony Oliver-Smith, eds. Involuntary Migration and
Resettlement: The Problems and Responses of Dislocated People (Boulder: A
Westview Special Study, 1982), pp. 49-68.
Analytical Discussion 97
for the children - when they applied for an exit visa under the OOP. A
number of these people had made arrangement for their future lives in the
West. If they failed to qualify for the OOP, many of those not permitted
rejected to leave legally chose clandestine escape. Usually, their kin suffered
serious reprisals for the escape of their relatives and for applying to
join them abroad. Since normal emigration from the country was impossible,
those left behind often themselves sought to escape at the next opportunity.
3. Absence of screening and the impossibility of voluntary repatriation
The absence of screening escapees for refugee status seems to have encouraged
a substantial number of Vietnamese to risk escape. Looking at the
genesis of this situation, we find the following antecedents. In 1975 the
United Nations General Assembly had endorsed the Executive Committee's
view that "unanimously recognized the need for continued humanitarian
assistance resulting from events in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula." 213 It further
urged the international community to strengthen its support of UNHCR's
efforts in this regard. With this broad mandate, UNHCR had a range of
options for its actions, including the choice of whether or not to screen
those arriving in first-asylum countries for eligibility of refugee status.
As the program for assistance to Vietnamese displaced within the
country was winding down, UNHCR, however, maintained its office there
to "keep a foot in the door," and continued assisting Kampuchean refugees
who had fled the Pol Pot regime 214 By June 1978, when the outflow from
Vietnam reached 50,000 persons a month, the following factors probably
held back UNHCR from introducing a screening procedure, even though it
might have been valuable:
_____________________
213 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement
No. 12 A (A/10012/Add.l), chap. IV; Thirtieth Session, Third Committee,
2161st meeting, para. 1-10, and Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 12 A
(A/10012/ Add.l), para. 121, in UN doc GA res. 3455 (XXX). "Humanitarian
assistance to the Indo-Chinese displaced persons," 9 Dec. 1975.
214 In 1978, the assistance amounted to some US $700,000; in 1979, $3.5
million; and in 1980, a further $10.2 million. Some in UNHCR considered
this the price of the Orderly Departure Program, Kumin, pp. 45-46.

98 Chapter 3
a) Vietnam was unwilling to take any Vietnamese back (in any case, there
seemed to be very few persons who would have voluntarily chosen to
return to Vietnam).
b) First-asylum countries were still only minimally familiar with customary
laws of asylum and the general principle of non-refoulement This lack of
experience brought about serious violations of international law, especially
in Malaysia, but also in Thailand and Singapore, in the form of push-offs
onto the high seas on often un-seaworthy boats, causing untold harm to
thousands of seeking to land. Under these circumstances, screening would
probably have antagonized the ASEAN countries and Hong Kong, who
feared getting stuck with the ineligible residual caseload of rejected people.
c) The massive influx of asylum seekers severely challenged capacity of
UNHCR to cope with emergency protection and assistance issues. Anything
other than simple resettlement registration for starting resettlement
processing would at that time have overtaxed its existing structures in the
region.215 Because their lives were at stake, both during flight and in the
process of entering a country of refuge, UNHCR's objective was to arrange
resettlement as speedily as possible. Quick resettlement became a physical
means of protection. In addition, the political context was grim. Setting up a
screening process and negotiating for repatriation of persons not qualifying
as refugees did not seem to have bright prospects, and neither Vietnamese
nor U.S. authorities at that time seemed ready for it. Therefore efforts in
this direction were not a top priority.
d) Until the 1979 meeting, UNHCR employed the term "Vietnamese
displaced person" (VNDPs) for the boat people. 216 Only slowly thereafter
did all arrivals started to be called "refugees." In light of UNHCR's
preexisting operation on behalf of displaced persons within Vietnam, the
assistance program in first-asylum countries seemed to be an extended arm
of the preexisting program
__________________________
215 In September 1978,1 went on a one-week mission to the East Coast of
Malaysia (Pulau Tengha, an island one hour offshore from Mersing, north of
Singapore), with the objective to interview nearly 6000 new arrivals. Even
though working from 7:00 a.m. until late at night to register some 800 persons
a day, proper screening would have required not only more resettlement staff
but also protection officers for formal determination of eligibility. UNHCR
was not equipped at that time for this task.
216 See UN doc A/34/627, "1979 Meeting on Refugees in SEA," 7 November
1979.
Analytical Discussion 99
within Vietnam, and so the implementation of a screening procedure
seemed unnecessary.
Though the 1979 Meeting was successful in terms of immediate results, I
believe that the following issues should also have been raised at that time
with the Vietnamese authorities:
a) screening of new arrivals; and
b) exploring solutions for those found outside of
UNHCR's competence, including their return to Vietnam under internationally
agreed-upon and safe conditions. 217 Rather than negotiating a fair
sharing of the burden with Vietnam, all energies were directed toward
handling the result of Vietnam's arbitrary policy, 218 regardless of the actual
motivation that caused people to leave the country. The U.S.A. advocated a
policy of international burden-sharing, but Vietnam's non-cooperation
seems to have been seen as an insurmountable obstacle to direct
negotiation. Without addressing the problems that caused people to leave
Vietnam, the 1979 meeting nonetheless produced a magnet in terms of
attracting money, 219 resettlement places, international public attention and
compassion, and mobilization of the various states (except Vietnam). In the
early 1980s, however, the euphoric willingness to make resettlement places
available started to dwindle, and "compassion fatigue" set in. Even so, still
no screening nor repatriation projects were seriously considered.
Because Vietnam has recently agreed, for the first time, to the voluntary
repatriation of approximately 9,500 Vietnamese boat people who were not
accepted by rejected by the British authorities in Hong Kong, 220
________________________
217 It was nearly ten years later that provisions of this type were agreed upon.
See Memorandum of Understanding between the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam and UNHCR which was signed on 13 December 1988 in Geneva
(see in the appendices). This agreement includes plans of sreening of new
arrivals, and the repatriation of Vietnamese citizen on a voluntary basis.
218 There was a backlog of over 300,000 persons in camps in Southeast Asia
who were awaiting a durable solution. A higher monthly rate of departure for
resettlement was to be the first step of the solution. See UN doc A/34/621,
"1979 Meeting on Refugees in SEA," Background note dated 9 July 1979, in
Annex I, p. 8.
219 UNHCR's expenditures jumped from $206,995,000 in 1979 to $496,956,000
in 1980. Information Paper UNHCR, Geneva, April 1987.
220 "Vietnam, in Flurry of Moves, Pushes for Better Ties to U.S.," The New
York Times, October 17,1988.

100 Chapter 3
a regional screening mechanism needs to be developed. Screening procedures
will probably also demand that more time be allocated for an interview,
which may make it possible to elicit a more in-depth and conclusive
explanation on the motives for escaping from Vietnam than the one usually
given so far. This in turn would provide more specific clues to the nature
and seriousness of the problems and to what the international community
might be able to do about them. In addition to documenting more specific
motives for escape, a comprehensive interview could also provide grounds
for or against voluntary repatriation.
Long before Hong Kong decided to make its unilateral move for
screening and negotiation of repatriation, Senator Kennedy, who had stood
up in the interest of Vietnamese displaced and uprooted people since the
mid-1960s, asked his staff director, Jerry Tinker, in 1984 to carry out a
three-week field investigation of the Indo-Chinese refugee program in
Southeast Asia. The first two conclusions of this investigation were:
Repatriation: We must finally negotiate and implement repatriation agreements;
this will require high-level and sustained diplomatic activity by all concerned
governments; UNHCR screening: For all future arrivals the UNHCR should screen
bona fide refugees and sort them out from economic migrants; deportation, if not
voluntary return, can be considered for such migrants. 221
In a survey conducted for the Kennedy report, 471 Vietnamese who had
arrived in Songhkla, Thailand between December 1983 and January 1984
were interviewed about their motivations for leaving Vietnam. The survey
confirmed an already then suspected shift in motives for flight. The
majority of the interviewees (47) indicated economic hardship as their
major reason; only 33 persons complained about political harassment because
of their years of service in the former regime. Sixteen draft-age males
gave as their main reason for leaving the desire to avoid military service.
For four persons, the primary motive was family reunification.222 As the
current motives for leaving Vietnam continued to be studied and findings
made known, serious concerns finally arose in early 1988, subsequent to
new harsh refoulement policies involving the lives of hundreds of boat
people. A series of meetings and seminars were held to
______________________________
221 See: Refugee and Migration Problems in Southeast Asia: 1984. A Staff
Report, Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy Committee on the
Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Ninety-Eighth Congress, Second session, August
1984, p. iii [hereinafter referred to as Kennedy Report].
222 Kennedy Report, pp. 7-8.
Analytical Discussion 101
examine possible new ways of dealing with this problem. The consensus for
new approaches seems to have become increasingly strong. In addition, some
scholars of international and refugee law hold that the Vietnamese boat people
are not conventional refugees but refugees sui generis, 223 because they
constituted a mass flow for which resettlement was seen as the only solution;
the 1951 UN Convention could not be applied through eligibility screening.
A seminar on First Asylum for Vietnamese Boat People, held 25-28 May,
1988 in Cha-Am, Thalland, produced a summary of the discussions that
included the following points:
* Greater emphasis should be placedon the role of Vietnam as the root cause of the
problem and how to solve it.
* Mechanisms should be developed to determine the claims of new arrivals to refugee
status on a regional basis. Those determined not to be bona fide refugees
should be repatriated to Vietnam in accordance with international law and
established UNHCR procedures. UNHCR is urged to negotiate an arrangement
with Vietnam to take back nonrefugees.
* In view of the dismal record of Vietnam, UNHCR and the international community
should exert greater effort to actively negotiate voluntary arrangement with
Vietnam. 224
On 18-19 July 1988, officials from ASEAN countries and Hong Kong met
again in Bangkok to review recent developments on various topics, including
prospects and conditions for returning to Vietnam asylum seekers who do not
qualify for refugee status.
In an effort to provide leadership in negotiations concerning the outflow
from Vietnam, UNHCR has been working during the past few years to seek
the most appropriate solutions, despite the ongoing influx of boat people and
the severely restrictive policies that first-asylum nations and resettlement
countries alike have been adopting toward Vietnamese refugees. UNHCR
negotiated possible new approaches with the Hanoi authorities and received
indications that Vietnam is now prepared to allow the
________________________
223 See Theodor Veiter "Begriffe und Definition zum Flüchtlingsrecht," The Refugee
Problem on a Universal, Regional and National Level, Thesaurus Acroasium
Vol. XIII. Institute of International Public Law and International Relations of
Thessa loniki, 1987. p. 733. .
224 Representatives from seven Southeast Asian Countries - Malaysia, Thailand,
Brunei, Indonesia, Hong Kong, the Philippines, and Singapore.- met in Cha-
Amunder the sponsorship of the Ford Foundation, May 25-28,1988. See Refugee
Reports. 24 June 1988, p.9.

102 Chapter 3
return of nonrefugees, provided that the return is voluntary and that the
international community makes available economic assistance. 225 Vietnam's
change of policy now justifies that a screening mechanism might finally be
set up, and mat the return of nonrefugees might be carried out by UNHCR
under international monitoring system and with international assistance. This
assistance to Vietnam should, however, not only be directed toward the
reintegration of returnees but should also cover economically deprived areas
in Vietnam from which people have been leaving. Vietnam's change of
policy appears also to include a softening of its application of article 89 of its
penal code, which deals with the punishment of returnees for having left the
country in a clandestine manner. 226 With these new developments, screening
is now more likely than ever before; this will no doubt have an impact on an
individual's decision whether or not to attempt escape from Vietnam in the
future.
4. Prospects of rescue at sea
The chances of being rescued at sea by international vessels may have influenced
people's decisions to leave Vietnam - particularly in the period
between the Geneva Conference in July 1979 and the mid-1980s, through
which world public opinion was focused on their plight. From September
1979, on several mercy ships were operating in the South China Sea with the
purpose of rescuing Vietnamese boat people in distress. 227 Although some of
these ships had great difficulties in unloading the human cargo they had
rescued 228 until 1979, when UNHCR started to make special ar-
_______________________
225 Nguyen Xuan Oanh, Lecture, Harvard University, 3 October 1988.
226 "Hanoi no longer brands as traitors and criminals those who have applied to leave
the country legally, Sergio Viera de Mello, who directs the efforts of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Asia, said in an interview on returning
from Vietnam." "Hanoi seen willing to take back people," Boston Globe, 2 August
1988.
227 Akuna was operated by Food for the Hungry; Cap Anamur by the German
Committee 'A Ship for Vietnam;' lie de Lumiere by the French Committee 'Un
Bateau pour le Vietnam'; Lysekil by the Egil Nansen Committee of Norway; and
Seasweep by World Vision International.
228 Among the countries in the Asian region, only Singapore, the Philippines, Hong
Kong, and Japan would accept to disembark refugees rescued at sea. Singapore,
however, would not allow any landings of direct arrivals from Vietnam, and from
October 1978 would admit refugees on a resettlement guarantee from a third
country that the entire group would have left Singapore within three months. The
Analytical Discussion 103
rangements to allow speedy procedures for disembarkation, 229 I gathered
evidence from many refugees in Singapore between July 1979 and June 1981
that they had simply taken the opportunity to leave, at times with limited
supplies and unseaworthy boats, in the hope of eventual rescue.
Undoubtedly, the mercy ship rescue operation, as well as the remarkable
sacrifices some commercial ships underwent to rescue boat people, contributed
to saving thousands of lives of people in distress after arduous encounters with
Vietnamese patrols, ruthless pirates, and untold other difficulties. Even with the
rescue operations, we are uncertain now many drowned and never reached safe
shores; 230 without the rescue attempts, the loss and damage to human life
would have unquestionabbly been much higher.
Returning to rescue at sea as a pull factor: Even though I do not suggest that
rescue operations should be stopped, a combination of approaches may provide
a better incentive for Vietnam itself to take action in the situation. The South
China Sea is one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. Therefore,
commercial vessels will keep navigating in this area. Through the International
Maritime Organization, shipping agents, ship owners, and ship captains may
take note of the continuing need for
landing of Vietnamese rescued by mercy ships was only feasible under exceptional
circumstances.
229 The Disembarkation Resettlement Offer (DISERO), was a pool of visas, originally
negotiated and established by the writer on the basis of 200 visas made available by
the Government of Belgium, "to resettle Vietnamese refugees should they be rescued
by a vessel flying a flag of convenience or of a country which can not reasonably be
expected to resettle refugees." The Norwegian mercy ship Lysekil, on its first rescue
tour, returned to Singapore in July 1979 returned with 259 rescued people on board.
The Norwegian Government appealed to other countries to absorb rescuces from
subsequent mercy voyages. However, Lysekil stopped rescues and switched to
transporting food and other supplies for refugees in the region, so that the 200 visas
that the Belgian Government provided for this purpose could be 'redeployed.' As a
result, more than six hundred people could be safely brought to land with this "safety
valve" by which Belgium gave a guarantee for resettlement to the authorities of
Singapore. In resettling the refugees elsewhere, especially under the family
reunification program, these visas were, in fact, used several times. Subsequently
UNHCR Headquarters replenished this visa pool and added an additional mechanism,
the Rescue at Sea Resettlement Offer (RASRO). During 1986 2,591 refugees were
rescued at sea. Some 1,249 benefited from the RASRO scheme, and a further 292
persons were disembarked under the DISERO Scheme. UN doc. A/Ac. 967 694, 3
August 1987: Note on International Protection, submitted by the High Commissioner,
p. 11.
230 According to UNHCR's estimates, as many as 250,000 people may have drowned.

104 Chapter 3
rescues. 231 They should be told that the need for rescue persists, but at the
same time more attention should be given to international efforts to
address some of the problems that have do far caused Vietnamese to leave
home.
5. United Nations aid in camps in neighboring countries.
During the first five years after the fall of Saigon, the expectation of international
assistance for those in refugee camps was most probably not a
desire factor for two reasons. First, the camp facilities did not have major
improvements to offer beyond the material conditions of the vast majority
of people in Vietnam; and second, the impact of the social and economic
changes introduced by the new regime took some time to become visible,
and so there was a time lag in setting up the refugee camps and making
them somewhat more livable.
Since the early 1980s, however, there have been indications that conditions
in Vietnam have become so bad that a number of people took the
risk of escaping, despite all threatening consequences. However much
time it would take to find a new home, they knew they would be cared for
in the refugee camps.
Astri Suhrke, one of the leading scholars in refugee causes, suggests
that specific policies or programs set up in response to refugee situations
might have the double-edge effect of attracting more refugees. 232
6. Overseas Vietnamese lobby for aid and resettlement abroad
Apart from the more than 1.5 million Vietnamese resettled as refugees
in Western nations, a number of Vietnamese, especially intellectuals who
_____________________
231 The objective is to prevent incidents such as the following from taking
place: "The United States Navy is investigating allegations that the crew of a
Navy ship refused to rescue some Vietnamese boat people who later
resorted to murder and cannibalism to survive at sea," "Vietnamese
Refugees Accuse a U.S. Ship," The New York Times, 11 August, 1988.
232 "A relief program established in response to a crisis situation tends to
attract subsequent arrivals from that situation. A refugee policy designed for
a particular group or one particular nationality suggests patterns of
attractions [emphasis added]." Astri Suhrke, "Global Refugee Movements
and Strategies of Response," in Mary M. Kitz, ed, U.S. Immigration and
Refugee Policy. Global and Domestic Issues (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath,
1983), pp. 157-89.
Analytical Discussion 105
spent time abroad during the Vietnam War, never went back. First they did
not return because of the war, after 1975, they did not return because of the
new political situation. A great many of these people are well-established
nationals of various resettlement countries. They are business-men andwomen,
university professors, public servants, and even legislators.
These well-established expatriates maintain links to their native land by
sending information and, especially, merchandise, which has created the socalled
"underground economy" by which a number of relatives in Vietnam
can manage to covering their everyday living expenses. More important,
these Vietnamese abroad maintain strong connections with national
legislators, executive officers, and other policymakers to ensure that their
compatriots' voices are heard.
The Indochina Resource and Action Center (IRAC) in Washington, D.C.
is an outstanding model of effectiveness not only for keeping the issue of
Indo-Chinese refugees alive in the USA but, more important, for bringing
about policy changes in the U.S administration. Assisted by other significant
nongovernmental and public interest organizations, the IRAC has organized
international conferences and debates with the most important policymakers
on refugee affairs in this country. These efforts, just recently crowned by the
government's announcement of the increase of the resettlement quota for
Asian refugees, is one example of what overseas Vietnamese, in a joint
effort, have been able to achieve. 233
Concluding remarks
To summarize this section, we find that both "push" and "pull" factors that
motivated Vietnamese boat people to escape from their country have
become, to a significant extent, a function of international response to the
situation. Even if factors such as the wish to be reunited with the family
abroad were partially addressed by the OOP, much more could have been
done. Neither the refugee-producing country, the USA, nor the other major
receiving countries ever seemed to have undertaken significant or persistent
efforts to address the problem of the exodus from Vietnam at its source.
I agree with other analysts that if there had been some relations between
Vietnam and Western countries, a dialogue with the ethnic Chinese
population might have been possible. Major resettlement countries,
__________________________
233 The New York Times, September 1988.

106 Chapter 3
other than the USA, might have been able to apply pressure on Vietnam
to ease its re-education policies and to make its new economic policies
more flexible at a much earlier stage. Threats by those Western countries
who maintained small aid programs, despite the USA-advocated embargo
since 1979, to cut funding for food and development aid, reconstruction
assistance, and aid to internally displaced people, might have produced
some liberalization in the conditions that compelled people to flee.
Even though the so-called "Paris Cease Fire Agreement" of 1973, prior
to the US withdrawal, predicted that the United States would contribute to
the healing of the war in post war reconstruction of the democratic
Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina no specific agreement had
been made in this regard. 234 Vietnam's request for U.S. reparation
payments for war destruction has long been a barrier to reestablishing
U.S. - Vietnamese relations, even though the issue was discussed during
the Nixon administration.
I believe, along with other informed analysts of the scene, 235 that if
both sides had been able to make some reasonable concessions, a number
of developments might have been possible, including a more reasonable
treatment of South Vietnamese dissenters; a somewhat balanced approach
in international relations, with less reliance on the USSR; probably a more
peaceful, less aggressively militaristic attitude, perhaps avoiding an
invasion into Cambodia; and more opportunities inside the country,
producing fewer refugees.
Analytical Discussion 107
3.1.2.2. Nicaraguan Refugees in Honduras and CIREFCA
Introduction
The massive displacements of Miskito and Sumo Indians within Nicaragua
and into Honduras are a sobering example of how indigenous people can be
manipulated into becoming casualties of power politics. It is not the number
of refugees involved in this case that is noteworthy, but rather the strategies
practiced upon them by external forces. A full analysis of the complex
motives leading to the displacement of the Miskitos and Sumos is beyond
the scope of this dissertation; in this section we will concentrate on the
conditions that led to the movements into Honduras in the spring of 1986.
This study will focus on the persons for whom the UNHCR attempted
to provided international protection and assistance. It will not attempt to
provide a full analysis of the underlying political ambitions and actions of
the indigenous anti-governmental forces that operated in Nicaragua and
Honduras on both sides of the Coco River. It will, however, attempt to
pinpoint the direct impact of the rebels' actions on the indigenous peoples of
the region, many of whom were made refugees against their will, often
repeatedly, were prevented from returning home voluntarily, and feared or
suffered forced recruitment. The data for this investigation are drawn from
primary and secondary printed sources and from interviews with selected
policymakers, UNHCR colleagues and non-United Nations officials during
and after my term of service as the United Nations and non-United Nations
officials. Another important source of information is the personal interviews
I conducted with 808 Misquito Indians in refugee locations in Honduras in
February 1986. The International Conference on Refugees in Central
America (CIREFCA) has been documented elsewhere.
Background
The Atlantic Coast, or 5 "Mosquitia," of both Nicaragua and Honduras is
marked by ethnic, geographic, and political complexity. An estimated ten
percent of Nicaragua's population is Indian, including about 75,000 Miskitos
and a small, shrinking group of some 5000 Sumos. 236 In addition, there
are small groups of Rama Indians, another Amerindian group, now
__________________________
234 Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, 27 January
1973, Article 21.
235 Dyer/Claik, "Vietnamese Boat People Crisis," p. 19.
______________________
236 Refugees, UNHCR Geneva, August 1987, p. 28.

108 Chapter 3
almost extinct; Garifondas (so-called Black Caribs); English-speaking
Creoles, mainly in the South; and, in the second half of this century, mestizo
(Hispanic) peasant migrants from the Pacific side of the country. 237
This indigenous rural population, which has been living in stable village
communities concentrated in the Mosquitia, is striving to preserve its
threatened traditions and vanishing culture. Like lowland ethnic groups in
many other countries, these indigenous people do not demand development
and progress. Their struggles are not against unemployment or for Socialism.
The native people of the Mosquitia rather struggle for the survival of their
collective ethnic identity, their common language, a mythological geography
and history, and collective land ownership, as well as the memory of an
economy based on gift exchange, which was suppressed by the Protestant
mission of Moravian priests in the recent history. 238
After the Sandinista government came to power in 1979, it believed that
the Indians should be "integrated into the national revolutionary mainstream
through the mass organizations designed to promote class consciousness, and
minimize the Indian's nationalist disposition. " 239 The new authorities
prepared a national plan to implement their social and economic reforms,
which the indigenous populations rejected. Having suffered forceful
integration into the state of Nicaragua a century before, the Indian groups
could not identify with the policies propagated by the new Nicaraguan
government after 1979. 240 Both ALPROMISU (Alianza
__________________________
237 Martin Diskin, "The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," in Thomas Walker, ed.,
Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua, [hereinafter
cited as "The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles]," Westview Press, 1987, p. 83.
238 Klaudine Ohland and Robin Schneider, "National Revolution and Indigenous
Identity: The Conflict between Sandinistas and Miskito Indians on the Atlantic
Coast" [hereinafter cited as National Revolution and Indigenous Identity], IW-GIA,
No. 47, (Copenhagen, 1983), p. 9.
239 Glenn T. Morris, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place - Left-Wing Revolution, Right-
Wing Reaction and Destruction of Indigenous People, The Case of Mosquitia."
Cultural Survival Quarterly, 11, No. 3 (1987), p. 19.
240 It is worthwhile to note that the Mosquitia had its own history before 1860 as a part
of the British Empire. With the Treaty of Managua of 1860 between Nicaragua and
Great Britain, the British recognized for the first time Nicaragua's sovereignty over
the Atlantic Coast In 1894 Nicaragua occupied the Mosquitia militarily and
incorporated it into its national territory as one of the departments. In a similar
treaty, Honduras was given a small pan of the Mosquitia. This resulted in the
division of the Mosquitia and produced a 100-year-long border dispute, which was
resolved only in 1960 by the International Court of Justice which defined the
Analytical Discussion 109
de Progreso de los Miskitos y Sumos, or Alliance [for the Progress of]
Miskito and Sumo Development) and SUKUWALA (Asociacion Nacio-nal
de Comunidades Sumu) were established in the early 1970s to expand
activities for Indian self-determination. In November 1979, hardly four
months after the Nicaraguan revolution, Daniel Ortega met with representatives
of all the indigenous groups of the Atlantic Coast, who were
adamant about being recognized as ethnically distinct. MISURASATA
(Miskito Sumo Rama Sandinista Asia Ta Kanka, or Miskito, Sumo, Rama,
and Sandinistas Working Together) was established on the spot as a
result. 241 Of these three organizations MISURASATA was to play a major
role in further developments.
By 1980 and 1981, MISURASATA members, by participating in a
governmental literacy campaign and educational training, had raised Miskito
consciousness and enhanced both the leadership abilities and militant
aspects of the organization. When MISURASATA's leadership started to
freely advocate self-determination and autonomy for Atlantic Coast peoples,
the Sandinista leadership was unprepared to cooperate any longer.
Increasing tensions on both sides led to the incident of Prinza-polka in
which four Miskitos and four governmental soldiers were killed. 242 Shortly
afterwards, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found that
irregular forces crossing from Honduras had killed six Nicaraguan soldiers
in San Carlos, and that Nicaraguan army forces "illegally killed a
considerable number of Miskitos in Leimus in retaliation for the killings in
San Carlos, in violation of Article 4 of the American Convention on Human
Rights." 243 This violent season became known as "Red Christmas."
Steadman Fagoth Muller, a influential orator and MISURASATA leader,
was jailed in 1981 and only released on the agreement that he would study
abroad. He escaped to Honduras, luring large groups of the Miskito
population to come with him and join one of the earliest contra
Coco River as the border between the Nicaraguan and Honduran Mosquitia.
Lioba Rossbach y Volker Wunderlich, "Derechos Indígenas y Estado Nacional
en Nicaragua: La Convención Mosquitia de 1844," Encuentro: Revista de la
Universidad Centra Americana en Nicaragua, Nos. 24-25, (April-September
1985), pp. 30-35.
241 Martin Diskin, "The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," p. 84.
242 Martin Diskin, "The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," p. 85.
243 Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights of a Segment of the
Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, OEA/Ser. L.V./II.62, doc. 10
November 1983, Washington: General Secretariat, OAS, May 16,1984
[Original in Spanish, November 29, 1983], p. 129.

110 Chapter 3
groups, "15th of September" (originally organized around a radio station
controlled by Somozists and ex-National Guardsmen). Fagoth and his
followers began to organize in camps and start military training, expecting
that their eventual uprising against the Nicaraguan government would bring
about the intervention of foreign forces and international organizations in
support of the insurrection, thus furthering the group's separatist goals. 244
In an interview in the Miami Herald, Fagoth Muller stated that in January
1981 his organization had decided to declare "total war" on the
Sandinista Revolution. 245 After these indigenous groups based, in Honduras
and armed by the United States, staged attacks in the Rio Coco border area
at the end of 1981, the Nicaraguan Government decided on 28 December
1981 to "move 42 villages of the Coco River region to an area located some
60 kilometers south of the river. ... Approximately 8,500 Miskitos were
relocated [to the new government resettlement area Taspa Pri in
Nicaragua]." 246
During the Red Christmas incidents, many Miskitos had been captured
by the government of Nicaragua on charges of being counterrevolutionaries.
Approximately 2,000 Nicaraguan Miskitos and Sumos began crossing
the Coco River into Honduras to take refuge from the Sandinista government.
Between January and June 1982 some 8,000 more entered
Honduras to escape forced relocation. By December 1982, there were
12,000 Indians in relief programs in the Honduran Mosquitia. A total of
4,000 Indians in 1983, 247 and 3,200 in 1984 crossed the river into Honduras
from Nicaragua. 248
________________________________________
244 Klaudine Ohland and Robin Schneider, National Revolution and Indigenous
Identity, pp. 259,260.
245 Klaudine Ohland and Robin Schneider, National Revolution and Indigenous
Identity, pp. 258.
246 OAS, Report on the Human Rights of Nicaraguan Miskito Indians,
OEA/Serl.V.II.62, doc. 26, May 16,1984, Washington, p. 9. See also Martin
Diskin, et al., "Peace and Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua," A
Report of the Lasa Task Force on Human Rights and Academic Freedom
(Pittsburgh: L£-tin American Studies Association, September 1986). Citing
the events on Christmas as a threat to national integrity, the Nicaraguan
government carried out this forced relocation of villages on the upper Coco
River and a "systematic destruc tion of houses and livestock there to deny
support to the attacking forces" (p. 11).
247 At Christmas 1983 the people of the Nicaraguan Village Francia Sirpe (with
approximately 1,300 persons) crossed into Honduras, led by Bishof Schlaefer.
248 Americas Watch, "With the Miskitos in Honduras," p. 5.
Analytical Discussion 111
Most of the Indian leadership was subsequently arrested. The government
abandoned its support for MISURASATA and abrogated its promise of Indian
rights to self-government, land, and resources. Many of those arrested were held
without due process of law.
In February 1983, U.S. and Honduran armed forces began joint military
exercises in the Mosquitia about 15 kilometers from the Nicaraguan border,
between Puerta Lempira and Mocoron. A military infrastructure was set up in
several Honduran locations with U.S. support and advice, rapidly transforming
the country into a North American military base -especially in the Atlantic
Coastal area bordering on Nicaragua, where the indigenous refugees were
concentrated and where forces of the MISURA were operating: 249
A major "relief effort for the Miskito Indians living on the Honduran- Nicaraguan border has
had the effect of maintaining the MISURA "contra" army. One of the groups contributing to
this effort is funded in large part by Rev. Moon's Unification Church. 250
Nicaraguan Miskito Indians in the Honduran border region were assisted by the
Friends of America (FOA), which was founded in April 1984 to offer
humanitarian support for Indian contra activities. FOA obtained private funding
to operate from its base in Rus-Rus, also providing support for activities
conducted by MISURA groups.
Unfortunately, in or out of uniform, MISURA groups have caused serious
protection problems for refugees, and on occasion for UNHCR and
_________________________
249 MISURA was the group that formed around Steadman Fagoth Muller in Honduras,
whereas the groups of MISURASATA intensified their military incursions into the
South of Nicaragua from Costa Rica during 1983-84. See Jörge Jenkins Molieri, El
Desaflo Indigena en Nicaragua: El Caso de los Miskitos, Realidad Social (Mexico,
1986), p. 281. Discrepancies between Fagoth Muller and CIA resulted in late 1984 in
"his removal by the CIA from his organization, MISURA. As a result, in September
1985 the CIA created a new Indian contra organization known as KISAN (Nicaraguan
Coast Unity), to be led by Wycliff Diego. In 1987, with the looming demise of KISAN,
the CIA operatives in Honduras, in cooperation with Col. Eric Sanchez of the Honduran
Fifth Battalion Headquarters, near Mocoron, created yet a third Indian contra
organization ~ FAUCAN (United Armed Forces of the Atlantic Coast). The plan was to
bring the Indians under the clear and unambiguous control of the CIA and Honduran
military, and to ensure that the Indians followed the CIA's strategy in the Mosquitia,
subsuming their own aspirations. Morris, "The Case of the Mosquitia," pp. 21,22.
250 "Who are the Contras?," Congressional Record, Proceedings and Debates of the 99th
Cong., 1st sess. Vol. 131, No. 48, Washington, 1985, U.S. Congress, House of
Representatives, Report, April 23,1985, p. 1.

112 Chapter 3
World Relief staff as well, through life-threatening harassments, kidnapping,
and forced recruitment. 251
Military construction and U.S. armed attacks continued to advance, and
several human rights violations were committed by both Nicaraguan
governmental forces and armed indigenous groups. 252 The events of early
1986 that led to the last major influx of Nicaraguan Indians into Honduras
may be seen to some extent as a culmination of abuses of the indigenous
Nicaraguan population. The three principal factors that led to that last large
flow were "induced" asylum, forced recruitment, and prevention of
voluntary repatriation, each of which we will consider in turn below.
UNHCR in the Mosquitia
Refugee-producing situations such as that in the Mosquitia, which seem to
be increasing in countries of the developing world, pose new challenges to
UNHCR's function of international protection. In these new situa-
___________________
251 Molieri, [El Desafio Indígena], p.274. Molieri stales that in reality Mocoron, and
thereafter the refugee camps in Tapamlaya, Rio Patuca, Cocobila, Usibila y
Srumlaya that were attended by UNHCR and the Noithamerican Protestant organization
World Relief, were transformed in places of recruitment by the followers
of Steadman Fagotti. For their recruitment they used various mechanisms, money,
coercion and threat to the families, to kidnapping of the young men, and secret
training camps for making them to attack Nicaraguan positions. This work was facilitated
by the Moravian pastors, who originally had belonged to the MISURA-S
ATA (translated by the author).
252 Americas Watch has prepared key documents on the Human Rights situation in
the Atlantic Coast. See especially Human Rights in Nicaragua: Reagan, Rhetoric,
and Reality (1985), which notes that of the two most serious incidents attributed
to the Nicaraguan governmental forces, "There is no evidence that they were
directed or condoned by the central government ...There has never been any
evidence of radically motivated or widespread killings of Miskitos." See also
Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua, 1981-1985 (1985) and
(1987), and Miskitos in Nicaragua: 1981-1984 (1984). Another important
document is Trabil Nani: Historical Background and Current Situation on the
Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua, issued by the Center for Research and
Documentation of the Atlantic Coast and the Riverside Church Disarmament
Project See also Diskin et at, "Peace and Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua: A Report of the LAS A Task Force on Human Rights and Academic
Freedom," LASA Forum 16 (Spring 1986) and LASA FORUM, 17 (Summer
1986), pp. 13-24, and Richard Fagan, Forging Peace. The Challenge of Central
America, Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America, Basil
Blackwell, New York, 1987, p. 65.
Analytical Discussion 113
tions national authorities either have lost or are losing the confidence of a
segment of their citizens, or have become unable to provide them with protection
against abuses by rebel forces.
International law clearly provides that "everyone has the right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state. Everyone has the right
to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." 253 When
national authorities run into difficulties in enforcing those rights for their own
citizens, however, then the United Nations must do everything it can to
guarantee these rights.
UNHCR noted with unease the growing political and military unrest in the
Mosquitia and became increasingly concerned for the well-being of the
indigenous populations flowing into Honduras. Moving cautiously, UNHCR set
up a program in the Honduran Mosquitia, primarily for protection purposes. The
Office built up a small team of officials in the Mosquitia, but due to serious
protection problems it was soon forced to increase its staff there.
Protecting the displaced Nicaraguan Indians became a sensitive and delicate
mission. Refugee efforts were transformed, through the support of the Honduran
Armed Forces and the influence of the U.S. Embassy, into counterrevolutionary
activities. The wife of the American Ambassador in Tegucigalpa, Diana
Negroponte, played a conspicuously active role in refugee affairs; in 1982 she
was listed as a World Relief staff member. 254
It was almost impossible to maintain a correct count on the refugees,
because their constant migration made an accurate census difficult. People
seemed to be on the move all the time between villages, or between the
villages and the border area on the Honduran side, either of their own accord
or as a result of coercion by MISURA groups. The fluctuations in the refugee
population are reflected in the official UNHCR statistics, which, even despite
the 1986 influx, had fallen again by the end of 1986 to earlier levels. 255 This
happened largely because these "new" refugees,
_____________________
253 Article 13 of the Declaration of Human Rights. See also Article 11 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
254 Molieri, El Desafio Indigena, pp. 276.
255 The Numbers of Nicaraguan Miskito and Sumo Indians under UNHCR care and
maintenance in Honduras have been as follows:
December 31,1983: 13,767
December 31,1984: 15,477
December 31,1985: 12,095 June 30,1986:17,731
December 31,1986: 15,857

114 Chapter 3
practically from the time of their arrival in the Spring of 1986, wanted to
return to Nicaragua. Thousands of them did so spontaneously by crossing
the Coco river, where KISAN (a successor group to MISURA, affiliated
with the Union Nicaraguense de oposicion, UNO) prevented them from
doing so, they sought the assistance of UNHCR.25 6 Since 1986, 13,501
Miskitos and Sumos have sought UNHCR's assistance in returning
The 1986 influx
a) "Early warnings" signals and interviews to substantiate the signals.
Early information received and collected from Miskito Indians newly arrived
at the refugee locations suggested by January 1986 that entire
villages on the Nicaraguan side of the Coco River were being prepared for
displacement into Honduras on day X. In an attempt to substantiate this
early warning information, a fact-finding mission to the Honduran
Mosquitia in mid-February 1896 was dispatched with the objective of
examining the nature and potential implications of the refugee movements
of the previous few months.
__________________
December 31,1987: 13,115 September 30,1988: 9,383(*)
Documents of Information: HCR/HON/2/86/E April 1986 (for December
1983-June 1986) and HCR/HON/2/88, April 1988 (for December 1986-
April 1988). (*) The statistics for the September 1988 data are from
UNHCR, "Numbers of Refugees as of 30 September 1988", Table 2,
Geneva, 1988.
256 On December 1,1983, the Nicaraguan government decreed a general
amnesty for the Miskitos, see OAS Report, op. cit., p.130, on the basis of
which UNHCR facilitated voluntary repatriation to Nicaragua. After
publicly admitting mistakes in its Atlantic Coast policy, the Nicaraguan
government began to emphasize negotiation over warfare, permitted people
to return to their original communities, and initiated discussions concerning
autonomy of the Atlantic Coast. The voluntary repatriation efforts were,
however, greatly hindered by the Indian contra organizations, as will be seen
later in this section. But since mid-1986 the stream of repatriates continued
to increase, enhanced by an "air bridge" to carry repatriates from Puerta
Lempira in Honduras to Puerta Cabeza in Nicaragua, which had been
arranged after lenghty negotiations between the governments of Honduras
and Nicaragua and UNHCR. See Hansruedi Peplinski and Martin Diskin,
Report of the ICVA Mosquitia Mission [ICVA — International Council of
Voluntary Agencies], June 9,1987, p. 2.
257 UNHCR statistics as of 1 October 1988.
Analytical Discussion 115
Out of the 1,859 new arrivals in Honduras between 15 December 1985
and 28 February 1986, 258 808 persons were interviewed. More than half -
446 - had entered the refugee locations directly from Nicaragua; 311 had
arrived from the border area; and 51 were returning from the border area
after having already been in the refugee locations.
All the interviewees were asked to state the main reason they had come to
the refugee locations in Honduras. Of the new arrivals from Nicaragua
58% cited lack of food and medicine as a primary factor,
30% wished to visit family living in Honduras; and 12%
feared possible conflicts where they were living.
Among new arrivals from the Honduran border region:
50% indicated lack of food and medicine as a factor; 20%
feared possible conflicts; 25% wished "not to be left behind";
and259 5% wished to visit family in Honduras.
Those reentering UNHCR refugee locations from the Honduran border,
however, unanimously cited lack of food, medicine, and clothes as their
chief motive for returning to the refugee sites.
These statistics must, of course, be taken with a grain of salt For one
thing, the questionnaires had to be designed in a neutral manner, and
therefore could not include questions that would elicit responses of a political
nature. Second, even though three different rooms were set up in
which to conduct interview, the lack of privacy inherent in lining up refugees
for center-based interviews exposed them to pressure and coaching.
In retrospect, it would have been better to conduct random interviews in
their huts. In addition, establishing the accuracy of translations was a
problem. Although the refugees who served as interpreters were known to
UNHCR, it was hard to determine to what extent they themselves were
subject to pressure and threats by KISAN. Despite these shortcomings,
however, the interviews were valuable for several reasons. First, they
provided first quantifiable data on the interviewed group. Second, through
informal discussions with the interviewees after finishing the
_____________________
258 Americas Watch, "With the Miskitos in Honduras," p. 10.
259 This new category emerged among this group during the interviews.

116 Chapter 3
questionnaires, more information on preparations for the forthcoming
"crossing" became available. Third, just by asking refugees questions
about their reasons for coming into Honduras and what their problem
were at home, care could be demonstrated not only for the safety and
well-being of this group, but also for future persons seeking the Organization's
protection.
b) Analysis of the findings and of other collected information
Most of the returning refugees said they were coming back to the Coco
River from the government resettlement area Taspa Pri. 260 Many of them
claimed the government had used lethal force in the large-scale relocation
within Nicaragua to Taspa Pri in 1982, although the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights has been unable to establish actual loss of
life. 261 In some villages along the river, tensions between the KISAN and
governmental forces contributed to scaring the people away. Many of the
refugees had received some basic governmental assistance to reestablish
themselves in their villages, but they found their communities devastated
almost beyond repair.
None of the interviewed persons explicitly admitted to having been
persecuted by governmental or Indian contra forces. 262 1 found, however,
as did an Americas Watch representative, that there had been obvious
coaching of refugees by KISAN groups on how to respond. 26 3 Yet even
despite this coaching, 12 percent of the interviewees who had arrived di-
_________________
260 In mid-1985 the Nicaraguan government had allowed people living in
Taspa Pri, where those used to a river community life-style had never really
adjusted, to return home to their own communities.
261 OEA/Ser JVII.62, Report of Human Rights of the Miskito Indians, p. 129.
262 The 1951 UN Convention and the 1967 UN Protocol do not define the
originator of the persecution. If irregular forces produce persecuting factors
then governments might not any longer be in the position to protect their
nationals. Therefore the Miskito Indians exposed to the actions of
indigenous antigovernmental armed forces would fell within the scope of
the UNHCR's mandate. The Declaration of Cartagena of 1984, signed by
more than ten states, though not being a treaty that does put obligations on
states, it is important as a normative quality under customary law, although
it lacks the legal force of a formal treaty it extends the mandate of UNHCR
was thereby extended to include persons in refugee-like situations, victims
of coercion and compelled flight
263 Americas Watch, "With the Mislätos in Honduras," p. 3.
Analytical Discussion 117
rectly from Nicaragua and 20 percent of the returnees from the border
admitted fear of conflict as a reason for coming over.
In interviews with a group of 23 persons just after their crossing into
Honduras at Suhi on February 28, 1986, the leader of the group said that
they had all come to Honduras to visit family members. He carried a document
issued by the judge of their village, Wiraphni, stating that all 23
persons were authorized to seek refuge in Honduras. The group leader
explained that KISAN groups were organizing the Indians living in Nicaraguan
border villages to enter Honduras all together on a single day in the
near future. 264
He happily expressed his satisfaction at having obtained special permission
to cross before that day. At the end of the interview, the group
leader gave me a booklet containing 820 names; the persons listed were all
being prepared for "the crossing."
The information collected during my fact-finding mission to the Honduran
Mosquitia clearly pointed toward the preparation of an organized
exodus. The justifications that the interviewees gave for entering Honduras
(mostly the lack of food, medicine, and clothes) were probably influenced
by KISAN groups' coaching and pressure. In-depth and confidential
conversations with "deserters" from KISAN revealed that the organization
maintained strict control over the movement of people, on both the
Nicaraguan side and the Honduran side. But since on the Nicaraguan side
KISAN ran the risk of being opposed in their actions by Nicaraguan armed
forces, their control over "their" people in Honduras was much more
stronger.
The initial influx that arrived in the first two month of 1986 had the
function of giving UNHCR "early warning," allowing it to prepare contingency
plans for the expected massive border crossing of the allegedly
persecuted, starving, and sick.
Several researchers, human rights workers and journalist have visited the
area and documented the situation in detail on public record. They also
informed about the influx of the first 1,500 persons between December
1985 and February 1986 suggesting that a much larger group's imminent
arrival was common knowledge and an accepted, if not expected, fact.
________________________
264 KISAN did not seem to have total control over all people. "Some Miskitos
began to cross the Coco River in December 1985 because of their urgent need
for food and medicine and for other reasons." Americas Watch, "With the
Miskitos in Honduras," p. 12.

118 Chapter 3
We understand from Professor Martin Diskin that there were
indications to consider integrating some 50,000 Indians from Nicaragua as
"pioneers" for the economic development of the Mosquitia, which may
have contributed to plans to rather relocate them within the Atlantic Coast
of Honduras instead of allowing them to repatriate voluntarily. 265
But one of the main problems was that the "old" refugees did not want
to be relocated, and the new arrivals were under strong pressure remain
within the reach of the border area, so as to be able to keep collecting their
food rations at the refugee locations.
UNHCR had a major problem with the diversion of food destined for
refugees to recipients outside the refugee areas. There were constant
complaints of food shortages, and the amount of rations actually needed in
the refugee locations was usually far above the amount calculated foil the
number of people counted in the official census. 266 Stricter administrative
measures, such as keeping systematic count of the actual beneficiaries,
were initiated by the new World Relief Director in June 1985; they have
helped to maintain control of these assistance problems to some extent
Analysis of the three major causes of the Miskito influx
"Induced asylum": Although the interviewees did not explicitly say that
they had been forcibly evacuated into Honduras, they confirmed that a
large group was being prepared to follow them. Information collected before,
during, and after the interviews made it clear that a large number of
people had no choice whether or not to cross the Coco River. As
predicted, approximately 8,500 Nicaraguan Indians entered Honduras
during Easter week of 1986. 267 Although William Casey, then director of
____________________
265 Interview with Martin Diskin , Professor at the M.I.T., Cambridge, USA on
14 October 1988.
266 According to interviews done by human rights workers with repatriatees in
Nicaragua in November 1986, the interviewees complained that there was
not enough food in Honduras. They also complained that KISAN was a
constant bother; although UNHCR kept the armed KISAN out of the camps,
they nevertheless came in in civilian clothes (and took their food away).
267 Martin Diskin, an authority on indigenous questions and Anthropology
Professor at MIT, interviewed a group of repatriating Miskitos in the
holding camp in Leon, Nicaragua, in July 1986. All said that they were
taken across ("led," "kidnapped," "crossed" were their words) by KISAN .
By the same token, journalists from the Philadelphia Inquirer and the
Boston Globe had found that KISAN had spread
Analytical Discussion 119
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Elliot Abrams, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs, tried to blame this movement of Miskito people
on Sandinista atrocities, independent observers found "evidence lacking of new
Sandinista abuses that caused their flight." Rather, they found that "KISAN had
spread fear as part of a deliberate plan to evacuate the Miskitos to Honduras." 268
Interviews done by a human rights workers confirmed that KISAN had "crossed
them over." 269
This forcible relocation of 8,500 at one blow, similar to actions in other villages
such as Francia Sirpe, was undertaken solely to create a stir in international public
opinion, in gross violation of common article three of the Geneva Convention. 270
What investigators of this case found most disturbing was the callousness with
which KISAN and others exploited
fear as part of a deliberate plan to evacuate the Miskitos from Nicaragua to Hon-duras.
Diskin, "The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," p. 90.
268 Diskin et al., "Peace and Autonomy on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua," September 1986,
p. 24.
269 Human rights workers visited the Coco River area in Nicaragua on 21-24 November,
1986 for a fact-finding mission, which included interviews with returnees of the "new"
refugees who had already returned from Honduras, either spontaneously or, when KISAN
had prevented it, with UNHCR's assistance. The people they talked with on the Coco River
mentioned several human rights violations that KISAN was guilty of, and none by the
Nicaraguan governmental forces. The most serious complaint was the forcible evacuation
of the Coco River communities to Honduras during the Easter week. Not only had KISAN
"crossed" them over, but all those who had already repatriated from Honduras and did not
want to return there again were forced by KISAN to do so. The human rights workers
mentioned the case of one Miskito Indian who permitted his name to be used: Franklin
Vincent, 54, from San Carlos on the Coco River. After having been forcibly evacuated to
Sumubila (in Taspa Pri) by the Nicaraguan Government in 1982, he had returned to his
village San Carlos in February 1986, where he lived quietly for two months until in April
KISAN forced him into Honduras. He said KISAN came to take them away, telling them
only that they "had" to leave, and giving no other explanation. Those who opposed this
relocation would be punished and were taken by force. In their interviews, the human rights
workers found a familiar refrain among the repatriees: "because KISAN crossed them
over", 'they came,' 'they took our food.' "They" meant "los Kisanes."
270 Additional Protocol H, June 6, 1977, Article 17, relating to non-international armedconflicts
of the four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, prohibits the forcible
displacement of civilian populations, unless the security of the civilians concerned, or
imperative military reasons, so demand. Neither condition had been met by KISAN in the
forcible evacuation of 8,500 Indians from the Coco River into Honduras at Easter 1986.
See Francoise Bory, Origin and Development of the International Humanitarian Law
(Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1982), p. 37.

120 Chapter3
the Miskitos, turning them into refugees in order to discredit and destabilize
the Nicaraguan government It is no coincidence that these events occurred
during the debate in the U.S. Congress over a $100 million aid package to the
contras, with further funds earmarked for KISAN. 271
Prevention of repatriation: The U.S. Administration anxious to obtain
Congress approval for contra aid funding, considered voluntary repatriation to
be politically counterproductive to its policy of "bashing the evil empire." 272
So did KISAN and the Honduran military authorities, some of whom believed
that voluntary repatriation would improve Nicaragua's image and bring anti-
American elements back into the country. Voluntary repatriation, whether
spontaneous or highly organized, wül depend on "whether the refugees are
convinced that the causes of their flight have moderated sufficiently to promise
a resumption of important aspects of their old lives." 273 That about half of the
"new" refugees returned almost instantaneously to Nicaragua may be
interpreted in two ways. First the people had had no major reason to leave their
homes other than coercion (in addition to loosing their rice-crops); and second,
the power of
____________________
271 The forced movement suggested that the reconciliation process was working too
well inside Nicaragua, and that external opposition was losing in its efforts to
discredit the Nicaraguan government. "Disgracefully, they were aided in this
effort by the United States." Martin Diskin et al., "Peace and Autonomy," p. 25.
See also Steve Stecklow, "A Media Event - with no Audience," and "Caught up
in Conflic, Indians Flee Nicaragua." "Why the Miskitos decided to seek refuge
here is in dispute. One American official says that the tribe has become a
'political football' in the ongoing struggle between the Sandinist government of
Nicaragua and the contras." Philadelphia Inquirer, 6 April 1986.
272 Diskin, "The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," p. 81. "The United States
claimed that its support for anti-Sandinista forces in the Atlantic Coast region
was meant to help achieve Indian self-determination by the overthrow of
Sandinistas" (p. 98) But by 1986, when the Atlantic Coast had acquired enormou
significance in "Reagan's war against Nicaragua," because the major contra 1
further to the west had failed militarily, therefore, even with an additional $10
million voted by Congress, it became unlikely that summer, that the Contras in I
west would be the route to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. A scenario of
military penetration of the Atlantic Coast region seemed more likely to capture a
larger community such as Puerta Cabeza and declare a provisional government
through which to channel additional resources and perhaps U.S. troops. William
Gasperini, "Miskitos Divided in Allegiances to Sandinistas and to Homeland," In
These Times, 3-9 September 1986, pp. 8-9, as quoted in Diskin, "Manipulation of
Indidigcnous Struggles," p. 92.
273 Gordenker: Refugees in International Politics. 1987, p. 127.
Analytical Discussion 121
coercion was short-lived enough so that as soon as they arrived in the
Honduran camps, many refugees began the process of repatriation. 274
Other scholars have found that "the opposing social forces [in this case
KISAN] also have foreign alignments, who often become the foremost
patrons of the refugees. In conflicts that have led to huge outpourings of
refugees, foreign involvement has been blatant, as in Afghanistan and
Central America. " 275 It is clear that without strong foreign alignment and
support, the Indian contra organizations would not have been able to
maintain control over the people and keep them in foreign lands despite
their wish to return home. Where control and pressure failed, KISAN used
threats and distorted information to prevent repatria tions. Human rights
workers report that relief workers indicate having heard KISAN telling
those who wanted to return that they would be killed if they went back to
Nicaragua.
As the Nicaraguan Miskitos won increased autonomy, the Indian contra
organizations needed to exercise stronger pressures to prevent people from
going home. The Miskitos' move toward self-determination started with the
governmental autonomy commission, created in December 1984. The
Nicaraguan Indian commander Eduardo Pantin, who was seeking a
nonmilitary solution to the conflict, played an important role by bringing
about the first draft of a proposed autonomy statute in June 1985, which,
despite enormous obstructive efforts by the United States, the Nicaraguan
government has incorporated into the 1987 constitution. 276 Moreover, the
returnees, in approving current conditions in Nicaragua, are the bearers of
good news to those remaining in Honduras, 277
_________________
274 Peplinski and Diskin, "Report of the ICVA Mosquitia Mission," 1987, p. 13.
275 Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence; Draft, Forthcoming; Oxford University
Press, 1989, Chapter 10, p. 14.
276 See Comisión National de Autonomía de la Costa Atlantica, Principios y
Políti-cas Para el Ejercício de los Derechos de Autonomía de los Pueblos
Indígenas y Comunidades de la Costa Atlantica (Managua: Comision National
de Autonomia de la Costa Atlantica, 1985); and Chapter VI, articles 89,90,91,
Republica de Nicaragua, "Constitutión Política," La Gazeta Diario Oficial
(Managua), January 9, 1987, pp. 46, 47, as quoted in Diskin, "The
Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," pp. 95,96.
277 The International Committee of the Red Cross has been operating a mailing
system by which the refugees in Honduras were enabled to exchange messages
safely with relatives in the Nicaraguan Mosquitia. This has been an important
relief and support measure for the refugees.

122 Chapter 3
which has encouraged large groups to spontaneously walk back, assisted by
UNHCR if KISAN resisted it. 278
Caught in the middle of tensions between different groups of people
needing its protection, UNHCR moved to place those who wished to repatriate,
or who were otherwise threatened by KISAN, in "protection houses"
until their actual departure from the Mosquitia. On 28 May 1985 in Mocoron,
I observed first-hand how the MISURA forces attempted to kidnap the young
males of the twelve repatriants directly out from under UNHCR protection
officers when they were accompanying them to the airplane. A mission of the
International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) concluded, "There are
[still] pressures against successful return ... . [Nongovernmental] support of a
successful repatriation of Miskitos and Sumo Indians can be the most valuable
contribution to the pacification of the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua.” 279
In the fall of 1987, UNHCR initiated a more than $2 million project to help
returnees on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua. The provision of funding by the
European Economic Community and other European countries and agencies
shows that now there is an implicit approval on the part of these donors for
improving conditions in the country of origin. With this backing and support,
the prevention of voluntary repatriation will soon finally be able to come to an
end. 280
____________________
278 Even though the refugees are adequately cared for in Honduras (although their
presence there is used for various political and military purposes), an ICVA mis sion
pointed out that for more and more refugees, the negative evaluation of refugee life
plus the changes seen in Nicaragua over the past five years prompt them to go home.
The UNHCR list of refugees interested in repatriation is longer than can be handled
by the present staff. In addition, a representative of the Moravian Church in
Managua told the mission that repatriation reflected a general desire to return to
Nicaragua, saying that "the myth of fear has broken," that KISAN's propaganda was
false, and expressing satisfaction with the autonomy law approved on April 24 1987
in Puerta Cabeza. See Peplinski, and Diskin, "Report of the ICVA Mosquitia
Mission," May 20-30,1987, p. 10-12.
279 Peplinski and Diskin" Report of the ICVA Mosquitia Mission," 1987, p. 17.
280 The rehabilitation project is to provide assistance to returnees on the Atlantic Coast
of Nicaragua," (UNHCR Letter of Instruction of 17 September 1987) for transport
and logistics, domestic needs and shelter, agricultural tools and equipment, and
operational support through the Nicaraguan Institute of Social Security and Welfare
(INSSBI), the Ministry of Constructions (MICONS), the Ministry of Housing and
Settlement (MIDINRA), the Ministry of Health (MINSA), the Ministry of Education
(MED), under the supervision of the UNHCR Charge de Mission for Nicaragua. The
total expenditures from 1 August 1987 until 30 September 1988 are estimated at
approximately $2,300,000. See UNHCR, "Special
Analytical Discussion 123
Forced recruitment by armed groups was also a recurrent problem in most
refugee locations in the Mosquitia, both in Honduras and Nicaragua. During its
mission in May 1987, the ICVA delegation found that the "movement toward
repatriation competes with the effort to use this [refugee] population as a
recruiting base for guerrilla warfare and to support the allegations of Sandinista
repression."28i Cultural Survival also reports: "With the organization members
deserting before their eyes, the KISAN leaders resorted to stongarm tactics to
maintain themselves, including invading refugee camps, kidnapping Indian
youths and conscripting them. " 282
MIT Professor Martin Diskin has asserted that KISAN in particular has
forcibly recruited Miskitos and taken reprisals against those who wished to
remaln neutral. 283
Even more serious incidents have occurred. In February 1987, a group of
fifteen Sumos who had recently been repatriated to Nicaragua with UNHCR
assistance was seized by an Indian contra group together with thirty other
Sumos, as they were all traveling back to Musawas, their village of origin in
Nicaragua. When the Indian contras attempted to convince the Sumos to return
across the river to Honduras, thirty escaped. Another fifteen were taken armed
guard, and were forced to travel for four days up the Coco river to Rus Rus in
Honduras. Three of this group, having obtained permission to visit relatives in
the refugee camp at Tapalwas (an exclusively Sumo refugee village), did not
return to fight. The contra group set out to recapture them, with the warning: "If
[we] caught them in Nicaragua [we] would kill them. "284
____________________
Program Of Rehabilitation Assistance to Returnees of Indian Origin (Miskito and
Sumo) on the Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua," (Draft), 25 July 1988.
281 Peplinski and Diskin, "Report of the ICVA Mosquitia Mission, 1987, p. 10.
282 Glenn T. Morris, "Between a Rock and a Hard Place - Left-Wing Revolution,
Right-Wing Reaction and the Destruction of Indigenous People," Cultural Survival
Quarterly 11, No. 3, (1987), p. 22.
283 Diskin, "The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," p. 90.
284 Americas Watch, "The Sumos in Nicaragua and Honduras: An Endangered
People." (Washington, Septem D.C., September 1987), pp. 28 and 29. This document
reported another forced recruitment in March 1987, which ended in the murder
of three resistors: On 28 March 1987, Palacios, an Indian Contra leader took
35 Sumos from Nicaragua by force. The recruits were forced on a 23-day march
toward Ahuasbila in Honduras, when three of them, after refusing to continue,
were said to have been executed. Fourteen of the remaining abductees were found
at KISAN headquarters, and the rest managed to escape to the UNHCR refugee
camp at Tapalwas, p.30. See also Americas Watch " Violations of the Laws of

124 Chapter 3 Analytical Discussion 125
The dearth of roads and communication infrastructures in the Mosquitia,
which basically consists of one road and otherwise rivers, has created one
of the most difficult challenges for UNHCR to monitor and attempt to
prevent forced recruitment. Those Miskitos successfully blocked from
voluntary repatriation and unable to reach out to UNHC for assistance
have been in serious danger of being forcibly recruited Indian contra
groups. This problem started when the first refuge wanted to return after
the amnesty in 1983, and remains acute today.
UNHCR has worked on confidence-building measures among those
who wished simply to live in peace and work the land made available to
them through the government of Honduras for self-sufficiency projects;
but since UNHCR is perceived as an "enemy" of KISAN, refugees who
were cooperating with UNHCR in its assistance programs have tended
suffer consequences. The large numbers of women with small children
who were left behind in the refugee locations suggested that many male
and single females were taken for forced labor or even thrust into zones
of combat.
Concluding remarks
As a human rights worker put it, KISAN and its U.S. advisors cynically
relied on UNHCR and intended to instrumentalize the good offices of
UNHCR to take care of the refugees they created. Their manipulation of
international relief organizations was a shameful waste of precious and
limited international relief resources, as well as a misuse of UNHCR,
which was not designed to care for make-believe refugees - that is,
arbitrarily generated ones. Miskitos and other indigenous groups who
were pushed into Honduras at Easter 1986 had well-founded fears of
persecution by KISAN if they refused to let themselves become refugees.
These persons were more in danger where they were going than in the
country from which they supposedly fled: the danger came from the
guenillas who presumably were fighting for them. 285
It is not UNHCR's usual task to involve itself in the causes that make
people gravitate toward refugee camps. It might, however, have been
possible to provide U.N. and non-U.N. policymakers with a more com-
prehensive analysis of the motives and to offer recommendations on how to
confront the Spring 1986 influx. Of course, UNHCR is operating in
Honduras in a highly sensitive context. If the Office was unable or unwilling
to make a more systematic collection of information, concerning the
causes of the announced movement for early analysis and action, UNHCR
might have been able to indicate these problems in a general manner to
researchers from public interest organizations, such as Cultural Survival, or
experts on indigenous people, so as to establish the facts in an objective and
reliable manner. That way UNHCR would not be directly associated with
the investigation; in any event, it would not need to pass judgment on the
result of these findings or on those responsible for the acts committed.
UNHCR might have been in a good position to express its concern about
the impending situation, in the interest of the persons for whom it was
expected to provide protection from the authorities. If UNHCR had been
prepared to take preventive action, its resources of international
humanitarian assistance would not have been used to maintainigroups of
people who would probably not have received it under different circumstances.
Apart from sparing UNHCR's energies, it is likely that many of the
8,000 Nicaraguan Indians who entered UNHCR's refugee location
subsequent to the initial interviews would not have needed to cross the
border. A proof for this assumption is that approximately 8,000 of the "new
refugees" wanted to go back to Nicaragua after having barely arrived with
the Spring 1986 influx. 286 Many of them stated that they had not wanted to
come into Honduras, and decided to spontaneously return across the border.
Those who were impeded by KISAN or preferred to repatriate officially
under the auspices of UNHCR did so, which brought the figure for 1986
UNHCR assisted repatriations to 1,714. With better facilities in place, and
negotiations between the Nicaraguan, Honduran, and UNHCR authorities
successfully concluded in a tripartite agreement allowing for large-scale
repatriations, the UNHCR assisted repatriation figures for Miskitos and
Sumos jumped to 3,873 in 1987, and to 7,994 during the first nine months of
1988. 287
The High Commissioner himself and, if necessary, the UN Secretary-
General should have been kept better informed of the situation in a direct
and continuous manner. They might have wanted to arrange for more
War By Both Sides in Nicaragua In 1987," (Washington,D.C. November 1987),
p. 52
285 Interview with anonymous human rights worker, on the handfile of the
author, p.
________________________
286 The New York Times, 18 April 1987.
287 UNHCR, "Comparative Repatriation Statistics in Central America and
Mexico," Jan.-Dec. 1987, Jan-Sept. 1987, Jan-Sept 1988, October 1988/AW.

126 Chapter 3
comprehensive fact-finding to deal better with this situation on both a
humanitarian and a political level.
International nongovernmental advocacy organizations might have
been able to send more missions than they did, to study the situation and
transmit accurate reports into the arena of international public opinion.
The case study of the Miskito and Sumo Indians has shown how people
were arbitrarily turned into refugees without their realizing what was
happening. They became pawns of international political strategies, and
once they had served their purpose they were allowed to go home,
assisted by humanitarian good offices of UNHCR. It is surely not the role
of the United Nations, or any humanitarian organization for that matter, to
play into the cynical interests of political powers who should have the
ultimate responsibility to safeguard the basic rights.
3.1.2.3. Uprooting people in the Vietnam War
Introduction
According to U.S. government records, more than 10 million people were
displaced or uprooted, involuntarily and often repeatedly, during the long
and anguished history of the Vietnam War. 2 »» The reasons for this
upheaval shifted as the war progressed: people were first grouped into
"strategic hamlets," then scattered in anticipation or in the wake of largescale
military operations, and finally uprooted to be politically exploited
as "refugees."
The lessons learned from this experience might be relevant for current
situations that are causing forced displacements, as for example in
Ethiopia today, where similar governmental strategies and tactics are
uprooting millions of the local population.
In examining the Vietnamese displacement at its various stages, we
shall explore whether a stronger international presence of United Nations
organizations, aside from UNICEF, UNESCO, and other nongovern-
__________________________
288 U.S. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate
Problems connected with Refugees and Escapees. Relief and Rehabilitation of
War Victims in Indochina: One Year after the Cease-fire. A Study Mission
Report. 93rd Congress, 2nd Session, 1974, pp. 6-7 and 12, (See statistics in the
appendix).
Analytical Discussion 127
mental agencies that were there already, 289 could have helped contain the number
of internal refugees and war victims. The collorary question is whether today
with decreasing East-West tensions international preventive action by the United
Nations or other nongovernmental intervention in current refugee-producing
situations offers a better chance of reducing the severity of harm inflicted on
civilians than was possible in Vietnam. Notwithstanding the right of
governments to relocate their nationals within their territories for purposes they
believe to be in their best national interest, they also have the obligation to
implement such policies under humane conditions, in accordance with minimum
international humanitarian standards. Wherever these minimum standards
(defined in Chapter 5) are severely compromised, endangering the lives and
security of large numbers of people, international preventive action seems called
for.
Clearly the Vietnamese authorities were overwhelmed by the responsibility of
responding adequately to the need of refugees already created, let alone the task
of containing the conditions that threatened to turn millions of innocent
bystanders into refugees. Therefore, more involvement by international
organizations might have not only offered much needed assistance, but also
created a calming effect by maintaining an institutional network within and
outside the country.
Perhaps because of the abysmal experience in Vietnam, the massive
population uprootings have rarely been attempted since then, except for the
villagization program currently taking place in Ethiopia (whose objectives,
however, are primarily aimed at ideological reeducation rather than at the
prevention of contact with and support for guerrilla operations, as was the case
with Vietnam).
The printed sources for this study are primary and secondary documents,
statements, and reports. I also draw on my personal observations and interviews
with Vietnamese refugees, officials, voluntary agency staff, and other scholars.
______________________________
289 International nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) concerned with and involved
in assisting refugees within Vietnam in the mid-1960s included Church World
Services, Catholic Relief Services, CARE, International Rescue Committee, and
the American Friends Service Committee. U.S. Congress, Refugee Problems in
South Vietnam, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary. US. Senate, Subcommittee
to Investigate Problems connected with Refugees and Escapees, 89th
Cong., 2nd Session, 4 March 1966, (Washington: 1966), U.S. Government Printing
Office, p. 6.

128 Chapter 3
The three issues and time periods that I will focus on are: forced relocation
under the strategic hamlet program during the years 1961-63;
large-scale bombardment and military operations, causing "tactical" refugees,
in the years 1965-1973; and the massive displacement and it
times deliberate creation of refugees in the years 1965-1975.
Background
Evidence from U.S. government documents indicates that the generation,
of refugees and sweeping population displacement had its beginning in
the 1954-55 refugee flows from the North to the South of Vietnam after
the 1954 division of the country. Even at that early stage displacing large
numbers of people was not only a by-product of the war but rather, in
specific instances, a strategic goal. In a background paper of 1961, L. L
Lemnitzer, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated the
intentions to the Secretary of Defense:
[To] encourage again the movement of refugees from the North into the South
[1954-. 55] by stimulating the desire to do so among the people in the North, and
by reestablishing the highly successful settlement program....The goal should be
a million refugees. 290
It would, however, be an exaggeration to say that all of the ten million
refugees and displaced persons in Vietnam were the result of an
intentional policy to drive the rural population to U.S.-controlled
cities. 291
Strategic hamlets
The program of "strategic hamlets," a vast and expensive enterprise, was
drawn up in 1961 in response to the increasing Communist insurgency in
South Vietnam. Launched in early 1962 by the Vietnamese government
under President Diem's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, the program engendered
a huge wave of population relocations with the intent of creating quasi-
______________________
290 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Vietnam Relations 1945-1967: A Study prepared
by the Department of Defense. Printed for the House Committee on Armed Services,
U.S. G.P.O. Washington: 1971 declassified, Memorandum No. JCSM-228-61
to the Secretary of Defense, April 11,1961, attached Background Paper, p. 31.
291 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, After the cataclysm: Postwar Indochina
and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology, Boston, South End Press, 1979, p. 66
Analytical Discussion 129
self-governing communities that would be physically and politically insulated
from Vietcong influence. Nhu declared that the strategic hamlets were necessary
for the security of the people to ensure the success of the government's political,
social, and military programs through an enthusiastic movement toward
solidarity and self-sufficiency.292 British advice and American support helped
put the program into place, in the hope that the peasants would defend
themselves against the expected Vietcong attacks. Upon his return to
Washington from a Pacific meeting in July 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara told members of the press that the strategic hamlet program was the
"backbone of President Diem's program for countering subversion directed
against his state." 293
The majority of the hamlets were self-reliant, with their own resources,
although the U.S. was supplying equipment and construction materials. The U.S.
Agency for International Development (AID) agreed to fund the Strategic
Hamlet Kits, which provided building materials, barbed wire and stakes, light
weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment, although the agency ran
into problems with delivery schedule and funding.294 Critics cautioned that
under this so-called "cornerstone strategy," strategic hamlets were established by
simply throwing up bamboo fences and barbed wire, and the citizens were not
always well prepared for relocation:
When peasants resisted resettlement - this happens often - they were driven out
of their villages by force.... The Vietnamese Army did not always use humane
methods.... In some cases villages were burnt when their inhabitants put up a
determined resistance to the resettlement. An official of the U.S. Operations
Missions in Saigon stated that the United States pays compensation for all
damages. 295
____________________________
292 The Pentagon Papers, Department of Defense, Published by the Armed Forces
Committee of the House of Representatives, O & D Task Force Final Report Bk.
3, United States - Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, IV. B. 2. Evolution of the War,
Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963, p. 24.
293 The Pentagon Papers, Department of Defense, Published by the Armed Forces
Committee of the House of Representatives, O & D Task Force Final Report Bk.
3, United States - Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, IV. B. 2. Evolution of the War,
Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961- 1963, p. 21. See also The Pentagon Papers, The
Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, Vol.
II, The Senator Gravel Edition, Beacon Press Boston, 1971, p. 149.
294 The Pentagon Papers, Vol, n, The Senator Gravel Edition, Beacon Press Boston,
1971, p. 152.
295 Seymour Melman, In the Name of America: The Conduct of the War in Vietnam
by the Armed Forces of the United States (New York: Dutton, 1968), p. 338-39.

130 Chapter 3
This program turned a major part of the population into refugees and displaced
persons. By the end of the summer of 1962, the government of
Vietnam claimed that 3,225 of the planned 11,316 hamlets had already been
completed. Over 33 percent of the nation's total population were already
living in completed hamlets. 296 According to a study by the Southeast Asia
Program at Cornell University, by July 14, 1963, 8,737,613 people were
housed in 7,202 hamlets. 297 Although this figure appears exaggerated, even
U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk claimed that half the population had
been relocated by 1963. 298
According to the assessment of David Halberstam, the Pulitzer Prizewinning
reporter of the The New York Times, the U.S. and Vietnamese
authorities had hoped that the hamlet concept would force the Vietcong to
attack the civilians, driving the enraged populace into the arms of the
government. The policy, however, achieved exactly the opposite result:
Most able-bodied men rallied to the Vietcong, perhaps less out of conviction than
[in] defiance of the regime's coercive methods. 299
Moreover, the Vietcong were not hungry, and did not need to prey off the
villagers. Most of them were originally from the South, knew the area well,
and thus easily infiltrated the hamlets.
When they attacked, they attacked only the symbols of the Government: the
armory or command post of the hamlet, the hamlet chief or the youth leaders. They
rarely harmed the population, and so the people of the village, who saw that the
Government had not kept its promises and could not protect them, often sided with
the Vietcong after a raid. 300
__________________________
296 See Table, Government of Vietnam Report on Status of Strategic Hamlets in:
Department of Defense, Study, Published by the Armed Forces Committee of
the House of Representatives, O & D Task Force Final Report Bk. 3, United
States -Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, IV. B. 2. Evolution of the War,
Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963, Appendix, p. 28.
297 Milton Osborne, Strategic Hamlets in South Vietnam: A Survey and a
Comparison, South East Asia Program (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 1965), p. 33.
298 Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, After the Cataclysm: Postwar
Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology (Boston: South End
Press, 1979), p. 322.
299 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam, A History: The First Complete Account of Vietnam
at War (New York: Penguin, 1984), p. 256.
300 Melman,p.340.
Analytical Discussion 131
The results showed that the method of combating insurgency with a carrotand-stick
approach (appealing programs and coercive control) utterly failed to
bring the entire nation under the government's control, as Under Secretary of
Sate George W. Ball commented. 301 It may well have been doomed from the
outset because of "the peasants' resistance to measures which changed the
pattern of rural life - whether aimed at security or control." 302 Such a policy of
forced relocation, dictated from above in absolute disregard of the interests
and needs of the people, was bound to be both costly and ineffective and,
even worse, to backfire on the initiators. Even the Pentagon itself
acknowledged later that this program was doomed from the outset because it
alienated many of those whose loyalty it aimed to win. 303
On November 1,1963, a coup d'etat toppled the Diem regime; the deposed
President and his brother Nhu, the architect of the strategic hamlet program,
were killed. The strategic program died with them. 304
Large-scale bombardment and military operation
The skirmishes of the Vietnam War began escalating into major military
operations following the Southeast Asia Resolution (later known as the
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution), which was originally a contingency plan for
responding to potential attacks by the North Vietnamese Army forces. 305 The
incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin on August 2 and 4, 1964 in which the North
Vietnamese Army allegedly attacked U.S. patrol ships, signaled the real
beginning of the Vietnam War. Later, as the war became increasingly
unpopular and its legitimacy was called more and more into question, the
Gulf of Tonkin incident came under reexamination. An investigative hearing
was held before the U.S. Senate Committee on For-
_______________________
301 The Pentagon Papers, Vol. u, The Senator Gravel Edition, Beacon Press
Boston, 1971, p. 149.
302 The Pentagon Papers, Vol. H, The Senator Gravel Edition, Beacon Press
Boston, 1971, p. 131.
303 The Pentagon Papers, Vol, n, The Senator Gravel Edition, Beacon Press
Boston, 1971, p. 131.
304 The Pentagon Papers, Published by the Armed Forces Committee of the House
of Representatives, United States - Vietnam Relations 1945-1967, IV. B. 2.
Evolution of the War, Strategic Hamlet Program, 1961-1963, p. 35.
305 U.S. Senate, The Gulf of Tonkin: The 1964 Incidents; Hearing before the Committee
on Foreign Relations. 93rd Congr., 21 February 1968 (Washington,D.C.: U.S.
G.P.O.), pp. 11-12

132 Chapter 3
eign Relations. On 20 February 1968, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara testified before the Committee that when the facts had been
established to the complete satisfaction of all responsible authorities, the
U.S. had responded with an air strike on the facilities that supported the
attacking vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. Mr. McNamara's testimony
prompted the chairman of the Committee to raise the matter of the contingency
draft of the Southeast Asia Resolution "Mr. McGeorge Bundy
[President Johnson's National Security Advisor] told this Committee that
this draft had been prepared some months before the Tonkin incidents in the
hearing. " 306
Harry Summers Jr., an expert on military affairs, bluntly described the
duplicitous resolution and its consequences:
In voting unlimited presidential power, most members of Congress thought they
were providing for retaliation for an attack on our forces, and preventing a largescale
war in Asia, rather than authorizing its inception... . 307
Once the Americans got involved, they found that their adversaries were
conducting warfare mainly with guerrilla tactics, for which the American
and their South Vietnamese allies were insufficiently prepared. Finding
themselves outmaneuvered, they resorted to a strategy of large-scale
bombardment.
The level of warfare produced correspondingly large flows of refugees. 308
Reports pointed out that people were forced to flee to escape from both
Communist harassment and American bombings. 309
Whatever its strategic value, the bombing was overwhelmingly
destructive. By the end of the war, the U.S. had dropped 7 million tons of
bombs and dumped another 7 million tons of explosives on Vietnam,
compared to 2 1/2 million tons in Europe and the Pacific during World War
II. Vietnam thus earned the unwelcome distinction of being the most
heavily bombed country in the history of the world. The result of that le vel
of violence was that one person in every thirty was killed, one in
_______________________
306 U.S. Senate. The Gulf of Tonkin: The 1964 Incidents; Hearing before the
Committee on Foreign Relations, 1968, p. 11,12.
307 Harry G. Summers Jr., On Strategy. A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam
War, (No-vato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982), p. 23.
308 U.S. Senate. A Report to the Committee on the Judiciary. Refugee
Problems in South Vietnam, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems
Connected -with Refugees and Escapees, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. March
4,1966, p. 11,14.
309 Edward B. Marks. "Saigon: The Impact of Refugees," Reporter, 36, No. 1
(1967), pp. 33-36.
Analytical Discussion 133
twelve was wounded, and one in five was made a refugee or a displaced
person. 310 Every time the war escalated, the flow of refugees increased
dramatically. Those who survived the disruption were thoroughly demoralized
by all the turmoil. Their utter lack of control over their situation turned large
portions of the local population into indifferent and passive burdens, who
certainly could have managed their lives independently if their lives had not been
disrupted by governmental policies with which they had little motivation to
identify. During the period of the Tet and May offensives of 1968 and the 1972
Easter offensive, the number of registered refugees and displaced persons was
particularly high. Altogether, between 1965 and 1973 more than ten million
people became refugees or displaced war victims. 311
The large-scale refugee flows that had been produced by the intensification of
the war posed enormous challenges to both the Vietnamese and the U.S.
capacities. The sudden enormousness of the refugee flow in 1965 made a policy
response urgent. There was no survey of the refugees' needs, and the U.S. AID
Mission in Saigon did not have a single person assigned full-time to refugee
affairs. 312
In July 1965, the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Refugees began conducting
public hearings on problems related to refugees in Vietnam. Although Vietnam's
Ministry of Social Welfare was at that time responsible for emergency aid to the
evacuees, and the Ministry of Rural Development for their resettlement, the
capacity of the Vietnamese authorities to handle this tasks was overwhelmed.
Dramatic needs caused by a "stepup in the bombing of certain villages, with a
corresponding increase in the number of refugees" (Senator Kennedy estimated
500,000 or
____________________________
310 Harrison Salisbury, ed., Vietnam Reconsidered (New York: Harper, 1984), p. 267.
311 For detailed statistics, see Appendix, Chart I: "Newly Registered Refugees by
Official GVN/USAID Count, 1965-1973" and Table: "Statistical summary of refugee
and war victim movement in South Vietnam, 1965-73." In US Senate.
Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate Problems connected with
Refugees and Escapees. Relief and Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina:
One Year after the Ceasefire. A Study Mission Report. 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., 1974,
pp. 12 and 6-7.
312 U.S. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to investigate Problems
connected to Refugees and Escapees. Civilian Casualty and Refugee Problems in
South Vietnam: Findings and Recommendations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O.,
1968), p. 2.

134 Chapters
600,000 people to be refugees in mid- 1965) called for U.S. efforts to
"enlist the humanitarian aid of other countries." 313
In February 1966, full responsibility for refugee affairs was given to
the newly created Special Commissariat for Refugees in the Office of the
Prime Minister of South Vietnam. A year and a half later, in November
1967, the Special Commissariat was merged with the Ministry of Social
Welfare, taking over responsibility for refugee relief. The Ministry had
staff in the country's four military zones, each comprising a number of
provinces.
The appointed US AID Refugee Coordinator in Saigon was assigned
to coordinate the U.S. relief effort with that of about twenty religious and
nonsectarian U.S. and international nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), which were assisting with important contributions in cash, goods
and services. But the refugee problem was considered part of the overall
"pacification" problem - where war strategy and refugee policy met and
clashed. By the end of 1965, the NGOs anticipated that about one million
refugees would need assistance and protection. 314 To cope with the sheer
numbers of these huge human flows in a devastating war situation, these
organizations developed important fund-raising activities to assist the
refugees with goods and services wherever possible.
In June 1967 the refugee function of US AID was transferred to the
joint civil and military staff of Civil Operation and Revolutionary Development
Support (CORDS), within the the U.S. Military Assistance
Command - Vietnam (MACV), the combat military side of MACV under
the command of the Deputy CORDS Chief Robert A. Komer (later
William E. Colby) who was under the command of General Abrams, who
later replaced General Westmoreland as Commander-in-Chief of the
whole U.S. MACV. 315 Protection and assistance were henceforth mainly
under military control, which is inherently unsuited to deal with such
primarily humanitarian matters.
The refugee problem in Vietnam became more and more
unmanageable, and the needs so great that in 1966, Senator Edward Kennedy,
who was Chairman of the Subcommittee to investigate problems
_______________________
313 U.S. Congress. Refugee Problems in South Vietnam, Report of the
Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, made by its Subcommittee to
Investigate Problems Connected with refugees and Escapees, 89 th Cong.,
2nd. Session, 4 March 1966, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington: 1966, p. 4.
314 U.S. Congress. Refugee Problems in South Vietnam, 4 March 1966, p. 7.
315 Louis Wiesner, Victims and Survivors: Displaced Persons and OAer War
Victims in Vietnam, 1954-1975, New York: Greenwood Press, 1988, p. 90
Analytical Discussion 135
connected with refugees and escapees at that time, recommended to the Senate
Judiciary Committee that greater efforts be made to enlist the support of the
international community and intergovernmental organizations. At the same time,
Kennedy recommended the use of the United Nations and its specialized
agencies as channels of assistance for the dispossessed, and he reported to the
Subcommittee that he had already met earlier that year with a number of United
Nations officials: Secretary-General U Thant; Under Secretary C.V. Narasimhan;
Miss Julia Render-son, Director of the United Nations Bureau for Social Affairs;
Mr. Sherwood Moe of UNICEF; and Dr. Arthur Gaglotti of UNESCO. Kennedy
also initiated conversations with Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, and established informal contacts with
representatives of the World Health Organization. 316 The purpose of these
contacts was to solicit support for humanitarian assistance to refugees and
displaced persons within Vietnam.
The 1966 recommendation by Senator Kennedy to enlist international
humanitarian assistance did not materialize, despite the United Nations' readiness
to help. 317 The major sticking point was, ironically, resistance on the part of the
U.S. government, which tolerated the efforts of most NGOs to assist the
uprooted and displaced people but looked unfavorably upon any other projects
other than the modest ones being implemented by UNICEF and UNESCO. 318
Deliberate creation of refugees?
As the war dragged on, the line between the incidental creation of refugees as a
byproduct of large-scale military operations and the deliberate uprooting of
people to destabilize Vietcong held areas became
____________________________
316 U.S. Congress. Refugee Problems in South Vietnam. Washington: 1966, p. 33.
317 Personal interview with Zia Rizvi, former Special Assistant to the High Commissioner
for Refugees Sadruddin Aga Khan, on 27 March 1988. Rizvi suggested that
international organizations could have helped more at that time in Vietnam. He also
indicated that international organizations at times too easily give in to political
pressures, tending to hide behind the rationale of scarce resources. The pressures in
this case appear to have originated mainly from the United States for not involving
the United Nations with major projects in Vietnam at an earlier stage.
318 Personal interview with Mr. Louis A. Wiesner, author of Victims and Survivors,
Displaced Persons and Other War Victims in Vietnam, 1954-175; New York:
Greenwood Press, 1988.

136 Chapter 3
increasingly obscure. The U.S. and Vietnamese would bomb particular
areas, after warning people to evacuate through leaflets, radio announcements,
and loudspeaker messages.
Professor Seymour Melman has assembled a number of reports filed by
correspondents of the The New York Times, The Christian Science
Monitor, and Le Figaro to support the claim that the United States pursued
a deliberate policy of creating refugees for strategic and military
reasons. 319
George Goss, the head of the U.S. Mission's Refugee Division, and Dr. Nguyen
Phuc Que, the Vietnamese Refugee Commissioner, agreed that while most
peasants voluntarily left their homes to escape from battles, bombardments and
war, more and more, though, the people called refugees have been forced into the
camps by allied troops to deny support to the Viet Cong workers and soldiers. 320
One correspondent reported that the flight of refugees and the forcible resettlement
of people from the Iron Triangle, War Zone C, and the
mountain valleys of Binh Duong province drained the Communists of one
million possible supporters in 1966. 321
Though U.S. Commanders denied that there was a policy of
intentionally generating refugees, one civilian official declared policy or
no, they sure were doing it. Another American official implied that the
U.S. was looking favorably on creating a flow of refugees for the purpose
of winning the war. "War is about people," this official said. "The side
that has the loyalty of the people ought to win it. This is a good opportunity
to add a few thousand friends on our side." 322
The intentional generation of refugees sparked reactions among the
civilian population that made the situation worse. Many people developed
a "hamster syndrome" of indiscriminate hoarding, in reaction to the
chronic shortages of critical supplies that were partly due to the highly
centralized governmental relief system. In addition, making the refugees
passive recipients of charity so strained the relief administration that it
was often on the verge of breaking down. The refugee influ into the cities
was a deliberate goal by American strategists, who calculated that this
"forced urbanization," as they termed it, would withdraw peasant
_______________________________
319 Melman, pp. 347-50.
320 Melman, p. 350.
321 Melman, p. 364.
322 Melman, pp. 364-65
Analytical Discussion 137
support from the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, and thus hamper their
ability to subsist in the countryside. 323
Ambassador Kromer, however, pressed the military commander to "limit the
generation of refugees ... and to assume temporary responsibility for those they
created." 324 But some U.S. Force commanders seemed to be particularly resistant
to his suggestions, and went on generating refugees with little regard to what
would become of them.
Post-1973
After the Paris Cease-fire Agreement of January 1973, refugees still fled from
violence in the countryside. The major difference, however, in the post-cease-fire
refugee resettlement program (administered by a Vietnamese Interministerial
Committee) was the avoidance of forced relocation, (out of Communist-controlled
areas), whereas much of the pre-1972 refugee resettlement had been carried out
without the consent of the people relocated. 325 Senator Kennedy repeated his
long-standing policy recommendation that refugee resettlement in Vietnam should
be voluntary and that the movement of people should play no role in U.S.
policy. 326
The Cease-fire Agreement also guaranteed freedom of movement, a right that
was not always honored by either side. 327 The changing balance between South
and North Vietnam had contributed to increased refugee flows into overcrowded,
ever shrinking South Vietnamese-controlled areas. The numbers of refugees by
far exceeded South Vietnam's capacity to absorb them. In accordance with the
1973 Paris cease-fire agreement, many people wanted to return to their homes,
most of which were, however, in Communist-controlled areas. Therefore the
South Vietnamese authorities prevented this wherever they could. These people
were forced to remain where they were and became a festering sore
___________________________
323 Karnow, 1984, p. 439.
324 Wiesner, (Draft) p. 598.
325 U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Relief and Rehabilitation of War
Victims in Indochina, May 1974. Washington, U.S. G.P.O., p. 16.
326 U.S. Congress. Relief and Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina, May 1974, p.
3.
327 U.S. Congress. Relief and Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina, 1974, p. 17.

138 Chapters
where they were held. They probably became a factor in helping the invading
North Vietnamese Army ultimately to win.328
The forced resettlement of populations into strategic hamlets caused
large-scale human suffering and was a threat to the lives and security of
millions of civilians. It drove much of the population to sympathize with
the enemy rather than to withdraw its support from them. The great majority
of these forcibly relocated people did not support the government of
Vietnam in the war and thereby contributed to losing it.329 On the
contrary, a recent study shows that those who were forced into strategic
hamlets opened their gates to the Vietcong. Communist cadres and guerrillas
moved freely in and out of the strategic hamlets and were given
supplies and often Vietnamese government rations. Moreover, these relocated
villagers provided intelligence to the Communists and withheld it
from government troops. They did not actively work or fight against the
enemy. Large-scale bombarding and military operations causing 'tactical'
refugees, were mainly based on a Western military concept, and barely
took into account the people concerned, their human needs and abilities.
The result was great instability and turmoil.
The potential role of the United Nations
This sad chapter in Vietnam's history shows how easily people can become
political pawns in the hands of those with power. This was not only
true during the Vietnam War; it has been a reality before and ever since,
and is likely to stay part of power politics for years to come.
The aim of this section is to examine whether UN specialized expertise
and experience might have been able to help prevent the massive
displacement and uprooting of some of these people. The question is
whether today, in a world tending toward an easing of relations between
the major powers, and perhaps holding more possibilities for international
law enforcement of human rights instruments and peaceful resolution of
regional conflicts, the potentials exists for this tendency of using people
for political purposes to abate. We suggest that today there may be more
possibilities for protecting civilians from policies that actively seek to turn
them into refugees.
International human rights law has been extended into national jurisdiction,
as indicated in Chapter 5. This justifies not only the U.N.'s legi-
___________________________
328 Wiesner, Victims and Survivors, (Draft), p. 601.
329 Wiesner, Victims and Survivors, (Draft), p. 607.
Analytical Discussion 139
timate interest but also its action within states's borders to start seeking solutions
to refugee problems where they arise. 330
UNHCR assisted returning ethnic Vienamese expelled from Cambodia after
1970. In 1974, in an extension of its activities that the General Assembly approved
ex. post facto, it also helped Vietnamese displaced persons within their country. 331
The U.N. might have been able to provide technical expertise and humanitarian
assistance to Vietnam at an earlier point than 1974, when UNHCR initiated its
programs for approximately 750,000 displaced persons within the country.
Immediately following the Peace Agreement for Vietnam in 1973, UNHCR
started to negotiate the first phase of its special operation for displaced and
uprooted populations. 332 Dale De Haan, then Chief of Staff of Senator Edward
Kennedy, had visited North Vietnam from 10 to 17 March 1973 to examine the
need for and possible scope of international and U.N. relief efforts in Vietnam. 333
During a second mission to Vietnam by Senator Kennedy's Office in July 1974,
UNHCR initiated a special operation for "displaced and uprooted populations" in
Vietnam 334 (and Laos) in response to requests from these
________________________
330 UN GA res. 41/124, 4 December 1986: The General Assembly "recognizes the
importance of finding durable solutions to refugee problems and recognizes also that
the search for durable solutions includes the need to address the causes of movements
of refugees and asylum seekers from their countries of origin...."
331 UN GA res. 3454 (XXX), 9 December 1975: Report of the UNHCR, in which the
General Assembly for the first time mandated the UNHCR to undertake special
humanitarian tasks reaffirming the eminently humanitarian character of the High
Commissioner's Office "for the benefit of refugees and displaced persons" [emphasis
added].
332 U.S. Congress, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Aftermath of War: Humanitarian
Problems of South East Asia, A Staff Report, Prepared for the Use of the
Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with refugees and Escapees, 94th
Cong., 2nd sess., 17 May 1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1976),
p. 9.
333 The mission report is contained in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Relief and Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina. Part III: North Vietnam
and Laos: Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems connected with
Refugees and Escapees, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., 1973, pp. 33-49. Hereinafter cited as
1973 Kennedy Mission Report, as quoted in Kumin, "Orderly Departure from
Vietnam: A Humanitarian Alternative?" (Ph.D. dissertation) The Hetcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, 1987, p. 40, hereinafter cited as 1987 Kumin ODP Dissertation.
334 In 1978, there were still 750,000 persons reported as displaced inside Vietnam,
besides 350,000 refugees from Democratic Kampuchea. See International Migra-

140 Chapters
authorities, having first informed the Executive Committee of the UN
High Commisioner's Program in a specially convened meeting on July 24,
1974 about it, and obtained the concurrence of the Secretary-General.335
with official blessing, UNHCR opened a Regional Office in Vientiane,
Laos in October 1974 and a Branch Office in Hanoi in June 1975 to
implement its programs.
Why did the U.N. not get involved earlier? For one thing, no U.N.
body had a specific mandate to intervene in a country on behalf of internally
displaced nationals. Only the U.N. Secretary-General, on the basis
of Article 99 of the U.N. Charter, had the authority to launch a major relief
operation within a country's borders, as U Thant had done in 1971-72
during Bangladesh war of independence. In the case of Vietnam, the insurmountable
obstacle to U.N. action to contain the human suffering was
the absolute opposition of the major powers involved, particularly the
U.S., which would accept no interference in a conflict that it considered
central to its national interest.
But it cannot have been the original intent of the drafters of the U.N.
Charter and other pertinent instruments that situations harming millions of
people should be ignored by the United Nations simply because they take
place within a country, whereas less serious situations between two
countries come under their competence. In real life, human misery does
not stop at international borders or with the Convention-defined refugees.
Today, the plight of displaced persons, whether within or outside their
national territory, exceeds by far the number of persons recognized as refugees.
If the people are affected by power politics beyond their control,
and seem unable to enjoy minimal standards of treatment within their
country, then the United Nations should exercise its international moral
responsibility by providing at least humanitarian, and perhaps also economic,
assistance.
International humanitarian assistance might help to alleviate the conditions
that caused a number of people to flee or to be uprooted. The
Secretary-General's good offices might be usefully employed as a facesaving
device for reluctant governments by which the
lion Policies and Programmes: A World Survey, Department of International
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Studies, No. 80, (New York: United
Nations, 1982), p. 94.
335 The program included agricultural and small-scale industrial projects, support
for rural health facilities, and educational projects. See Kumin, p. 41
Analytical Discussion 141
United Nations, through the physical presence and activities of the
Secretary-General, could move into situations where other U.N. organs
would not be acceptable. 336
Even where international peace is not directly at stake, but simple human
suffering occurs on such a large scale that it becomes an issue of public
domain, the Secretary-General has the authority to intervene. Former
Secretary-General U Thant indicated that it might be
useful to add an Article 99(a) [to the U.N. Charter,] which would authorize the
Secretary-General to bring to the attention of the membership global threats to
human well-being other than those to peace and security.... I have, on my own
initiative and without any supporting resolution from any United Nations organ,
launched two relief operations which are concerned with millions of people.... to
fill the gap until more regular arrangements can be made. 337
The big powers now seem to be more inclined to accept a more active
United Nations role - implicitly yielding some concessions in their stance
on domestic jurisdiction - precisely because they seem to more willing to
explore paths to disengagement from their costly and complicated regional
conflicts. The 1988 peace efforts and actual agreements in Central America,
Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq, Angola, and the Western Sahara are indicators
of this hopeful trend. 338
Both superpowers seem to be reaching a point where they favor a political
agreement over military intervention. That is where multilateral
mediation and negotiation might then acquire new momentum in international
relations. Dialogues and negotiation would help millions of refugees
and displaced persons to take control of their future, by giving them
the free choice of either returning home or staying in their countries of
asylum. These international actions would not only address the conditions
that produce refugees, but also help bring about changes so that those who
are currently refugees can emerge from that condition.
_________________________________________
336 Bertram Ramcharan, The Humanitarian Good Offices in International Law:
Good Offices of the United Nations Secretary-General in the Field of Human
Rights (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), p. 54.
337 Ramcharan, The Humanitarian Good Offices in International Law, p. 52.
338 Stanley Hoffmann, "Lessons of a Peace Epidemic," The New York Times, 6
September 1988.

CHAPTER 4
New Approaches and Policies
4.1. International Conflicts and Refugees:
Since the publication of the first edition there have been substantial
developments in the field of the policy propositions. Therefore, we have
rewritten this chapter entirely.
The discussion in the previous chapters has shown that attempts to
adopt preventive thinking and action date back to the sixties and early
eighties. In chapter 2, we looked at initiatives to create a UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, to establish a connection between human
rights and mass exoduses as well as the discussions on averting new refugee
flows. The Refugee Policy Group has continued its policy work playing an
active role in inspiring fresh thoughts for new approaches. The research and
gathering activities of the UN Office for Research and Collection and
Information has been integrated into the new Department for Humanitarian
Affairs, which the UN Secretary General created in March 1992. The work
of the Independent Bureau for Humanitarian Issues has been completed
with its final report in 1988 on "Winning the Human Race" 339 , with which it
remains an inspiration for years to come.
The analysis in Chapter 3 underlined the need for action in three main
areas, including on:
1. Conflict prevention with peace-making, peace-keeping and peacebuilding;
2. Institutional arrangements for coordinating UN emergency
responses;
3. Country of origin information and preventive protection of
UNHCR.
Preventing refugee-producing situations has seen major challenges in the
______________________
____________________________
339 Report of the Independent Commission for Humanitarian Issues, Winning
the Human Race, London: Zed Books, 1988

144 Chapter 4
situation of the wars in the Gulf and in former Yugoslavia. And yet the
term prevention has bravely survived in the discussions for finding
solutions in these senseless wars. Bitter ethnic conflicts, senseless killing,
violence and evictions have led to the displacement of more than four
million people within and outside Iraq and the former Yugoslavia.
As the High Commissioner Madame Ogata also said in her Graz
speech in May 1992:
For forty years, refugee policies and practices were affected by the predomiant
power struggle for global dominance, which was the Cold War. It was
international support for victims of communist persecution and repression, which
in 1951 led to the establishment of UNHCR to protect and assist individuals
seeking refuge in free and democratic countries of the West In those days the
problem appeared relatively simple. Flight from regimes in the East made the
granting of asylum in the West an act of benevolence, and protection against
refoulement self-evident Voluntary repatriation was inconceivable, and
integration in countries of asylum or resettlement the only real solution. The
1951 Convention was adopted, acceded to and respected by many States.
Protection of the individual under the supervision of UNHCR was agreed on.
Since then, liberation wars and ethnic strife caused mass refugee
movements, but there was hope and generosity. With the 1969 OAU
Convention on Refugees, violence as a cause of flight, asylum as a way of
protection and voluntary repatriation as the ideal solution were adopted.
Other regions in the Southern hemishere showed a similar combination of
pragmatism and vision in the way they dealt with refugee-producing
problems. 340
The 1992 Note on International Protection of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees highlights prevention as one of the main
elements of protection. The internal Working group on international
protection of UNHCR, which in early 1992 reviewed UNHCR's
protection activities, recognized:
the need to give greater content to a role for UNHCR vis-a-vis countries of
origin, including in the area of prevention. Here, the challenge is to develop a
balanced and effective refugee policy which includes new options on prevention.
Early warning, preventive diplomacy, human rights promotion, economic
_______________________
340 Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees at the Academic Graz International Conference "Fortress Europe?
Refugees and Migrants: Their Human Rights and Dignity", Graz, Austria,
23 May 1992, p. 1-4.
New Approaches and Policies 145
and social development and protection of internally displaced persons were
areas agreed on for specific UNHCR initiatives. The internal working group
felt that inter-agency cooperation was particularly important, considering
the complementarity of mandates and expertise in the UN.
The UN can look back to more than 40 years of conflict prevention
efforts, which during the Cold War had limited possibilities for contributing
to prevent refugee-producing situations. UN-conflict prevention, after the
East-West-conflict, is likely to be more successful. Therefore, an
examination of the mandate, methods, facilities and funding of the UN
conflict-prevention efforts are relevant for a proper understanding of the
subject. We will review them before discussing the new Department for
Humanitarian Affairs and before more specifically looking at new
approaches for UNHCR's information on and preventive protection in
countries of origin.
4.1.1 UN Conflict Prevention: Experience and Prospects: 341
Many conflict situations overwhelmed the power of the Security Council
during the Cold War period. Still, a number of regional conflicts could be
contained or decreased, which possibly otherwise could have led to
confrontations of the superpowers. 342
The concept of preventing conflicts has been used for many years. Dag
Hammarskjold for the first time in the late 1950s coined the term of
PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY. The UN's peace-keeping experience is the
largest in the world and is recognized world wide. The Nobel Peace Prize
for Peace-keepers in 1988 is just a testimony in recognition of their
accomplishments. Peace-making, with activities in political and I diplomatic
reconciliation, mediation and arbitration, good offices and fact-finding have
made some progress, especially since there is no longer superpower
confrontation. However, its effectiveness is still totally
________________________________
341 This chapter is based on a paper delivered by the author at the
International Seminar organized by the Finnish Institute of International
Affairs on "The Art of Conflict Prevention: Theory and Praxis of the UN,
EC/WEU, NATO, CSCE and the CIS" in Helsinki on 2 June 1992 after
interviews with competent officials at the UN-headquarters in April 1992,
whose cooperation is herewith gratefully acknowledged.
342 See: Brian Urquhart, "Mehr als eine Action von Hilfssheriffen", in: Die
Blauhelme, Im Einsatz für Frieden, Hrsg. Ernst Koch, 1991 Report Verlag,
p. 57

146 Chapter 4
dependent on the political will of concerned States. Peace-building processes,
which could either precede or follow conflict prevention efforts have faced
serious obstacles.
For 50 years the aim of the UN has remained the same: To maintain
international peace and security. It is the nature of conflict prevention efforts
which has changed over the last 50 years, particularly since 1989. Today,
there are no longer models to guide policy and action. The once existing
models are no longer applicable. This is a challenge and an opportunity for
the UN and its conflict prevention objectives.
Both the Members of the Security Council and the new Secretary-
General, in recognition of the challenges and opportunities ahead, have given
fresh impetus to explore possibilities to strengthen the capacity of preventive
diplomacy of the UN. We will examine the basis of the UN's mandate for
maintaining peace and security and thus prevention of conflicts.
1. Mandate:
a) What is the UN mandate for conflict prevention?
Primary instruments containing especially a mandate applicable for conflict
prevention are contained in the UN Charter, (essentially in Articles 1, 11(2),
24, Chapter VI and VII, Articles 40 and exceptionally 41 as well as in Article
99). Article 1 stipulates that the "Purposes of the United Nations are:
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and the removal of threats to the peace,
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and
to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustments or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
Article 24 specifies the functions and powers of the Security Council to
whom the Member States have conferred the primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security. Article 25 provides that "the
Member States of the United Nations agree to carry out the decisions of the
Security Council" in accordance with the Charter. Even though some Member
States insist that Article 25 decisions are only mandatory if taken under
Chapter VII, there has developed a general agreement that all decisions of the
Security Council (regardless if
New Approaches and Policies 147
statements, decisions, resolutions) are mandatory.
Chapter VI and VII of the Charter refers to peaceful settlement of
disputes and action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression are key elements for UN conflict
prevention. For the peaceful settlement of disputes, the Security
Council shall, on the basis of Article 33, call upon the parties of any
dispute - to settle it by such means as by negotiation, enquiry,
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to
regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their
own choice.
In accordance with Article 34, Member States agree that the
Security Council may investigate any dispute, any situation which
might lead to international friction, or which may give rise to a
dispute, in order to determine the degree of possible danger of
continued international peace and security.
Article 40 of Chapter VII provides that in order to prevent the
aggravation of a situation, the Security Council may call upon the
parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it
deems necessary or desirable. In exceptional circumstances, the
Security Council may proceed under Article 41 and decide on such
measures as arms embargo and non-military sanctions.
The Secretary-General could be called upon to play the important
roles of mediator and adviser of numerous governments for conflict
prevention. In the exercise of his function as chief administrator of the
United Nations, he takes decisions, which may be qualified as
political. Article 99 provides him with powers that go well beyond
those previously given to any head of an international organization.
He "may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter
which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international
peace and security". These powers require the Secretary-General to
exercise the highest qualities of political judgement, tact and integrity.
He has the power to judge on the opportunity whether or not he brings
personally a matter to the attention of the Security Council.
The drafters of Article 99 wished to ensure the existence of a
capable organ to which Member States could bring a particular
threatening matter of interest before the UN without hesitation. The
Secretary-General must be prudent in the application of Article 99.
Article 99 implies a value judgement of a potentially controversial
situation because this initiative supposes a favorable response by the
Security Council. The Secretary-General risks his name for measures
ultimately taken by the Security Council. That was the case of Trygve

148 Chapter 4
LIE in the case of Korea and of Dag HAMMARSKJOLD in the case of the
Congo. Trygve LIE committed his prestige and his influence in the operation
(essentially handled by the USA) of which he completely lost control. The
developments in the Congo appeared to rest totally on the shoulders of Dag
HAMMARSKJOLD. These two cases are dangerous for the tasks of the
Secretary-General. In fact, Article 99 offers the same prerogatives as those of
Article 11(2) 343 and of Article 35 344 , but that the Secretary General has not the
same means as does the General Assembly or Member States.
In his last annual report, the Secretary General reiterated that the so far
insufficient development of preventive capacity of the Secretariat has always
limited the recours to Article 99, particularly in its anticipatory aspect. 345
Our research shows that Secretaries-General have rarely invoked Article
99, except, for example, explicitly in relation to the Congo, (1960) and several
times implicitly, including Korea, 1950; Laos, 1961; Pakistan 1971; Vietnam,
1972; Lebanon, 1976 and 1978; Iran/Iraq, 1980. 346 The nature of the UN
mandate for conflict prevention is
___________________________
343 The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United
Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the
United Nations.
344 Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation that
could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security to the attention
of the Security Council or the General Assembly.
345 lavier Perez de Cuellar; "Rapport du Secretaire General sur l'Activite de
reorganisation", 1991, DPI/1168 - 40924- September 1991, p. 10.
346 Congo: On 13 July 1960, Dag Hammarskjold requested the Security Council for an
urgent meeting on the basis of Article 99 by letter (S/4381,13 July 1960). The
resolutions of the Security Council of 14 July (S/4387) and 22 July 1960 (S/4405)
were passed on the basis of an initiative under Article 99. Repertory of Practice of
United Nations organs Suppl. 3, Vol. IV, Articles 92-11 of the Charter, United
Nations New York, 1973. See also Jean-Pierre Cot and Alain Pellet, La Charte des
Nations Unies, Commentaire article par article, Economica, Bruylant; pp. 1319,
1320.
Korea: On 25 June 1950, Trygve Lie requested the president of the Security
Council for an urgent meeting transmitting a communication of the USA
concerning an act of aggression upon the Republic of Korea (S/1495). In his
memoires, Trygve Lie stated to have invoked Article 99, this was not used "ä la
lettre" cf. Memoires of Trygve Lie, Au Service de la Paix, Paris, Gallimard, 1957,
pp. 371-373. See also Cot/Pellet, pp. 1319.
Laos: On 5 September 1961, Dag Hammarskjold, requested the President of the
New Approaches and Policies 149
universal and any situations that could endanger international peace and
security could be put on the agenda.
b) What efforts have been made to delineate and communicate in advance
the type of behavior that will not be tolerated by the United Nations?
Through the statement of the President of the Security Council of 31
January 1992 (S/23500) the members of the Council reiterated their
concern about the humanitarian situation of the innocent civilian
population in Iraq. With a view to achieve a more effective role of the UN,
the Security Council in this statement invited the Secretary-General to
prepare his "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and
making more effective within the framework of the Charter the capacity of
the UN". 347
The Report of the Secretary-General on Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, which was published in mid- 1992,
provides the relevant details on this analysis. 348
_________________________________________________________________
Security Council to convene an urgent meeting outside the framework of Article 99,
on Laos. Repertory of Practice of the UN Organs, Vol. IV, pp. 161-162.
Pakistan: On 20 July 1971, U Thant submitted a memorandum (S/10410) to the
President of the Security Council regarding developments in East Pakistan and the
adjacent Indian State and their consequences. With respect to "possible
consequences of the present situation, not only in the humanitarian sense, but also as
a potential threat to peace and security". Repertory of Practice of the Un Organs,
Vol. V, pp. 134.
Vietnam: On 11 May 1971, Kurt Waldheim transmitted a memorandum to the
President of the Security Council in which he suggested that the members of the
Council in which he suggested that the members of the Council consult with each
other and examine actively which measures could be taken to put an end to the war.
Cot/Pellet, pp. 1321.
Lebanon: On 30 March 1976 and 16 March 1978, Kurt Waldheim drew the
attention of the Security Council to the serious situation, while transmitting
communications he had received and offering his good offices. Cot/pellet pp. 1321.
Iran/Iraq: On 25 September 1980, Kurt Waldheim directed a letter to the President
of the Security Council expressing the opinion that the conflict between Iran and
Iraq was undoubtedly a threat to peace and security and that the Security Council
should examine it urgently. Cot/Pellet, pp. 1321,1322.
347 UN.doc. S/23500,31 January 1992, pp. 3,4,5.
348 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace", Report of the Secretary-General
pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council

150 Chapter 4
From the point of view of declaratory prevention value, Security
Council resolutions 687 and 688 (Omnibus resolutions) have been the most
important for many years as they embrace the various aspects of the conflict.
Therefore they may be considered legal precedents as they represent first
steps of the Security Council to formulate a position concerning an internal
situation in a condition of non-war.
Furthermore, in the Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of
the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the United
Nations (46/58) of 1991, the General Assembly expresses its appreciation to
the Secretary-General for the completion of the Handbook on the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes between States. He is requested to publish and
disseminate widely the Handbook in all the official languages of the United
Nations.
The Declaration on Fact-finding by the United Nations in the field of
the Maintenance of International Peace and Security (46/59) of 1991 gives
the UN Organs an important new basis for preventive work. After recalling
previous relevant documents 349 , it outlines in detail the purpose, criteria,
procedures and competencies related to UN Fact-finding activities. It is the
first instrument with such far reaching possibilities and is likely to play a
substantial role in conflict prevention efforts in the future.
The Cold War-period has impeded the Secretaries-General since the
1960s to be more forceful; its end might allow these declaratory prevention
principles to be invoked more effectively than before. Another element is
important to add here. The international human rights community,
disarmament agreements and regional conflict resolution work over the past
some 20 years do provide important additional terms of reference for the
UN's work in the area of conflict prevention. One thing seems to be clear,
that intentions to do something before the event is a more accepted concept
in the United Nations and its Member States now. Therefore, declaratory
prevention has perhaps not been as effective as would be desirable.
However, given the more favorable international
_________________________
on 31 January 1992. United Nations, New York, 1992.
349 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations
and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the UN,
(2625, XXV); the Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of
International Disputes (37/10); the Declaration on the Enhancement of the
Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in
International Relations (42/22); the Declaration on the Prevention and
Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace
and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field (43/51).
New Approaches and Policies 151
political environment today, it is likely to be an integral part in the future
UN work in attempting to prevent conflicts.
One should not forget here the declarations in the human rights field,
especially the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948.
2. The Decision-making procedures of the UN for conflict prevention:
On the basis of the UN Charter Art. 34, the Security Council may
investigate any dispute.or any situation which might lead to international
friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the
continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security. The Security Council
may initiate an action itself or a Member may request action. In cases of
self-initiatation, various Members consult with each other to agree in prior
consultations as to whether or not a particular conflict is to be put on the
agenda. If one Member wishes to bring an item onto the agenda, it
addresses a communication to the President of the Security Council to call
for a meeting or, in urgent cases, to call for an immediate meeting for
considering the matter.
Once prior consultations on the conflict among the Members are
completed, and the action to be taken decided upon, a draft text of a
resolution, decision, or statement will be prepared and agreed before
distribution to the 15 Members in the six official UN working languages
for review prior to the formal Security Council meeting. There the text is
officially agreed upon (it becomes a child of 15 parents representing a
consensus of all 15 Members unless there is dissent or a veto, especially
from a permanent Member).
On the basis of Article 35 of the UN Charter, any Member or non-
Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation
which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, to the
attention of the Security Council or the General Assembly. In addition,
any Member of the General Assembly may bring an item onto the agenda.
The proposal is first addressed to the General Assembly Committee
composed of the 23 Vice-presidents of the General Assembly and chaired
by the President of the General Assembly, which decides to include the
item in the preliminary agenda of the General Assembly. This in turn
approves the agenda at its first meeting of the session. One of the few
situations in which the General Assembly Committee of the General
Assembly did not approve an item being put on the agenda included a

152 Chapter 4
request by Iraq that stated a threat to peace due to the build up of Western
military forces. If the Security Council is dealing with a matter, then the
General Assembly does not deal with it. 350
As already mentioned, the basis of Article 99 of the UN Charter, the
Secretary-General may bring implicitly or explicitly to the attention of the
Security Council, any matter which in his opinion may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security. On the basis of Article 11.3
of the UN Charter, the General Assembly may call to the attention of the
Security Council situations which are likely to endanger international peace
and security.
Decisions regarding conflict management are made inter alia as foreseen
in Articles 40, 41, 42, 44, 48, 50 of the UN Charter. Both the Secretary-
General and the Security Council may take action to:
i) review
ii) intercede
iii) act
in order to attempt conflict management. The system of conflict management
is yet to be further developed and strengthened. The period during the Cold-
War impeded the implementation of an effective system.
A pragmatic approach prevailed so far, where required, when elements
for timely and effective decision-making procedures were weak or lacking all
together.
3. Conflict prevention facilities including early warning for conflict
management/conflict prevention and for humanitarian matters:
In the late 1950's, without previous discussion, Dag Hammarskjold began
to practise preventive diplomacy by means of his various practical
innovations, such as "UN presences" and the dispatch of personal
representatives to potentially dangerous areas". 351
In other, less politically sensitive areas, the United Nations started to
apply early warning and related concepts, while the United Nations Statistical
Office (UNSO) and the Department of International Economic and Social
Affairs (DIESA) developed databases for economic forecasting and reporting,
identifying social and environmental indicators, and establishing the issuance
of projections as a regular practice of their work (as do the World Bank and
IMF). In the early
___________________
350 Interview with a senior official of the UN Secretariat in New York, 2 April 1992.
351 Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold. New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 258.
New Approaches and Policies 153
1970s, the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) established
the Earthwatch, and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) set up
the Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) in the mid
1970s. 352
Finally, in 1981, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan recommended an early
warning system in the humanitarian field and one year later Perez de
Cuellar, the then Secretary-General in his 1982 Annual Report, promised
to develop in the political arena, a wider and more systematic capacity for
fact-finding in potential conflict areas. On the request of the Secretary-
General, the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs
(PSCA), following the 1982 Annual Report, set up a special service to
monitor new agencies' daily releases, and to prepare immediate summaries
of these and other reports in the international press.
The real breakthrough followed, however, with the UN financial crisis
and the increasing refugee emergencies. This led the General Assembly to
appoint the so-called Group of 18 to study the efficiency of the United
Nations. Its recommendations of 1986 were directed at streamlining,
rationalizing, and cutting of duplications in the Secretariat. 353 In the same
year another initiative, the Group of Governmental Experts to Avert New
Refugee Flows, recommended in its final report to the Secretary-General
"to ensure timely and fuller information on potential refugee situations". 354
The establishment of the Office for Research and Collection of
Information (ORCI) in March 1987 is one of the direct results of the two
groups' recommendations. The Secretary-General took this first
institutional measure to "provide early warning of developing situations
requiring the Secretary-General's attention". 355 and to centralize several
functions from different services in this new office.
ORCI's function was intended to enable the Secretary- General to
________________________
352 Tapio Kanninen, "The Future of Early Warning and Preventive Action in the
United Nations", Occasional Papers Series, Number V, The Ralph Bunche
Institute of the United Naüons, New York, May 1991, pp. 2-3.
353 UN Doc. 49 (A/41/49), 15 August 1986. Report of the Group of High-Level
Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and
Financial Functioning of the United Nations, General Assembly Records; p. 12:
Recommendation 18.
354 UN doc. A/41/324, 13 May 1986. Note by the Secretary-General. Report of the
UN Group of Governmental Experts on International Co-operation to Avert
New Flows of Refugees, p. 18.
355 UN doc. ST/SGB/225, 1 March 1987: Office for Research and the Collection of
Information, p. 1.
154 Chapter 4 provide the Security Council with early information, and thereby play a
more central and effective role in the prevention of conflicts and the

monitoring of factors related to possible refugee flows.
a) Early warning for conflict management/prevention
After five years of operation and with the arrival of the new
Secretary-General in January 1992 the constellation for UN early
warning is newly emerging. As of 1 March 1992, ORCI was dissolved
and its various components integrated into the newly established
Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Humanitarian
Affairs. The decision of Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali for rearrangement
might be explained in two ways: first, he was aware that ORCI had
not been able to fulfill its mandate, and second, he wished to use more
traditional manners of organizing research and analysis for diplomatic
decision making divided into geographical areas. 356
Whereas the ORCI structure represented a single channel for
information and advice to the Secretary-General, the new system is
divided into several channels. There is die news-gathering section that
monitors some 15 to 20 news sources and summarizes the relevant
developments for the Office of the Secretary-General. 357 This section
has been separated from the analytical work of the early warning
mechanism. It operates under the SG's Spokesman in the Department
for Public Information where political core issues are likely less
focused on than formerly in ORCI. This physical separation might
cause some problems in the future.
Some former ORCI staff who had been responsible to analyze
incoming information for early warning indications have been split
now to deal with Africa, the Middle East, Asia, Europe and the
Americas, and humanitarian affairs, with different lines of authorities.
There are likely to be differences of interpretation of emerging
conflict situations, and the need and nature of the involvement of the
Secretary-General and the Security Council. The conception of the
early warning system and the establishment of the computerized
database is expected to continue to be used in the new set-up. It is
detached, however, from both the news
___________________
356 Jürgen Dedring, "Early Warning at the United Nations - Revisited",
Note for the ISA Convention, Atlanta, Georgia, 1-4 April 1992.
357 The News Distribution of the Spokesman's Office/DPI include "Political
Information Bulletin", see for example #3, on News Agencies on Current
Political Issues of 1 April 1992.____________________________
New Approaches and Policies 155
service and the geographical data units. The hope is to eventually arrive at a
state-of-the-art instrument for precedent based analysis and advice on
emerging conflicts, both international and internal, as they affect
international peace and security. 358
Specifically, during the first press conference by the Secretary-General
on 19 March 1992 in New York, Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali was asked
whether the United Nations was adequately informed about the most
sophisticated intelligence to carry out its work, or whether it should improve
its access to sophisticated intelligence in a cooperative effort involving all
UN Member States. The Secretary-General replied that he believes that the
United Nations must have its own intelligence. He underlined that, if the
United Nations wants to maintain its independence, receiving information
from the different intelligence of the Member States must be avoided.
Though he recognized that this will require additional financial capacity,
non-existent for the time being, he emphasized that:
If we want to have preventive diplomacy, we will need to have our own
intelligence and a more important presence of the United Nations in the different
countries and in the different regions where there will be the possibility of having
military confrontations. 359
This is an ambitious challenge. As officials responsible for this work in the
UN pointed out, the relentless pursuit within the UN to build a viable
framework for early warning is becoming ever more urgent, because the
opportunities are increasing.
b) Early warning in the humanitarian field:
The main problem of early warning in this field and especially in the
refugee area has not been a lack of information, but rather the issue of how
existing information could be channeled into the UN decision-making
process at high levels. This was also one of the findings of the UN Joint
Inspection Unit (JIU) which provided a detailed study on the coordination
of activities related to early warning of possible refugee flows in July 1990.
Since the JIU arrived at the basis conclusion that the UN lacked a systemwide
mechanism to deal with the issue of potential mass flows, its
recommendations included the following measures:
__________________________
358 Jürgen Dedring, "Early Warning at the United Nations - Revisited", p. 3.
359 SG/SM/4718, 19 March 1992, Transcript of Press Conference by the
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, held at Headquarters today, 19
March [1992].

156 Chapter 4
- designate a central focal point of the UN system for this task and
- establish a working group on early warning of refugee flows consisting of
representatives of ORCI, UNHCR, Centre for Human Rights, UNDRO, FAO, as
well as those of UNDP, WFP and others, to work out practical measures for modes
of co-ooperation and procedures to develop an effective early warning system for
refugees. 360
This matter was then discussed in the UN Administrative Coordinating
Committee (ACC) which lead to the establishment of the recommended Working
Group by Decision 1991/9. The mandate of the Working Group of the ACC on
Early Warning of New Flows of Refugees and Displaced Persons was defined 361
and the Working Group is to present its final report to the ACC in October 1992.
Some of the issues that seem to transpire in the process of the ACC Working
Group include that, for the consultative mechanism to function effectively, a core
group of agencies such as FAO, the Departments of Political and Humanitarian
Affairs respectively, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNDP.WFP, and possibly the Center
for Human Rights will need to make a serious commitment to carry out specific
fundamental activities. These activities will need to include mechanisms,
procedures and senior staff within their own organizations capable of handling
this enormous additional task. 362
In the resolution of the General Assembly 46/182 of 19 December
1991 that provided the basis for establishing the post of UN Emergency Relief
Coordinator to head the new Department on Humanitarian Affairs, early warning
is underlined as one of the guiding principles. The academic workshop of York
University in its session in early February
1992 suggested the functional structure for a humanitarian early warning system
to be divided into five distinct but related functional phases:
1. Data collection, Exchange and Dissemination;
2. Analysis of data;
____________________________
360 The Role of the United Nations in Early Warning Regarding Refugees and
Displaced Persons: A Background Paper, 20 March 1991.
361 "... to develop an effective early warning system related to new flows of refugees
and displaced persons, including measures of cooperation and procedures for
gathering, analyzing and disseminating information in a timely manner to all
concerned, and to make recommendations on the need for an interagency
consultative mechanism."
362 Lance Clark, Final Report of the ACC Working Group on Early Warning of
New Flows of Refugees and Displaced Persons, Working Document, Rapporteur 13
March 1992.
New Approaches and Policies 157
3. Coordination and synthesis of the various analyses received;
4. Formulation on and communication of the early warning; and
5. Action on the warning. 363
The above shows that the United Nations' experience with early warning is
considerable. Its effectiveness, however, is difficult to measure. Considering
the only recently ended Cold-War, which impeded substantial work in early
warning for both conflict prevention and addressing potential crises, the
establishment of ORCI in 1987 for early warning, essentially in the political
field, and the setting up of the ACC Working Group for early warning in the
humanitarian field are and will remain landmarks. Whatever the outcome of
the newly emerging early warning constellation and function in the United
Nations, it has become an accepted fact that UN organizations must look
ahead together.
Of course, early warning has more prospects for success in smaller
conflicts and crises. Human lives saved, and nuclear catastrophes prevented
because of early warning and rapid preventive action make it worth the
effort. Even the Members of the Security Council recognized in their
Summit meeting in January 1992 that there are new favorable international
circumstances under which the Security Council has started to fulfil more
effectively its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and
security 364 . There seems to have developed a true political will to take
action before and not after the conflicts have blown up. For this to be
effective, early warning will be both essential and is likely to be more
readily obtainable in this new international environment than before.
4. Conflict management methods: Peace-keeping, Peace-making,
Peace-enforcement.
Peace-keeping as a concept is not specifically stipulated in the Charter, but
it has evolved over the years as an internationally acceptable way of
controlling conflicts and promoting the peaceful settlement of disputes. It
introduces to the military sphere the principle of non-violence. Thus, for the
first time in history, military forces are used worldwide not to wage war,
but to control and end conflict between peoples or communities.
_____________________
363 "Towards Practical Early Warning capabilities concerning Refugees and Displaced
Persons", Report, Centre for Refugee Studies, York University, North York,
Ontario, 7 February 1992. p. 1,4.
364 UN. doc S/23500,31 January 1992, Note by the President of the Security Council.

158 Chapter 4
The first such operation was created in the Middle East in 1948 in the
form of an observer mission. The first of the United Nations peacekeeping
forces was created also in the Middle East, in 1956. 365 On 10 December
1988, the Secretary-General accepted the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo on
behalf of United Nations peace-keepers. With him were seventeen Blue
Berets representing United Nations operations in the field.
At the opening session of the Follow-up Meeting of the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki on 24 March
1992, the Secretary-General transmitted a message through Mr. Sotirios
Mousouris, the Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs. This
message underlined that the CSCE and the UN share similar ideals and
face common challenges and priorities and actions regarding peace and
security, such as preventive diplomacy, disarmament, economic and social
development, human rights and democracy. Mr. Boutros Ghali referred to
the division of labor between the UN and the European Community for
peace-keeping and peace-making efforts, respectively. He also referred to
a recent dispatch of UN fact-finding missions to Nagorno-Karabakh,
which is intended to complement the CSCE in its peace-making efforts. 366
A few days before that, on 19 March 1992 in the UN Headquarters in
New York, the Secretary-General gave his first press conference. He
reiterated one of his priorities: reinforcing regional cooperation
mechanisms for conflict management and making a clear division of
labor. For example, a division between the European Community and the
United Nations for dealing with peace-making, and with peacekeeping/maintaining
the cease-fire, respectively. He sees the UN role as a
complementary one: through cooperation with the different regional
bodies to promote preventive diplomacy and even a kind of
decentralization in the different peacekeeping operations.
When asked about peace and development, the Secretary-General
mentioned two interesting cases, El Salvador and Cambodia, where the
role of the UN is not limited to peacekeeping, but where the UN is
moving to the second stage, which is the construction of peace through
development. In this connection Mr. Boutros- Ghali reminded his
audience that a great majority of the 77 military conflicts have taken
______________________
365 The Blue Helmets, A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, Second
Edition, United Nations, New York, 1990, p. 13.
366 SG/SM/4723 - DC/2399, 27 March 1992, Secretary-General stresses
concerns of UN and CSCE in message to Helsinki Follow-up meeting, DPI
UN, New York.
New Approaches and Policies 159
place in the countries of the Third World during the past 45 years. Therefore,
it is essential that the UN maintain a close relation between peace-keeping
and peace-building.
Discussions and practical efforts to invigorate peace-keeping and
cooperation between the UN and regional organization have so far had
limited success. Therefore, a new operation is just starting in Somalia to bring
military protection and humanitarian aid. Only recently, the General
Assembly urged the United Nations:
[...] to provide such technical assistance as may be appropriate to the Organization of
African Unity should the latter decide to launch a peace-keeping operation. 367
a) Peace-keeping:
According to Mr.Goulding, Under Secretary-General of the UN in charge of
peace-keeping, there are two kinds of peace-keeping operations. The classic
operation is to help "create the conditions in which negotiations can go on",
usually by helping maintain the cease-fire at the end of a war. The newer
type, seen in Namibia, Cambodia, Western Sahara and El Salvador, forms
part of a political settlement which has already been negotiated but requires
an impartial third party to oversee its implementation. He regards the process
in El Salvador, where he worked very closely with his "peace-making"
colleague Mr. Avaro de Soto, as a model; by contrast, Mr. Goulding explains
the arrangements in Western Sahara, negotiated in great secrecy by the
Secretary-General's special envoy Mr. Issa Diallo as a disaster. 368
Peace-keeping is in great demand these days. There are 12 operations,
including the unprecedently ambitious task of bringing peace and
reconstruction to Cambodia, that involves supervising both the existing
administration and the election of a new one. The cost of this Cambodia
operation alone is estimated to be $1.9 billion.
i) What are the problems and means to prevent conflicts?
There are two crucially important problems which actually hinder the UN to
be as effective as it could if they did not exist:
_________________________
367 A/RES/46/20, 17 March 1992. Cooperation between the United Nations and the
Organization of African Unity. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly.
368 Edward Mortimer. Marrack Guolding, the UN's protector of a fragile peace,
Financial Times, 29 February -1 March 1992.

160 Chapter 4
The first problem is money. Already before Yugoslavia, the Secretary-
General experienced serious funding problems. Now there is a head-on
clash over the cost of the Yugoslav operation between the Secretariat and
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, who are reluctant
to make available the funds required. Insufficient funding can have serious
consequences. For example, the Security Council had drastically reduced
the size of the UN force in Namibia which Mr. Goulding had asked for
(and he blames this for the deaths of 333 people when, in April 1989,
SWAPO guerrillas swarmed across the Angolan frontier straight into the
guns of the South African Army). 369
The second problem is the management capacity of the Secretariat itself.
This, according to Mr. Goulding, is already "stretched to the breaking
point". He adds "we need more people, better financial and administrative
procedures. We must have the money available when we need it. At the
moment we have no authority to spend anything. We need reserves". 370
If the money and the management problem did not exist and political
will of the permanent members of the Security Council and concerned
parties were always consistent, the UN could be more effective in
preventing or suppressing violent conflicts on the basis of the Charter and
subsequent arrangements.
For the 25 peace-keeping operations (from 1948 through 1992), the
total cost amounts to about $8,311 million. For the current 12 peacekeeping
operations, at the time of revising this book for the second edition,
the United Nations calculated an approximate annual cost for 1991-1992
of more than $2,700 million, (including UNPROFOR and UNTAC). The
current operations are the following:
1. UNTSO - UN Truce Supervision Organization
June 1948 - To present
Rough annual cost to the UN: about $31 million
Current strength (military personnel): 300
Fatalities: 28
2. UNMOGIP - UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
January 1949 - To present
Rough annual cost to the UN: $5 million
_______________________________
369 Edward Mortimer. Financial Times. 29 February -1 March 1992.
370 Ibid.
Current strength (military personnel): about 40
Fatalities: 6
3. UNFICYP - UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus
March 1964 - To resent Rough annual cost to the UN:
$31 million Current strength (military personnel): about
2,200 Fatalities: 158
4. UNDOF-UN Disengagement Observer Force (Syria/Isreal border)
June 1974 - To present
Rough annual cost to the UN: $43 million
Current strength (military personnel): about 1300
Fatalities: 30
5. UNIFIL - UN Interim Force in Lebanon March
- To present
Rough annual cost to the UN: $157 million Current
strength (military personnel): about 5,800 Fatalities: 185
6. UNJXOM - UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
April 1991-To present
Rough annual cost to the UN: $67 million
Current strength (military personnel): about 470
New Approaches and Policies 161
7. UNAVEM U-Angola Verification Mission
June 1991 - To present
17 month cost to the UN through October 1992: $128 million
Current strength (military/police personnel): about 440
8. ONUSAL - UN Observer Mission in El Salvador
July 1991 - To present
16 month cost to the UN through October 1992: $70 million Current
strength (military/police personnel): about 1,000
9. MINURSO - UN Mission for the referendum in Western Sahara
September 1991 - To present
Estimated cost to the UN for 9,5 months: $59 million
Current strength (military personnel): about 375
10. UNTAC - UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia March
1992 - To present
Estimated cost to the UN for 15 months: $1.9 billion
Projected max. strength (military/police personnel): 19,500
11. UNPROFOR - UN Protection Force (Yugoslavia) March
1992 - To present

162 Chapter 4
Estimated cost for 12 months: $611 million
Projected max. strength (military/police personnel): 13,870.
12. UNOSOM-(Somalia).
Of the above UN Peace-keeping operations, two are funded from the UN
regular budget (UNTSO and UNIMOGIP), one is funded through voluntary
contributions (UNFICYP) and the rest are financed from their own separate
accounts on the basis of legally binding assessments on all Member States.
Since the mandates of most forces are renewed periodically starting from
different dates, annual cost estimates for comparative purposes are
approximate. The figures provided for operational strength, some of which
include both military and police personnel, vary slightly from month to month
due to rotation. 371
ii) What kind of forces could be made available?
Four of the above mentioned operations have also civilian police personnel.
For 13 operations established between 1956 and 1985, the major troop
contributors have been the Nordic countries (except Iceland), Austria,
Canada, and Ireland. Some of them were Non-Aligned. All of them
maintained a neutral view of the conflicts making them acceptable to the
parties concerned. They made available personnel, equipment and training,
with which they had contributed, as of 1987, out of approximately 450,000
men and women in UN peace-keeping operations. 372
These countries gained considerable experience during the early years,
especially from the Congo, Gaza, and Cyprus. 373 Despite the experience
gained, there is a clear need for strengthening the UN efforts in training and
education - along the same lines as UNHCR, UNICEF and other UN organs
dealing wiÄ emergency management for higher efficiency in cost and
benefits. In the face of dramatic changes worldwide, the UN will need to
expand its role in planning,
371 Background Note, United Nations Peace-keeping Operations, Fact-sheet,
Prepared by the Communications and Project Management Division,
Department of Public Information, United Nations PS/DPI/15 - March 1992.
372 Lt. Cor. Christian Harleman, Peacekeepers for a Changing World. Presentation
given to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, 14 May 1991, pp.
1,2.
373 The Blue Helmets. A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping. Second Edition.
1990, United Nations, New York.
New Approaches and Policies 163
implementing, conducting and controlling complex UN field operations.
These will increasingly be composed of civilian personnel. There are
suggestions to establish regional training centers.
The New York Training Seminar on Peace-keeping, which took place
on 23 - 27 March 1992 had the purpose to develop a working understanding
and knowledge of peace-keeping operations as a major instrument of the
United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Distinguished speakers, experts in the field presented and discussed a
number of issues related to the subject with the participants mainly from
Permanent Missions to the UN and UN Headquarters officials. The Director
of the Training Programmes for Peace-keeping and Peace-making of the
UNITAR Office provided a comprehensive handfile for this Seminar that
contains a rich source of documents and most recent research results. 374
As Sweden has made an outstanding contribution to peace-keeping in
terms of training and equipment, it is discussed here in more detail as an
example. After some discussion, the Parliaments of Sweden, Denmark and
Norway decided in 1964 to organize Stand-By Forces, and Finland
simultaneously decided to do the same. Thereafter, Sweden gradually
developed a system for recruiting, organizing, training and serving abroad.
Ten years later in 1974, the Swedish Parliament adopted a bill which
provided the constitutional framework for the Swedish-Stand-By Forces,
which stipulates the following:
- within the Defense Forces there shall be a military force voluntarily organized
as a Stand-By Force,
- the Government is authorized to put this force at the disposal of the United
Nations,
- the Force consists of a maximum of two battalions and a special unit of a size
not exceeding a third battalion (mil. observers, disaster relief units, etc.),
- the personnel of the Stand-By Forces is employed for this purpose.
Implementing this bill, the Government had instructed the Supreme Commander of the
_____________________________
374 Lt. Cor. Christian Harleman. "Handfile for New York Training Seminar on Peacekeeping",
23 - 27 March 1992 contains sections on Introduction/Background,
Establishment Operation, Management Structure, Developments, Enforcement and
Conclusions. UNITAR, 801 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017. Papers
contained include "Negotiation to Establish a Peace-keeping Operation" By C.
Harleman; "Operational Effectiveness of a Peace-keeping Operation" by Col. H.
Purola, Deputy Military Advisor to the Secretary-General; "United Nations Peecekeeping
Operations: Some Swedish Views and Experiences" by Lars-Goran
Engfeldt, Deputy Permanent Representative of Sweden to the UN in New York.

164 Chapter 4
Swedish Defense Forces to recruit, organize and train the Stand-By Force. 375
Peace-keeping has grown into an international phenomenon with coverage on
all continents - the Americas, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe - by forces
coming now from the different continents. Training and equipment of Member
States has had a varying degree of preparedness and technological
advancement. As a distinguished trainer in the UN system put it,
[...] peace-keeping in its traditional sense is not a military operation but instead a
political operation where the military instrument is used as a 'cooling' tool in order to
give time for the political considerations. 376
Future peace-keeping operations will mean new activities, some of which fall
outside the traditional field of peace-keeping. Involved will be considerable
large components of civilians from which will emerge new requirements for
training. This development may serve as a catalyst for change; the current adhoc
establishment of peace-keeping forces may give way to a more systematic
approach.
b) Peace-making:
International law abounds with instruments urging States to submit disputes
according to some means of peaceful settlement ever since the 1899 and 1907
Hague Conventions for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. 377 In practical
politics, States and organizations have set up a variety of mechanisms for
settling disputes and making peace. 378
375 Lt. Cor. Christian Harleman. Education and Training of Swedish UN troops at
the United Nations Training Center (UNTC), Almnaes, Sweden, January 20,
1991 (Rev. Mar 3), pp. 1,2.
376 Lt. Cor. Christian Harleman. Education and Training..., p.7.
377 The Conference of 1899 and The Conference of 1907 (ed. James Scott), The
Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conference, Translation of the Official Texts
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1990) published under the auspices of the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The Conventions are still in force
among some 60 states. See in: Roy S. Lee, A Case for Facilitation in the
Settlement of Disputes, 1991 German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 211-
244.
378 See GA Res. 46/58 Report of the Special Committee on the Charter of the United
Nations and on the Straightening of the Role of the Organisation, 9 December
1991, which mentions the completion of the Handbook on the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes between States. It covers i) principles of the peaceful
settlement of
New Approaches and Policies 165
Furthermore, there arc numerous bilateral and multilateral treaties that
contain some form of settlement of disputes or handling of conflicts.
The usual means or methods of conflict management may be divided
essentially into six groups:
1. Negotiation
2. Good Offices
3. Enquiry and fact-finding
4. Mediation and conciliation
5. Arbitration, and
6. Judicial settlement. 379
Approaches to peacemaking are by no means mutually exclusive.
Experience of the United Nations shows that the Organization has been
most successful when Coordinated efforts were undertaken at all levels. In
recent years, the functions of the Secretary-General's good offices have
been increasingly in demand to come to the aid of parties seeking to resolve
their differences. Where possible, peace-keeping should move in step with
peacemaking, to help create conditions in which peacemaking can prosper
and in a combined effort, lead to the peaceful resolution of a conflict. This
is sometimes difficult to achieve. To reach agreement as to the causes of a
conflict is usually much more difficult than it is to maintain a cease-fire.
Long-standing peace-keeping operations do not automatically mean failure,
but they may be a measure of its success in preventing a recurrence of
hostilities despite any intractability of the conflict between the parties. 380
The Secretary-General and/or his representatives arc responsible for
peacemaking. There arc task forces for different conflict situations. As
practitioners, not every top official might have the time required to keep up
with the newest conflict prevention techniques and research-findings.
disputes between States; ii) means of settlement; iii) procedures envisaged in the
UN Charter; iv) procedures envisaged in other international instruments.
379 These methods are addressed in the Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of
Disputes between States, op.cit.in terms of characteristics, functions,
application of the methods, and instrumental and related aspects and outcome.
Cf. Roy S. Lee, A Case for Facilitation in the Settlement of Disputes, 1991
German Yearbook of International Law, pp. 211-244.
380 The Blue Helmets, op.cit. pp. 7,8.

166 Chapter 4
c) Peace-enforcement:
Certain aspects of the mandate under the Charter are enforceable, in principle,
as the Member States agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council Article 25. In order to prevent the aggravation of a conflict,
the Security Council may decide what measures other than the use of force are
to be employed to give effect to its decisions. Measures to be applied for
enforcement may include complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and of raid, sea, air, postal, telegraphic radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations (Article 41).
In order to take urgent military action, Members shall hold immediately
available air-force contingents for the combined international enforcement
action (Article,44). The action required to carry out the decisions of the
Security Council shall be taken by all Members of the United Nations or by
some of them, as the Security Council may determine (Article 48).
If preventive or enforcement measures are taken by the Security Council,
against another State, whether Member of the United Nations or not, which
has difficulties in implementing these measures, this State has the right to
consult with the Security Council for a solution (Article 50). Measures taken
by Member States in the exercise of the right to self-defence shall not in any
way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council.
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize regional
arrangements or agencies for the enforcement action under its authority. But
no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or agencies
without the authorization of the Security Council.
On the basis of these provisions in the UN Charter, the following
comments may be made. The United Nations is a global organization for
peaceful resolution of conflicts, for enforcing peace, when negotiations fail.
Ideological divisions prevented agreements for peace-making for many
years during the Cold War period which led to a polarization of the world.
The Security Council has on occasion agreed to negotiate peaceful ends of
conflicts, and similar to the League of Nations, it has made use of military
force observers to monitor cease-fires or armistices.
In a few cases the Security Council applied sanctions to enforce peace
(Article 41) which generally proved however rather ineffective. Possibly due
to the temporary absence of the Soviets from the Securiy Council meeting,
Article 43 was applied in Korea 1950 for the first time.
New Approaches and Policies 167
Incidentally, the Soviets later proclaimed this operation unconstitutional.
The Members of the Security Council asked the USA to conduct the
military operation and move this question to the General Assembly.
During the Congo operation, the Security Council, on 21 February
1961, authorized ONUC use of force as a last resort to implement its
resolution. This was not done under Chapter VII, which later become
questionable.
The second and latest application of enforcement was in 1990 to evict
Iraqi forces from Kuwait with the approval of all five Permanent Members
of the Security Council. This was only possible due to the end of the Cold
War and the willingness of the Security Council to work out a consensus.
The peace enforcement mechanism on the Gulf went into motion, after
Iraq's refusal of 12 UN resolutions. Without going into the details of the
Security Council's actions here, the list of resolutions (attached in the annex
hereto) indicates the process and efforts to give Iraq a way out. The main
points of deliberations were:
- A Sanctions-Committee to oversee the matter,
- Non-recognition of any regime established by the invader,
- Declaration that Iraq's annexation was illegal.
Meanwhile, in response to the appeal of Saudi Arabia for protection, USA
and British forces were dispatched. Iraq was requested to facilitate the
departure of foreign nationals. Whereas Iraq made the attempts to break the
sanctions, Kuwait invoked Article 51 of the Charter and requested
assistance. Soon thereafter, US naval units and later Western allies moved
into the Gulf region. The final resolution 678 of 29 November 1991 of the
Security Council demanded compliance by Iraq by 15 January 1991.
Subsequent to the meeting of the Secretary-General and Saddam
Hussein on 12 January 1991, and the non-compliance of Iraq, the USA
launched the air war on 15 January 1991. After failure of more diplomatic
efforts and defiance of Iraq in the face of the air war, ground war took
place from 27-28 February 1991.
Under Chapter VII and on the report of the Secretary-General on the
implementation of paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 678, the
United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) was
established on 5 April 1991. Thereupon, the Security Council authorized
the destruction of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (18 April 1991), and

168 Chapter 4
approved humanitarian operations and the setting up of Civilian
Guards.
Analysis of the Role of the Security Council:
Despite an apparent agreement for joint action, there were differences
on
a number of questions including:
Should sanctions have been given more time?
Should Soviet peace initiative have been given more time?
Should the ground war have been launched differently?
Should there have been any sanctuaries?
Should the Coalition forces have attacked longer after Iraq had
declared that it was withdrawing?
Should the Security Council have had the right on deciding on the
Kuwait-Iraq border?
Should the UN really have a right to decide destroying Iraq
weapons
of mass destruction?
The Security Council authorization of peace enforcement under
Chapter VII, first with sanctions and later with the use of force under
Article 51 were a result of special circumstances which are unlikely to
be repeated. Over the past four years the Permanent Five members
established a precedent of cooperation to take collective action. Iraq
provided a scenario where they could act by consensus. The USA had
very special relations with Saudi Arabia and had provided naval escort
to Kuwaiti ships during the Iraq-Iran war. The United Kingdom also
had special relations with the Gulf States, and France had special
interest in questions including oil. Similarly, Japan and Germany
(non-troop contributors) rely on oil from that region. Iraq had been
one of the major friends of the Soviet Union.
Providing humanitarian assistance to the Kurds became a special
feature, which however left out the Shias in the South of Iraq. In
addition, the developing United Nations system for the monitoring,
collection and destruction of weapons of mass destruction was a new
process, providing food for thought for the future. The Security
Council, especially the Non-Aligned Movement being unprepared to
authorize traditional peace-keeping under Chapter VII, the consensus
remained very basic. It is likely that dealing with the internal conflict
in Iraq, the Security Council will seek a broad consensual agreement
of the parties
concerned. 381
Peace-building:
New Approaches and Policies 169
In his press conference on 19 March 1992 in New York, the Secretary-
General defined peace-building as economic and social development and
technical assistance to be given to protagonists of a dispute once peace has
been attained. 382
5. Funding:
How much is spent on conflict prevention?
Considering the purpose of the United Nations, to maintain peace and
security, the whole budget does contribute either directly or indirectly to
conflict prevention. 383 The General Assembly's budget appropriations for the
two years 1992-1993 amounts to $2.5 billion, of which the following rounded
allocations might be considered directly related to conflict prevention efforts:
1. Overall policy-making, direction and coordination
2. Good offices and peace-making; peace-keeping;
Research/ collection of information
3. Political and Security Council Affairs
4. Political/General Assembly/Secretariat
5. Special political questions, regional cooperation
trusteeship and decolonization
6. International Court of Justice
7. Human rights
8. Protection of and assistance to refugees
Total for 2 years 384
$ 36 million
$100 million
$ 16 million
$ 13 million
$ 9 million
$ 18 million
$ 23 million
$ 61 million
$276 million
____________________________
381 Cf. to Peace Enforcement by Major General Indar Jit Rikhye, from Notes for
presentation to UNITAR Seminar on Peace-keeping on 27 March 1992 in New
York.
382 SG/SM/4718, 19 March 1992, Transcript of Press Conference by the Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali Held at Headquarters Today, 19 March (1992).
383 The General Assembly approves the regular programme budget biennially on the
presentation by the Secretary-General and the review of Committee for
Programme and Coordination and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions.
384 A/RES/46/186, 6 March 1992. Budget Appropriations for the biennium 1992-

170 Chapter 4
The main source of funds for the regular budget is contributions of Member
States to be paid according to a scale specified by the General Assembly. The
main criterion on which scale of assessments is based is the capacity of member
states to pay. 385 (However, the financial situation of the United Nations is
serious. In the last years Member States requested the Secretary-General to
establish 12 peace-keeping/observer operations as compared to the total 25
since the beginning in 1948. Only one of these twelve operations was financed
from the regular budget 386 and the other eleven were established on the basis of
a special account through the Security Council. 387
The special account operations are financed by assessed
1993 of the General Assembly, pp. 1,2,3.
385 The legal regime governing assessments is Article 17,2, of the Charter of the UN,
which provides: "The expenses of the Organisation shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly". Under the scale which
applies to the period of 1989-1990, assessments range from a maximum of 25%
for the largest contributor (USA) to a minimum of 0.01% (for example,
Bangladesh, Haiti, or Liberia). See: "The Financing of the United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, The Need for a Sound Financial Basis", by Susan R.
Mills, International Peace Academy, Occasional Paper, Nr. 3,1989, p. 5.
386 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
Security Council Resolution 622 (1988).
387 UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group Sec. Council Res. 619 (1988)
(UNIIMOG)
UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) Sec. Council Res. 626 (1988)
UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) Sec. Council Res. 632 (1989)
Namibia 435 (1978)
UN Observer Group in Central America Sec. Council Res. 644 (1989)
(ONUCA)
UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) Sec. Council Res. 689 (1991)
UN Mission for the Referendum in
Western Sahara (MINURSO) Sec Council Res. 690 (1991)
UN Observer Mission in El Salvador
(ONUSAL) Sec. Council Res.693 (1991)
UN Angola Verification Mission
(UNAVEM u) Sec. Council Res. 696 (1991)
UN Advance Mission in Cambodia
(UNAMIC) Sec. Council Res.717 (1991)
UN Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) Sec. Council Res. 743 (1992)
UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Sec Counc il Res.745
(1992)
Source: Handfile UNITAR Training Programme, 23-27 March 1992.
New Approaches and Policies 171
contributions from all Member States on the basis of a special scale of
assessments, which places a heavier burden on the permanent Members of
the Security Council and some wealthier Member States, and reduces that
of the least developed countries. This method is generally accepted by the
Member States and will probably be applied to future operations without
problems. 388
In his annual report for 1991, the Secretary-General mentioned that the
increasingly ambitious and costly operations have led to a serious financial
shortfall. At the date of that report some $810 million of the regular budget
and $500 million for peace-keeping were outstanding. 389 In view of the 25
% scale of assessment applicable to the USA, this country's outstanding
payment is by far the highest
But, even as USA financial pressure has been driving the United
Nations to the brink of insolvency, the organization began unexpectedly to
demonstrate how it could be made to work best. Namely by providing a
reliable instrument for impartial third-party management of international,
especially regional conflict situations by way of peacekeeping and
peacemaking. 390
Therefore, the UN needed to draw upon cash reserves (i.e. Working
Capital Fund and the Special Account totalling about $236 million), to
meet current operations. Reporting on the financial situation of the
organization, the Secretary-General pleaded that the outstanding
contributions to the regular budget and the peace keeping operations be
paid in substantial amounts. 391
In order to provide Member States with the necessary elements to
address the financial crises, Secretary General Perez dc Cuellar offered the
following three proposals in November 1991:
- Establish measures to deal with cash flow problems
- Establish a Humanitarian Revolving Fund
- Establish an UN Peace Endowment Fund ($ 1 billion). 392
___________________________
388 F.T. Liu, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Management and Operations";
International Peace Academy, Occasional Papers on Peacekeeping, p. 31.
389 Rapport du Secr6taire-General sur l'Activite' de rOrganisation, 1991, pp. 23,24.
390 George L. Sherry; "The United Nations Reborn, Conflict Control in the Post-
Cold War World". Critical Issues 1990.2, Council on Foreign Relations, New
York; p. 10.
391 A/46/600,24 October 1991. The Financial Situation of the United Nations.
Report of the Secretary-General.
392 A/46/600/Add.l, 19 November 1991. The Financial Situation of the United
Nations, Proposals to Address the Problems of Today and Tomorrow. Report of

172 Chapter 4
Brian Urquhart advanced recently some innovative suggestions to address
funding problems. They are:
- Shift peace-keeping costs to defense budgets
- Introduce a sort of "levy" on private companies, especially in the
filed of shipping or air transport, since they are clearly benefitting
from peace-keeping activities, and
- Impose a 1% "tax" on all international arms transactions. 393
In fact the Italian Government has already introduced a new mechanism in this
regard. By law 180 (6 Febraury 1992), it has established that in order to
finance Italy's participation in "peace and humanitarian initiatives in the
international field" it is possible to deploy not only funds appropriated "ad
hoc", but also up to 1% of the funds allotted for development assistance (if
such initiative relate to developing countries). 394
On 13 May 1992, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali delivered a
lecture in Washington where he also addressed the funding problem of peacekeeping.
He stated, given the political will, the funding problems could be
easily resolved and suggested the following four steps:
1. A revolving capital fund would be established to finance the start-up cost of
peace-keeping operations;
the Secretary-General, p. 2.
393 Speech to the "Cosmopolitan Club", New York City, February 1992. In New
York Review of Books, April 9, 1992, p. 42. Cited by Roberto Toscano. Address
on "Peace-keeping in the New International Situation" at the International
Symposium Prospects of Reform of the United Nations System, Rome, May
1992, p. 23.
394 Law 180 mentions specifically the supply of goods, services and financial
contributions to "international organizations, foreign countries, Italian and foreign
private and public entities having as a goal the maintenance of peace and
international security, as well as initiative in the humanitarian field and with the
goal of protecting human rights". Given Italy's very substantial effort in the field
of development assistance to LDC's, Italian participation in peace-keeping efforts
in the third world is not likely to run the risk of being inadequately funded. It
would be an important step if other countries would make such budgetary
arrangements to solidify the linkage between peace and development. The
meaning of the linkage is twofold: "there is no peace without development", but
also "development assistance is useless unless there is peace". See in Roberte
Toscano's address on "Peacekeeping in the New International Situation" at the
International Symposium on Prospects of Reform of the United Nations System,
in Rome, April/May 1992, p.24/25.
New Approaches and Policies 173
2. As soon as the Security Council decided to set up a new operation, the
Member States would be asked to pay immediately one third of the
established cost of its first year and the Secretary-General would be
automatically given the authority to commit up to this sum;
3. A reserve stock of basic peace-keeping equipment would be established so
that some of the most needed items were always available;
4. Member States would pay their assessments, both for the initial one third
and for the full budget, fully and on time. 395
Mr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, looking at the costs of peace-keeping,
reiterated at this occasion his belief that even the UN calculated
estimated amount of $2.7 billion for this exceptional year is not high in
relation to the costs of the alternative, namely, continued conflict. On the
same occasion, he said that one only needs to recall the astonishing sums
of money that were spent to 'win' the cold war - in the 1980s global
expenditures on arms approached $1 trillion per year, or $2 million per
minute - to acknowledge that peace-keeping is an inexpensive way to
help maintain stability in the post-cold-war-era.
Aware that the current volume of peace-keeping expenses is creating
real problems for Member States, the Secretary-General has started to
review existing operations for identifying possible areas of saving
without affecting their effectiveness.
In considering cost and effectiveness, it is also encouraging to see
that of the 13 operations established since 1988, six have already
completed their mandate. These include two in Africa, in Namibia
(UNTAG), where 46 000 refugees could start to live afresh through
UNHCR's support, and where free and fair elections were successfully
carried out in November 1989 under UN supervision; and in Angola
(UNAVEM I), where from 1989 to 1991, the UN military observers
monitored and verified the withdrawal of Cuban troops. In the Middle
East, the Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) that monitored the
implementation of the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq following their
eight-year war, withdrew with the agreement of both parties in 1991. In
Central America (ONUCA), observers monitored the cease-fire in
Nicaragua, helped to verify the cessation of aid to irregular forces in the
region; and assisted in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan
resistance. They were withdrawn in January 1992. In Cambodia,
following the signing of the Paris peace accords in October 1991, an
___________________________
395 SG/SM/4748,13 May 1992. Secretary-General Delivers Ninth David M.
Abshire Lecture, "From Peace-keeping to Peace-building ” , Press Release,
United Nations, New York, p. 7.

174 Chapter 4
advance mission of military observers (UNAMIC) paved the way for the
arrival of UNTAC, which started operating last March. 396
The agenda of the Secretary General mentioned before addressed
the questions of financing and suggested measures for peace and
preventive diplomacy.
In concluding this chapter on peace-keeping and peace-making, on
peace-enforcement and peace-building, and considering the significant
problems that existed, peace-keeping has been, overall, a significant
success for the United Nations. The success, however, has not been
uniform, especially when peace-making has not kept the pace with
peacekeeping. In addition, there was a human cost. 812 men and women
from 43 countries have died while in service of the UN peace-keeping
forces, which should never be forgotten. 397
Looking into the future, the Secretary-General said that others might
also be able to undertake peace-keeping operations. In fact, regional
organizations have carried out some operations in the 1960s and the
1970s, of which the most successful was an Arab League force deployed
between Iraq and Kuwait from 1961 to 1963. On the basis of a resolution
adopted by the Organization of American States (OAS), an Inter-
American Peace Force operated in the Dominican Republic from 1965 to
1966. In 1979, Egypt, in cooperation with the USA, organized a
Multilateral Force and Observers in the Sinai to help implement the
peace treaty with Israel. It is interesting to note that this latter force was
established only after a request for a UN peace-keeping operation was
rejected (by the Soviets, on behalf of the Arab Member States). 398
The UN is no doubt the most experienced peace-keeper. The
demands have, however, grown to such an extent that time seems to have
come to share this responsibility. The decentralization of peace-keeping
and peace-making would be in tune with the radically new international
environment of a multi-polar world that should be led by a multiplicity
of institutions. Therefore, the regional organizations are obvious
candidates for assuming larger responsibilities.
Chapter VIE of the Charter, specifically provides for regional
organizations to "make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local
disputes ... before referring them to the Security Council".
_____________________________
396 Ibid, p. 8,9.
397 SG/SM/4748, 13 May 1992. Secretary-General Delivers Ninth Annual
David M. Abshire Lecture, Trom Peace-Keeping to Peace-Building', p.5.
398 SG/SM/4748, 13 May 1992. Secretary-General Delivers Ninth Annual
David M. Abshire Lecture, "From Peace-Keeping to Peace-Building 1 , p.5.
New Approaches and Policies 175
The problem is, however, that regional oranizations have almost no
experience and lack the necessary structure and procedures, and more
importantly, most of them are in an even worse financial situation than
the United Nations.
In his address on peace-keeping on 13 May 1992 in Washington, the
Secretary-General expressed his belief that regional organizations must
help to carry a larger share in this task. He insisted on a clear division of
labor in Yugoslavia, between the European Community, which has for
sometime been engaged there both in peace-making and peace-keeping,
and the United Nations, which is responsible only for peace-keeping in
certain areas. He said also to have offered to help the CSCE to obtain
some technical advice with regard to its own peace-keeping efforts in the
dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.
In addition, in setting up the most recent efforts in Somalia, the
Secretary-General associated the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
the Arab League and the Organization of the Islamic Conference. In this
most recent operation there is an interesting innovation. In recognition of
the important role non-governmental organizations can play in new and
broader peace-keeping operations, and after having been involved for
many years in their humanitarian aspects, the latest Security Council
resolution on Somalia acknowledges that much of the relief work to be
protected by the UN military personnel, will be carried out by nongovernmental
organizations. 399
The 1992 Agenda for Peace of the Secretary-General places its
policy recommendations in the changing international context and
outlines plans and actions after an intensive consultative process both
witin the UN Secretariat's special task force for this purpose and outside,
namely interested governments and organizations. Considerations and
suggestions include measures to build confidence, fact-finding, early
warning, preventive deployment, demilitarized zones. In the area of
peacemaking the Agenda proposes states to accept jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, amelioration through assistance, sanction
in special economic problems, use of military force and Peace-
Enforcement-Units. In the area of peace-keeping the agenda looked at the
increasing demands, considered new departures in peace-keeping,
personnel and logistics. For post-conflict peace building it examined
cooperation with regional organizations and arrangements, safety of
personnel and financing. This document gives a fresh basis to embark on
________________________
399 Ibid, p. 6.

176 Chapter 4
a new course for preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention.
4.1.2 New Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA):
Major humanitarian emergencies in the last thirty years called for new
approaches. Resolution 2816 (XXVI), which in 1971 called for the
appointment by the Secretary-General of a Disaster Relief Coordinator
(and resulted in the establishment of the UN Disaster Relief
Coordinator, UNDRO), addressed "natural disasters and other disaster
situations". Ten years later, resolution 36/225, called for the Secretary
General to designate a lead entity from within the U.N. system to deal
with "Complex disasters and emergencies of exceptional magnitude." At
that time there appeared to be a consensus that U.N. emergency
responses were not adequate.
Looking back at experiences including Biafra in the late 1960's,
Pakistan early 1970's, the Indochinese outflows, the Horn of Africa,
strife and displacement in Central America, operation Lifeline in Sudan
and several others in the eighties, which provide lessons and insights for
improvements. Both U.N. and other organizations, including many
nongovernmental agencies have made significant contributions to bring
relief in humanitarian emergencies. UNICEF, for example acted in a
capacity of "troubleshooter" in several places to mediate for an
unblocking of the situation with or without coordination with other
concerned U.N. agencies. 400 Many of these experiences contributed to
discussions on creating the post of Under Secretary General for
humanitarian affairs. This was hoped to enable coordination of all
humanitarian emergencies.
This Under Secretary General would also undertake to
"troubleshoot" on behalf of the field operations by interceding at the top
level of the U.N. agencies and programs, with foreign governments
experiencing emergencies, and with key donors, when the authority of
the Secretary General is needed to influence behavior, policies or
resources of the system's major players in order to enhance priority and
coordination in the overall effort for a given emergency. 401
______________________________
400 Source: Discussions with Staffan de MIstura, UNICEF Representative in
Dubrovnik, 14 Nov. - 20 Dec. 1991 concerning humanitarian corridors.
401 Source: Discussions with Ambassador Jonathan Moore, Deputy
Permanent Representative, USA Mission to the U.N. Headquarters in
New York, 2 April 1992.
New Approaches and Policies 177
Preceding the finalization of the basis for setting up a humanitarian
office in the Secretariat in New York, Brian Urquhart and Erskine
Childers presented a thorough study, which provided practical
suggestions on dealing with humanitarian emergencies, with prevention
and mitigation and improving the international response. The authors
also offered a description of the responsibilities of the Under Secretary-
General, in which they foresaw his chairing on behalf of the Secretary-
General a standing high-level United Nations Board for Humanitarian,
Disaster and Migration Affairs.
Finally, after about six months intensive negotiations, the General
Assembly adopted Resolution 46/182 to set up the Department for
Humanitarian Affairs. 402 Under the chapter of coordination, cooperation
and leadership, the leadership of this resolution of the Secretary-General
was recognized as critical for coherent response to natural disasters and
other emergencies. As Urquhart/Childers had recommended, the
General Assembly adopted that an Inter-Agency Standing Committee
serviced by a strengthened Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief
Coordinator should be established under the chairmanship of the highlevel
official with the participation of all operational organizations and
with a standing invitation to the international Committee of the Red
Cross, the League of Red Cross Societies, and the International
Organization for Migration. Relevant non-governmental organizations
can be invited to participate on an ad-hoc basis. 403
Jan Eliasson, appointed Under Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs in March 1992, makes the following comments on a first, albeit
a very initial, evaluation of his office:
Firstly, while humanitarian assistance must be provided regardless
whether there is an immediate solution at hand, the United Nations has
been increasingly called upon to address simultaneously both the
humanitarian and the political dimensions of conflict situations.
Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Mozambique are a case in point that
humanitarian assistance, delivered impartially, can have a positive
impact on peacemaking effort. Corridors of peace and zones of
tranquillity can reinforce peace-making initiatives.
_________________________
402 46/182. Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency
assistance of the United Nations, 19 December 1991.
403 46/182, paragraph 38.

178 Chapter 4
Secondly, the United Nations is required in an increasing number of
emergencies to negotiate not only access.but also arrangements to ensure
the safety of personnel and relief supplies. The situations in Somalia, the
former Yugoslavia and Iraq are tragic reminders of this dilemma.
Thirdly, the serious problem of land mines, millions of which remain
scattered in current and former combat zones, must be urgently addressed.
Relief assistance, repatriation and rehabilitation have been and will
continue to be seriously hampered unless demining is vigorously
pursued.
Fourthly, cooperation among operational organisations is essential for
effective UN response to disasters and emergencies. This cooperation must
be all inclusive, applying equally to the relationship among the UN
organizations and with the International Committee of the Red Cross,
International Federation of the Red Cross, the International Organization
of International Migration and the non-governmental organizations.
Cooperation must also be extended to and strengthened with the relevant
regional organizations.
Lastly, while the UN stands ready to meet growing challenges in response
to emergencies of increasing magnitude and complexity, the UN must be
provided with the necessary resources to carry out the tasks entrusted to it.
This applies not only to the immediate humanitarian requirements, but also
to rehabilitation and development resources should be mobilized to
prevent emergencies from recurring. 404
This very initial evaluation still leaves room to pursue the
recommendations made in the Secretary-General's Report on the review of
the capacity, experience and coordination arrangements in the United
Nations system for humanitarian assistance prior to establishing the
Department for Humanitarian Affairs. This report foresaw measures,
among others, on early warning and prevention. In looking at the
responsibilities of the various organizations involved in humanitarian
assistance, the office of the UNHCR was examined. It reported on the
Working Group on Solutions and Protection, which was convened by the
High Commissioner at the request of the Executive Committee to
______________________
404 Jan Eliasson, Paper on "The UN Response to Humanitarian Emergencies" for
publication in the ACP/EC Courier on Humanitarian Action, forthcoming.
New Approaches and Policies 179
examine the issue of assisting, protecting and resolving the situation of
internally displaced persons and refugees fleeing situations of serious
internal disturbances and civil war. 405 An analysis of capacities in critical
areas for rapid UN responses led the report to state that "early warning is
indispensable for prevention and preparedness activities". It went on
saying "that many organizations in the UN system already operate early
warning activities.... These include UNHCR (its experimental [Refugee]
Emergency Alert System), which alms at providing data on incipient
flows of refugees, and its databases in the area of legal protection". 406
This report, which was a cornerstone towards the establishment of the
Department for Humanitarian Affairs, foresees coordinated approach
among all UN agencies, in which UNHCR - on the basis of its imminent
humanitarian mandate - should play a significant part.
4.1.3. Country of Origin Information and Preventive Protection of
UNHCR
For UNHCR's project on country of origin information, initially starting
with Vietnam, staff and facilities are currently being put in place. The
pursuit of preventive protection to reduce the factors which compel
displacement as suggested by the High Commissioner, has been agreed
upon at the 29 July 1992 international meeting on the humanitarian
assistance in former Yugoslavia. 407
UNHCR has usually played a cautious role, responding to refugee
situations only after they have actually occurred. More recently, however,
it has began to play a more active role by information gathering and
sharing with other U.N. and non-U.N. bodies. Obtaining timely, reliable
information on potential new major flows is crucial to these efforts.
The evaluation of information on incipient refugee situations in
countries of origin requires impartiality rather than noninvolvement, a
balanced approach in providing protection rather than a studied
inattention to causes in the search for solutions. In fact, when the UN
Secretary General was requested to help improve the coordination of the
_____________________
405 A/46/568,17 October 1991, p. 10.
406 A/46/568,17 October 1991, p. 19.
407 Report of the International Meeting on Humanitarian Aid to Victims of the
Conflict in the former Yugoslavia. HCR/IMFY/1992/4,10 August 1992, p. 6.

180 Chapter 4
efforts of the United Nations organs within the Secretariat, 408 UNHCR,
as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, was presumably
included in this request.
Depending on the policy directives of the General Assembly,
UNHCR functions de facto as a political body in order to fulfill its
humanitarian mandate within a highly political context. Strengthening
its own sources of authentic and impartial information on causal factors
and moving toward a broad solution-oriented approach encompassing
preventive measures could further UNHCR's objectives of providing
international protection and assistance to persons of concern.
From its experience with particular situations, UNHCR is better
placed than any other U.N. body to determine the potential of particular
situations for causing refugee movements. Working in most of the
trouble spots, the Office can readily detect factors that would trigger
population movements if they were allowed to deteriorate. 409
Furthermore, it has offices in more than 100 countries (some of which,
as regional offices, cover more than one country, for a total of more
than 130 nations) and has direct access to those who provide the most
important first hand information: the refugees themselves. No other
U.N. organization has such widespread access to potential refugees and
refugee-generating situations around the world. UNHCR has also the
experience and expertise to provide guidance in refugee-related
situations to States and organisations. In restructuring its channels of
information to take a more active role in assessing potential refugeeproducing
conditions, UNHCR can be of particular help to the U.N. in
its increasingly successful role in regional conflict resolutions.
a) Potentials and limitations on UNHCR's work in the country of origin
There are many factors that had held UNHCR back from integrating
country of origin/early warning into its functions. The following
comments were inspired by discussions with Lance Clark, formerly
Research Associate of the Refugee Policy Group, Washington. He felt
that in most cases UNHCR staff did not seek out early warning
information as actively as they should. 410
____________________________
408 UN doc. A/41/324, paragraph 70.
409 In detecting such factors UNHCR would not need to pass judgement
410 Lance dark, "Recommended next steps for UNHCR regarding early
warning," Washington, D.C.: Refugee Policy Group, (1988) p.l.
New Approaches and Policies 181
One of the most important constraints on UNHCR is its traditional
avoidance of activities that might be interpreted by governments as
interfering or political. For this reason, UNHCR job descriptions have not
included instructions for assessing and reporting conditions in potential
refugee-producing situations. Where field officers have undertaken such
efforts on their own initiative, they have often been reprimanded and
discouraged from further attempts.
The following are among the constraints on UNHCR's attempts to
take a more active role in potential refugee-producing situations. While
the stumbling blocks seem formidable they are not insurmountable.
These include:
- Lack of confidential channels within UNHCR;
- Insufficient financial resources to undertake the extra work of systematic
reporting on potential refugee flows;
- Danger that UNHCR be accused of producing a "pull-factor" by building
- contingency plans based on advance information.
- Lack of basic data to enable the field office to accurately assess
information at hand and predict the impact of possible developments;
- Lack of trustworthy sources of information in the field (which is often the
- situation in politically sensitive contexts);
- Insufficient time and background knowledge at headquarters, to interpret
raw data reported from the field offices partly due to high staff turnover;
- Strain on organizational and staff capacities to handle additional functions
of
- information-gathering and processing on top of current work pressure to
cover needs of refugees already under UNHCR's care;
- Restricted access to conflict areas by UNHCR either within the country of
origin or across the border, where some first refugees might have been
reported to arrive;
- Rapid staff rotation, usually requiring new staff members to concentrate
on narrowly defined specific jobs.
It is being explored to provide specific training in the area of early
warning/country of origin information and preventive protection. Among
the new measures the following are appearing with growing frequency on
the training schedules:
1. Ensuring that new staff members receive a comprehensive orientation to
their tasks, including early warning activities;
2. Providing training in early warning reporting to all staff members
regardless of their official functions;
3. Thorough briefing of UNHCR staff posted in new countries about possible

182 Chapter 4
scenarios of new refugee influxes and about political factors concerning potential
refugee-producing or receiving countries;
4. Warning activities feature increasingly in description of tasks of relevant UNHCR
staff.
5. Responding quickly and appreciatively to efforts made by field staff to collect,
analyze, and report early warning information.
b) Cooperation with the C/JV. Commission on Human Rights
The general humanitarian principles of the United Nations as a whole guide the
UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) in discharging its mandates, and
the UN Charter binds the member states to support the UNHCR's goal. 411
UNHCR's work is likewise inspired by the United Nation's general humanitarian
goals. Since refugees are often created as a result of the abuse or denial of human
rights, UNHCR has a special interest in the work of the Commission on Human
Rights. "In exercising international protection on behalf of refugees, the
international agency asserts the rights of refugees." 412 As Goodwin Gill also said:
UNHCR has specific responsibilities in regard to the human rights of refugees. ... The
office finds its context in the United Nations Organizations as a whole, and cannot be
isolated from the general objectives or the purposes and principles of the latter. 413
Mechanisms have meanwhile been established in the UNHCR and the UN
Commission on Human Rights, to collaborate in specific areas.
The sessions of the Commission provide useful occasions for UNHCR to
raise before a wider concerned audience current problems that the Office faces in
protecting jeopardized human rights of refugees. 414 UNHCR's Statute embraces
the concept for the organisation to function as a protector of human rights, but it
concern thus far has
411 International Economic and Social Cooperation, Article 55c, which promotes
"universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."
412 Paul Weis, "The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
and Human Rights", 1 Hum. Rht J. 234,249 (1968), as quoted in Jack I. Garvey,
"Toward a Reformulation of International Refugee Law," Harvard International
Law Journal. 26 No. 2 (Spring 1985), p.488-89.
413 Goodwin-Gill, "Human Rights and the Protection of Refugees in International
Law," Draft paper, York University, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, May 1988, pp. 6-7.
414 Statement of the Director of the Division of Refugee Law and Doctrine made
under item 12 at the 44th Session of the Commission on Human Rights 1988, p.2.
New Approaches and Policies 183
been almost entirely limited to helping refugee and asylum seekers
outside their country of origin.
UNHCR has traditionally had largely informal contacts only with the
Commission on Human Rights, although both bodies pursue a number of
common goals. Most of this contact has taken place through the Center for
Human Rights, a body of UN officials composed of representatives of
forty three governments providing support and advice to the Commission
on Human Rights. 415 In 1988, for the first time in years, UNHCR made a
formal statement to the 44th session of the UN Commission on Human
Rights. The address focused on the links between human rights and
refugee rights. Its lowkey but direct participation in the sessions of the
Commission need not embroil UNHCR in the politics of the Commission
debate. Rather, UNHCR's participation puts the Office in the mainstream
of international protection of human rights on the basis of its specialized
focus for a defined group of people.
The UN Commission offers UNHCR a forum for reaching a wider
audience, partly by producing and disseminating useful source material,
and partly by facilitating opportunities for UNHCR to make informal
contacts with governmental and non governmental delegations on matters
of concern. It also has the advantage of being an influential decisionmaking
body within the UN system.
The inclusion of an article on refugee children, introduced by
UNHCR into the Draft Convention of the Rights of the Child, which took
ten years of negotiation, is one of the concrete results of the cooperation
between UNHCR and the UN Commission on Human Rights.
c) UNHCR's involvement monitoring events likely to cause refugees
Atle Grahl-Madsen, who has been instrumental in defining the legal
standards for UNHCR's protection and handling of refugees, began to
raise the issue of a more preventive role for UNHCR:
415 lain Guest, "Facing a Mid-Life Crisis," [UN Watch A Special Report on the
UN Human Rights Commission], Human Rights Internet Reporter, 12, No.2
(Winter 1988), p.54. According to Guest, most of the 43 governments on the
Commission themselves violate human rights. Of the 43, only five
(Portugal, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Belgium and San Tome) escaped censure in
Amnesty International's 1987 annual report. The 43 members are elected
every three years by the Economic and Social Council, although the five
permanent members of the security Council (France, USA, USSR, China
and the United Kingdom) are all guaranteed a seat (p.54).

184 Chapter 4
One question interesting to us in the context of international refugee law is whether and
to what extent the High Commissioner ought to get involved in such activities as
monitoring events likely to cause outflows of refugees; alerting States, international
organizations and world opinion to such situations; and suggesting measures to be taken,
perhaps also taking certain steps vis-ä-vis the State in question. 416
Though Grahl-Madsen recognizes that according to the UNHCR Statute, the
work of the High Commissioner needs to be "social and humanitarian"
(Paragraph 2), he believes that the Commissioner needs "all the early warning he
can get. ... It would be in line with his normal activities if he took the initiative to
some aid programme enabling people to stay home rather than leaving for an
uncertain future abroad." 417
Often the most valuable sources of early warning information are the
refugees who have already arrived in the country of asylum. This is especially
true in the early stage of a refugee flow. At that time, interviews with refugees
can be crucial in the determining whether the existing flow will taper off or grow
into a massive influx. 418
Information on which contingency and emergency plans are based has in
many cases been obtained from die first trickle of refugees over an international
border. In situations where resettlement is by and large the only solution
available, UNHCR interviews each refugee individually, or at least each head of
family. This has been its practice in Southeast Asia, for example, since
resettlement countries would not start their processing before UNHCR
established records on the new arrivals. Despite ample opportunities for in-depth
gathering of information, much of which could be usefully employed in a
dialogue with the country of origin, UNHCR has generally refrained from asking
refugees overly detailed questions about conditions in the country of origin, and
the circumstances and problems they encountered before and during their flight.
Increasingly, however, UNHCR officials have come to realize that detailed,
accurate, and current information on potential refugee situations is of crucial
importance for the Office's efforts at advance planning. 419 In
____________________
416 Grahl-Madsen, "The Emergent Law Relating to Refugees," in The Refugee Problem
on Universal, Regional and National Level, Thesaurus Acroasium Vol. XIII,
Institute of International Public Law and International Relations of Thessaloniki,
1987,p.244.
417 Grahl-Madsen, "The Emerging Law Relating to Refugees," p.244.
418 Lance Clark, "Recommended next steps for UNHCR regarding early warning,"
Refugee Policy Group (RPG), Washington (1988), p.l.
419 See, for example Cartmail, Exodus Indochina, 1983. p.233: "For example, every
Vietnamese boat leader, whose boat is rescued and whose travelling compatriots
New Approaches and Policies 185
its 1987 Note on International Protection, UNHCR stated that information
must be shared between the States and the Office, and with other
intergovernmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations, to ensure "the
accurate identification of situations producing flight, and or groups and
individuals in need." 420
Guy Goodwin-Gill asserts that there is a congruence of interest and
responsibility between states and UNHCR, comprising both territorial and
international elements. The territorial responsibilities involve standards of
treatment, individual freedom, and community interests; "international
responsibilities involve protection and assistance, attention to root causes and
solutions." 421
Each party to this equation must fulfill its duty. If a given state does not
discharge its responsibilities in ensuring proper standards of treatment,
individual freedom, and the community interest of its population, then the
resulting problem becomes a matter of international responsibility. Conversely,
providing protection and assistance only once people have been compelled to
flee, without asking how the people came to be in that condition, might allow
governments to "get away with murder." 422
The requirement that UNHCR's actions be nonpolitical restricts its role
only to impartiality rather than of absolute noninvolvement in such basic
matters as identifying causes of refugee movements and reporting on them for
efforts to develop preventive measures. When assessing conditions that could
bear on refugee flows in a country within its jurisdiction, UNHCR might just
indicate in a non detailed manner basic facts, which other better suited
organizations could more fully investigate
disembark in Singapore, has to complete a detailed questionnaire on the time and
circumstances of their escape, the type of boat and details on the journey and
rescue. The answers to these 33 questions are then evaluated every month in
relation to every group that is rescued and averages determined. Results arrived at
include information on... origin, ages and ethnic composition... showed that most
of the refugees arriving in Singapore between the July Conference and September
(1979) were ethnic Vietnamese and only a small percentage ethnic Chinese, a
statistic that offers further strong evidence that the exodus of refugees from
Vietnam has been a exodus controlled by Hanoi and designed to expel Vietnam's
Chinese population."
420 UN doc. A/AC.96/694,13 August 1988, p.3.
421 Goodwin-Gill, "UNHCR's Expanding Mandate," Draft paper, May 1988, p.16.
422 United States Committee for Refugees, "Beyond the Headlines, Refugees in the
Horn of Africa," (Washington: U.S. Committee for Refugees, January 1988), p.20.

186 Chapter 4
for devising ways on how to tackle a potential refugee situation. 423
There might be situations in which a field assessment conjures up such
worst-case scenarios that it might well be unwise or undesirable to put
findings or recommendations in writing for transmission to headquarters.
Such possibilities underscore the need for reliable, confidential channels of
communication that must include verbal, face-to-face briefings. 424
e) UNHCR's New Project: Country of Origin Information
An organized and coordinated data system will allow UNHCR to move
from being essentially a reactive organization to an active one in all aspects
of refugee problems, from determining origin to devising solutions. By
increasing its expertise, the Office will be stronger to employ its leverage
with states and in coordination with the Secretary-General.
While reorganizing the Division of Refugee Law and Doctrine in late
1987, UNHCR made arrangements to establish and maintain a complete
database providing information at headquarters on a country-by-country
basis. Situated within the Division of Protection, this database would
include collecting information on legal developments concerning refugee
protection around the globe. This same unit, however, would be also
responsible for cooperating with the Center for Documentation on Refugees
(CDR) and the regional Legal Advisors in the collection and analysis of
information concerning countries of origin, and for disseminating this
information to field offices and at headquarters. 425 UNHCR country of
origin information would contaln a short, factual account of the problem
that may give rise to refugees, so that conclusions, if and when necessary,
may be drawn from UNHCR's
________________________
423 If this is done in a discrete way with face saving devices for the parties
concerned, it might not be resented as an intervention into internal affairs.
424 It is a general problem in the United Nations system that there are not really
reliable confidential channels available. Therefore important but sensitive
information tends not to get through where policy decisions may be possible.
Or instead of running the risk of harming the source or relations with
concerned parties, it might be worthwhile to consider providing basic
indications while refraining from commenting on them. It might also be
valuable to leave competent researchers or political officers from other offices
undertake the checking on the spot. That way, mere is a chance that the word
gets out while protecting UNHCR for the sake of protecting refugees.
425 UNHCR/IOM/79/87 - UNHCR/FOM/72/87,28 September 1987.
New Approaches and Policies 187
perspective. 426
Constraints on country profiles may include the objections of states,
UNHCR's lack of confidential record keeping, and the need for constant
updating to keep them useful.
Advantages include the contribution of this system, already in partial
use, to the overall efficiency of UNHCR's work. The comprehensive
assessment of developing situations should increase the understanding of
the claims of individuals and groups and should permit more accurate
decisions on their behalf. Having a standardized system will enhance
consistency in UNHCR's responses, and compensate for holes created by
quick staff turnover. A comprehensive data base will also encourage greater
completeness than is usually possible with individuals reporting. In
addition, this data base would provide greater written continuity of
knowledge and overcome information deficiencies easily arising in the
context of large bureaucracies. The country profiles will provide a useful
basis for further developments of doctrine and legal principles, and should
generally enhance UNHCR's role in refugee-related matters, especially in
consultations with governments and other organizations on how to address
conditions that cause new refugee movements.
Aside from strengthening its own sources of information, UNHCR
could draw on reports from outside, which are prepared by specialized
human rights groups and other relevant organizations. Efforts have started
and need to continue to have these materials, if received immediately after
their publication, distributed promptly by the Center for Documentation on
Refugees to its field offices and within its headquarters. Information
prepared by well-informed outside sources would broaden UNHCR's
perspective and enhance its understanding of local refugee-producing
conditions in countries of origin, especially in areas where UNHCR is not
represented or has difficulty of access. The enrichment of information
sources would also benefit UNHCR policymakers and negotiators in their
contacts with governments and organizations within and outside the UN
framework. In the field as well, such reports would strengthen the position
of regional desk officers as focal points for carrying out their work in
support of the field offices.
The aim of country of origin information is to allow the Office to keep
up with challenges it will inevitably face in the future. Considering
__________________
426 In the framework of the intergovernmental consultations on asylum-seekers,
governments and UNHCR agreed at a workshop held in Dardany (26-27
January 1989) that there is a need to know more about ways to collect and
retrieve country of origin information.

188 Chapter 4
the recognized leadership role UNHCR enjoys in questions concerning
refugees, it only stands to gain if it takes more active and future-orientated
steps.
With an improved information system in place, and taking an active role
to preempt events that have the potential to generate refugees, UNHCR will
be able to make an active contribution to a more integrated international
response in a joint effort with competent U.N. bodies, intergovernmental
regional organizations, and selected nongovernmental agencies.
The constant overwhelming challenges UNHCR faces every day,
however, limit the time available to develop long-term strategies. Where lives
are at stake, an immediate response must take priority over long-term
planning; and so a crisis mentality has come to dominate the thinking of the
organization and some of its officials. By the same token, the donors on
which UNHCR depends tend more readily to fund relief operations to assist
new refugee influxes than to set aside a budget line for addressing conditions
that could generate refugees. Reducing vulnerabilities, and increasing
capacities of potential refugees through nongovernmental organizations in the
developing world, promises to develop as a practical measure to prevent
people from turning into refugees. 427
The scale of today's refugee flows and their effects on international
security are compelling attention from those at higher and higher political
levels. The Secretary-General has increasingly involved himself in refugee
questions directly and through the new Department for Humanitarian Affairs,
in addition to the United States, 428 who from the very beginning played a very
active role in UNHCR matters, and the Soviet Union. 429 The newly perceived
importance of refugee problems makes the role of the High Commissioner
more powerful on the one hand, but on the other hand more vulnerable, not
just to questions, for which more informed answers are needed, but also to
criticism if the Office falls to live up to expectations.
It is no longer enough to pick up the pieces after a massive flow has
______________________
427 See the concept of development in Mary B. Anderson and Peter J. Woodrow,
"An Approach to Integrating Development and Relief Programming: An
Analytical Framework," International Relief/Development Project, Harvaard
University, May 1988, p.4.
428 See also Gordenker, Refugees in International Politics, 1987, p. 17.
429 For the first time, the Soviet Union participated as an observer at the Session of
the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program in October 1987.
New Approaches and Policies 189
been generated. All parties are now realizing the need for early
warning/country of origin information and preventive protection. This was
also what one of the previous High Commissioners said already in 1986:
You cannot prevent people who have compelling reasons from fleeing to another
country for refuge. You must address the reasons which prompted their flight. 430
d) Preventive Protection
In 1992, the High Commissioner herself addressed the 48th session of the
UN Commission on Human Rights, saying that
With encreasing emphasis in the UN on preventive diplomacy, I believe
UNHCR should equally focus on what I might call preventive protection.
When I speak of prevention, let me state clearly that I mean prevention of the
circumstances which force people to leave. In this sense, prevention becomes
another aspect of solutions. 431
At this occasion, Mrs. Ogata added that the success of preventive strategies
will in part depend on the effectiveness of early warning of developing
problems.
In this connection, Grahl-Madsen notes that the High Commissioner
could act on behalf of "United Nations protected persons" or "internationally
assisted persons," or even more discreetly as the "ombudsman" of the United
Nations system, not having to call a spade a spade:
[...] he might perhaps, as a quid pro quo, achieve some easing of the policies and
practices of a given government, and thus effectively to help to avert new flows of
refugees by reducing the "push factor," or at least help to keep them at a level at
which one might be able to cope with them. 432
___________________________
430 Hocké, "Beyond Humanitarianism," Joyce Pearce Memorial Lecture, 29 October
1986, Oxford, p.9.
431 Statement by Mrs. S. Ogata, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to
the forty-eighth session of the Commission on Human Rights (20 February
1992), p. 2.
432 Grahl-Madsen, "The Emerging Law Relating to Refugees." Grahl-Madsen further
observes: "The High Commissioner would have to work discreetly, not for
publicity, and after all, it would only be serious situations which would attract
the High Commissioner's attention, situations which - if allowed to developed
unchecked - might cause inconvenience to other States as well as to the
international community at large. Also the High Commissioner would melt into

190 Chapter 4
In the midst of the humanitarian nightmare in former Yugoslavia with
almost 3 million people - refugees, displaced persons and people trapped in the
besieged cities and regions, innocent civilians continue to be victims of terror
and deadly reprisals. The High Commissioner convened on 29 July 1992 an
international ministerial meeting with an objective to obtain support for
concepts to deal with the crisis and for the necessary funding. The summary of
the president states a general endorsement of the High Commissioner's
suggestion for a comprehensive approach evolving around seven key-elements,
including preventive protection to reduce the factors which lead to
displacement. 433 In her message to the meeting of the Humanitarian Issues
Working Group of the London Conference, the High Commissioner urged for
strengthening protection in the region both preventive and temporary. 434 At the
same time, the High Commissioner insisted that the basic principle of nonrefoulement
cannot be compromised. 435
UNHCR's presence in refugees' countries of origin is in principle always of
crucial importance to any prevention and solution-oriented activities. 436
Preventive protection inside countries of origin is increasingly extended so
that people do not feel compelled to cross borders in search of
protection. 437
the background, once a situation became so grave as to be considered a threat to
international peace and security and thus a matter for the political organs of the
United Nations: the Secretary-General and - notably - the Security Council. In the
major political confrontations the High Commissioner ought not to be involved;
then better a Special Representative or some similar agent or agency, who could
take the brunt without jeopardizing the ongoing, humanitarian work," p.245.
433 HCR/IMFY/1992/4,10 August 1992, p. 6.
434 Statement by Mrs. Sadako Ogata United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees and Chairperson of the Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the
International Conference on former Yugoslavia (Geneva, 9 October 1992).
435 Ibid., p. 2.
436 See A/AC.96/799,25 August 1992, p. 8
437 Ibid., p. 9.
Chapter 5
Legal Justification
5.1. Objections of states against international preventive actions
As this is a thesis in political science and not in international law, this
chapter is limited to a brief summary of possible legal arguments of states
against the proposed international preventive actions, and rebuttals to those
objections. It will not attempt to provide an exhaustive account of
international law on the subject.
The main reason that international and nongovernmental organizations
have limited their involvement in preventive work is that states tend to
perceive early warning and prevention activities as intrusions into their
internal affairs. The rationale that states often use to resist plans for preventive
action is that it may interfere with their own national security and
other domestic matters. We will make it quite clear that our proposed actions
are not intended to infringe on national sovereignty. On the contrary, we
hope that with international assistance, the weaker countries and their people
will be less vulnerable to intervention by larger powers.
5.1.1. National security
Both national 438 and international Iegislation439 for the protection of human
rights and refugees contain restrictions on the grounds of national
_________________________
438 Art. 11(2) of the Aliens Law 1965 (Ausländergesetz) of the Federal Republic
of Germany foresees: "Ausländer, die als politisch Verfolgte Asylrecht
genießen, heimatlose Ausländer oder ausländische Flüchtlinge können, wenn
sie [sich] rechtsgemäß im Geltungsbereich dieses Gesetzes aufhalten nur aus
schwerwiegenden Gründen der öffentlichen Sicherheit und Ordnung
ausgewiesen werden." See Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law,
London: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 82.
439 Art. 3 of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, adopted by the General
Assembly in 1967, does not only acknowledge the national security exception,
but also appears to authorize further exceptions in order to safeguard the
population, as in the case of a mass influx of persons. Goodwin-Gill, The
Refugee in International Law, pp. 96-97. The Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe, in a resolution of 1967, recognized 'the necessity of
safeguarding national security nd of protecting

192 Chapter 5
security. 440 The traditional meaning of "national security" is protection of a
state and its population, government, and borders from disruption by outside
forces. Helmut Schmidt, the former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of
Germany, broadened the concept of national security to embrace issues of
monetary stability, worldwide inflation, unemployment, and other ills, which
have lent a new economic dimension to the term. 441
On the one hand, we recognize that security is imperative for the well-being
of the state and its citizens. On the other hand, in practice, we find that at times
portions of the population remain unprotected by the authorities in power
within their own country. In such cases, the state will often resist intervention
by claiming its own security is at stake, even if it does so at the expense of
some of its citizens. Human rights "often lose out to the interest of the states on
spurious grounds such as national security." 442 It is not the nation's security that
is really being threatened, but only its license to abuse its people.
States cling tightly to the issue of national security when it suits them, but
may drop it quickly when other considerations take precedence. How
groundless the "national security defense" can be is illustrated by the example
of what has happened in Vietnam. Subsequent to the 1988 negotiations over the
possible voluntary repatriation of Vietnamese persons not found eligible for
refugee status, the Vietnamese authorities have indicated for the first time since
1975 that they would be prepared to allow those persons to return home, and
that they would soften their previous position regarding these refugees as a
threat to national security. In order to obtain badly needed economic aid and
emerge from its political isola tion, Vietnam has abandoned its application of
article 89 of its 1986 penal code on punishment for persons having left Vietnam
"illegally."
the community from serious danger.' See Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International
Law, p. 106.
440 Art 33 (1,2), concerning expulsion of refugees of the 1951 UN Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees make explicit mention of the restriction on grounds
of national security: "1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully
in their territory save on grounds of national security or public order. 2. The expulsion
of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance
with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national
security require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence [to]... the competent
authorities." See the text of the Convention in HCR/INF/29/Rev.3.
441 Amos A. Jordan and William Taylor, Jr., American National Security: Politics
and Process, 1981, p. 3.
442 Van Boven and Ramcharan, "Problems in the Protection of Human Rights at the
International Level," p. 105.
Legal Justification 193
Just before the October 1988 plebicite the Chilean authorities on September
2, 1988 lifted the ban on nationals to return home, many of whom
had been expelled from or fled the country during the time after the 1973
coup d'etat on grounds of national security. 443
Not only can the doctrine of "national security" be invoked to prevent
outsiders from intervening in a country's human rights abuses, but it can also
be the weapon that the national authorities turn against those supposedly
under their protection. Examples are alarmingly easy to find. Suspecting that
members of the Salvadoran guerrilla movement had infiltrated the refugee
camp Colomoncagua, the Honduran army conducted a military incursion on
August 31, 1985 into the camp for "reasons of national security." 444 Two
refugees were killed, ten detained, and twenty-five injured. In 1978, seven
Vietnamese boat people were found with firearms on board a boat arriving
in Malaysia. They were detained under the Malaysian Internal Security Act
and only after persistent intercessions on the part of UNHCR before the
Malaysian authorities were these refugees given access to due process of
law.
There are no intrinsic reasons that international preventive actions should
be viewed as a risk to national security. The policy proposal detailed in the
previous chapter consists of humanitarian and political actions to enforce
the international accountability of states to international organizations both
for the welfare of their people and for their behavior toward resident aliens.
5.1.2. The doctrine of domestic jurisdiction
States create their own rules governing their population, territory, and traffic
across their borders. 445 In countries from which refugee flows
________________________________
443 "Chile allows exiles to return," Boston Globe, 2 September 1988.
444 "Honduras Reported to Raid Refugees," The New York Times, 5 September
1985; "The Killing Catches Up to Refugees in Honduras, The New York
Times, 8 September 1985.
445 "Typische Bereiche innerer Zuständigkeit - Staatsform, Verfassung,
Staatsangehö-rigldet. Wirtschaftsrecht, Zoll, Aus- und Einwanderung - sind
auch weiterhin gewohnheitsrechtlich zu beachten, soweit sie nicht vertraglich
eingeengt oder völlig internationalisiert sind. Die Beziehungen zwischen Staat
und Individuum, dessen Stellung in der nationalen Gesellschaft, sind, wie die
Verfassungsordnung Überhaupt, traditionell typische Bereiche innerer
Zuständigkeit" Helmut Rumpf, Der internationale Schutz der Menschenrechte
und das Interventionsverbot (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1981), p. 23.

194 Chapter 5
spring, the objection against international intervention on the basis of domestic
jurisdiction often has a political connotation. Except for natural disasters, when
people flee for nonpolitical reasons, a state tends to react aggressively to
reminders about the fundamental humanitarian principle of respecting their own
nationals' rights, especially in volatile and tense internal situations. States
generally have been wary of signing international treaties, such as the
convention on territorial asylum, that would cut into their domestic
jurisdiction. 446 Also, during the implementation of binding international and
regional human rights instruments, when enforcement of humanitarian minimal
standards would be most urgently required, states often override
constitutionally guaranteed fundamental freedoms by invoking exceptional
decisions, thus derogating from what should be nonderogable principles. States,
especially authoritarian ones, tend to fend off outside intervention under the
rationale of domestic jurisdiction, while "legalizing" actions against their
citizens with arbitrary administrative decrees restricting their rights. 447
5.2. Rebuttal of states'objections
In the past, states have been able to get away with the argument that what they
do within their own borders is their own's business. There was a lingering
power to the concept in international law that a nation's boundaries are
sacrosanct. International acquiescence to this reasoning has, in part, enabled
such horrors to take place as the Armenian genocide under the Turks, the
killing of some 10 million Russians in the early 1930s under Stalin, the
Holocaust under Hitler, the genocide under Pol Pot and Idi Amin, and the
current slaughter of the Ba'hai people in Iran.
___________________________
446 "Mention has to be made, however, of the fact that Europe disposes of the very
effective instruments for the judicial enforcement of the obligations arising out of
the European Convention on Human Rights and of treaties establishing the European
Communities." T. Stein, "Regional Enforcement of International
Obligations," Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht,
(ZaoRV), 47 No. l (1987), p. 111.
447 Chile is one such example. By virtue of the transitory Art. 24 of the 1980 Constitution,
in situations of pertubation of the internal peace and security, the President
may expel or prohibit the return of Chilean nationals, detain people for five days,
or send people into internal exile within the territory. See "Informe sobre la situaciön
de los derechos humanos en Chile," Report by the Interamerican Commission
of Human Rights of the Organization of American States, OEA/SER.
L/V/II.66, doc. 17,27 September 1985, pp. 41-42.
Legal Justification 195
In view of the shocking cruelties humanity has witnessed, it is imperative to
reorient priorities, and put "basic human rights above any absolute notion of
border impermeability." 448
To begin with, the domestic jurisdiction argument might be rebutted with
the fundamental question: Are "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms,"
referred to in the UN Charter, matters essentially within domestic juris diction?
The answer must be no.
It is the consensus of judicial opinion that there is no matter which by its very nature is
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States or which cannot be regulated by a
general or individual norm of international law. A matter is, therefore, within the domestic
jurisdiction of a State only if there exists no general or individual rule of international
law which governs it. 44 '
Even though the terms "human rights" and "fundamental freedoms" might
mean different things to different people, which might contribute to a
weakening of the legal force of obligation, these concepts are considered by the
United Nations created specific obligations regarding at least minimal
humanitarian standards. If states still object on the grounds of domestic
jurisdiction, then we might recall that member states, by virtue of joining the
world organization have also accepted an obligation to cooperate with the
United Nations in achieving its purpose of maintaining international peace and
security. If international peace and security are threatened in a conflict in which
large numbers of human lives are in danger, states are required to cooperate
with the Secretary-General in his efforts to save human lives. 450 The guiding
thought should
___________________________
448 See Fernando R. Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law And
Morality, p. ix.
449 Morrison, Benni Sue, "International Organizations and Human Rights:
Reconciling the Protection of Human Rights with Contemporary World Order,"
diss. New York University 1981, pp. 51-52.
450 The representative of Algeria, in referring to groups of people being executed in
Ethiopia, stated in the 2301st Plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly that
the General Assembly would wish both the Secretary-General and the President of
the General Assembly to do all they can to save human lives in danger. His interpretation
that in the minds of members of the General Assembly, "collectively and
individually, the action does not in any way represent interference in the domestic
affairs of a Member State" was not objected to. See Ramcharan, Humanitarian
Good Offices in International Law, 1983, pp. 172-173

196 Chapter 5
not be simply that we do what the law tells us, but that our actions are well
founded, necessary, morally justifiable, and politically sound. 45 1
It is all very well to pass resolutions that call on oppressive or authoritarian
regimes to change practices that they have established to systematically inflict
harm upon its citizens. The real burden, however, falls on the shoulders of
those who must implement the resolutions - governments, international
organizations, and especially, human rights and relief workers in the field.
Secretaries-General, UN individual officials, and organizations have all, in fact,
taken initiatives in the past to tackle specific situations within the territory of
member states, with or without the consent of the state concerned. They have
been able to do this out of concern that the situation, if left unchecked, would
create or dramatically increase refugee flows. These initiatives, despite the
states' initial argument about national security, were approved ex post facto by
the community of states, through such bodies as the U.N. Security Council, the
General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the Executive Committee of the UN High
Commissioner's Program. 452 To be successful, these initiatives must be based
on vision, good judgment, and courage. Once practical actions have been taken,
overcoming states' objections, an important precedents is established on
subsequent legal decisions can be based, particularly in individual cases.
Moreover, these initiatives and practices can serve as precedents in drafting
national and international codes of law.
Therefore we recommend that alternative preventive action gain acceptance
and overcome states' objections through practice, wherever possible in the
absence of an explicit legal instrument providing the basis for it. In this way, an
important body of precedents can be built up as
_______________________
451 In this sense we see the role of the UN not in the narrowly defined, restricted
view, but support that in practice, its freedom for action be widened with the appropriate
means. These means, some of which will be developed below, are
designed not to antagonize governments but to find face-saving devices with international
presence, to provide a link to the outside world, which can mean protection
for potential victims and those, mainly local people, who are trying to
protect the victims directly within their country. By representing an international
conscience the UN and other international workers can make it a matter of selfinterest
for states to make concessions for the sake of their foreign policy image.
452 Examples include "U Thant initiierte spontan, ohne ein ausdrückliches Mandat,
die UNDPRO (United Nations East- Pakistan Relief Operation), nachdem er vergebens
an den Sicherheitsrat appelliert hatte, "to stem the tide of human misery
and potential disaster." See A. Pauer, p. 162; See also UN GA res. 3454 (XXX) 9
Dec. 1975. UNHCR's initiative to assist Vietnamese displaced persons within
their country.
Legal Justification 197
states become accustomed to these types of actions. Aside from relying on the
U.N., the argument of domestic jurisdiction may be further rebutted by judicial
decisions of regional or international courts that a state does accept, thereby
conceding limitations on its internal jurisdiction. 453
For the first time, a regional court recently made a judgment that the
concerned government accepted:
In the first verdict of its kind, the Interamerican Court of Human Rights today found the
Honduran Government guilty in the disappearance of a Honduran citizen in 1981. 454
This court and arm of the Organization of American States "ordered Honduras
to pay damages to the victim's family." 455 The government of Honduras has
accepted this verdict, according to a spokesman for President Jose Azcona
Hoyo, who announced:
Velasquez's family will be compensated by the state because Honduras faithfully complies
with the obligations under international agreements. 456
One of the seven judges, Mr. Buergenthal, an American law professor,
commented on the significance of this decision: The Court's verdicts were
effective "because they cannot easily be written off as propaganda. If the
countries we find in violation receive economic aid from places where value is
placed on preserving human rights, then our verdicts could be of some
significance." 457 Moreover domestic public pressures to make nations conform
to international standards of behavior are growing stronger, which contributes
further to the erosion of the "reserved domain." 458
___________________________
453 According to Article 63 of the American Convention on Human Rights "Pact of
San Jose, Costa Rica," Chapter VIII, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
shall rule that the consequences of the measure that constituted the breach be remedied,
if there has been a violation of a right protected by this Convention.
454 "O.A.S. Tribunal Finds Honduras Guilty in Political Killings, a First", The New
York Times, 30 July 1988.
455 "O.A.S. Tribunal finds Honduras guilty," The New York Times, 30 July 1988.
456 "Honduras agrees to pay family of student," Boston Globe, 31 July 1988.
457 "O.A.S. Tribunal finds Honduras guilty," The New York Times, 30 July 1988.
458 458 M.S. Rajan, The Expanding Jurisdiction of the United Nations, (New York:
Oceana Pubications, New York, 1982), p. 234

198 Chapter 5
52. Definition of proposed international preventive action
In order to establish that states objections against our proposal are justified we
will first examine principles of intervention or humanitarian intervention to
show that there need not be a clash between the proposed preventive action and
intervention.
5.2.1. Meaning of intervention, and of humanitarian intervention a)
Intervention
What, exactly, constitutes intervention? Lauterpacht established the classical
legal definition of intervention in his International Law and Human Rights:
Intervention is a technical term of, on the whole, unequivocal connotation. It signifies
dictatorial interference in the sense of action amounting to a denial of the
independence of the State. It implies a peremptory demand for positive conduct or
abstention - a demand which, if not complied with, involves a threat of or recourse to
compulsion, though not necessarily physical compulsion, in some form. 459
This definition is now considered too restrictive by many political scientists
and practitioners who have suggested much broader grounds for intervention.
George Modelski, for example, notes that the influence of intervening powers
is readily perceived, but further asserts that strict impartiality on the part of
noninvolved third parties is equally important, partly because neutrality cannot
be legitimately expressed by simple noninvolvement:
459 Lauterpacht points out the concurrence of scholarly opinion in the definition of
the term: "Oppenheim describes intervention as 'dictatorial interference by a State
in the affairs of another State,' and emphasized that 'intervention proper is always
dictatorial interference, not interference pure and simple'. Prof. Verdross speaks
of intervention as taking place when a State threatens another with evil if the latter
refuses to yield in a manner which international law leaves to its exclusive jurisdiction.
Professor Stowell, in the leading monograph on intervention, refers to it
throughout as aiming at enforcement There are few topics in international law in
which the uniformity of definition is so impressive and instructive. In order to
justify the use of the term 'intervention' in its accepted scientific connotation there
must be an attempt 'to impose the will' of one or more States upon another State in
an 'imperative form." As quoted by Laurie Sheila Wiseberg, "The International
Politics of Relief: A Case Study of the Relief Operations Mounted During the Nigerian
Civil War (1967-1970)," diss. University of California, Los Angeles, 1973,
p. 481.
Legal Justification 199
The alternative of nonactivity or nonintervention does not exist because inactivity or
nonintervention must be interpreted as encouragement of the stronger party in internal
war. (Emphasis in the original) 460
Modelski not only criticizes the bystander for remaining silent but also holds
him partly guilty for the crime committed. 461 The principle of nonintervention,
however, serves an important purpose in protecting smaller nations from being
arbitrarily invaded by larger powers. Recognizing some fundamental advantages
to nonintervention, the drafters of the UN Charter included Art. 2(7):
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene
in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state462
Even though he was a representative of the sponsoring power, then U.S.
Secretary of State John F. Dulles urged that the principle of "domestic jurisdiction"
should be interpreted as a political principle, "allowing it to evolve as
the state of the world, the public opinion of the world, and the factual
interdependence of the world makes it necessary and appropriate that it should
evolve." 463 Dulles' words probably signify that, as early as in 1945, the
increasing interdependence developing among the nations in the years to come
inevitably meant a gradual decrease of domestic jurisdiction.
_________________________
460 See Laurie Sheila Wiseberg, p. 482.
461 This, at times, is an accusation made against UN officials (of the UNDP, UNHCR
and other UN organizations) who are serving in countries where the most cruel
atrocities are being committed by governmental, para-governmental, or antigovernmental
forces, without being able due to their restricted mandate to take any
action albeit their motivation. The risk is the choice between being declared
'persona non grata' (considered by many committed international workers to be a
compliment for having done a good job against oppressive regimes) or staying inside
the country and trying to do what is possible to relieve the suffering.
462 The principle of nonintervention can be found in many international instruments,
including in the League of Nations Charter 15(8); the pact of the Ligue Arabe of 22
March 1945, the OAS Charter of Bogota, 30 April 1948, the Warshaw Pact Art.8,4
May 1955; the OAU Charter of 25 May 1963, GA Res 2131, (XX), 21 Dec. 1965,
GA Res 2625 (XXV), 24 Oct. 1970, and the Final Act of Helsinki (v), 1 Aug. 1975.
Helmut Rumpf, Der Internationale Schutz der Menschenrechte und das
Interventionsverbot, pp. 14-15.
463 Rajan.p. 229.

200 Chapter 5
b) Humanitarian intervention
The term "humanitarian intervention" is traditionally meant to apply to any
type of intervention, including military, for humanitarian purposes, as for
example to deposing a dictator, stopping massive human rights violations, and
protecting nationals on foreign soil.
Research in the recent past, especially by students of international law,
tended to focus rather narrowly on a single aspect, that of intervening to protect
one's nationals who were endangered in a foreign country. 464 Studies on the
subject contain diametrically opposed interpretations of the legitimacy of
"humanitarian intervention." On the one hand, Shan Mei holds that the idea that
intervention is justifiable on humanitarian grounds is quite simply not true. Mei
suggests that "an intervention by an outside power may touch off an
international conflict. In a world overloaded with nuclear bombs, nothing
would be more ironic than if mankind were exterminated because of the
protection of human rights." 465
On the other hand, Fernando Teson makes a comparison with an adult
hitting a child so severely as to endanger the child's life. We have no choice
then but to interfere, even if the adult says "It's my child, it's my home, and it's
my business," because he has no right to jeopardize the life of a child. Teson
asserts:
Humanitarian intervention among nations is morally justified for similar reasons. Nation
A has no moral right to stand by while Nation B proceeds to imprison, tonure, and
slay large numbers of a minority group within a population. Although the victims may
be citizens of Nation B, nationality from a moral standpoint is even less relevant than
parenthood is in the previous example. Nation A must intervene, forcibly or otherwise,
in order to prevent or mitigate the criminal acts. 466
________________________________
464 Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry Into Law and Morality, 1988, p.
vii.
465 Mei further suggests, "Military deployment is not only unable to bring about the
minimum standard of human right, but often, domestically, sharpens alienation,
worsens communal relations, intensifies the civil war, increases the deaths of the
innocent; and internationally, widens the gap and deepens the distrust among
nations ... A deprivation of human rights in a state, no matter how shocking it is,
usually does not constitute a direct threat to regional or world peace." Shan Mei,
"Humanitarian Intervention under International Law," Harvard Law School, Graduate
Program Paper, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 41-44.
466 Teson, p. xiii.
Legal Justiflcation 201
Other scholars, including Vattel, admit the principle of humanitarian intervention
in exceptional cases. 467 In reviewing several states' practice of
interventions during the past three decades, Pauer found that the primary
motive for states to intervene by force was usually their own self-interest,
and only secondarily to restoring or maintaining minimal humanitarian
standards. 468 Their self interest had been the primary motive for their interventions,
rather than the desire to stop massive human rights violations. 469
Given that "humanitarian" intervention is often carried out for political
purposes rather than out of genuine humanitarian concern, Pauer seeks
alternatives. He concludes that modern international law offers states several
individual and collective possibilities for defending minimal humanitarian
standards, such as voting in the United Nations for institutional, nonpolitical
intervention, offering economic aid or diplomatic intercession.
The above examination of principles of intervention has revealed some of
its essential weaknesses. The original intent of humanitarian intervention
was for an outside force to come in, fix the problem, and depart.
Unfortunately, the temptation to remain in the occupied country, or
otherwise retain an undue influence over its domestic affairs has proved
overwhelming to most nations in modern times. Therefore, we must reject
"humanitarian intervention" as a means of international preventive action,
because of the likelihood of its implementation by force, which is
disallowed to states under the U.N. Charter (Art. 2 (4)), and its potential for
political abuse. Leaving aside humanitarian intervention, then we
_________________________
467 Stephen B. Young, "Between Sovereigns: A Reexamination of the Refugee's
Status," in Transnational Legal Problems of Refugees, 1982 Michigan
Yearbook of International Legal Studies (New York: Clark Boardman Co.
Ltd., 1982), p. 363. See also Helmut Rumpf. Der international Schutz der
Menschenrechte und das Interventionsverbot, p. 76: "Der Klassiker unter den
Zeugen des Prinzipes der Nicht-Intervention, hielt eine Einmischung in
innere Angelegenheiten 'aus besonderen Gründen' für denkbar."
468 Pauer cites the USA in the Dominican Republic, April 1965; India in
Pakistan, December 1971; Vietnam in Cambodia, January 1979; Tanzania in
Uganda, April 1979; France in Central African Republic, September 1979;
and Spain in Equatorial Africa, January 1979. See Pauer, pp. 156-78.
469 "Die Staaten intervenierten vielmehr durchweg zu eigennüztigen Zwecken,
wie zur Verhinderung einer kommunistischen Machtübernahme (USA), zur
Schwächung des politischen Gegners (Indien), oder zur Vertreibung des
unbequemen Nachbarn (Tansania). Lediglich in zwei Fällen interventionarer
Tätigkeit (Frankreich und Spanien) fiberwog deutlich humanitäre
Motivation. Pauer, pp. 178-79.

202 Chapter 5
suggest that the principle of nonintervention be balanced against the
collective responsibility for the well-being of the world's citizens, to be
carried out through international cooperation as proposed under Art 1(3)
of the UN Charter for solving international humanitarian problems.
5.2.2. Justification for the proposals
The problems created by massive refugee flows are so far-reaching and
complex that the international community cannot realistically expect to
prevent them if it does not focus on both the refugee-receiving and the
refugee-producing countries. 470 Much attention is already being devoted
to remedial measures. Our proposal, by contrast primarily offers recommendations
on how minimum standards of treatment of individuals and
groups might be furthered within their home countries, so as to prevent
them from needing to move for survival.
Our proposal leaves out of consideration the threat or use of force,
which is prohibited by Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter. 471 Forcible intervention
are only permissable for bodies with explicit competence for the use
of force - the Security Council (Art. 39, 40, 41, and 42 of the UN Charter)
and the General Assembly (Art. 11 (2,3), and 24 (1) of the UN
Charter) - to guarantee minimal humanitarian standards of treatment and
international peace and security. 472 Because our proposed means for international
preventive action are not directed either to the Security Council
or to the General Assembly, we have excluded from our discussion
forcible means that might be used to avert refugee flows.
Individual states are called upon solely for the purposes of mediation.
The main actors in our policy proposal are the UN Secretariat, international
organizations such as UNHCR, nongovernmental humanitarian institutions,
research outfits, and the media; these entities are most crucial
in promoting the protection of human rights and handling humanitarian
________________________________
470 See also F.P. Feliciano, "International Humanitarian Law and Coerced
Movements of Peoples Across State Boundaries," Australian Yearbook of
International Law, 9 (1985), p. 115.
471 "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state...."
472 Pauer, pp. 81,90,91.
Legal Justification 203
emergencies, and they have no competency for undertaking interventions by
the use of force. 473
Diplomatic good offices by interested states, in coordination with the UN
Secretariat (through either the Secretary-General or the Office for Research
and the Collection of Information), should be arranged at an early stage of a
potential refugee-producing situation. Peaceful conflict resolution with the
assistance of appropriate bodies, including nongovernmental and
international organizations, should be the immediate goal. If material
assistance can relieve the situation and help to defuse tensions, international
humanitarian relief is called for. 474 If despite major efforts in material aid,
diplomacy, and mediation, tensions still are not eased, additional pressure
can be brought to bear on the possible parties through on site fact-finding
missions and the threat of international public exposure.
5J. Legal basis for preventive action
In comparison with the past, UN Secretaries-General have recently sought
to widen their scope of action in the defense of human beings; however,
their good offices in the field of human rights are still fairly limited, being
"mostly used to address some individual cases, and to a lesser extent,
situations." 475 Under Dag Hammarskjold's pioneering doctrine of
"preventive diplomacy," the United Nations and its member states made
substantial progress in widening the grounds for international preventive
action within national boundaries. Although Hammarskjold paid for his
efforts at implementing preventive diplomacy with his life,
_______________________________
473 See also Laurie Wiseberg and Henry Scoble, "Recent Trends in the
Expanding Universe of Non-Governmental Organizations Dedicated to the
Protection of Human Rights," J. Int'l L de Politics, 8 (1979), pp. 627-658 as
quoted in Pauer, pp. 22-23.
474 Recognizing the detrimental effect of disasters, the General Assembly
resolved (A Res 35/36,1980) that developing countries need to be provided
with adequate and timely assistance in matters of disaster relief, prevention,
and preparedness.
475 Theo C. Van Boven and Berti G. Ramcharan, "Problems in the Protection of
Human Rights at the International Level", Paper presented to the
international seminar on the philosophical foundation of human rights. Ed.
lonna Kucuradi, 9-13 June 1980, Ankara, in Van Boven International Law:
The Protection of Human Rights in the UN, Course materials for the Harvard
Law School. Cambridge, Mass., (1987), p. 904.

204 Chapter 5
the doctrine itself has survived and gained ground through such concrete measures
as the establishment of ORCI.
It is not only the U.N. that has expanded its preventive work into the sovereign
territory of nations. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for
example, has achieved an unparalleled acceptance of its efforts on behalf of
civilians in internal armed conflicts. Those efforts have brought its workers even
into places (such as Chile's prisons) where the government would not permit any
outside access, even by the United Nations. 476 The actions of the ICRC, which have
won widespread political acceptance, are rooted in four legal sources: the four 1949
Geneva Conventions and their two 1977 Protocols Additional, the Statutes of the
Red Cross, the Statutes of the International Committee, and the resolutions of the
international conferences of the ICRC. 477 UNHCR is in a similar position. Despite
its limitations of its original mandate, over the years its scope has extended its
actions on behalf of nationals who are not necessarily refugees within a country.
This has become possible partly because governments have come to appreciate the
value of having UNHCR take over some of their burden of caring for their citizens,
thus sparing themselves a great deal of financial and administrative strain. For
example, UNHCR was called upon to assist nationals within Sudan in
___________________________
476 See Protocol II, relating to non-international armed conflicts, which was adopted by
consensus at the end of the Diplomatic Conference. In accordance with Article 1,
Protocol II is applicable in armed conflicts "which take place in the territory of a High
Contracting party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over
a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and conceited military
operations and to implement this Protocol... An article of the Protocol prohibits t he
forcible displacement of civilian populations, unless the security of the civilians
concerned, or imperative military reasons, so demand. This provision is important and
should in future prevent the tragic wandering of entire populations." [emphasis added]
In: Francoise Bory, Origin and Development of International Humanitarian Law
(Geneva, 1982), pp. 35-37.
477 - Les Conventions humanitaires, c'est-a dire les quatre Conventions de Geneve du 12
aoflt 1949 relatives ä la protection des victimes des conflits armds et leurs deux
Protocoles additionnels du 8 juin 1977;
- les Statuts de la Croix-Rouge Internationale;
- les Statuts du CICR [Comite* International de la Croix-Rouge];
- les resolutions des Conferences internationales de la Croix-Rouge. See Claude
Wenger, "Lc Comit6 International de la Croix-Rouge et les re'fugie's," in The Refugee
Problem on a Universal, Regional and National Level, 10th session: September 1982
of the Institute of Public International Law and International Relations of Thessaloniki
1987, pp. 17,18.
Legal Justification 205
1971-72, without distinguishing between returning refugees and those who
had been internally displaced without crossing a border and becoming
"true" refugees. 478 Similarly, in Vietnam in 1974-75 the High
Commissioner started on his own initiative a program of agricultural and
small industrial projects for about 750,000 people displaced within the
country. The program, begun on the High Commissioner's personal initiative,
after only informing the Executive Committee obtaining its consent
ex post facto of the General Assembly subsequently. 47 '
We thus find that member states have ceased to see an irreconcilable
dichotomy between their own national interests and international cooperation.
They have also come to accept that international cooperation
inevitably involves international organizations in their domestic development
- an infringement on their national jurisdiction that they seem to
tolerate, if not welcome. 480 The cooperative efforts of international and
nongovernmental organizations, operating within or outside of an embattled
nation's borders, with or without the consent of the govemment(s)
concerned, helps both relieve the suffering of civilian bystanders and defuse
tensions that could generate an even more serious conflict
The current cross-border operation from Sudan to Eritrea (Ethiopia) may
be mentioned as a successful example of the new cooperative measures.
Here many nations, especially Western countries, have expanded their
efforts so as to operate substantially through nongovernmental
organizations, as well as through the traditional channels of national
authorities in Addis Ababa. Through the "intervention" of these
nongovernmental organizations, careful cross-border operations have been
set up to bring food to famine-stricken Ethiopians in rebel-occupied areas
without their having to cross into Sudan simply to obtain relief.
As a result of the lessons learned from the 1984-85 famine in Ethiopia,
during which, according to government estimates, one million persons
died, the early signals of an impending new famine in 1987 initiated
massive operations for bringing food to people instead of people to food.
Despite numerous obstacles, including both governmental, and rebelcaused
obstruction of efforts to bring food into droughtstricken areas of
Eritrea and Tigray to needy people trapped in the rebel-occupied
______________________
478 UN GA res 2958 (XXVII), 12 December 1972: "Sudanese refugees coming
from abroad and other displaced persons."
479 UN GA res 31/35, 30 November 1975, in which the General Assembly
unanimously endorsed the EXCOM's view of 24 July 1974, which recognized
the need for humanitarian assistance to Vietnamese displaced within their
country.
480 Rajan.p. 206.

206 Chapter 5
North, no massive refugee flows occurred as in the previous famine. 481 From
other organizations in the nongovernmental sector, we find increasingly active
and impatient efforts to keep pace with the evolution of international
humanitarian emergencies. One example is the first international conference
on the "Droit et Morale Humanitaire," organized in January 1987 under the
auspices of the French nongovernmental organization Médecins du Monde.
This conference recalled that many victims do not benefit from any regime of
humanitarian help, concluding that in many situations international
humanitarian assistance 482 is not yet treated as an inalienble right of victims or
an obligation of states. 48 3 Bernard Kouchner, cofounder of Medecins sans
Frontieres, honorary president of Médecins du Monde, and currently Minister
for Humanitarian Affairs in France, sought to shake the international
community out of its complacency:
Peut-on les laisser mourir sous pretexte qu'une frontiere nous separe de leur
plainte? Plaisant malheur, plaisante justice que borde une riviere. La loi
internationale, le droit international sont feroces. Des lors qu'ils sont au loin et sous
des systemes politiques differents du nötre, tant pis pour les autres que Ton proclame
dgaux dans des declarations faussement universelles. 484
A year later, in August 1988, the SARRED Conference (Southern African
Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons) took place in Oslo. This
conference, with a high-level representation of governments and agencies,
proposed, for the first time, to elaborate a plan of action for international
humanitarian intervention in Southern Africa. The importance of this proposal
lies in its support from the approximately 500 representa-
_____________________________
481 "The 'back door' for providing relief via Sudan has a much larger infrastructure
and is moving much more food than at a comparable point during the last
famine," see Opening remarks, Lance Clark, Refugee Policy Group, Meeting on
'Famine in Ethiopia and the International Response,' May 11,1988 p. 2. Harvard
University. In that sense, international preventive action within Ethiopia worked.
482 With GA Res 2816 (XXVI), 1970 UNDRO was established. It has since been
dealing with numerous natural disasters.
483 Mario Bettati, Bernard Kouchner, Le Devoir d'lngtrence: Peut-on les laisser
mourrir?, See in its Annex: "Resolution sur la Reconnaissance du Devoir
d'Assistance Humanitaire et du Droit à cette Assistance," Adoptee par la Ire
Conference Internationale de DROIT ET MORALE HUMANTTAIRE sous
I'dgide de Mödecins du Monde et la Facultd de droit de Paris-Sud le 28 janvier
1987 à Paris.
484 Mario Bettati, Bernard Kouchner, Le Devoir D'lngerence: Peut-on les laisser
mourir? (Paris: Editions Denoel, 1987), p. 11.
Legal Justification 207
tives of more than 80 governments and international organizations who
participated in the conference. 485 This plan, if realized, would run along the
same lines as the proposed alternative means of preventive actions expounded
in Chapter 4, to help meet inadequacies of the current system and spare those
who cannot rely on the protection and assistance of their own governments
from undue suffering.
5.3.1. International cooperation to avert new refugee flows
Subsequent to the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) in
1980 (see Chapter 2), the UN General Assembly established the Group of
Governmental Experts on International Cooperation to Avert New Flows of
Refugees 486 and gave it a well-defined mandate. First, the Group was to
prepare a comprehensive review of the problem of averting new flows of
refugees and develop recommendations for improving international
cooperation, with due regard to the principle of nonintervention in the internal
affairs of sovereign states. 487 One year later, the General Assembly reaffirmed
and extended this mandate. 488 Under the refined mandate, the group organized
its work program to cover all circumstances causing new massive flows of
refugees (including manmade causes and factors, political upheavals,
socioeconomic factors, and natural causes). The group was to analyze
existing international theoretical instruments and practical applications in the
search for appropriate means
_____________________________
485 "La communautfi internationale s'est engagée à accroitre l'aide aux réfugiés
d'Afrique australe",Le Monde, 31 August 1988.
486 UN GA Res. 35/124,11 Dec. 1980.
487 The Resolution also recalled: "...to be mindful of the importance of reaching
general agreement that has significance for the outcome of its work; ...to take
into account the comments and suggestions submitted to the Secretary-
General... from Member States, organs and organizations of the United Nations
and specialized agencies as well as the views expressed during the debate on
this item at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly and also the study
submitted to the Commission on Human Rights at its thirth-eigth session by the
special rapporteur [Human Rights and Mass Exodus]." See UN GA res.
36/148,11 December 1981.
488 UN GA res. 37/121, 16 December 1982, stressed in paragraph 5 the need for
members of the Group to embark upon the study in question within the
framework of a constructive, future-oriented approach and on the basis of
friendly relations and close co-operation among Member States, reflecting the
spirit of GA Res 2625 (XXV) of 1970

208 Chapter 5
for improving international cooperation to avert new massive flows of refugees
489
The Group conducted its study between April 1983 and May 1986, and was
able to achieve a consensus among its 25 members on the conclusions and
recommendations in its final report. With the submission of its report to the
Secretary-General, the Group had successfully fulfilled its mandate.
The Special Political Committee (SPC) of the General Assembly reviewed
the report. As a follow-up, 20 states 490 cosponsored and introduced a draft
resolution into the Special Political Committee, 491 which commended the
Group "for the work it has accomplished by consensus as reflected in its
report." 492 After the report was presented to the SPC and the draft resolution
introduced, 493 nine more countries joined in co-sponsoring the draft
resolution. 494 Without much further debate, the SPC adopted the resolution by
consensus and recommended its adoption to the General Assembly. 495
On 11 December 1986, the General Assembly considered and adopted the
Group's final report again by consensus. This was virtually the first time a UN
group had worked so persistently on such a sensitive issue and seen it through.
Therefore the emerged consensus has a particular significance in that it
reflects some political willingness on the part of the states to take the UN
Group's conclusions and recommendations seriously. This willingness, though
still tentative and in need of careful fostering, may be interpreted and invoked
as a legal basis for implementing the refugee-prevention responsibilities that
the General Assembly, through the endorsement of the Group's
recommendations assigned to the states, 496
__________________________
489 UN Doc A/41/324,13 May 1986.
490 Australia, Austria, Canada, Costa Rica, Czecholovakia, Denmark, Djibouti,
Federal Republic of Germany, Honduras, Italy, Japan, Norway, Pakistan,
Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Thailand, Togo, United Kingdom, and the United
States of America.
491 UN doc. A/SPC/41/L.5,9 October 1986.
492 UN doc. A/ SPC/41/L.5,9 October 1986, paragraph 1.
493 UN doc. A/SPC 41/L.5,9 October 1986.
494 Bangladesh, Cameroon, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Swaziland.
495 UN doc A/41/755,23 October 1986.
496 The main obligations that the report imposed on states were: To respect the principles
in the Charter, to use peaceful means for resolving international disputes,
and thus improve situations that suggest a danger of future flows of refugees; to
prevent new massive flows of refugees, to promote civil, political, economic, so-
Legal Justification 209
the main organs, 497 the Secretary-General, 49 « and other competent UN
bodies. 499
Moreover, this emerging consensus on the legitimacy of taking action in
the country of origin, so that people would not have to flee, opens the way
for new initiatives that could be tied in with programs of the UN bodies, as
mandated by the General Assembly. Therefore, our policy propositions
should not face objection from member states.
5.3.2. The erosion of domestic jurisdiction over human rights violations
Massive violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms are a major
cause of refugee flows. This section will briefly examine how the extension
of international and regional human rights law is contributing to a erosion of
domestic jurisdiction in this field.
Progress in the codification of international human rights instruments,
and strengthened practical application, are paving the way for international
preventive action in this field. The modern history of international human
rights codification may be grouped into the four following periods 500
cial and cultural rights, to cooperate with one another in order to prevent future
massive flows of refugees, and wherever new massive refugee flows occur, to
respect existing generally recognized norms and principles. See UN doc.
A/41/324,13 May 1986.
497 To make fuller use of their respective competencies under the Charter for the
prevention of new massive flows of refugee flows. See UN doc A/41/324, 13
May 1986, p. 17.
498 The consensus also provides the Secretary-General with the legal basis to give
continuing attention to the question of averting mew massive flows of
refugees, to ensure that timely and fuller information relevant to the matter is
available in the Secretariat, to improve the co-ordination within the Secretariat
for obtaining early assessments on situations that might give rise to new
massive flows of refugees; and to help improve the co-ordination of the efforts
of the United Nations organs and specialized agencies and of member states
concerned for timely and more effective action. See UN doc. A/41/324,13 May
1986, p. 18.
499 In the selection of projects, they should consider, in consultation with the
states directly concerned, giving greater support to those projects that directly
or indirectly could help avert new massive refugee flows. UN doc. A/ 41/324,
13 May 1986, p. 18.
500 This section draws from the lecture given by Bertram Ramcharam,
"Reflections on the Protection of Human Rights in the UN", at the Harvard
Law School/ Human Rights Program, 17 September 1988.

210 Chapter 5
1) 1945-1977: Standard setting. During this period, major human rights
treaties were adopted. The UN Charter of 1945, with provisions concerning
human rights in articles 1(3), 501 13(1b), 502 55, 503 55 and 504 68, 505 was the first
major international instrument to surpass the authority of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. In Bogota in May 1948, not long after the
ratification of the U.N. Charter, the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man was adopted by the Organization of American States, to be
supplemented in later years by other instruments. 506
Seven months later, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted
by UN General Assembly Resolution 217 (III) A, giving greater specificity to
the guarantees of international human rights. 507 The Decla ration is the basic
international instrument of the inalienable and inviolable rights of all members
of the human family. Its purposes is to serve as "the common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations" in an effort to secure universal and
effective recognition and observance of the rights and freedoms it lists. 508
__________________________
501 "To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion...."
502 "The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the
purpose of ... assisting in the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
..."
503 "The United Nations shall promote c) universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms...."
504 "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
H
505 "The Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social
fields and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as
may be required for the performance of its functions....
506 The American Convention on Human Rights, also called 'Pact of San Jose,' was
concluded in 1969. Ten years later, the Interamerican Court of Human Rights was
established, whose jurisdiction has so far been recognized only by Argentina,
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Peru and Venezuela. See Wolfgang Heinz, Menschenrechte
in der Dritten Welt, (Munich: Beck, 1986), p. 17.
507 The Soviet Union, Byelorussia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and South
Africa abstained. See Rajan, p. 99.
508 See Human Rights, The International Bill of Hitman Rights, (New York: United
Nations, 1988), p. 2.
Legal Justification 211
Over the years the Declaration has come to occupy a quasi-legal status. For
many people, this document constitutes binding international law. It is
constantly invoked not only by the General Assembly, but also by the Security
Council and U.N. Organs and by virtually all member states. 509 Former
President Jimmy Carter often asserted the authority of the document:
The Universal Declaration means that no nation can draw the cloak of sovereignty over
torture, disappearances, officially sanctioned bigotry, or the destruction of freedom
within its own borders. 510
These frequent referrals have elevated the Declaration to the status of general
or customary law. 511 The drawing up of a more obligatory form of these rights
into treaties which could give these rights binding legal force, has been taking
place since 1951.
Finally, in 1966 the United Nations adopted two International Covenants on
Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) and Social, Economic and Cultural Rights
(CSECR) and other instruments that have the force of law for the countries that
have ratified them. 512 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(CCPR) 513 recognizes the right for
____________________________
509 The Declaration is quoted in international instruments, including the Council of
Europe's Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(1950), the Constitution of the Organization of African Unity (1963) and in the Final
Document of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975), signed
at Helsinki by 35 States. The Declaration is invoked in a score of national
constitutions. It inspired and in many cases, has become part of countries' national
legislation, and has been cited with approval in national courts. The International Bill
of Human Rights, United Nations, New York, 1988, p. 3.
510 See James Rowles, "Human Rights in the World Today: An Introduction," paper,
Harvard Law School Course material, 1988, p. 3.
511 Rowles, p. 15.
512 The CCPR, the CESCR, and the Optional Protocol came into force in 1976 after their
ratification by 35 United Nations Members. As of October 1987,91 countries had
become parties to the CESCR; 87 had ratified the CCPR; and 39 had ratified the
Protocol, which together make the International Bill of Rights. The International Bill
of Human Rights, 1988, p. 3.
513 According to Art. 4 (2), No derogations from the following may be done, not even in
time of public emergency, Articles 6, right to life; 7, freedom from torture; 8
(Paragraph 1 and 2) freedom from slavery or servitude; 11, freedom from imprisonment
on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation; 15, freedom from
being held guilty on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a
criminal offense; 16, the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law;
and 18, freedom from thought, conscience and religion.

212 Chapters
every human person to life, liberty, and security of person; to privacy; and to
freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment as well as from torture.
It recognizes the right to freedom from slavery; to immunity from arbitrary
arrest; to a fair trial; to recognition as a person before the law; to immunity
from retroactive sentences; to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; to
freedom of opinion and expression; to liberty of movement; and to the right to
enter and leave any country, including one's his own. The Optional Protocol
to the foregoing establishes the right of individual petition. 514
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(CESCR) 515 recognizes the right to work and to the free choice of employment;
to fair wages; to form and join unions; to social security; and to
adequate standards of living. It also recognizes the right to freedom from
hunger and to health and education.
Finally, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination was established in 1965. The Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), which functions under this
Convention, has been enunciating important criteria in cases brought before
it, where it interprets the legal provisions. 516
Among other notable international legal instruments is the regional
agreement among 35 ideologically opposed states - from Western Europe and
North America on the one hand to the Socialist bloc countries of Eastern
Europe on the other - in the Final Document of the 1975 Helsinki Conference
on Security and Co-operation. This broadly based support for the Helsinki
Accords reinforces the notion that the universal respect for
__________________________
514 Undo- Art. 28 of the CCPR, a Human Rights Committee (HRC) was set up to
consider progress reports from States that have ratified the Covenant Under the
Optional Protocol, individuals, after having exhausted the national judicial
system, may file complaints of human rights violations by ratifying States. The
HRC has 18 members, who are not representatives of Governments, but rather
independent experts, persons of high moral character and recognized
competence in the field of human rights. See Hans Thoolen, People Matter
(Amsterdam: Mculenhoff, 1982), p. 135.
515 Recently, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was
established under the CESCR to review states' reports on their progress in
promotion of these rights.
516 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2106 a (XX), 21 December 1965. Entry into force: 4
January 1969, in accordance with article 19 Text United Nations Treaty Series
No. 9464, Vol. 660, p. 195.
Legal Justification 213
human rights and fundamental freedoms is "an essential factor for peace, justice
and prosperity." 517
2) 1978-1981: Model Setting. This period was marked by the transla tion of
legal standards of the international instruments into action by governments,
international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations. One of the main
forces behind this implementation was the UN Centre for Human Rights
(formerly UN Division for Human Rights) in Geneva. The Centre for Human
Rights serves the Commission on Human Rights 518 and designed the models for
action under the U.N. Division's then director Theodoor van Boven, an eminent
scholar and activist on human rights. These "models" gave guidelines for
investigating and monitoring specific types of abuses, each handled by a special
submit of the Commission on Human Rights. These submits, which today form
part of the UN bodies with responsibility in the field on human rights 5 w (see
chart by Meselson/Wiseberg in the Appendix), consist of Working Groups of the
Commission on Human Rights 52 » and Special Rapporteurs, Representatives, and
Experts of the Commission on Human Rights for thematic investigations. 521 The
Special Rapporteurs are appointed by the
__________________________
517 Ludger Kühnhardt, Die Universalität der Menschenrechte, Olzog Verlag, München,
1987, p. 365. [Translated by the author]
518 The membership of the Commission on Human Rights currently consists of 43 representatives
of Governments. The Commission, the most important policy-making
organ of the UN in the field of human rights, prepared the draft of the CCPR and
the CESCR. The methods of work in dealing with violations of human rights are:
public debate; taking urgent measures (i.e. sending telexes); making
pronouncements, studying particular situations; gathering and analyzing data; considering
communications; appointments of special rapporteurs; and appointments of
working groups. See Thoolen, People matter, pp. 44 and 135.
519 Sarah Meselson & Laurie Wiseberg, "United Nations bodies with Responsibility
in the Field of Human Rights," Human Rights Internet Reporter, 12, No. 3, July
1988,pp.30-31.
520 The Submits are: Human Rights in South Africa; Gross Violation of Human
Rights; Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances; Right to Development; Human
Right Defenders; Rights of the Child; and Rights of Minorities. See Sarah Meselson
& Laurie Wiseberg, UN bodies with Responsibility in the Field of Human
Rights, in UN WATCH, Human Rights Internet Reporter, pp. 30-31.
521 These include: Human Rights in El Salvador; Human Rights in Iran; Religious
Intolerance; Human Rights in Chile; Human Rights in Afghanistan; Use of Mercenaries;
Summary or Arbitrary Executions; Human Rights in Haiti; Human Rights
in Guatemala; Human Rights in Equatorial Guinea. The three latter are being dealt
with under the Program of Advisory Services. Meselson & Wiseberg, pp. 30-31.

214 Chapter 5
Secretary-General to go on special missions to offer the international
community's services, investigate alleged violations, and develop activities
with governments. 522
3) 1982-1987: Model implementing and testing. During this time the models
developed over the preceding period by the Centre for Human Rights were first
put into practice. Where necessary and appropriate, adaptations were made to
help promote the development of national infrastructures for constitutional,
investigative, judicial, teaching, and dissemination activities. 523
4) 1988 on: Reflection and evaluation. Increasing global interdependence
has forced sovereign states to take into account the international community's
concern in the area of human rights.
There is no way of isolating oneself from the effects from gross violations
abroad; they breed refugees, exiles, and dissidents who come knocking at our
doors - and we must choose between bolting the doors, thus increasing misery
and violence outside, and opening them, at some cost to our own well being. 524
Even though the drafters of the UN Charter rejected the notion of "protection"
of human rights, preferring the term "promotion," in practice the U.N. has been
involved in protection measures over the last forty years. Aside from the legal
instruments, which are enforceable among states that ratified them, coalition
building for specific new proposals has made it difficult for individual states to
resist allowing the U.N. some role in their internal affairs, especially if massive
violations of human rights can be established. Such concessions have
contributed to the shrinking of domestic jurisdiction in the field of international
human rights. By the same token this U.N. practice extends the UN's
jurisdiction into their internal affairs. By agreeing to binding treaties, states
must accept interference in their internal affairs. The eminent British scholar
Hersch Lauterpacht judges these conflicting claims:
______________________
522 The fact-finding by these special rapporteurs has not always functioned as well as
would be desirable, since some of the rapporteurs tend to see their role more as
diplomatic than investigative. Ramcharan, "Reflections," Lecture, Harvard Law
School, Cambridge, 17 September 1988.
523 United Nations Association, A Successor Vision: The United Nations of
Tomorrow, (New York: UNA, 1987), p. 32.
524 Stanley Hoffmann, "Duties beyond borders: On the limits and possibilities of
ethical politics", p. Ill, as quoted in Kühnhardt, Die Universalität der Menschenrechte,
Olzog, München, 1987, p. 362.
Legal Justification 215
Once States agreed that questions should form the subject of Declaration or
Convention, they clearly placed them outside their 'domestic jurisdiction' and article
2 paragraph 7 became inapplicable. 525
States show a greater willingness to cooperate with the Secretary-General in
permitting international measures to be taken within their borders than ever
before. Facts of such practice speak for themselves. 526 For example, in the
recent Iran-Iraq war, the UN was able to investigate the use of chemical
weapons, 527 look into the prisoner of war situation, 528 and make arrangements
to establish protection for civilians 529 - all without an explicit mandate.
Not only have states allowed UN and other organizations to take action
within their territories, but some, such as the Federal Republic of Germany
and Canada have initiated measures themselves to promote human rights in
the developing nations. 530
Still, in taking these actions on their own, rather than under the general
auspices of the U.N., states will invariably risk being accused under Art. 2(7)
by the government in question of intervening into its internal af-
_______________________
525 Hersh Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights, 1950, p. 213, as
quoted in Rumpf, p. 18. For a discussion of nonintervention in Art 2(7), see
Section 5.2. above.
526 "The power to bring matters to the attention of the Security Council or the
Assembly has been interpreted to imply the power, which the Secretary-General
has frequently exercised, to make such inquiries and investigations to inform the
appropriate organ of the matter in question." Hans Kelsen, Principles of
International Law, (New York, 1966), p. 281.
527 "UN says Iraq used poison gas in air raid," Boston Globe, 24 August 1988.
528 "U.N. Team to Visit Gulf War Prisoners," The New York Times, 24 July 1988.
529 Ramcharan, "Reflection," Lecture, 17 September 1988.
530 Different ways and levels can be used: "Persönlicher Einsatz für einzelne oder
Gruppen von Opfern, einschließlich der Aufnahme von politischen Flüchtlingen;
vertrauliches Vorstelligwerden bei der Botschaft in Bonn, durch den eigenen
Botschafter im Zielland oder im Rahmen von offiziellen Besuchen; allgemein
gehaltene Bekundungen, man sei über die Lage im Lande "besorgt"
(Pressemitteilungen, Reden bei internationalen Konferenzen etc.), und
öffentliche Stellungnahmen, die die Regierungspolitik des Ziellandes direkt
kritisieren." Der damalige Staatsminister im Auswärtigen Amt, Klaus von
Dohnanyi meinte "Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist heute stark genug, um es
sich leisten zu können, durch ihre Diplomaten und politischen Repräsentanten
leise, aber energisch und zielbewußt in Menschenrechtsfragen vorstellig zu
werden. Wenn wir dies tun, kann es sich dabei auch nicht um die Einmischung
in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Länder handeln: Menschenrechte sind
eine internationale Verantwortung." See Heinz, Menschenrechte in der Dritten
Welt, 1986, pp. 33,37.

216 Chapters
fairs, even though this argument is losing much of its force in the international
legal community. 531
Without the consent and cooperation of member states, the U.N. would be
powerless to further the international protection of human rights. Gradually,
governments have begun to overcome their resistance to U.N. intervention in
matters of major human rights violations. The former Junior Minister in the
British Foreign Office, Evan Luard, offered the following rebuttals of criticism
against states' actions: A relative openness in human rights questions would, in
principle, be compatible with foreign policy goals. There are also "political
costs" in not reacting to human rights violations. It might at times be necessary
to pay a price, such as in specific cases less leverage, for active human rights
policy, but the saving of human lives and the prevention of torture and other
violations of fundamental freedoms are worth the price. 532 Cyrus Vance,
Secretary of State under the Carter Administration, explained how a
commitment to human rights is actually in a nation's best self-interest:
Emphasis on human rights serves our long-term interest in peace and stability.
We have learned that the heavy silence of repression is not stability: It is too
often the ominous calm before the storm ... By alleviating the sources of
tension and discord before they disrupt into violence, nations can help build
real stability . 533
Not only the setting of standards for investigation and protection in situations
of massive human rights violation but its application in practice by states and
the United Nations is gaining legal grounds. 534
_______________________________
531 "Die interne Menschenrechtspolitik eines Staates aber kann durch internationale
Kritik oder Ermunterung beeinflusst und gefördert werden", See Richard Falk,
"Theoretical foundations of human rights," p. 67, as quoted in Kühnhardt, Die
Universalität der Menschenrechte, p. 369.
532 Heinz, pp. 33-34. (Translation mine)
533 Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of
Human Rights (Lanham, Md.: Hamilton Press, 1986), reviewed by Thomas Conley
Merriman in Human Rights Yearbook, 1 (Spring 1988), p. 327.
534 Each year the number of United Nations resolution concerning massive human
rights violations increases. Even though these resolutions, which are often preceded
by open and public debate, may not create customary law, they can influence
the development of international law. "Bindend sei jedoch nicht die jeweilige Resolution,
sondern die Staatenpraxis." See Wolfgang Seiffert, Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung, 31 August 1988.
Legal Justification 217
5.3.3. Massive refugee flows - a danger to world peace?
Refugee movements usually occur in a framework of general strife,
upheaval, and tension. This may be observed in parts of Indochina, and
has certainly been true in Central America. The General Assembly noted
in its resolution following the FRG's proposal for international cooperation
to avert new flows of refugees:
Massive flows of refugees may not only affect the domestic order and stability of
receiving States but also jeopardize the stability of entire regions and thus
endanger international peace and security [emphasis added] .535
It is the mandate of the Secretary-General to maintain international peace
and security; therefore member states must support the UN chief executive
in fulfilling this heavy responsibility regardless of their own interests.
The United States Refugee Coordinator under the Reagan Administration,
Ambassador Jonathan Moore notes: "Refugees are human rights
violations made visible." 536 This statement may indicate that massive
human rights violations have become an increasing concern, especially
when they degenerate into a politically destabilizing factor. States that
have received massive groups of refugees have often complained that this
poses a threat to their own and the region's security. 537
In the light of the Secretary-General's mandate to maintain international
peace and security, the Commission on Human Rights, in its resolution
30 (XXXVI) requested the Secretary-General, in cases where large
scale exoduses of persons become a matter of international concern, "to
consider establishing direct contacts with appropriate governments, to assess
the relationships between the situation and full enjoyment of human
_______________________
535 UN GA Res 35/124,11 December 1980.
536 Jonathan Moore, "Refugees and Foreign Policy: Immediate Needs and
Durable Solutions," Speech, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School, 6
April 1987, p. 3.
537 If, as was established by the UN Group on international cooperation, an act
that generates refugee flows endangers 'international peace and security,' it
is a violation of the UN Charter, and by definition an internationally
wrongful act that entails the international responsibility of the state
concerned. A response thereto would not, under the circumstances,
constitute an intervention. The Group's conclusions clarified that generating
refugees or expelling citizens is not an internal affair, but inevitably involves
more than one state, and thus becomes an international matter. See Luke
Lee, "Towards a World Without Refugees," The British Yearbook of Intl.
Law (1986), pp. 331-32.

218 Chapters
rights and to make concrete recommendations for ameliorating such situations."
538 Even Grahl-Madsen, the eminent scholar on refugee law,
advocates that for purely humanitarian and practical reasons "the very best
thing would be not to become - not to have to become, that is - a refugee in
the first place." 539 In two regions in particular - Southeast Asia and Central
America - states hard hit by an enormous influx of refugees have publicly
warned of the threat to their security.
A meeting in May 1988 attended by representatives from seven
Southeast Asian countries - Malaysia, Thalland, Brunei, Indonesia, Hong
Kong, the Philippines, and Singapore - reached this anxious conclusion
about the unabated flow of Vietnamese refugees:
If this exodus continues unabated, it will create unacceptable political, security,
economic and social problems for the countries of first refuge. 540
ASEAN members had been reacting to the exodus from Vietnam with such
aggressive measures as pushing off arriving boats to the high seas. They
stressed that the eradication of the conditions leading to the continuing
exodus would contribute to creating a congenial climate for stability,
harmony, and good neighborliness in the region. 541
Honduras, which has been hosting a large proportion of Central American
refugees and displaced persons, has also complained about the resulting
security problems within the country and the growing tensions with
its neighbors. The border situation between El Salvador and Honduras, as
between Nicaragua and Honduras, is tense. Regular and "irregular forces"
(the term used in the Contadora peace process for the armed in-
________________________
538 Ramcharan, Humanitarian Good Offices in International Law, 1983, p. 2.
539 Atle Grahl-Madsen, "The emergent International Law relating to Refugees:
Past-Present-Future," The Refugee Problem on the Universal, Regional and
National Level, Institute of International Public Law and International
Relations of Thessaloniki, 1987, p. 239.
540 See "Seminar on First Asylum for Vietnamese Boatpeople, Cha-Am,
Thailand 25-28,1988," in Refugee Reports, U.S. Committee for Refugees,
Vol. IX, Number 6, June 24,1988, p. 9.
541 In order to find a solution to the problems felt by the first-asylum countries,
including threats to their national security, the ASEAN foreign ministers
proposed to hold another United Nations-sponsored international conference
to "discuss halting the exodus of Indochinese refugees." See "Schultz Begins
18-Day Visit to 7 Asian Lands and Hong Kong," The New York Times, 7 June
1988. and "Proposition de conference de 1'ONU sur les boat people," La
Gazette de Lausanne, 5 July 1988.
Legal Justification 219
surgency) alike are employing aggressive tactics in the area. Insurgency and
counterinsurgency activities strain relations between governments, demanding
the highest level of political mediation. The Secretary-General, under his
mandate to maintain peace and security, translated his support for the peace
process into concrete action, in the form of a special plan of economic
cooperation for Central America: "The Situation in /Central America: Threats
to International Peace and Security and Peace Initiatives." Drawn up as [partly
on the impetus of] the 1987 peace agreement among Central American states,
this plan of cooperation is the first general political Central American
agreement to include provisions for the treatment and repatriation of refugees
and the handling of displaced persons:
[there is an increasing] complexity and seriousness of the situation of the refugees
and displaced persons in the Central American region, and its effects on the social
and economic development of the area. 542
Stressing the link between refugee movements and regional stability, the
country's Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York,
Ambassador Hernandez Alcerro, recently expressed a cautious hope for the future
in the UN Security Council commenting on the Central Ameri- can Peace Plan:
Once the hostilities are over, the tensions among neighboring countries
produced by such refugee movements will come to an end. 543
During the debate about the the Secretary-General's special program of
economic assistance to Central America, the Czechoslovakian representative
spoke on behalf of all the Socialist countries, expressing the hope that the
special program for Central America would help to achieve the basic goal
"shared by all of us: peace, security and development." 544 In addition, Peru,
which in had sponsored the establishment of the Support Group for the peace
process in Lima in 1985, reiterated its confidence in the Secretary-General in
further strengthening peace and development in Central America. Peru
cautioned, however, that the process must take into account
_______________________
542 UN Doc A/42/L.49,10 May 1988.
543 A/42/PV.24, p. 21, cited in S/PV.2803,22 March 1988.
544 A/42/PV.111,13 May 1988, p. 61.

220 Chapters
the situation of those other countries of the isthmus which have suffered
repercussions from the crisis, particularly as far as the refugee problem is
concerned. 545
The Secretaries-General can thus be seen to have used their authority in situations
where massive refugee flows were likely to endanger international peace and
security, by convening the international meeting on refugees in Southeast Asia in
1979 and through the initiative for special program in Central America. 546 In
concluding this chapter on the legal justification for international preventive
action, we recognize that on the one hand the notion of the sovereignty of state,
the doctrine of domestic jurisdiction, and the principle of nonintervention are well
established norms in international law and politics. On the other hand, the implementation
of international human rights laws and the emerging consensus on the
need to intervene within states to address causes of refugee flows is developing
slowly. The ultimate purpose of the search for the legal basis of our proposal is to
promote the restoration or maintenance of minimal standards of humanitarian
treatment.
As we can establish from pertinent instruments and practice, states have
accepted and agreed to do just that, both through individual ratification of relevant
instruments and by the very act of joining the United Nations, which implies an
acceptance of the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and the extension of
international jurisdiction into their domestic territory.
We found three legal cornerstones for our policy: first, the emerging
international consensus among all states belonging to the United Nations that
there is a need to strengthen international cooperation to avert new refugee flows,
and the acceptance and assignment of specific obligations to states and
responsibilities to the main organs and the Secretary-General of the United
Nations for this purpose; second, the progress in the codification of international
human rights law and the practice of states and the United Nations in the
implementation of these standards that has
_________________________
545 A/42/PV.111,13 May 1988, pp. 64-65.
546 In an increasingly complex world, the role of the Secretary-General is becoming
more complex and sensitive. Even though much of his success at maintaining peace
and security, partly having an effect on containing refugee-producing situations,
depends on the international political climate, scholarly work shows that his use of
discretionary authority has been "influenced by both the personal qualities of the
incumbent and the nature of the organization; but mostly has depended on the fluid
and changing nature of international politics and diplomacy." Jaka Jido-for Okolo,
"Evolution of the Use of the Discretionary Authority of the United Nations'
Secretary-General", diss. New York University 1984, p. I
Legal Justification 221
been limiting states' domestic jurisdiction in this field; and third, the
recognition that massive refugee flows can destabilize international
peace and security, which has motivated the Secretary-General to take
concrete actions to address refugee-producing situations.
Our proposal therefore represents neither an offense nor an
intolerable intervention into states' internal affairs, but rather
harmonizes with the current evolution of international law and
political practice, which chalenges traditional principles of nonintervention
with regard to refugee-producing situations.

Concluding remarks 1
Chapter 6 223
The last 30 years, especially the early Cold War period, besides being directly
and indirectly the cause for millions of refugees, seriously impeded effective
preventive actions. As early as the late 1950's the then Secretary-General
Hammarskjold coined the term 'preventive diplomacy'. Progressively, as from
the early 1980's, actions with preventive purpose or content were proposed,
discussed, and some of them started in and outside the United Nations. Past
initiatives and projects have provided references and incentives, they helped
catalyze forward thinking and conceptualizing of fresh ideas.
The analytical discussion has shown that the reasons why people become
refugees are not necessarily due to individual persecution or fear of persecution.
The examples analyzed also documented situations in which people become
refugees to serve specific strategic or political purposes. These cases were not
chosen for their representativity, but were selected for direct testimonies
collected from former and current refugees and displaced persons in and from
Vietnam in South East Asia, as well as from personal interviews and
observations in Central America. The evidence from these testimonies require
actions against conditions created for political reasons, in which refugees' lives
or liberty are at stake. The examples and analysis supports a broad agreement
that is emerging to intervene before people are forced to flee instead of waiting
on the other side of the border until the damage is done.
With the end of the Cold War, unprecedented opportunities for new
interaction and intervention developed with almost global cooperation for
preventive measures world wide. New approaches and policies in the rewritten
Chapter 4, document progress made in the area of policy propositions made in
the first edition. In fact, progress made goes beyond expectations. Of course, the
Post Cold War time has lead to a renaissance of the United Nations and the
fulfillment of its mandate. UN conflict prevention endeavors, at least small ones,
become a more realistic choice than before. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali is gaining fresh
_______________________
1 Revised for second edition

224 Chapter 6
grounds for developing innovative and daring approaches, which
recall Dag Hammarskjold, moving preventive diplomacy into new
lights and perspectives, written down in his 1992 "Agenda for Peace".
Most noteworthy is the heavy demand on peace-keeping, peacemaking
and peace building, which States still tend, however, not to follow up
sufficiently with the necessary funding. An emerging combined
approach of humanitarian, political and peace-keeping efforts bring
new significance in refugee prevention work. The analysis of UN
conflict prevention experience and perspective shows potentials but
also limitations for preventing new and recurring refugee situations.
Even though the mandate to maintain international peace and security
is respected and undisputed, the procedures and facilities often depend
on ad-hoc decisions and arrangements. This limits effectiveness and
result.
While during the Cold War the two super powers retained their
sphere of influence through containment policies, often at the cost of
refugees and displaced persons, political will of states remains the
crucial ingredient for any action with preventive purpose.
After long and intensive negotiations among interested
governments during 1991, the General Assembly finally resolved to
strengthen coordination of humanitarian action. States decided that a
coordinator working directly under the Secretary-General was best
suited to carry out this task, including undertaking mediation and
conflict resolution efforts. Chapter four provides an initial assessment
on the first few months of operation of the Department for
Humanitarian Affairs at UN Headquarters, which indicate the
complexities involved. The unprecedented humanitarian crisis in
Yugoslavia and Somalia, have no doubt placed unexpected challenges
to the preventive actions of the United Nations system as a whole.
It was the UN High Commissioner for Refugees whom the
Secretary-General appointed, however, to lead the operations in
former Yugoslavia. Considering that there are more than three million
refugees and displaced persons inside and outside the former
Yugoslavia UNHCR was found most suited UN body to deal with the
situation. The expertise and experience of UNHCR, gained over the
last forty years of existence, with the leadership of Mrs. Ogata in
handling the crisis have earned her support and credibility worldwide.
In this context concepts and activities on country of origin work have
gained new momentum. The establishing of a new section specifically
for this purpose is only one proof of it. An in-house early warning
working group, operating since 1989, has also evolved into a more
institutionalized mechanism: the UNHCR Early
Concluding Remarks 225
Warning Taskforce. Out of this activity is developing UNHCR's
active participation in the United Nations interagency working group
on early warning, established in 1991.
Preventive protection, which the UN High Commissioner defines
as prevention of circumstances which force people to leave as another
aspect of solutions, would have been unthinkable even four years ago.
Of course, for the time being, the concept and actions of preventive
protection are understood essentially in the context of the situation in
former Yugoslavia. Senseless war and killing naturally makes
preventive protection a different option. Nevertheless, the notion is
developing, allowing for application when circumstances permit. This
in itself is progress compared to previous times, and could evolve
eventually into a more broader acceptance and implementation
elsewhere. Action in the country of origin to address circumstances of
cross border movements is thus slowly emerging as an accepted
practice.
The issue of sovereignty is slowly gaining new light and
interpretation in the direction which was already indicated in the first
edition. The states of the international community can no longer
ignore the victims of specific practices (which amount to persecution
and massive human rights violations) only because they are still in
their countries of origin. The call to respect human rights and
humanitarian law can no longer be considered merely as lipservice,
but rather figures now prominently on international agendas. That the
Security Council is functioning again, and able to adopt such
resolutions as concerning Iraq and former Yugoslavia, would have
been unthinkable just a few years ago. They did perhaps not stop
refugee movements. But is is unclear what exactly would have
happened without them. Evidence shows, however, that without them
the human suffering could have been much worse.
Of course, there is still war in several parts of the world.
Preventive action, now and in the next few years, is likely to be more
effective, only in small specific situations. It is only known when
preventive action has not prevented refugees and war. Seldom are
reports publicly available of preventive actions' failures or successes.
Still, the approach to prevent rather than to cure is gaining acceptance
as the most desirable course of action. Consequently, the preventive
course is advancing towards a more proactive approach to promote
human rights, democracy and peace. Preventing circumstances forcing
people to flee is a part of mat process.

226
UNHCR Statistics on Refugee Population Worldwide
as at 1 January 1992
December 1991
LIST OF STATES PARTY TO THE
1951 UN CONVENTION AND/OR THE 1967 PROTOKOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGERS
States Party to the 195: UN Convention : 106
States Party to the 1967 Protocol : 107
States Party
States Party
to both the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol
to either one or both of these instruments
:
:
103
110
AFRICA!
Algeria Gabon Rwanda
Angola Gambia Sao Tome and Principe
Benin Ghana Senegal
Botswana Guinea Seychelles
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Sierra Leone
Burundi Kenya Somalia
Cameroon
Cape Verde (P)
Lesotho
Liberia
Sudan
Swaziland (P)
Central African Republic Madagascar (C)* Togo
Chad
Congo
Malawi
Mali
Tunisia
Uganda
Cote d'Ivoire Mauritania United Republic of Tanzania
Djibouti
Egypt
Morocco
Mozambique
Zaire
Zambia
Equatorial Guinea Niger Zimbabwe
Ethiopia
Nigeria
AMERICAS:
Argentina Dominican Republic Panama
Belize Ecuador Paraguay
Bolivia
Brazil
El Salvador
Guatemala
Peru
Suriname
Canada Haiti United States of America (P)
Chile
Colombia
Jamaica
Nicaragua
Uruguay
Venezuela (P)
Costa Rica
ASIA:
China Israel Philippines
Iran, Islamic Republic of Japan Yemen
EUROPE:
Austria Hungary* Norway
Belgium
Cyprus
Iceland
Ireland
Poland
Portugal
Czechoslovakia
Denmark 2)
Italy
Liechtenstein
Romania
Spain
Finland
France 3)
Luxembourg
Malta*
Sweden
Switzerland
Germany 4)
Greece
Monaco (C)*
Netherlands 5)
Turkey*
United Kingdom 6)
Holy See
Yugoslavia
OCEANIA!
Australia 1) Hew Zealand Samoa (C)
Fiji Papua New Guinea Tuvalu
227
UNHCR, October 1992
Source:

229
Evolution of Indicative Numbers of Asylum-Seekers EC
Member States from I January 1980 to 31 December 1991
Years Belgium Denmark Germany France Greece Italy Netherland
s
Portugal Spain U.
Kingdom
Total
1991 13,750 4,600 256,100 45,900 2,650 23,300 21,600 250 7,250 44,750 420,150
1990 12,950 5,300 193,050 49,750 6,200 4,750 21,200 100 6,850 25,250 325.400
1989 8,100 4,600 121,300 58,750 3,000 2,250 13,900 150 2,850 15,550 230,450
1988 5,100 4,650 103.100 31.700 8.400 1 ,300 7.500 350 3,300 5,250 170,650
1987 6,000 2,750 57,400 24,900 6,950 11,050 13,450 450 2,500 5,150 130,600
1986 7,650 9,300 99,650 23,500 4,250 6,500 5,850 250 2,300 4,800 164,050
1985 5,300 8,700 73,850 25,8(X) 1,400 5,400 5,650 100 2,350 5,450 134,000
1984 3,650 4,300 35,300 16,000 750 4,550 2,600 400 1,100 3,850 72,500
1983 2,900 800 19,700 14,950 450 3,050 2,000 1,500 1,400 4,300 51,050
1982 2,900 100 37.200 12,600 1,200 3,150 1,800 na 2,450 4,200 65,600
1981 2,4(X) 100 49.400 9,200 2,250 3,600 I.600 na na 2,400 70,950
1980 2,700 50 107,800 13.700 1,800 7.450 3,700 na na 9,950 147,150
Total 73,400 45.250 1.153,850 326,750 39,300 76,350 1 00,850 3,550 32,350 130,900 1,982,550
na = not available
(Figures for Luxembourg and Ireland not available)
Source: UNHCR Office for the European Institutions, Brussels, October 1992.

230
REFUGIADOS BA.JO MANDATO DEL ACNUR EN HONDURAS ABRIL 1988
1988
PAIS DE
ORIGEN
CAMPAMENTO/
ASENTAMIENTO
POBLACION
31 DIC..
1986
31 DIC.
1987
31 MAR.
1988
NAC1M DEFUNC REPVOI.
(*)
SALIDAS
REASNTA
M 1ERCER
PAIS
REUNOTC
FAMILIAR
NUEVAS
LLEGADAS
(*)
REIN-
GRESOS
TRANSFER
ENTRE
CAMP
+ (-)
POBLACION AL
30 ABRIL 1988
GUATEMALA El Tesoro 531 416 418 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 417
EL SALVADOR
Mesa Grande 11,297 5,711 5,688 12 0 51 0 0 8 0 0 0 5,641
Colomoncagua 8,148 8.068 8,321 19 4 19 0 0 1 0 0 0 8,316
San Antonio 1,462 1,215 1,202 3 0 13 0 0 0 1 0 0 1,193
Buenos Aires 51 54 38 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 30
Sub-Total 20,956 15,048 15,249 34 4 91 0 0 9 1 0 0 15,180
NIGARAGUA Jacaleapa 4,445 6,289 6,176 16 1 47 8 0- 0 19 0 (36) 6,119
(Costa del Teupasenti 3,746 4,541 4,319 14 0 12 0 0 0 14 0 (91) 4,244
Pacifico) L»s Vegas 0 928 2,146 9 5 2 18 0 0 321 0 127 2,578
Sub-Total 8,191 11,758 12,641 39 6 61 26 0 0 354 0 0 12,941
NICARAGUA
(Costa Atlantica)
Tapalwas 625 798 613 0 0 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 598
Tapamlaya 1,397 776 855 2 0 18 0 0 0 13 7 0 859
Prumnitara
500 588 4 0 112 0 0 0 0 0 0 480
Koko 868 822 818 2 0 155 0 0 0 0 4 0 669
Patuca 5,053 4,325 4,515 16 1 13 116 0 0 1 1 0 4,403
Mocoron 5,612 2,097 2,197 14 3 161 0 0 0 39 15 1 2,102
Rio Mocoron
2,268 2,294 15 2 293 0 0 0 171 7 (1) 2,191
Layasixa 1,716 1,095 723 1 2 88 0 0 0 1 5 0 640
Sixatigni 586 434 463 7 3 11 0 0 0 0 2 0 458
Sub-Total 15,857 13,115 13,066 61 11 866 116 0 0 225 41 0 12,400
TOTAL 45,537 40,337 41,374 137 21 1,022 142 0 9 580 41 0 40,938
(*)Wer cuadros separados UNHCR Budget: 1986 US$ 14,260,000
1987 US$ 14,263,000
1988 US$ 13,640,000
Source: UNHCR Honduras
HCR/HON/6/88
April 1988

231
FICHA DE INFORMACIÓN
SITUACIÓN DE REFUGIADOS EN HONDURAS
I. ESTADÍSTICAS/POBLACIÓN
NACIONALIDAD
CAMPAMENTO
POBLACION
31 DIC.
1983
31 DIC.
1984
31 DIC.
NUEVAS
LLEGADAS
NACIMIENTOS
SALIDAS
(****)
DEFUNCIONES
1985 ENE FEB MAR ENE FEB MAR ENE FEB MAR ENE FEB MAR
POBLACION
31 ENERO
1986
POBLACION
28 FEBRERO
1. GURTEMALTECOS EL TESORO 491 510 530 - - - 1 3 2 - - - - - - 531 534 536
2. SALVADORENOS
MESA GRANDE 9,588 10.662 11,362 72 28 45 59 65 45 122 75 92 4 3 2 11,367 11,382 11,378
COLOMONCAGUA 8,377 7,216 7,800 - - - 21 20 35 - 6 1 3 4 3 7,818 7,828 7,859
SAN ANTONIO 1,436 1,453 1,499 - - - 7 4 5 22 - 11 1 - - 1,483 1,487 1,481
BUENOS AIRES 369 192 65 - 1 - - 1 - - 3 3 1 - 64 63 60
SUB-TOTAL 19,770 19,523 20.726 72 29 45 67 90 85 144 84 107 9 7 5 20.732 20,760 20,771
3. NICARAGÜENSES JACALEAPA 1,411 1,755 2,755 98 67 193 8 9 7 31 29 - 1 - - 2,861 2,909 3,096
1(*)
14 (*)
LADINOS
33 (*) 1(*) 1(*)
TEUPASENTI 1,130 1,992 2,608 - 59 130 7 8 5 - 2 - 1 1 - 2,582 2,645 2,793
1 (*)
14(*)
33(*) l (*) 1(*)
SUB-TOTAL 2,541 3,747 5,363 132 127 338 15 17 12 65 32 15 2 1 0 5,443 5,554 5,889
4. NICARAGÜENSES LAMOSQUITIA 13.767 15.477 12,095 630 741 271 45 74 6 85 3 0 7 2 3 12,678 13,488 ** 13.203
MISKITOS/SUMOS
(***)
TOTAL 36.569 39,257 38,714 834 897 654 148 184 105 294 119 122 18 10 8 39,384 40,336 40.406
1986
POBLACION
31 MARZO
1986
II.. REPATRIACIÓN VOLUNTARIA
NACIONALIDAD 1984 1915 ENE FEB MAR TOTAL
1986 1986 1986 1986
1. GUATEMALTECOS 0 0 0 0 0 0
2. SALVADOREÑOS 2,110 827 144 84 103 331
3. NICARAGÜENSES 185 375 1 0 0 1
LADINOS
4. NICARAGÜENSES 57 566 13 3 0 16
MISKITOS/SUMOS
TOTAL 2,352 1.768 158 87 103 348
(•) Refugiados trasladados de un campamento a otro.
(**) Nuevo censo de rufgiados Miskitos/Sumos realizado
el 15 marzo de 1986.
(***) Ci fra de refugiados Miskitos y Sumos al 31.12.85
rectificada mediante censo realizado a mediados
de marzo de 1986
(****) Incluge repatriaciones voluntarias y salidas sin
notificación al ACNUR.
III. PRESUPUESTO OPERACIONAL: USS 11,500,000
Tegucigalpa, D.C., 01 de junio de 1986
Source:
UNHCR Honduras
HCR/HON/2/86(E)
April 1986

1) Estimated non-registered refugees,
including some 1,000,000 in Saigon
-ineligible to register since 1964, totaled.
2) Includes estimated 1,650,000 during
Tet and May 1968 offensives.
Source: US Senate. Committee on the
Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate
Problems connected with Refugees and
Escapees. Relief and Rehabilitation of
War Victims in Indochina: One Year
after the Ceasefire. A Study Mission
Report. 93rd Congress, 2nd session,
1974, p. 12.
3) Includes 281,000 registered in
1970 but generated earlier, plus
210,000 Cambodian Repatriates in
1970. 2,000,000.
4) Includes 700,000 displaced
persons in PRO areas and other
non-registered refugees
1
9 233
8
TABLE 1. - Statistical summary 7 of refugee and war victim movement in
South Vietman, US$ 14,263,000 1965-73
1
1. Newly registered refugees by 9 official Government of Vietnam USAID
count:
8
8
1965____________________________ 772.000
US$ 13,640,000
1966____________________________ 906.000
1967_ 463.000
1968 494.000
1969_ 590.000
1970__ 129.000
(Registered in 1970, but generated earlier) 281.000
1971__ 136.000
1972___ 1.320.000
1973___ _ 818.700
TOTAL_ 5.909.700
2. Camibodian repatriates, ethnic Vietnamese expelled from
Cambodia in 1970 _ 210.000
3. Estimated casualty and damage claimants, including some
1.000.000 temporarily displaced during Tet and May
1968 offensives 1.650.000
4. Displaced persons in PRG-controlled arens and other
nonregistered refugees from the 1972 offensive 700.000
5. Estimated nonregistered refugees, including some
1.000.000 in Saigon ineligible to register as refugees
since 1964 _ 2.000.000
Cumulative total since 1965 ___ 10.469.700
Source: US Senate. Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate
Problems connected with Refugees and Escapees. Relief and
Rehabilitation of War Victims in Indochina: One Year after the
Ceasefire. A Study Mission Report. 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974,
pp. 6-7.

234 235

236
ANNEX IV
UNBCR EXPENDITURE 1967 - 1991 (in US dollars)
Year General Special
Programmes
Programmes
1967 4,885,000 1,345,000
1968 4,880,000 2,161,000
1969 6,240,000 2,411,000
1970 6,410,000 1,898,000
1971 7,086,000 2,341,000
1972 8,284,000 15,803,000
1973 8,408,000 16,048,000
1974 12,053,000 22,773,000
1975 14,147,000 54,859,000
1976 15,696,000 75,166,000
1977 24,120,000 87,316,000
1978 40,487,000 94,194,000
1979 162,323,000 107,672,000
1980 281,885,000 215,071,000
1981 318,878,500 155,378,000
1982 318.883,800 88,076,200
1983 316,203,200 81,460,600
1984 345,953,900 98,246,400
1985 281,903,300 175,945,700
1986 281,078,800 159,646,200
1987 335,549,900 124,836,200
1988 395,295,200 150,202,200
1989 386,585,400 183,743,000
1990 331,293,100 212.716,000
1991 369,982.700 492,565,000
Breakdown of expenditure in 1991 by region
General
Programmes
Special
Programmes
Africa 184,466,400 101,890,900
Asia & Oceania 48,590,200 18,110,600
Europe & North America 28,748,000 1,619,200
Latin America t 19,622,200 20,548,100
Caribbean
South-West Asia, North 53,233,600 234,849,300
Africa & Middle East

238
239

240
2
Appendices 241
Memorandum of Understanding Between
the UNHCR and Vietnam
Following is the text of the memorandum of understanding between the UN. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Government of the Socialist Republic
of Vietnam concerning the orderly departure of persons who wish to leave Vietnam
for countries of new residence, agreed to May 30,1979.
Following discussion held in Hanoi between representatives of the Government of the
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and a delegation of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugess (UNHCR) from 26 February to 5 March and from
25 May to 30 May 1979, it is agreed that UNHCR will facilitate the implementation
of the 12 January announcement by the Vietnamese Government to permit the orderly
departure of persons who wish to leave Viet Nam for countries of new residence.
Regarding the programme to implement such orderly departure, it is understood that:
1. Authorized exit of those people who wish to leave Viet Nam and settle in
foreign countries - family reunion and other humanitarian cases - will be carried out
as soon as possible and to the maximum extent The number of such people will
depend both on the volume of applications for exit from Viet Nam and on receiving
countries' ability to issue entry visas.
2. The election of those people authorized to go abroad under this programme will,
whenever possible, be made on the basis of the lists prepared by the Vietnamese
Government and the lists prepared by the receiving countries. Those persons whose
names appear on both lists will qualify for exit. As for those persons whose name
appear only on one list, their cases will be subject to discussions between UNHCR
and the Vietnamese Government or the Governments of the receiving countries, as
appropriate.
3. UNHCR will make every effort to enlist support for this programme amongst
potential receiving countries.
4. The Vietnamese Government and UNHCR will each appoint personnel who
will closely co-operate in the implementation of this programme.
5. This personnel will be authorized to operate in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City
and, as necessary, to go to other places to promote exit operations.
6. Exit operations will be effected at regular intervals by appropriate means of
transport.
7. The Vietnamese Govemcmnt will, subject to relevant Vietnamese laws, provide
UNHCR and the receiving countries with every facility to implement this programme.
Source: Department of State Bulletin, October 79, Vol. 79/ Number 2031, November
1979, p. 9.

242 Appendices
Memorandum of Understanding between
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees
The Socialist Republic of Vietnam, hereafter referred to as the SRV, and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, hereafter referred to as UNHCR,
- Desirous to contribute to the resolution of humanitarian problems of direct
concern in South East Asia, in co-operation and dialogue with other parties
concerned,
- Noting that, to this end, the Government of the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam has initiated bilateral talks with other parties concerned and has
indicated its willingness to participate in multilateral efforts and negotiation,
- Noting the position of the SRV to allow repatriation of Vietnamese citizens
abroad on a voluntary basis,
- Without prejudice, therefore, to any decision or agreement that they may
reach as a result of such bilateral and multilateral negotiations.
Appendices 243
b) The SRV will ensure that such persons would be allowed to return to their
place of origin. If return to the place of origin is not feasible, they will be
allowed to return to a comparable place of their own choice subject to the
approval of the local authorities.
c) UNHCR will seek to obtain the necessary funds for appropriate
«integration assitance to returnees under this present understanding which
would be aimed at helping such persons to resume normal life in the
shortest possible time. Such humanitarian assistance would be limited in
scope and would cover such areas as transportation, reception and initial
installation. UNHCR may engage with the consent of the SRV, other
international, intergovernmental, or non-governmental organisations for the
implementation of one or various sectors of assistance.
d) In the exercise of UNHCR's traditional monitoring functions, SRV will
allow UNHCR full access to the returnees.
4. In implementing the above, the two sides have agreed to the "Provisional
Procedure for Readmission, Reception and Reintegration of Vietnamese
Citizens who apply for Repatriation to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam"
annexed hereto.
Have agreed on the following:
1. The RR V and UNHCR will continue to co-operate and will make their best efforts
to improve, expand and accelerate the Orderly Departure Programme from
Vietnam on the basis of the Memorandum of Understanding of 29 May 1979. To
this end, the two sides will intensify their contacts through bilateral and
multilateral channels with other parties, both at policy and technical levels.
2. UNHCR shall continue to exert efforts to secure resettlement places for eligible
Vietnamese in countries of first asylum and, where feasible, to promote other
appropriate solution.
3. In the framework of a voluntary repatriation programme, the two sides have
agreed to co-operate on the basis of the following principles and conditions:
a) The SRV Government states that persons who leave the country illegally commit
an offence and are subject to the provision of the law in that respect However,
within the framework of its humanitarian policy, the SRV Government will
ensure that the voluntary return from the countries of first asylum will take place
in conditions of safety and dignity in conformity with national and international
law. This would include the waiver of prosecution and of punitive and
discriminatory measures.
The United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees
Jean-Pierre Hocke
Geneva, 13 December 1988
For the Socialist Republic
ofVietNam
His Excellency Mr. Vu
Khoan, Assistant Minis-ster
of Foreign Affairs

244 Appendices
Interviews conducted for the thesis
ADJOYI, Kofi; Ambassador, Ex-Chairman of UN Group of Experts
ALSTON, Philip; Assistant Professor, The Fletcher School ANDERSON,
Mary; Co-Director, Intl. Relief & Dev. Project ANNAN, Kofi; UN ASG,
Human Resources & Security, New York
BALI, Neelan; Principal Officer, UN Security Council, NY
BEYER, Gregg; Formerly UNHCR
BOVEN, Theo C. van; Professor. Former UN ASG for Human Rights
BUCHE, John; International Orgs. U.S. Department of State
CLARKE, Lance; Research Associate, Refugee Policy Group CLAY, Jason;
Director of Research, Cultural Survival COONEY, James; Professor. John F.
Kennedy School, Harvard Univ. CUNY, Fred; Director, Intertect, Dallas,
Texas
DA CUNHA, Guillermo; Dep. Reg. Rep., UNHCR New York DA
VIES, Peter; Executive Director, InterAction, New York DEDRING,
Jürgen; Political Affairs Officer, ORCI, UN, NY DEWEY, Arthur;
Deputy UN High Commissioner for Refugees
FELLER, Erika; Senior Legal Research Officer, UNHCR FRANCO,
Leonardo; Head, Regional Bureau Latin America & Car. FRIEDRICH, Jan;
Secretary, FRG Permanent Mission, NY
GERSONY, Robert; Consultant, U.S. Refugee Program GOODWIN-GILL,
Guy S.; Vis. Professor, Carleton University, Ottawa GORDENKER, Leon;
Professor. Institute for International Studies GROLIG, Wilfried; Counsellor,
FRG Permanent Mission, NY
MOORE, Jonathan; U.S. Refugee Coordinator OSTERHELT,
Dr.; Abt 5, Rechtsabteilung, A.A. Bonn FACHE, John; UN
Centre for Human Rights, Geneva QUELLET, Guy;
Emergency Section, UNHCR, Geneva
RAMCHARAN, Berti; Head, Drafting Unit of ORCI, UN, NY
RIECHERS, Christian; Professor. University of Hanover REVI, Zia;
Sec. Gen., Ind. Bureau of Humant. Issues, Geneva ROGERS,
Rosemarie; Professor. Fletcher School of Law & Diplomacy
SEIFFERT, Jürgen; Professor. University of Hanover
SIMMANCE, Alan; Former Deputy Director, UNHCR SNYDER,
Fred; Ass. Dean and Professor. Harvard Law School
TA van Tai; Researcher, Harvard Law School TAVIANI, Henriette;
President of Terre D'Asyl, France THOMAS, John; Lecturer, HOD,
Harvard University TOBIN, Jack; Ad. Dir., Harvard Law School
Human Rights Prog.
URQUHART, Brian; Ex USG, now Sen. Fellow Ford Foundation
VENDRELL. Frances; Chief, Americas & Europe Data Unit, ORCI
VOLLERS, Dr.; VLRI, Ref. 230, United Nations, A.A. Bonn
WINTER, Roger, Exec. Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees
WOODROW, Peter; Co-Director, IntL Relief & Dev. Project
YACOVLEV, Igor, Sen. Couns., Legal & Hum. Affairs, URSS P.M.
YORK, Graf von; Permanent Representative, FRG Perm. Mission, NY
ZOLBERG, Aristide; Professor. New School of Social Research, NY
Appendices 245
JAEGER, Gilbert; Formerly Director of Protection of UNHCR JONAH,
James; Head of ORCI
KENNEDY, David; Professor. Harvard Law School KHAN, Irene.;
Deputy Representative of UNHCR, UK KLOSS, Klaudia; Visiting
Researcher, Harvard Law School KOZLOWSKI, Anthony;
Executive Director, ICVA, Geneva KUMIN, Judith; Deputy
Spokesman, UNHCR, Geneva
LEE, Luke; Intl. Law Association & U.S. Refugee Program LOESCHER,
Gil; Professor. Fellow, Refugee Study Program, Oxford
MALLOCH-BROWN, Marc; Intl. Man. Dir.. Sawyer Miller Group
MURRAY, Robert; Director, National Security Program, JFKS

246 Appendices
UN General Assembly resolution extending UNHCR's mandate
UN GA res 1167 (XII), 26 Nov. 1957 - Chinese Refugees in Hong Kong: The General
Assembly authorizes the High Commissioner for the first time to "use his
good offices to encourage arrangements for contributions ...."
UN GA res 1388 (XIV), 20 Nov. 1959 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"authorizes the High Commissioner, in respect of refugees who do not come
within the competence of the U.M., to use his good offices in the transmission of
contributions designed to provide assistance to these refugees...."
UN G A res 1499 (XV), 5 Dec. 1960 - Report of the UNHCR: The General
Assembly "invites State Members ... to devote attention ... by continuing to
consult with the High Commissioner in respect of measures of assistance to
groups of refugees who do no come within the competence of the U.N....."
UN GA res 1673 (XVI), 18 Dec. 1961 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"requests the UNHCR to pursue activities on behalf of refugees within his
mandate or those whom he extends his good offices...."
UN GA res 1783 (XVII), 7 Dec. 1962 • Continuation of the Office of the UNHCR:
The General Assembly "cotnmend[s] the High Commissioner for the efforts he
has made in finding satisfactory solutions of problems affecting groups of refugees
within his mandate and those for whom he lends his good offices...."
UN GA res 1959 (XVIff), 12 Dec. 1963 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"notfes] with satisfaction the efforts made by the High Commissioner, in
his various fields of activities, for groups of refugees for whom he lends his good
offices...."
UN GA res 2197 (XXI), 16 Dec. 1966 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"requests the UNHCR to continue to provide international protection who are
his concern, within the limits of his competence...."
UN G A res 2790 (XXVI), 6 Dec. 1971 - U.N. assistance to East Pakistan refugees
through the U.N. focal point and U.N. humanitarian assistance to East Pakistan:
"[EJndorses the designation by the Secretary-General of the UNHCR to be the focal
point for the co-ordination of assistance to East Pakistan refugees in India,
from and through the U.N. system, as well as the Secretary-General's initiative in
establishing the U.N. East Pakistan relief operation... [and] requests the Secretary-
General and the High Commissioner to continue their efforts to coordinate international
assistance and to ensure that it is used to the maximum advantage to relief
the suffering of the refugees in India and of the people of East Pakistan...."
UN GA res 2958 (XXVII), 12 Dec. 1972 - Assistance to Sudanese refugees returning
from abroad: The General Assembly "reaffirms ECOSOC res. 1655 (LII) and
1705 (LIII) ... [and] urge[s] the organizations associations with the U.N. and all
Governments to render the maximum possible assistance to the Government of the
Sudan in the relief, rehabilitation and resettlement of Sudanese refugees coming
from abroad and other displaced person...."
UN GA res 3143 (XXVIII), 14 Dec. 1973 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"requests the High Commissioner to continue his assistance and protection
Appendices 247
activities in favor of refugees within his mandate as well as those to whom he extends
his good offices...."
UN GA res 3274 (XXIX), 10 Dec. 1974 - Question of the establishment, in accordance
with the Convention of Statelessness, of a body to which persons claiming
the benefit of the Convention may apply: The General Assembly "requests the
Office of the UNHCR provisionally to undertake the functions foreseen under the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness in accordance with its article 11 after
the Convention has come into force...."
UN GA res 3454 (XXX), 9 Dec. 1975 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"notfes] with appreciation the efforts of the High Commissioner in carrying
out his duties for those of concern to his Office as well as the special
humanitarian tasks which he is called upon to undertake, reaffirming the
eminently humanitarian character of the activities of the High Commissioner for
the benefit of refugees and displaced persons...."
UN GA res 31/35, 30 Nov. 1976 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"commends the High Commissioner and his staff for the efficient manner in
which they continue to discharge their manifold activities on behalf of refugees
and dis placed persons [and] further requests the High Commissioner to continue
his humanitarian assistance on behalf of refugees and displaced person in
Africa...."
UN GA res 32/68,8 Dec. 1977 - Continuation of the Office of the UNHCR: The General
Assembly "recognizfes] the need for concerted international action on
behalf of the increasing numbers of refugees and displaced persons of concern to
the High Commissioner...."
UN G A res 35/41, 25 Nov. 1980 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"reaffirms the essential importance of the High Commissioner's action to provide
international protection to refugees and to promote durable and speedy solutions
through voluntary repatriation or return, and subsequent assistance in rehabilitation,
in consultation with the countries concerned, integration in countries of refugees
and displaced person of concern to the Office of the High Commissioner...."
UN GA res 37/195,18 Dec. 1982 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"reaffirm[s] the eminently humanitarian and non-political character of the activities
of the Office of the High Commissioner on behalf of refugees, returnees and
displaced persons of concern to the Office...."
UN GA res 38/121,16 Dec. 1983 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"commends the UNHCR and his staff for the valuable work they perform on behalf
of refugees, returnees and displaced persons of concern to the Office of the
High Commissioner...."
UN GA res 39/105,14 Dec. 1984 - Assistance to displaced persons in Ethiopia: The
General Assembly "aware of the heavy burden placed on the Government of
Ethiopia in caring for displaced persons and victims of natural disasters, as well
as for returnees and refugees,... requests the UNHCR to intensify his efforts in
mobilizing humanitarian assistance for the relief, rehabilitation and resettlement
of voluntary returnees, refugees and displaced persons in Ethiopia ...."
UN GA res 39/140, 14 Dec. 1984 - Report of the UNHCR: The General Assembly
"notes with satisfaction the initiatives taken by the High Commissioner in
developing the concept of development-orientated assistance to refugees and re-

248 Appendices
UN
UN
tumees, wherecvcr appropriate, and urges him to pursue those efforts in
cooperation with interested Governments as well as with the World Bank,
the UN Development Programme and other development organizations,
including non-governmental organizations...."
GA res 40/118,13 Dec. 1985 - Report of the UNHCR: The General
Assembly "not[es] with satisfaction and encour[ages] the continuing and
increasing co-operation between the Office of the High Commissioner and
bodies of the UN system, as well as Intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations ...." [and] commends the High Commissioner's
programmes for refugee and displaced women, especially those undertaken
to secure their protection and help to become self-sufficient through
educational, vocational and income-generating projects.,.."
GA res 41/124.4 Dec. 1986 - Office of the UNHCR: The General
Assembly "re-cognizes the importance of finding durable solutions to
refugee problems and recognizes also that the search for durable solutions
includes the need to address the causes of movements of refugees and
asylum-seekers from their countries of origin, and takes note of the Report
of the Group of Governmental Experts on International Co-operation to
Avert New Flows of Refugees...."
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This book provides an empirical analysis rather than a theoretical framework
of refugee situations during the Cold War. It focuses on potential refugeeproducing
situations with a view to prevent occurrances where refugees are
exploited as a weapon in political strife. In order to forestall the violation of
individual rights, the book proposes measures to prevent refugee situations
from arising, however, not to prevent persecuted individuals from seeking
protection. This second edition shows in its revised parts that the proposals
for prevention, including on mediation, early warning, and informationsharing
are all being implemented. Developments since the publication of the
first edition have entirely changed the international political climate. Prevention
has moved to the top of the agenda of the United Nations and individual
states alike. Progress achieved in the area of human rights and development,
humanitarian assistance and intervention, peacekeeping and peace-making
offer new possibilities and challenges for prevention and peace. The
international community should move forcefully now while almost global
cooperation is possible to institutionalize new prevention and intervention
approaches to save lives and to prevent future abuses of human rights and
forced population displacement. The Cold War may have finished but war,
internal and crossborder, is still alive.
Luise Drüke, born in Germany, received her
degrees in political sciences, philology,
management and economics from the universities
of Paris, Hannover and Saint Louis
(USA). She studied French at the Sorbonne and
European Community institutions and affairs at
the European Institute of Nice University. While
posted in Chile, she studied international law.
After fifteen years of refugee work worldwide
she went to Harvard University where she
received a M.A. in Public Administration from
the Kennedy School of Government in 1987.
While Fellow at Harvard she completed the
thesis for which she received her doctoral degree in political science from the
University of Hannover in 1989. Her publications focus on refugee causes and
prevention as well as on asylum policies in Europe.