Preventive Action for Refugee Producing Situations

96 Chapter 3
2. No right of return to Vietnam
So far, the Vietnamese authorities have regarded those whom they wished to
see leave and those who attempted or have succeeded in fleeing as enemies of
the state, unwanted at home. Their refusal to readmit anyone who left the
country clandestinely has given hope to Vietnamese who decide to escape that
once they make it out alive to a country of first refuge, nothing can stop them
on their way to the "golden West."
The 1975 precedent of a voluntary return of 1,500 persons from Guam to
Vietnam - most of whom were detained on arrival, and some of those executed
- left a bad memory in the minds of many Vietnamese. With these memories
in mind, most Vietnamese refugees have stated that they would not consider
returning home anyway, unless substantial political changes occur. 212
Many Vietnamese had hopes of being able to benefit from the OPD
Program, but not all met the program's criteria. Those who did suffered
various kinds of reprisals - losing work, food rations, or good education
lated by the Refugee Act of 1980. Before 1980, entry into the USA was achieved on
the basis of legislation contained in Section 212(d) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952, as amended, which permitted the Attorney General to authorize the
issuance of a "parole" (conditional entrance) to those refugees deemed qualified.
Under this "parole" system four categories, which were defined to establish priorities
among those qualifying for admission into the USA: Category I: Persons seeking
reunification with immediate family members in the USA; Category II: Persons who
had been closely associated with, or employed by, the USA during the Vietnam war;
Category III: Persons who had served in the military or civil administration of their
own government during the War; and Category IV: Persons warranting special
humanitarian considerations. See Citizens Commission Report, p. 9. The Refugee Act
of 1980, however, provides a permanent and fair framework for admitting refugees
according to the refugee status definition of the 1951 Convention. See Edward M.
Kennedy, "Refugee Act of 1980," International Migration Review, 15, Nos. 1-2,
(Spring-Summer 1981), p. 155. 212 In the turmoil of the evacuation in April 1975, a
few hundred people were among the evacuees in Guam, and were therefore given a
ship to sail back to Vietnam without a previous agreement with the authorities. Their
fate has never been confirmed, but the rumors about what happened to them are still
vivid in the memories of many Vietnamese. Personal interview with Shephard
Lowman, a former U.S. Foreign Service Official who was directly involved in the
evacuation operation, 19 August 1988. For the evacuation to Guam from Vietnam,
see, G.S. Mom-son and Felix Moos, "Halfway to Nowhere: Vietnamese refugees on
Guam," in Art Hansen and Anthony Oliver-Smith, eds. Involuntary Migration and
Resettlement: The Problems and Responses of Dislocated People (Boulder: A
Westview Special Study, 1982), pp. 49-68.
Analytical Discussion 97
for the children - when they applied for an exit visa under the OOP. A
number of these people had made arrangement for their future lives in the
West. If they failed to qualify for the OOP, many of those not permitted
rejected to leave legally chose clandestine escape. Usually, their kin suffered
serious reprisals for the escape of their relatives and for applying to
join them abroad. Since normal emigration from the country was impossible,
those left behind often themselves sought to escape at the next opportunity.
3. Absence of screening and the impossibility of voluntary repatriation
The absence of screening escapees for refugee status seems to have encouraged
a substantial number of Vietnamese to risk escape. Looking at the
genesis of this situation, we find the following antecedents. In 1975 the
United Nations General Assembly had endorsed the Executive Committee's
view that "unanimously recognized the need for continued humanitarian
assistance resulting from events in the Indo-Chinese Peninsula." 213 It further
urged the international community to strengthen its support of UNHCR's
efforts in this regard. With this broad mandate, UNHCR had a range of
options for its actions, including the choice of whether or not to screen
those arriving in first-asylum countries for eligibility of refugee status.
As the program for assistance to Vietnamese displaced within the
country was winding down, UNHCR, however, maintained its office there
to "keep a foot in the door," and continued assisting Kampuchean refugees
who had fled the Pol Pot regime 214 By June 1978, when the outflow from
Vietnam reached 50,000 persons a month, the following factors probably
held back UNHCR from introducing a screening procedure, even though it
might have been valuable:
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213 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, Supplement
No. 12 A (A/10012/Add.l), chap. IV; Thirtieth Session, Third Committee,
2161st meeting, para. 1-10, and Thirtieth Session, Supplement No. 12 A
(A/10012/ Add.l), para. 121, in UN doc GA res. 3455 (XXX). "Humanitarian
assistance to the Indo-Chinese displaced persons," 9 Dec. 1975.
214 In 1978, the assistance amounted to some US $700,000; in 1979, $3.5
million; and in 1980, a further $10.2 million. Some in UNHCR considered
this the price of the Orderly Departure Program, Kumin, pp. 45-46.