Preventive Action for Refugee Producing Situations

34 Chapter 1 Introduction 35
abroad for those found refugees and return to Vietnam for those not
qualifying for refugee status. To describe the complete Plan would require a
full new chapter which will be available elsewhere. Here this development
is only mentioned for the record and to show that it was finally
political/humanitarian action, which lead to the situation that in 1992 there
have been practically no new arrivals from Vietnam.
The second group of examples in this chapter will discuss two
instances in which, at the cost of much human misery, no specific
preventive actions were taken. The United Nations, in coordination with
interested governments and perhaps with competent nongovernmental
agencies, could probably have taken steps to alleviate, if not prevent, the
serious repercussions on the victims of these tragic situations.
The Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras and the International Conference
on Refugees in Central America (CIREFCA)
Between the beginning of 1982 and 1986, Nicaraguans of Miskito, Sumo,
and Rama ethnic origin crossed into Honduras from the Atlantic Coast of
Nicaragua, many of them involuntarily. 38 The problem of "induced asylum"
has continued over the years to varying degrees, but became particularly
acute in early 1986 with a new wave of about 8,500 "refugees," the largest
group ever to cross the border.
Despite the available evidence about this incipient movement obtained
in interviews with Miskito Indians who had just arrived in the refugee
locations, no specific action was taken on the conditions that were forcing
people to move.
___________________
38 The U.S.-based human rights organization Americas Watch undertook a
field study in early 1986 to establish the facts behind the movements of
Nicaraguan Miskito Indians into Honduras. Upon rumors that KISAN (the
and Sandinista indigenous armed forces operating in the Mosquitia) planned
to "move all people living on the Nicaraguan side of the Rio Coco into
Honduras," Americas Watch interviewed the first vanguard of entering
Miskito Indians in early April and found that everyone was going to leave
the Rio Coco: "Every last one ("toditos") they said, no one will be left."
Americas Watch also confirmed that the Miskito Indians wanted to stay in
their homes in Nicaragua and would not move lightly, but believed that they
were pressured into doing so by KISAN because the "U.S. Congress, which
was to vote on contra aid in the spring of 1986, would consider very
seriously the flight of a large number of Miskito refugees." See "Americas
Watch Committee. With the Miskitos in Honduras, (New York and
Washington, D.C.: Americas Watch Committee, 11 April 2986), pp. 13-14.
The purpose of this study is to show that for more than five years, and
most clearly in early 1986 with the last large movement, people were
uprooted time and again often against their will and often without
knowing the real reason for crossing the border into Honduras. Since
completing this book, the CIREFCA took place in 1989 which mobilized
political and material support for many refugees to be able to return home
in peace. All Nicaraguan refugees are now home and the UNHCR Office
in Honduras is almost closed.
Vietnam Before 1975
Alarmed by the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam from the
early 1960s, U.S. Senator Edward Kennedy undertook a personal initiative
in 1966 to obtain humanitarian assistance on behalf of refugees and
displaced persons within Vietnam from the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, which were great untapped sources of assistance
with trained personnel experienced in humanitarian activities." 39
Unfortunately, his contacts with the Secretary-General and other heads of
agencies, including the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, failed to
produce concrete results.
Disregarding the overwhelming strain placed on Vietnamese and U.S.
assistance mechanisms by massive waves of internal refugees forcibly
relocated, uprooted, and displaced, the U.S. Armed Forces Commanders
went on generating refugees regardless of what would become of them. 40
The International community had reason to be concerned about the fate of
the many millions of innocent Vietnamese civilians who became victims
of policies that have long since been condemned.
Chapter 4 has been rewritten. It is the heart of the thesis. This Chapter
is intended to show that only in the last four years, since the completing of
the first edition, revolutionary changes have contributed to new
approaches and policies for refugee prevention.
The first part on the UN Conflict Prevention documents forty years
of experience much of which has indirectly had an impact on the
39 U.S. Senate. A Report to the Committee on the Judiciary. Refugee
Problem in South Vietnam. Subcommittee to Investigate Problems
connected with Refugees and Escapees. 89th Cong., 2nd sess., March
4,1966, p. 11-14.
40 Louis Wiesner, Victims and Survivors, Displaced Persons and Other
War Victims in Vietnam, 1954-1975, (New York: Greenwood Press,
1988), in press.