Preventive Action for Refugee Producing Situations

106 Chapter 3
other than the USA, might have been able to apply pressure on Vietnam
to ease its re-education policies and to make its new economic policies
more flexible at a much earlier stage. Threats by those Western countries
who maintained small aid programs, despite the USA-advocated embargo
since 1979, to cut funding for food and development aid, reconstruction
assistance, and aid to internally displaced people, might have produced
some liberalization in the conditions that compelled people to flee.
Even though the so-called "Paris Cease Fire Agreement" of 1973, prior
to the US withdrawal, predicted that the United States would contribute to
the healing of the war in post war reconstruction of the democratic
Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina no specific agreement had
been made in this regard. 234 Vietnam's request for U.S. reparation
payments for war destruction has long been a barrier to reestablishing
U.S. - Vietnamese relations, even though the issue was discussed during
the Nixon administration.
I believe, along with other informed analysts of the scene, 235 that if
both sides had been able to make some reasonable concessions, a number
of developments might have been possible, including a more reasonable
treatment of South Vietnamese dissenters; a somewhat balanced approach
in international relations, with less reliance on the USSR; probably a more
peaceful, less aggressively militaristic attitude, perhaps avoiding an
invasion into Cambodia; and more opportunities inside the country,
producing fewer refugees.
Analytical Discussion 107
3.1.2.2. Nicaraguan Refugees in Honduras and CIREFCA
Introduction
The massive displacements of Miskito and Sumo Indians within Nicaragua
and into Honduras are a sobering example of how indigenous people can be
manipulated into becoming casualties of power politics. It is not the number
of refugees involved in this case that is noteworthy, but rather the strategies
practiced upon them by external forces. A full analysis of the complex
motives leading to the displacement of the Miskitos and Sumos is beyond
the scope of this dissertation; in this section we will concentrate on the
conditions that led to the movements into Honduras in the spring of 1986.
This study will focus on the persons for whom the UNHCR attempted
to provided international protection and assistance. It will not attempt to
provide a full analysis of the underlying political ambitions and actions of
the indigenous anti-governmental forces that operated in Nicaragua and
Honduras on both sides of the Coco River. It will, however, attempt to
pinpoint the direct impact of the rebels' actions on the indigenous peoples of
the region, many of whom were made refugees against their will, often
repeatedly, were prevented from returning home voluntarily, and feared or
suffered forced recruitment. The data for this investigation are drawn from
primary and secondary printed sources and from interviews with selected
policymakers, UNHCR colleagues and non-United Nations officials during
and after my term of service as the United Nations and non-United Nations
officials. Another important source of information is the personal interviews
I conducted with 808 Misquito Indians in refugee locations in Honduras in
February 1986. The International Conference on Refugees in Central
America (CIREFCA) has been documented elsewhere.
Background
The Atlantic Coast, or 5 "Mosquitia," of both Nicaragua and Honduras is
marked by ethnic, geographic, and political complexity. An estimated ten
percent of Nicaragua's population is Indian, including about 75,000 Miskitos
and a small, shrinking group of some 5000 Sumos. 236 In addition, there
are small groups of Rama Indians, another Amerindian group, now
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234 Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, 27 January
1973, Article 21.
235 Dyer/Claik, "Vietnamese Boat People Crisis," p. 19.
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236 Refugees, UNHCR Geneva, August 1987, p. 28.