Preventive Action for Refugee Producing Situations

120 Chapter3
the Miskitos, turning them into refugees in order to discredit and destabilize
the Nicaraguan government It is no coincidence that these events occurred
during the debate in the U.S. Congress over a $100 million aid package to the
contras, with further funds earmarked for KISAN. 271
Prevention of repatriation: The U.S. Administration anxious to obtain
Congress approval for contra aid funding, considered voluntary repatriation to
be politically counterproductive to its policy of "bashing the evil empire." 272
So did KISAN and the Honduran military authorities, some of whom believed
that voluntary repatriation would improve Nicaragua's image and bring anti-
American elements back into the country. Voluntary repatriation, whether
spontaneous or highly organized, wül depend on "whether the refugees are
convinced that the causes of their flight have moderated sufficiently to promise
a resumption of important aspects of their old lives." 273 That about half of the
"new" refugees returned almost instantaneously to Nicaragua may be
interpreted in two ways. First the people had had no major reason to leave their
homes other than coercion (in addition to loosing their rice-crops); and second,
the power of
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271 The forced movement suggested that the reconciliation process was working too
well inside Nicaragua, and that external opposition was losing in its efforts to
discredit the Nicaraguan government. "Disgracefully, they were aided in this
effort by the United States." Martin Diskin et al., "Peace and Autonomy," p. 25.
See also Steve Stecklow, "A Media Event - with no Audience," and "Caught up
in Conflic, Indians Flee Nicaragua." "Why the Miskitos decided to seek refuge
here is in dispute. One American official says that the tribe has become a
'political football' in the ongoing struggle between the Sandinist government of
Nicaragua and the contras." Philadelphia Inquirer, 6 April 1986.
272 Diskin, "The Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," p. 81. "The United States
claimed that its support for anti-Sandinista forces in the Atlantic Coast region
was meant to help achieve Indian self-determination by the overthrow of
Sandinistas" (p. 98) But by 1986, when the Atlantic Coast had acquired enormou
significance in "Reagan's war against Nicaragua," because the major contra 1
further to the west had failed militarily, therefore, even with an additional $10
million voted by Congress, it became unlikely that summer, that the Contras in I
west would be the route to overthrow the Nicaraguan government. A scenario of
military penetration of the Atlantic Coast region seemed more likely to capture a
larger community such as Puerta Cabeza and declare a provisional government
through which to channel additional resources and perhaps U.S. troops. William
Gasperini, "Miskitos Divided in Allegiances to Sandinistas and to Homeland," In
These Times, 3-9 September 1986, pp. 8-9, as quoted in Diskin, "Manipulation of
Indidigcnous Struggles," p. 92.
273 Gordenker: Refugees in International Politics. 1987, p. 127.
Analytical Discussion 121
coercion was short-lived enough so that as soon as they arrived in the
Honduran camps, many refugees began the process of repatriation. 274
Other scholars have found that "the opposing social forces [in this case
KISAN] also have foreign alignments, who often become the foremost
patrons of the refugees. In conflicts that have led to huge outpourings of
refugees, foreign involvement has been blatant, as in Afghanistan and
Central America. " 275 It is clear that without strong foreign alignment and
support, the Indian contra organizations would not have been able to
maintain control over the people and keep them in foreign lands despite
their wish to return home. Where control and pressure failed, KISAN used
threats and distorted information to prevent repatria tions. Human rights
workers report that relief workers indicate having heard KISAN telling
those who wanted to return that they would be killed if they went back to
Nicaragua.
As the Nicaraguan Miskitos won increased autonomy, the Indian contra
organizations needed to exercise stronger pressures to prevent people from
going home. The Miskitos' move toward self-determination started with the
governmental autonomy commission, created in December 1984. The
Nicaraguan Indian commander Eduardo Pantin, who was seeking a
nonmilitary solution to the conflict, played an important role by bringing
about the first draft of a proposed autonomy statute in June 1985, which,
despite enormous obstructive efforts by the United States, the Nicaraguan
government has incorporated into the 1987 constitution. 276 Moreover, the
returnees, in approving current conditions in Nicaragua, are the bearers of
good news to those remaining in Honduras, 277
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274 Peplinski and Diskin, "Report of the ICVA Mosquitia Mission," 1987, p. 13.
275 Zolberg et al., Escape from Violence; Draft, Forthcoming; Oxford University
Press, 1989, Chapter 10, p. 14.
276 See Comisión National de Autonomía de la Costa Atlantica, Principios y
Políti-cas Para el Ejercício de los Derechos de Autonomía de los Pueblos
Indígenas y Comunidades de la Costa Atlantica (Managua: Comision National
de Autonomia de la Costa Atlantica, 1985); and Chapter VI, articles 89,90,91,
Republica de Nicaragua, "Constitutión Política," La Gazeta Diario Oficial
(Managua), January 9, 1987, pp. 46, 47, as quoted in Diskin, "The
Manipulation of Indigenous Struggles," pp. 95,96.
277 The International Committee of the Red Cross has been operating a mailing
system by which the refugees in Honduras were enabled to exchange messages
safely with relatives in the Nicaraguan Mosquitia. This has been an important
relief and support measure for the refugees.