Preventive Action for Refugee Producing Situations

98 Chapter 3
a) Vietnam was unwilling to take any Vietnamese back (in any case, there
seemed to be very few persons who would have voluntarily chosen to
return to Vietnam).
b) First-asylum countries were still only minimally familiar with customary
laws of asylum and the general principle of non-refoulement This lack of
experience brought about serious violations of international law, especially
in Malaysia, but also in Thailand and Singapore, in the form of push-offs
onto the high seas on often un-seaworthy boats, causing untold harm to
thousands of seeking to land. Under these circumstances, screening would
probably have antagonized the ASEAN countries and Hong Kong, who
feared getting stuck with the ineligible residual caseload of rejected people.
c) The massive influx of asylum seekers severely challenged capacity of
UNHCR to cope with emergency protection and assistance issues. Anything
other than simple resettlement registration for starting resettlement
processing would at that time have overtaxed its existing structures in the
region.215 Because their lives were at stake, both during flight and in the
process of entering a country of refuge, UNHCR's objective was to arrange
resettlement as speedily as possible. Quick resettlement became a physical
means of protection. In addition, the political context was grim. Setting up a
screening process and negotiating for repatriation of persons not qualifying
as refugees did not seem to have bright prospects, and neither Vietnamese
nor U.S. authorities at that time seemed ready for it. Therefore efforts in
this direction were not a top priority.
d) Until the 1979 meeting, UNHCR employed the term "Vietnamese
displaced person" (VNDPs) for the boat people. 216 Only slowly thereafter
did all arrivals started to be called "refugees." In light of UNHCR's
preexisting operation on behalf of displaced persons within Vietnam, the
assistance program in first-asylum countries seemed to be an extended arm
of the preexisting program
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215 In September 1978,1 went on a one-week mission to the East Coast of
Malaysia (Pulau Tengha, an island one hour offshore from Mersing, north of
Singapore), with the objective to interview nearly 6000 new arrivals. Even
though working from 7:00 a.m. until late at night to register some 800 persons
a day, proper screening would have required not only more resettlement staff
but also protection officers for formal determination of eligibility. UNHCR
was not equipped at that time for this task.
216 See UN doc A/34/627, "1979 Meeting on Refugees in SEA," 7 November
1979.
Analytical Discussion 99
within Vietnam, and so the implementation of a screening procedure
seemed unnecessary.
Though the 1979 Meeting was successful in terms of immediate results, I
believe that the following issues should also have been raised at that time
with the Vietnamese authorities:
a) screening of new arrivals; and
b) exploring solutions for those found outside of
UNHCR's competence, including their return to Vietnam under internationally
agreed-upon and safe conditions. 217 Rather than negotiating a fair
sharing of the burden with Vietnam, all energies were directed toward
handling the result of Vietnam's arbitrary policy, 218 regardless of the actual
motivation that caused people to leave the country. The U.S.A. advocated a
policy of international burden-sharing, but Vietnam's non-cooperation
seems to have been seen as an insurmountable obstacle to direct
negotiation. Without addressing the problems that caused people to leave
Vietnam, the 1979 meeting nonetheless produced a magnet in terms of
attracting money, 219 resettlement places, international public attention and
compassion, and mobilization of the various states (except Vietnam). In the
early 1980s, however, the euphoric willingness to make resettlement places
available started to dwindle, and "compassion fatigue" set in. Even so, still
no screening nor repatriation projects were seriously considered.
Because Vietnam has recently agreed, for the first time, to the voluntary
repatriation of approximately 9,500 Vietnamese boat people who were not
accepted by rejected by the British authorities in Hong Kong, 220
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217 It was nearly ten years later that provisions of this type were agreed upon.
See Memorandum of Understanding between the Socialist Republic of
Vietnam and UNHCR which was signed on 13 December 1988 in Geneva
(see in the appendices). This agreement includes plans of sreening of new
arrivals, and the repatriation of Vietnamese citizen on a voluntary basis.
218 There was a backlog of over 300,000 persons in camps in Southeast Asia
who were awaiting a durable solution. A higher monthly rate of departure for
resettlement was to be the first step of the solution. See UN doc A/34/621,
"1979 Meeting on Refugees in SEA," Background note dated 9 July 1979, in
Annex I, p. 8.
219 UNHCR's expenditures jumped from $206,995,000 in 1979 to $496,956,000
in 1980. Information Paper UNHCR, Geneva, April 1987.
220 "Vietnam, in Flurry of Moves, Pushes for Better Ties to U.S.," The New
York Times, October 17,1988.