Preventive Action for Refugee Producing Situations

114 Chapter 3
practically from the time of their arrival in the Spring of 1986, wanted to
return to Nicaragua. Thousands of them did so spontaneously by crossing
the Coco river, where KISAN (a successor group to MISURA, affiliated
with the Union Nicaraguense de oposicion, UNO) prevented them from
doing so, they sought the assistance of UNHCR.25 6 Since 1986, 13,501
Miskitos and Sumos have sought UNHCR's assistance in returning
The 1986 influx
a) "Early warnings" signals and interviews to substantiate the signals.
Early information received and collected from Miskito Indians newly arrived
at the refugee locations suggested by January 1986 that entire
villages on the Nicaraguan side of the Coco River were being prepared for
displacement into Honduras on day X. In an attempt to substantiate this
early warning information, a fact-finding mission to the Honduran
Mosquitia in mid-February 1896 was dispatched with the objective of
examining the nature and potential implications of the refugee movements
of the previous few months.
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December 31,1987: 13,115 September 30,1988: 9,383(*)
Documents of Information: HCR/HON/2/86/E April 1986 (for December
1983-June 1986) and HCR/HON/2/88, April 1988 (for December 1986-
April 1988). (*) The statistics for the September 1988 data are from
UNHCR, "Numbers of Refugees as of 30 September 1988", Table 2,
Geneva, 1988.
256 On December 1,1983, the Nicaraguan government decreed a general
amnesty for the Miskitos, see OAS Report, op. cit., p.130, on the basis of
which UNHCR facilitated voluntary repatriation to Nicaragua. After
publicly admitting mistakes in its Atlantic Coast policy, the Nicaraguan
government began to emphasize negotiation over warfare, permitted people
to return to their original communities, and initiated discussions concerning
autonomy of the Atlantic Coast. The voluntary repatriation efforts were,
however, greatly hindered by the Indian contra organizations, as will be seen
later in this section. But since mid-1986 the stream of repatriates continued
to increase, enhanced by an "air bridge" to carry repatriates from Puerta
Lempira in Honduras to Puerta Cabeza in Nicaragua, which had been
arranged after lenghty negotiations between the governments of Honduras
and Nicaragua and UNHCR. See Hansruedi Peplinski and Martin Diskin,
Report of the ICVA Mosquitia Mission [ICVA — International Council of
Voluntary Agencies], June 9,1987, p. 2.
257 UNHCR statistics as of 1 October 1988.
Analytical Discussion 115
Out of the 1,859 new arrivals in Honduras between 15 December 1985
and 28 February 1986, 258 808 persons were interviewed. More than half -
446 - had entered the refugee locations directly from Nicaragua; 311 had
arrived from the border area; and 51 were returning from the border area
after having already been in the refugee locations.
All the interviewees were asked to state the main reason they had come to
the refugee locations in Honduras. Of the new arrivals from Nicaragua
58% cited lack of food and medicine as a primary factor,
30% wished to visit family living in Honduras; and 12%
feared possible conflicts where they were living.
Among new arrivals from the Honduran border region:
50% indicated lack of food and medicine as a factor; 20%
feared possible conflicts; 25% wished "not to be left behind";
and259 5% wished to visit family in Honduras.
Those reentering UNHCR refugee locations from the Honduran border,
however, unanimously cited lack of food, medicine, and clothes as their
chief motive for returning to the refugee sites.
These statistics must, of course, be taken with a grain of salt For one
thing, the questionnaires had to be designed in a neutral manner, and
therefore could not include questions that would elicit responses of a political
nature. Second, even though three different rooms were set up in
which to conduct interview, the lack of privacy inherent in lining up refugees
for center-based interviews exposed them to pressure and coaching.
In retrospect, it would have been better to conduct random interviews in
their huts. In addition, establishing the accuracy of translations was a
problem. Although the refugees who served as interpreters were known to
UNHCR, it was hard to determine to what extent they themselves were
subject to pressure and threats by KISAN. Despite these shortcomings,
however, the interviews were valuable for several reasons. First, they
provided first quantifiable data on the interviewed group. Second, through
informal discussions with the interviewees after finishing the
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258 Americas Watch, "With the Miskitos in Honduras," p. 10.
259 This new category emerged among this group during the interviews.