UNICEF Mongolia - Teachers College Columbia University

CHAPTER 4: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2007 SALARY REFORM AT SCHOOL LEVEL
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TEACHERS IN MONGOLIA: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING,
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND RETENTION OF TEACHERS
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educaon managers, and (in larger schools) by social workers to 436 teachers and 233 educaon
managers in the PETS sample. Deducons from salary supplements, and to a lesser extent also from
the base salary, were common pracce in 2005. The largest deducon made in the schools of the PETS
sample was on average 6,975 MNT per month, which was at that me 6.7 percent of the mean monthly
teachers’ income (average total pay of teachers was 103,647 MNT in 2005). The technical report of the
PETS Mongolia study discusses the deducons in greater detail. 30
The phenomenon of teacher absenteeism or prolonged absences is virtually nonexistent in Mongolia
because the salary is deducted from for the days missed in school. The PETS Mongolia study (World Bank
2007, see Table 6) found that the proporon of teachers in rural schools who were absent on the survey
day was much higher than those in urban schools; it was in fact three mes higher. It is important to
bear in mind, however, that the school administrators may have misunderstood the term and equated
teacher absenteeism with teacher vacancies—a fact that is also highlighted in the PETS Mongolia report.
In any case, teacher absenteeism is not a common phenomenon, even though there used to exist vast
differences with regard to regular aendance between teachers in rural and in urban schools.
The reasons for deducons from the salary supplements or the base salary were quite diverse and
difficult to assess objecvely. They included pedagogical issues (lesson planning and aenon to student
development); disciplinary issues with students (class management); personal characteriscs of the
teacher (personal organizaon and responsibility or morality, self-discipline and communicaon); and
concerns that are parcularly important to the school administraon (organizaon of official documents
and maintenance of school property). The most frequent reason for supplement reducon was when
class teachers did not ensure that their students were on good behavior. Twenty-six percent of all
“infracons”—leading to a supplement deducon—were related to “poor class management.” The
PETS Mongolia showed clearly that both the addions (supplements, bonuses) and the deducons
from the supplements lacked measurable and unambiguous evaluaon criteria. Therefore, most
school administrators used to resort to purely subjecve evaluaon criteria, which were at mes more
interpersonal than professional.
Has the situaon changed six years later? From a legal perspecve, the situaon has indeed changed.
The regulaon on supplements was revised and now states the entlement in terms of percentages of
the base salary. The supplement for class teacher amounts to ten percent of the base salary, for cabinet
leader five percent, and for head of the secon five percent. The earlier, vague formulaon of “up to
ten percent” or “up to five percent” was replaced, thereby making deducons impossible from a legal
perspecve. It is perhaps for this reason that none of the interviewed teachers in this study reported
deducons from salary supplements. The social worker is in charge of monitoring the work of teachers
as class teachers, and the educaon managers reviews the supplementary work of cabinet organizaon
and head of the secon. As before, each school lists the tasks for class teacher, cabinet leader, and head
of secon, but in contrast to a few years ago, the salary supplements are no longer deducted (in part
or completely) if teachers are not performing well on these addional tasks. Today there is another
mechanism in place to express discontent with the teacher’s work: the bonus system. Teachers who,
according to the evaluaon carried out by educaon managers perform poorly either in their teaching
or in their supplementary task(s), are supposed to receive a smaller bonus or no bonus at all. Both
an outcomes-based contract and a quarterly performance bonus are supposed to control and sancon
teachers. 31
30 Gita Steiner-Khamsi and A. Gerelmaa (2006). The Public Expenditure Tracking Survey in Mongolia. Technical Report. New York
and Ulaanbaatar: Teachers College, Columbia University & Open Society Forum, February 2006 (see chapter 5 on deducons).
31 For quarterly performance bonus, see Resoluon of the Government of Mongolia #54, December 10, 2008.