UNICEF Mongolia - Teachers College Columbia University

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CHAPTER 5: TOTAL PAY OF TEACHERS AND THE BONUS SYSTEM 1 2 3 4 5 6 flawed and deserves a thorough revision. It is a system that has developed over me and now includes components and aspects that are incongruent with each other. Over the past two decades, the bonus system for outcomes-based contracts and quarterly performance payments was merely added to a system that already operated with skills bonuses. This is an example of addive school reform in which new pracces and regulaons are merely added to exisng ones without replacing, or phasing out, previous regulaons. Each bonus system is problemac in itself for a different reason: • The bonuses for Olympiads and compeons reward teachers for focusing on high-performing students. • The bonuses for outcomes-based contracts enrely rely on funds generated at the school level and thus generate inequalies between large (resource-rich) schools and small (resource-poor) schools. • The bonuses for quarterly performance are financed from the centrally allocated salary fund but, in effect, funcon as a 13 th monthly salary in that the bonus is given indiscriminately to almost every teacher at the school, thus undermining the purpose of the bonus. TEACHERS IN MONGOLIA: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND RETENTION OF TEACHERS The following Table 18 presents the main features of the three bonuses and also summarizes the empirical findings from the study with regard to the actual beneficiaries. The column on actual beneficiaries lists the percentage of teachers who received the bonus in the past quarter or in the past year, respecvely, in the 28 examined schools of this study. From the perspecve of educaon managers, there is considerable overlap in the evaluaon criteria for the outcomes-based contract and the quarterly performance payments. Even though both bonus types require significant paper work from the educaon managers, they are ulmately vague, and the evaluaons come across as arbitrary. As a result, educaon managers do not dare to make harsh judgments on teachers’ performance for fear of being cricized for being biased and corrupt. There is a need to reconcile or integrate the two bonuses systems of outcomes-based contracts and quarterly performance payments. In addion, there is a need to revisit the evaluaon criteria. The outcomes-contracts do comprise a formave student evaluaon component. That is, teachers are in principle rewarded for student progress over the course of the school year and are thereby encouraged to draw aenon to mentoring individual students. For a variety of reasons, however, formave student evaluaon is not strictly enforced. The outcomes-contracts are driven by self-assessment and only in rare cases is the performance of the teacher rigorously assessed externally. As a result, teachers inflate the grades of their students towards the end of the school year in order to document progress over the course of the past few months. Nevertheless, strengthening formave student evaluaon and encouraging aenon to weak students would be very much needed if schools seek to systemacally aract out-of-school children and retain them in school unl the end of compulsory educaon or beyond. 86
CHAPTER 5: TOTAL PAY OF TEACHERS AND THE BONUS SYSTEM Type of bonus Olympiads & Compeons Outcomes-Based Contracts Quarterly Performance Payment Table 18: Main Features of the Three Types of Bonuses Intended purpose and frequency of award Rewards teachers who developed highperforming students in class; awarded once or twice a year. Rewards teachers on a variety of performance criteria, including overall class performance, lesson planning, communicaon skills, etc.; Awarded once a year. Reward teachers who did exceponally well (score A) or well (score B) on 4 evaluaon criteria; Awarded all 3 months. Financing source Special Fund from Central, Aimag, or Soum Budget Actual beneficiaries as % of all teachers in the study (N=123) Average rao as % of monthly base salary 40.0% 5% - 50% Educaon Fund of the School 29.0% 30% Centrally Allocated Salary Fund 99.2% 10-15% 1 2 3 4 5 6 In addion, it is problemac that schools are encouraged to use funds from their School Educaon Fund for rewarding teachers. There is a tendency for the school administraons to use all their savings and generated income on themselves and the school staff, rather than on students or on buying books, supplies, and other learning materials. Earlier studies on the School Educaon Fund (also known as School Development Fund), carried out for DANIDA, showed that schools spend most of the money in that fund for the professional development of teachers, for excursions with school staff, and other acvies that benefit the educaon and support staff at the school. This pracce is reminiscent of the mes when the teacher salaries were low and unaracve and addional sources had to be used to incenvize and retain teachers. These days, however, it is not necessary to make extra payments to teachers from the School Educaon Fund. In other words, schools should not be encouraged to use the outcomes-contract award mechanism to addionally fund teachers from the School Educaon Fund. TEACHERS IN MONGOLIA: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY ON RECRUITMENT INTO TEACHING, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AND RETENTION OF TEACHERS 87
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MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, AND SCIENCE
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The current trend
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TABLES, FIGURES, AND APPENDICES Tab
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This study examin
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION Expenditure
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UNICEF Mongolia - Teachers College Columbia University

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