Conflict Management in Indonesia – An Analysis of the Conflicts in ...

the potential to incite conflict. Rules were also created
and enforced in the village that included a prohibition
on making derogatory remarks about other
religions and being involved in violence. Any villagers
found breaking the rules were punished accordingly
or told to leave the village. Other civil society
initiatives included providing education, income
generation for women and trauma counselling.
However, Soeharto’s authoritarian legacy limited
civil society’s ability to handle the challenging
diversity of ethnic groups in Indonesia. His “unity”
policy used a variety of legal and ideological methods
to either curtail or regulate civil society, the most
well-known of which was the 1985 Law on Social
Organisations (Undang-Undang Organisasi
Kemasyarakatan No. 8/1985, otherwise known as
UU ORMAS). Under this law, all organisations had
to adhere to the state ideology of Pancasila. 14 With
the removal of regulations controlling organisational
activities in 1998, the number of NGOs and
other civil society organisations increased at a rapid
rate. However, many of these organisations are
fragmented along sectoral lines with a lack of coordination
between groups working on similar
issues; many are weak organisationally; and there
are very few mechanisms through which these
organisations can be held accountable to the communities
which they endeavour to help or claim
to represent.
Observations
Though the conflicts in Maluku, Poso and Papua
are clearly different from each other, there are a
number of common themes worth reflecting on –
not least because the conflict in Papua is ongoing
and more needs to be done to ensure that peace in
Maluku and Poso is sustained.
A clear common challenge has been the appropriate
use of the security forces. Inexperienced in
dealing with communal conflicts, the initial security
response in Maluku and Poso exacerbated tensions.
The security forces aligned themselves with different
sides in the conflict, allegedly supplying arms
and failing to arrest those who clearly violated the
law. In Papua, human rights abuses by security
14 Pancasila consists of five principles: Belief in the one and only God;
just and civilised humanity; unity of Indonesia; democracy guided
by the inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of deliberations
amongst representatives; and, social justice for all.
agencies and competition between them for control
over natural resources has led to increased mistrust
against the central government as well as migrants.
However, at the same time, the lesson from Maluku
and Poso is that when the security forces are seen
to enforce the law fairly and arrest those known to
be instigating violence, conflict can be reduced.
Funds for development and humanitarian assistance
should not be seen as a panacea. As violence
escalated in Maluku and Poso, the central government
and NGOs focused on providing emergency
aid, particularly to those displaced. While this was
an essential humanitarian response, it was only
when the central government began to address more
fundamental drivers of the conflict that violence
subsided. Similarly in Papua, relying on development
projects – which suffer from corruption and
poor co-ordination within government – has failed
to calm separatist sentiment. Indeed, uneven development
is a conflict driver. This lesson applies equally
to post-violence measures. Money was allocated in
Maluku and Poso to rebuilding infrastructure at
the expense of reconciliation and re-integration of
the conflicting parties. Such intangibles are harder
to address but essential for a lasting peace. Economic
wellbeing should not be regarded as a substitute for
political dialogue.
These case studies also ask difficult questions
about who is responsible for managing conflicts in
Indonesia, reflecting an ongoing debate in government
circles where there should be attempts to frame
conflict management in a national law. District and
provincial governments have occasionally been
constructive but once violence escalates beyond a
certain point, the central government needs to step
in – either as a facilitator of dialogue in a communal
context, or a participant in dialogue if they are
party to the conflict.
Better co-ordination within government is also
needed. Competition between provincial and district
governments in Maluku and Poso weakened
attempts to manage the conflict. In the case of
Papua, while the Papua Desk of the Coordinating
Ministry for Legal, Political and Security Affairs
has the formal mandate to deal with the region, at
times other agencies like the Ministry of Home
Affairs exercise greater power.
Civil society representatives – whether from the
NGO or religious community – have an important
role in prodding reluctant state authorities to take
action. It took a Christian leader, Pastor Tubondo,
14
Conflict Management in Indonesia