Conflict Management in Indonesia – An Analysis of the Conflicts in ...

y most actors including the OPM and the security
services. In 2007, the TNI started an informal
exchange with local human rights NGOs on how
to translate the concept into reality. 105 At the end of
2007 religious leaders again declared that conflicts
should be settled peacefully through a joint conflict
resolution process involving the government and
the Papuans, facilitated by a neutral third party.
A comprehensive evaluation backed by the government
and Papuans on the implementation of the
autonomy law was suggested, as was prioritising
the proper implementation of the autonomy law
over creating new provinces or regencies in Papua.
LIPI Road Map
More recently LIPI, a governmental research body
tasked with advising the government on policy
matters, produced a detailed proposal – The Papua
Road Map – for an inclusive dialogue process led
by the government and possibly facilitated by an
impartial third party. 106
The Road Map identifies four root causes of the
conflict:
The marginalisation of indigenous Papuans,
particularly economically, taking into account
the effects of transmigration;
The failure of development programmes in Papua
to prevent economic marginalisation;
Fundamentally diverging understanding of history
between Jakarta and Papua;
A legacy of state-sponsored violence against
Papua. 107
LIPI suggests a “New Papua” approach through
affirmative policies that empower Papuans. LIPI
105 Braithwaite, John et al., (2010), p.94.
106 Widjojo, Muridan (Ed.), (2009). The Indonesian version of the book
was launched on 30 June 2009 by the Minister of Defence Juwono
Sudarsono. In 2010 the book was published in English jointly by
LIPI, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, KITLV Jakarta-Leiden and ISEAS
Singapore. Its executive summary was circulated on the internet in
Bahasa Indonesia and English a year before its publication and has
attracted positive international, national and local responses.
107 This violence resulted from a long-standing military-security approach
to governing Papua motivated by fears of a separatist attempt to break
away. This approach has been backed by the nationalists in Jakarta
that dominate both the civilian and military bureaucracy, and has
continued through Indonesia’s transition to democracy. There have
been persistent allegations of violence against alleged separatist
leaders, for example: The 2009 killing of Papuan guerrilla leader
Kelly Kwalik by Densus 88 has revived and reinforced resentment
towards Jakarta, especially among young Papuans from the highlands.
recommends dialogue as a means for building a
shared understanding about the roots of the problems.
It distinguishes between four levels of dialogue:
national dialogue between the GoI and Papuans,
dialogue among Papuans in Papua, informal dialogue
among the Papuan elites, and international
dialogue between representatives of the GoI and
Papua with an international mediator.
In LIPI’s model, a pre-dialogue stage is needed
to build support for a dialogue in the first place
and establish terms of reference (ToRs). An internal
dialogue follows to socialise these ToRs and
revise and finalise them. In terms of an agenda,
LIPI suggests broaching the issues of history and
the political status of Papua, reconciliation and
human rights, the failure of development, and
marginalization and discrimination.
Its weakness may be that it is, at times, too academic.
It focuses on policies of local authorities,
neglecting analysis of the GoI’s policies. Little light
is shed on economic issues or the role of extractive
industries and the TNI. The issue of religious tensions
between Muslims and Christians, induced
mainly by the arrival of migrants from other parts
of Indonesia, is not given enough attention.
Noting these criticisms, the Road Map is a well
considered and timely document. As LIPI is a state
institution, it can more easily encourage other actors
across the GoI to engage seriously with the idea of
dialogue than would be the case if it had been a
civil society initiative. To, date, it has produced a
crucial initial impetus to build support for dialogue
in Jakarta and in Papua.
The Tebay Blueprint for Dialogue
In 2009, a Papuan Catholic priest and leading civil
society figure, Father Neles Tebay, launched an initiative
in Papua to promote dialogue between the
Papuan community and the Government in Jakarta.
He underlines the need for dialogue, stressing that
violence will not solve the conflict, special autonomy
has failed and the government is losing the support
of both Papuans and the international community.
He holds that both parties must demonstrate willingness
for dialogue and re-establish trust.
Tebay suggests holding the dialogue under the
‘Land of Peace’ umbrella. He explains that, before
dialogue is possible, internal dialogue among
indigenous Papuans, between indigenous and nonindigenous
Papuans, and between Papuans in Papua
and those in exile, must take place. He argues that
An Analysis of the Conflicts in Maluku, Papua and Poso
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