Conflict Management in Indonesia â An Analysis of the Conflicts in ...

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Institute which encouraged interfaith dialogue and promoted interaction between Christian and Muslims. Following the peace agreement, the local government prioritised reconstruction and the development of infrastructure but little attention was given to restoring social cohesion between religious groups. Civil society played a key role in filling in that gap, as well as working towards empowering women and providing for the needs of children. In Ambon, there were roughly ten local NGOs before the conflict. By 2001, this number had increased to more than 600. 61 The conflict brought in international NGOs and allowed local NGOs easy access to donor funds, even though some of the local NGOs possessed little to no local experience and had limited systems of transparency and accountability. When the emergency phase ended and the focus shifted to development, local NGOs started to dwindle: many did not have the experience and ability to manage reconciliation and development programs. Today there are around thirty NGOs, only ten of which are active. Many donors and international NGOs also left Ambon following the tsunami in Aceh in 2004 and the earthquake in Yogyakarta 2005, making it difficult for local NGOs in Ambon to access funds for post-violence recovery. After Malino II, international NGOs were more active in reconciliation activities, especially with IDPs. However, their success was limited by the fact that international organisations worked through local NGOs, who themselves had limited experience with “reconciliation”. Many donors and international NGOs also left Ambon following the tsunami in Aceh in 2004 and the earthquake in Yogyakarta 2005, making it difficult for local NGOs in Ambon to access funds for post-violence recovery. Members of local NGOs who were able to speak English left Ambon as well and headed to Aceh where opportunities were abundant. Local NGOs that have survived in Ambon have shifted their focus to alternative education, women’s and children’s empowerment, community development and revitalisation of traditions (adat). 61 Interview by Akiko Horiba with a former director of Hoalopu, Ambon City, 14 July 2009. Revitalisation of adat Adat refers to the customary laws, the unwritten traditional code regulating social, political and economic activity as well as the resolution of disputes. Adat has influenced specific ethnic group’s cultural norms, values and practices. The use of adat practices has declined sharply since the passage of Law No.5 in 1979 that introduced village administration which formalised control in the local government rather than among traditional leaders. This had a particularly significant impact in central Maluku, where there is a strong traditional intervillage alliance system that gradually declined after 1979. The alliance system had been an important mechanism for dispute resolution. Attention to adat especially panas pela (revitalising traditional relations, pela) started before Malino II and was initiated by village leaders and some activists. Activities to revitalise adat helped to restore the Ambon identity and a sense of brotherhood among the Ambonese. Traditional leaders called Raja (king) played key roles in the community. Traditionally, pela alliance was a form of kinship established between two communities of different religions. However, in this context, pela was used to restore trust and re-establish communications between returning IDPs and their neighbouring villages. The use of adat was effective because most people in Maluku are of the same ethnic group (Ambonese), unlike in Poso. Though adat had limited impact before Malino II, it subsequently became a symbol of reconciliation in Ambon and a means to restore a sense of community and identity among the Ambonese. In addition to panas pela, a Raja’s forum was created among traditional leaders. With the initial support of the Baku Bae movement, Rajas started discussing the relevance of their roles in the current context and in 2007 formed Majelis Latupati Maluku (MLM, Maluku traditional leaders’ conference). The formation of the MLM was seen as a revitalisation of adat and the recognition that the Raja still play an important role in the society. The Rajas were particularly useful in helping to mediate and resolve conflict between the different traditional communities (masyarakat adat) where their influence is still highly regarded. However, it is important to be aware of the limits of adat. Immigrants, especially from Bugis, Buton, Makassar and Java were often poorly integrated into traditional structures and adat. 30 Conflict Management in Indonesia
Conclusion Despite the numerous peace efforts, there was not a clear conflict management strategy and little coordination amongst the numerous actors in Maluku. This was especially the case during the emergency phase, when neither the central Government nor civil society had any long-term planning or future vision and conflict management was reactive. Security forces acted to prevent violence while local government and civil society focused on distributing the humanitarian aid. The lack of co-ordination and exchanging of information among the different stakeholders was seen as the biggest problem. However, several local communities adopted an effective conflict management strategy, as demonstrated by the example of the Wayame village and the Baku Bae movement. It was only after the signing of the Malino II Peace Agreement that the central and local government seriously addressed the issues associated with the conflict. The Government’s priority was reconstruction of infrastructure as well as resettlement of IDPs. However, the lack of a system of accountability and transparency meant that funds for conflict recovery were often misused. In addition, the Government was seen as paying insufficient attention to social cohesion as well as dealing with the trauma experienced by victims of the conflict, and most of these tasks were taken on by civil society and NGOs. Many local NGOs themselves suffered when they used funds for emergency aid without concrete planning of what was and is needed by the local community. The revitalisation of Maluku adat, led by civil society, was one of the more effective conflict management strategies. Although overt violence has declined, problems persist. In Ambon, for example, there are problems of segregation, unemployment, land and property disputes, increased migration from Java and religiously divided NGOs. Despite the power they have, through the decentralisation law, to create their own regulations (peraturan daera, perda), local government has not succeeded in offering clear policies to deal with these structural problems. An Analysis of the Conflicts in Maluku, Papua and Poso 31
Page 1 and 2: June 2011 Conflict Management in In
Page 3 and 4: June 2011 Conflict Management in In
Page 5 and 6: Contents Acronyms and terminology .
Page 7 and 8: Acronyms and terminology Adat Group
Page 9 and 10: PPN Papua Peace Network / Jaringan
Page 11 and 12: National University in Canberra in
Page 13 and 14: In this light, the Centre for Human
Page 15 and 16: experience handling separatist or a
Page 17 and 18: to persuade Jusuf Kalla to help med
Page 19 and 20: Figure 1: Map of Maluku Courtesy of
Page 21 and 22: An Indonesian soldier stands guard
Page 23 and 24: ecovery planning. Civil society als
Page 25 and 26: Ambonese demand the UN intervene in
Page 27 and 28: There are some examples of the medi
Page 29 and 30: poorly implemented and worked less
Page 31: family heads, and later changed bac
Page 35 and 36: Figure 1: Map of Papua Courtesy of
Page 37 and 38: at least be involved in the dialogu
Page 39 and 40: Box 1: OTSUS - Its origins and cont
Page 41 and 42: y most actors including the OPM and
Page 43 and 44: A major obstacle to dialogue has al
Page 45 and 46: The Papua Peace Network (PPN) was e
Page 47 and 48: y offering options regarding the fu
Page 49 and 50: Prohibiting the use of Papuan cultu
Page 51 and 52: Consulting within the movement Sinc
Page 53 and 54: Bougainville peace process, that a
Page 55 and 56: Security officials and residents, r
Page 57 and 58: Box 1: Timeline of the conflict in
Page 59 and 60: Conflict resolution initiatives Loc
Page 61 and 62: opportunities and political positio
Page 63 and 64: The Coordinating Ministry for Peopl
Page 65 and 66: An Indonesian anti-terror squad mem
Page 67 and 68: and Christian NGOs in Tentena. Co-o
Page 69 and 70: oth communities returning to the vi
Page 71 and 72: Annexes Annex 1: Research methodolo
Page 73: 9. The High Level Papuan Leaders Su

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