Conflict Management in Indonesia – An Analysis of the Conflicts in ...

A major obstacle to dialogue has always been
Jakarta’s contention that Papuan society is too
fragmented and so it is hard to identify Papuan
representatives. This is a reasonable concern given
that, since the death of Theys Eluay, there is no
single, recognised Papuan leader either in Papua
or in exile. However, this problem is increasingly
being addressed through the civil society public
consultation process. Groups brought together
from across the political spectrum have recognised
the need for unification and, despite differences in
approach, about 90 per cent of those who participated
in the consultations expressed support for dialogue.
Over the past year, the notion of a dialogue
between Jakarta and Papua has gained traction.
In June 2010, the MRP made 11 recommendations,
the two most important of which were to hand
back the Special Autonomy Law to Jakarta and to
urge Jakarta to hold a dialogue with indigenous
Papuans. 109 The prominent Papuan Catholic priest,
Neles Tebay considered the MRP’s actions and stated:
“Although the special autonomy policy implemented
since 2001 was hailed by many as the
only viable solution, it was not the result of
genuine dialogue between the Indonesian government
and the Papuans. This evident lack
of ownership is one important element to
understand better why the government never
implemented the autonomy consistently and
comprehensively, and why the Papuans can
easily hand the law back to the government.
What Papuans want instead is first and foremost
to be taken seriously and to have their
grievances acknowledged. The mention of
referendum and recognition of Papuas’ sovereignty
is to be understood as underlining the
necessity of dialogue.” 110
109 The other MRP recommendations were: the holding of a referendum
directed towards political independence; the GoI recognizes the
restoration of the sovereignty of the People of West Papua which was
proclaimed on 1st December 1961; urging the international community
to impose an embargo on international aid being provided for
the implementation of the Special Autonomy Law; no need for revisions
to be made to Law 21/2001 on Special Autonomy; halting all
proceedings for the election of heads of district in Papua, ending
transmigration and imposing strict supervision on the flow of migration
to Papua; urging releasing all Papuan political prisoners being
held in prisons everywhere in Indonesia; demilitarize Papua; closing
Freeport Indonesia. The recommendations are available at: www.
etan.org/issues/wpapua/2010/1007wpap.htm#Special_Autonom
110 Tebay, Neles, “Papuans want a Negotiated Solution”, The Jakarta
Globe, 5 July, (2010).
Reactions from Jakarta were mixed. Some
blamed Papuans for failing to implement OTSUS.
Initially, the President decided to increase special
autonomy and regional funds allocated to Papua,
West Papua and Aceh for 2011, as well as begin an
evaluation of OTSUS in Papua. 111
OTSUS failed, Inpres 5/07 had no impact,
there is no law and order anymore in
Papua, the security situation deteriorates,
prosperity declines, the culture of violence
gets a boost and marginalisation continues.
Only through dialogue can the conflict
be solved.
An encouraging development was the President’s
Independence Day speech on 17 August 2010 in which
he expressed his wish to engage in “constructive
communication” with Papua. As an initial step,
the President sought to improve communications
between the Government and the Parliament of
the Papua Province (DPRP), Parliament of the
West Papua Province (DPRD), and the MRP.
Critically, the President’s statement has helped
strengthen the position of progressives within government.
In more conservative government circles
even the term “dialogue” is sensitive, as it raises
fears about the disintegration of Indonesia and is
interpreted as bestowing both parties with equal
standing. Their fear is that dialogue will lead to the
contestation of the New York Agreement of 1962
and of the Act of Free Choice of 1969, questioning
the very basis of Indonesian sovereignty in Papua,
and that acknowledging human rights abuses
committed by the government could tarnish
Indonesia’s image.
More progressive elements in the government
include a number of senior officials in the Ministry
of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As
General (ret.) Bambang Dharmono has noted:
“OTSUS failed, Inpres 5/07 had no impact,
there is no law and order anymore in Papua,
the security situation deteriorates, prosperity
111 In addition to the evaluation of the GoI, the West Papua parliament
has also announced an evaluation. This evaluation is a consequence
of the MRP decision in June and shall enable the local government to
define its policy towards the GoI.
An Analysis of the Conflicts in Maluku, Papua and Poso
41