a thesis - Institute of Advanced Legal Studies

94 IMPLIED TRUSTS.
law, though the former case can no doubt be explained on the
ground of fraud. Apart from authority it is difficult to see why
there should be any difference between personal property and
land. Before the Statute of Uses, as Chief Baron Eyre pointed
out in Dyer v. Dyer (infra], if a feoffment were made without
consideration, the use resulted to the feoffor. One would have
thought, therefore, that after the statute there would have been a
resulting trust on a voluntary conveyance " unto and to the use
of " the grantee, and that this resulting trust would have been
saved by sect. 8 of the Statute of Frauds.
Whatever may be the true view as to this, it is clear that where
a transfer of property is made to a wife or child, or one to whom
the transferor stands in loco parent is, there is a presumption of the
same kind that the transferor intended it as an advancement, just
as in the case of a purchase in the name of such persons. (Lewin,
Trusts, 10th ed. 156.) This appears to have been tacitly assumed
in Say re v. Huglies, Foickcs v. Pascoe, Batstone v. Salter, and in
Standing v. Boicring (supra) ; although with the exception of the
somewhat vague case of Joinings v. Scllick (1687,1 Yern. 683), there
was apparently no direct authority for it before the case of In re
Orme (1884, 50 L. T. 51), where Kay, J., says, " Now I think it is
quite clear by authority that if advances are made to a person to
whom the individual who makes the advances is in loco parent is,
that those advances are prtmd facie gifts," and decided that the
money advanced in that case by a mother to her son for business
purposes was a gift to the son.
Illustrations.
1. A widow transfers certain East India Stock which stands in
her own name into the names of herself and her unmarried
daughter. There is a presumption of intention to benefit the
daughter, and in the absence of evidence the daughter is entitled
on the death of her mother. Say re v. Hughes (1868), L. B,. 5 Eq.
376.
2. A., widow, makes small advances from time to time to her son
B., to whom she is in loco parent is, to enable him to carry on
business or for his maintenance. A. never attempts to recover
these moneys, nor does she take any acknowledgment of them.
After A.'s death B. cannot be charged with them in the admimstra-