a thesis - Institute of Advanced Legal Studies

100 IMPLIED TRUSTS.
the father is not put on the legal liability to maintain, but on the
moral obligation. But, as Mr. Underbill says (6th ed. 126),
" Surely there is as much moral presumption of an intention by a
mother to benefit her offspring as there is in the case of the father
.... in reason and in custom there is assuredly as much obligation
on the part of a mother, who has the command of money, to
benefit her children with it as in the case of a father." In such
cases, however, Sir George Jessel admits that, even if the mother is
not in loco parentis, very little evidence beyond the relationship is
wanted, there being very little motive required to induce a mother
to make a gift to her child, so that the point is not of great
importance. (See also In re Or me (1884), 50 L. T. 51.)
The trust or advancement in these cases being founded on the
presumed intention of the parties, verbal evidence is admissible—
Firsf, to prove by whom the purchase-money is paid (Gascoigne
v. Timing (1685), 1 Yern. 366; Knight v. Pechey (1759), 1 Dick.
327; see also Ryall v. Ryall (1739), 1 Atk. 59; Willis v. Willix
(1740), 2 Atk. 71; and Groves v. Groves (1829), 3 Y. & J. 163) ;
Secondly, to prove the intention with which the transfer is
made in order to rebut the presumption of a resulting trust (Dyer
v. Dyer (1788), 2 Cox, 92; Rider v. ffidder (1805), 10 Ves. 364;
and Fowkes v. Pascoe (1875), L. E. 10 Ch. App. 343) ;
Thirdly, to rebut the presumption of advancement ( Williams v.
Williams (1863), 32 Beav. 370); and
Fourthly, to support the presumption of advancement (Lamplugh
v. Lamplugh (1709), 1 P. Wms. 113).
A resulting trust will not, however, arise under the rule stated
in Dyer v. Dyer if the policy of an act of parliament would be
thereby defeated. (Ex parte Tallop (1808), 15 Yes. at p. 71.) For
instance, there will be no resulting trust in favour of a purchaser
who buys land in order to qualify the transferee to act as a justice
of the peace (Crichton v. Crichton (1894), 13 E. 770), for this
would be to defeat the statute 18 Greo. II. c. 20, which requires
that the ownership shall be a beneficial one. And it may be that
this principle goes further, and that there will be no resulting trust
where the property has been bought for any illegal purpose. The
decision in Groves v. Groves (1829, 3 Y. & J. 163) appears to have
been partly based on this ground.