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a thesis - Institute of Advanced Legal Studies

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18 TRUSTS IN GENERAL.<br />

the trustees should stand possessed <strong>of</strong> the property on the trusts<br />

specified ; in each case the result was the same—the husband was<br />

bound by the settlement.<br />

Of course, if the property in respect <strong>of</strong> which this question<br />

arises is given to the wife for her separate use, these decisions do<br />

not apply. The wife does not claim under the Married Women's<br />

Property Act then, and if she repudiates the settlement her<br />

husband does not become entitled to the property settled. The<br />

trustees <strong>of</strong> the repudiated settlement cannot, therefore, claim on<br />

the ground that the property belongs to the husband, and that he<br />

is bound by the settlement.<br />

Lunatics.—A. disposition <strong>of</strong> property, whether by instrument<br />

inter vivos or by will, by a person usually <strong>of</strong> unsound mind is valid<br />

if made during a lucid interval. (Hall v. Warren (1805), 9 Yes.<br />

605.) A disposition for valuable consideration made by a person<br />

while <strong>of</strong> unsound mind is valid, unless it can be shown that the<br />

person in whose favour it was made was aware <strong>of</strong> the insanity, in<br />

which case it is voidable. This applies to sales (Motion v. Camroux<br />

(1848), 2 Exch. 487 ; 4 Exch. 17 ; Elliot v. Lice, infra], to mortgages<br />

(Campbell v. Hooper (1855), 3 Sm. & Gr. 153), to contracts<br />

(Imperial Loan Co. v. Stone, (1892) 1 Q. B. 599), and presumably<br />

also to dispositions by way <strong>of</strong> trust.<br />

But if a disposition <strong>of</strong> property by a person <strong>of</strong> unsound mind is<br />

gratuitous, it is not merely voidable but void. (Elliot v. Ince<br />

(1857), 7 De GK M. & GK 475; Manning v. Gill (1872), L. B,<br />

13 Eq. 485.) It would follow from this that a voluntary trust,<br />

whether created by deed or will, by a person <strong>of</strong> unsound mind at<br />

the time, is wholly void whether the beneficiaries or trustees were<br />

cognizant <strong>of</strong> the insanity or not.<br />

What amount <strong>of</strong> insanity is sufficient and required to invalidate<br />

the disposition is a difficult question. It was discussed in the case<br />

<strong>of</strong> Banks v. Goodfcllow (1870, L. E. 5 Q. B. 549) with reference to<br />

a will, and it was held that the mere existence <strong>of</strong> delusions in the<br />

testator's mind are not sufficient if they have not affected the dispositions<br />

made by the will. There seems to be no reason why<br />

there should be any different rule for an instrument inter vivos.<br />

Where such a disposition is impeached on the ground <strong>of</strong> insanity,<br />

if the lunatic has since been found by inquisition to have been insane<br />

at the date when the disposition was made, the burden <strong>of</strong> pro<strong>of</strong> that<br />

it was made during a lucid interval is thrown on the party claiming<br />

under it. If he is not bound by the inquisition because not a

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