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a thesis - Institute of Advanced Legal Studies

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10 TRUSTS IN GENERAL.<br />

(4) The capacity <strong>of</strong> any one <strong>of</strong> the persons beneficially interested<br />

to enforce the obligation.<br />

These may be combined to form a definition, as follows:—<br />

" A trust is an obligation imposed either expressly or by implication<br />

<strong>of</strong> law whereby the obligor is bound to deal with<br />

property over which he has control for the benefit <strong>of</strong> certain persons<br />

<strong>of</strong> whom he may himself be one, and any one <strong>of</strong> whom may enforce<br />

the obligation."<br />

It is not straining language to speak <strong>of</strong> a person imposing an<br />

obligation on himself, while it is submitted that the use <strong>of</strong> the<br />

words " any one <strong>of</strong> whom may enforce the obligation " sufficiently<br />

marks the distinction between trust and contract; even if the<br />

definition is still wide enough to include a depositum bailment,<br />

such as that in In re Tidd (1893, 3 Ch. 154), it is submitted that<br />

that particular kind <strong>of</strong> bailment is really a trust and that it is<br />

therefore unobjectionable to call it one. On the other hand, it may<br />

perhaps be objected that it is not wide enough to cover trusts in<br />

which there is no cestui que trust, like a trust for the erection <strong>of</strong> a<br />

monument, such as that in Mitford v. Reynolds (1848, 16 Sim.<br />

105), or for the care <strong>of</strong> animals, as in In re Dean (1889, 41 Ch. D.<br />

552) ; it is true that these have been decided to be valid trusts,<br />

although they are not enforceable by anybody. In conflict with<br />

this decision, however, it has been said to be elementary law that<br />

for the creation <strong>of</strong> a trust there are three requisites—a trustee, a<br />

cestui que trust, and property which one man holds on trust for<br />

another: In re Brooke andFremlirfs Contract (1898,1 Ch. at p. 651).<br />

Such trusts are therefore not trusts in the ordinary sense in which<br />

the term is used by lawyers. The trust so called is only valid in<br />

this sense—that the person who would take if it were not carried<br />

out cannot complain if the trustee does what the settlor has<br />

requested. (Cf. Ashburner, Equity, p. 124.) They may perhaps<br />

be called trusts <strong>of</strong> imperfect obligation.<br />

There remains one other distinction. A trust may be either<br />

an active trust or a bare trust. The terms special trust and simple<br />

trust are synonymous and are sometimes used, but the former are<br />

preferable, as they have been adopted by the legislature. The<br />

distinction is <strong>of</strong> " general practical importance," to adopt the<br />

words <strong>of</strong> Hall, V.-C., in Christie v. Ovington (1875, 1 Ch. D. 279),

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