a thesis - Institute of Advanced Legal Studies

RESULTING TRUSTS. 99
4. Copyhold land is granted to A. and B., his wife, and C.,
their son, to take in succession for their lives and the life of the
survivor. A. pays the whole of the purchase-money. C. is not a
trustee for A. Dyer v. Dyer (1788), 2 Cox, 92.
5. A. enters into an agreement in the name of himself and his
wife to purchase land, and dies before the whole of the purchasemoney
is paid. The land belongs to the wife, and the remainder
of the purchase-money must be paid out of A.'s estate. Drew v.
Martin (1864), 2 H. & M. 130.
6. A. buys debentures in a railway company in the name of
himself, his wife, and X., one of the trustees of his marriage settlement.
This is an advancement, and on A.'s death X. holds merely
as trustee for the wife. In re Eykin's Trusts (1877), 6 Ch. D. 115.
But again the circumstances of the case must be taken into
consideration, and if these go to show that the purchaser did not
intend a gift, the mere fact that the purchase is made in the name
of a wife or child is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of a
resulting trust. (Marshal v. Crutwett (1875), L. E. 20 Eq. 328.)
It is doubtful whether this presumption of advancement applies in
the case of a purchase by a mother in the name of a child, although
the better opinion seems to be that it does. It seems to have been
assumed that it did in Garrctt v. Wilkinson (1848, 2 De Gr. & Sm.
at p. 246), and so decided in Say re v. Hughes (1868, L. E. 5 Eq.
376), and that it did not in In re De Viame (1863, 2 D. J. & S. 17),
and in Sennet v. Sennet (1879, 10 Ch. D. 474), where Sir Greorge
Jessel says: "In the case of a father you have only to prove the
fact that he is the father, and when you have done that the
obligation at once arises ; but in the case of a person in locoparentis
you must prove that he took upon himself the obligation. But in
our law there is no moral obligation—I do not know how to express
it more shortly—no obligation according to the rules of equity—
on a mother to provide for her child: there is no such obligation
as a court of equity recognizes as such." Since this was said
s. 21 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, has made a
married woman having separate property subject to the same
liability for the maintenance of her children as the husband is.
This is perhaps not material, since the presumption in the case of
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