a thesis - Institute of Advanced Legal Studies

RULES DETERMINING INTENTION TO CREATE A TRUST. 45
tioned in a schedule, but the annuitants are not parties to the
deed. A. can revoke the deed and the annuitants are not entitled
to restrain X. and Y. from reconveying the property. Walwyn
v. Courts (1815), 3 Sim. 14.
2. A. conveys property to B. and 0. upon trust to pay the
debts owing by A. to the creditors specified in the schedule to the
conveyance. The creditors are made parties to the deed, but
they neither execute it nor conform to its terms. They cannot
enforce the trust. Garrard v. Lauderdale (1831), 3 Sim. 1 ;
2 Euss. & My. 451.
3. A. conveys property to B. and 0. upon trust to pay the
debts due to them and all other debts then due from A. No
creditor other than B. and C. is a party to the conveyance, nor is it
communicated to any other creditor. No other creditor can enforce
it, and A., B. and 0. are entitled to execute a subsequent deed by
which the first is partially revoked. Acton v. Woodgate (1833),
2 My. & K 492.
4. A., being obligor of several bonds of which B. is surety,
conveys property to B. upon trust to pay the bond creditors. The
creditors neither execute nor have they notice of the deed. They
cannot enforce it, but B. can retain the property until released
from his liability as surety. Wilding v. Richards (1845), 1
Coll. Ch. E. 655.
5. A. conveys all his property to B. upon trust to pay thereout
a sum of 5,000/. (to be raised by B. on A.'s behalf) and also all
other debts due from him, including a debt due to C. The deed is
not communicated to any of the creditors of A. (see p. 751 of the
report). C. cannot require an account from B. Johns v. James
(1878), 8 Ch. D. 744.
The general rule is subject to several qualifications, however.
These are:—
(a) When any of such creditors or persons is party to and
executes the deed of assignment.—It was laid down in Mackinnon v.
Stewart (1850, 1 Si. N. S. 76) that a trust deed for creditors which
was executed by the majority of them was irrevocable, and therefore
a dissenting creditor could not in the absence of fraud have it