Strategies for Executive Compensation: Design and Tax Issues for a ...
Strategies for Executive Compensation: Design and Tax Issues for a ...
Strategies for Executive Compensation: Design and Tax Issues for a ...
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equity compensation. Triggers range from fraudulent misconduct to bad faith behaviour<br />
<strong>and</strong> even the mere occurrence of a negative restatement of financial results.<br />
2. U.S. STATUTORY CLAWBACKS<br />
Specific types of clawbacks are statutorily m<strong>and</strong>ated under the U.S. Sarbanes-Oxley<br />
Act of 2002 (“SOX”), <strong>and</strong> Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re<strong>for</strong>m <strong>and</strong> Consumer Protection Act<br />
(“DFW”). These measures are relevant <strong>for</strong> Canadian corporations which are <strong>for</strong>eign<br />
private issuers under U.S. securities laws. These provisions are also of more general<br />
interest since the concepts introduced <strong>and</strong> developed in the U.S. statutory clawbacks<br />
are widely adopted by both US <strong>and</strong> Canadian issuers in drafting their contractual<br />
clawback policies.<br />
The clawback provisions in SOX adopted the basic notion, incorporated in most current<br />
clawback policies, that executive bonuses based on materially inaccurate financial<br />
results that are subsequently subject to a negative revision should be <strong>for</strong>feited. The<br />
<strong>for</strong>feiture, or clawback, is conditioned on a finding of executive misconduct that has<br />
resulted in the material non-compliance in the financial results. These provisions apply<br />
to any incentive payments, covering both cash <strong>and</strong> equity awards, in the one-year<br />
period following the issue of the financial results that later had to be restated. The<br />
clawback is m<strong>and</strong>atory <strong>for</strong> U.S. public companies but only applies to the CEO <strong>and</strong> the<br />
CFO. However, the misconduct required to trigger the provision is not required to be<br />
that of the CEO or the CFO. 2<br />
The DFW introduced ‘bigger <strong>and</strong> better’ clawbacks that apply in a wider set of<br />
circumstances to a wider base of employees. Under these provisions, any material<br />
non-compliance with reporting requirements that necessitates a restatement of financial<br />
results triggers a clawback mechanism that applies to incentive awards received by all<br />
current or <strong>for</strong>mer executives. There is a three year look-back period, which means that<br />
incentive awards h<strong>and</strong>ed out during the three years preceding the date of restatement<br />
1 J. Tuzyk, Blakes Bulletin on Securities “Clawbacks Coming to Canada”, November 2011, available at<br />
http://www.blakes.com/english/view_bulletin.aspID=5026