Global Security: in Search of a New Vision - Center for Strategic ...

82 Lieutenant General Evgeniy Buzhinsky
A BAL ANCED AND FLEX I BLE APPROACH FOR AFGHAN I STAN
It has already been said that despite the con sid er able time that has passed since the fail ure of the
Taliban regime, the sit u a tion in the coun try causes con cern. Unfor tu nately, we can not yet speak about
real improve ments in the envi ron ment there. Frankly speak ing, the influ ence of the cen tral gov ern ment
is lim ited to the Kabul area—the new Afghan author i ties still do not con trol other parts of the coun try.
As for the coun try’s econ omy, it exists only because of for eign dona tions and the opium trade. But the
growth of Taliban activ ity is even worse than that.
In our opin ion, there can not be only a mil i tary solu tion to the Afghan i stan prob lem. A bal anced and
flex i ble approach that takes into account both the real i ties of the coun try and the men tal ity of the
Afghani peo ple is nec es sary. So we wel come NATO’s com plex approach to the solu tion of the Afghani
prob lem. There is no doubt that inte grat ing mil i tary and civil com po nents and achiev ing more effec tive
coor di na tion of inter na tional efforts are the only ways to pro vide stability in the country.
A pro cess to restore Afghani state hood and econ omy should be sup ported by effec tive mil i tary
efforts. Here again Rus sia is ready to ren der assis tance such as pro fes sional train ing of Afghan i stan’s
army per son nel as well as arms and mil i tary tech ni cal equip ment deliv er ies and main te nance. Rus sia has
already granted weap ons and equip ment in the amount of about U.S.$200 mil lion to Pres i dent Karzai's
government.
ISSUES WITH PRO VID ING SUP PORT
Unfor tu nately, our efforts to assist the Afghan gov ern ment some times encoun ter obsta cles that we
find dif fi cult to explain. For exam ple, the pilot pro ject of pro vid ing Rus sian aid and coun sel con cern ing
pro fes sional train ing of drug-fight ing struc tures in Afghan i stan and cen tral Asia has stum bled. When we
ques tion Kabul’s refusal to send Afghan cadets to a drug coun ter-action course (a joint Rus sian aid and
coun sel pro ject in Domodedovo), we hear expla na tions that Afghans behaved inad e quately. The main
argu ment con cerns the open ing of the Min is try of Inte rior Acad emy in Kabul, where nec es sary train ing
is to be con ducted. If that is the case, let’s stop the pro ject if Afghans do not want it.
Another example involves the agreement on providing military-technical assistance to Afghanistan,
which expired in Jan u ary 2006. We noti fied the Afghanis in advance that, accord ing to Rus sian leg is la tion,
con tin u a tion of that kind of assis tance was pos si ble only after a cor re spond ing request from the Afghan
gov ern ment. How ever, we still have not received any such request. Unof fi cially, we receive sig nals that
there are plans to reequip Afghan forces with West ern-made arms and equip ment. If so, it should be said
clearly: Thank you, we do not need this kind of assis tance. But know ing about Afghan adher ence to Rus -
sian-made weap ons, I doubt that such reequipment is possible, at least in the short term.
Another point is that the final doc u ments from the last NATO sum mits make no ref er ence to such an
orga ni za tion as the Col lec tive Secu rity Treaty Orga ni za tion (CSTO). In fact, the orga ni za tion has great
expe ri ence in drug-threat coun ter-action, espe cially in Afghan i stan. I think that devel op ing coop er a tion
between CSTO and NATO, which had deal ings with secu rity mat ters on both sides of Afghan i stan’s bor -
ders, would be mutually beneficial.
Cer tainly we know of the Alli ance’s prin ci pal posi tion not to deal with CSTO as an orga ni za tion but to
address its mem bers on an indi vid ual, case-by-case basis. I am not going to elab o rate on that, but my
strong belief is that it is a mis take, espe cially in Afghan mat ters. I am sure that devel op ing real coop er a -
tion with coun ter-regional orga ni za tions such as CSTO and per haps the Shang hai Coop er a tion Orga ni -
za tion (SCO) can play a pos i tive role in the sta bi li za tion of the sit u a tion in the region, includ ing ter ror ism
and drug-threat coun ter ac tion. It would be use ful to build up inter ac tion in the area between old inter na -
tional orga ni za tions, especially those already involved in Afghanistan.