Global Security: in Search of a New Vision - Center for Strategic ...

110 NATO Assis tant Sec re tary Gen eral Peter C.W. Flory
years, and con cluded that these pro grams pose an increas ing threat to the Alli ance. This ech oed NATO’s
find ings at the Riga and Prague Sum mits.
While no one can pre dict with con fi dence the exact pace of Iran’s mis sile and nuclear devel op ments,
there is an aware ness among Allies that cur rent trends are bring ing more and more of NATO ter ri tory
into mis sile range of Iran. There is also an appre ci a tion of the fact that devel op ing a NATO sys tem to
defend NATO ter ri tory against bal lis tic mis siles, if the Alli ance decides to do so, will take time, so delay -
ing deci sions until we have per fect clar ity on the threat would involve risks.
I think the Bucha rest Dec la ra tion also reflects an aware ness that in addi tion to spe cific pro grams in
spe cific coun tries of con cern, there is also, at a more gen eral level, a grow ing nexus or poten tial nexus
between (1) the spread of dangerous capabilities, specifically ballistic missiles and nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons and technologies, (2) political instability, and (3) extremist ideologies, in areas of
impor tance to NATO and NATO mem bers, that could pose a threat to the secu rity of the Alli ance. This
approach is some times described as a “capa bil ity-based approach,” focus ing not only on iden ti fied
threats, but on the broader ques tion of how an adver sary—any adver sary—might fight, and what capa -
bil i ties might be needed to coun ter such threats.
After not ing the increas ing threat, the Bucha rest Dec la ra tion goes on to say:
“Mis sile defence forms part of a broader response to coun ter this threat.”
One of the ques tions many gov ern ments asked them selves, after the U.S. pro posal put mis sile defence
back on the agenda in NATO, was, where does mis sile defence fit into the spec trum of tra di tional mea -
sures for com bat ing the spread of mis siles and WMD For exam ple, should it be addressed by diplo -
macy, arms con trol, non-pro lif er a tion regimes, and tra di tional mil i tary deter rence For some, the
ques tion was, will mis sile defence under mine or weaken these tra di tional tools
The answer NATO came up with was to rec og nize that mis sile defence is part of a broad, lay ered
defence along with all the mech a nisms I just men tioned. Most nations, of course, sim ply do not have the
desire to pos sess dan ger ous, destabilizing weap ons. In other cases, exist ing treaty and polit i cal norms,
together with vigourous non-pro lif er a tion pol i cies and diplo macy, have helped shape the bal ance of
incen tives so nations have aban doned the pur suit or pos ses sion of these weap ons—for exam ple
Kazakhstan and Ukraine, South Africa, and Libya.
But these mech a nisms have been unable to pre vent some nations from defy ing the rules and norms.
Not every nation agrees to be bound by trea ties and agree ments, and some of those that do, cheat. And it
does n’t take a large num ber of nations like this to cre ate a threat to oth ers.
In this con text, Alli ance lead ers con cluded that mis sile defence could sup port tra di tional arms con trol
and non-proliferation measures. In particular, by devaluing ballistic missile capabilities, missile defence
can over time reduce the incen tive to develop mis siles in the first place.
Another con sid er ation was the impact of mis sile defence on tra di tional deter rence. Here there is no
doubt that tra di tional mil i tary deter rence will con tinue to play a vital role. But there is a grow ing con cern
that, in an era of dic ta to rial and/or extrem ist regimes that may not share our val ues or assump tionsand
espe cially after Sep tem ber 11 rede fined the lim its of what might be con sid ered “unthink able”traditional
deter rence, while nec es sary, may no lon ger be suf fi cient. NATO nations also under stand that some
coun tries pur sue bal lis tic mis siles and WMD pre cisely because these can fur nish an asym met ric means to
counter traditional military strengths and deterrence.
Another ele ment in this dis cus sion was the poten tial value of defen sive options in deter ring or coun -
ter ing threats, for exam ple, in the case of a rogue regime will ing to launch an attack against an Alli ance
mem ber, then use its own pop u la tion as a shield to pre vent a mil i tary response.