Global Security: in Search of a New Vision - Center for Strategic ...

12 Dr. Roger Weissinger-Baylon
Despite the above con cerns (espe cially Admi ral Fitz ger ald’s), Ambas sa dor Tacan Ildem, the Turk ish
Ambas sa dor to NATO, is clearly more opti mis tic about the future of Kosovo:
…Bring ing about the inde pend ence of Kosovo was the cul mi na tion of a long, unique, and com pli cated pro cess, and, to
fur ther con sol i date sta bil ity in the region, we have to sup port Kosovo by all means as well as ensure the well-being of all
the com mu ni ties within its bor ders.
After the par lia men tary elec tions in Ser bia, we remain cau tiously opti mis tic about the secu rity sit u a tion in Kosovo. The
deter mined pres ence and increased activ i ties of KFOR have con trib uted to sta bil ity and secu rity, but it is very impor tant
for all actors in thea tre to assume their respon si bil i ties and respec tive roles.
In the com ing years, let us hope that the more opti mis tic assess ment pre vails!
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Afghan i stan is NATO’s most impor tant oper a tion. Con se quently, a num ber
of argu ments and obser va tions were made about its suc cess and chal lenges, includ ing a warn ing by Brit -
ish Ambas sa dor to NATO Stu art Eldon, which we should heed:
…we must be hon est about what we are doing. In essence, the inter na tional com mu nity is engaged in sup port of the gov -
ern ment of Afghan i stan…The Afghans must lead—it is, after all, their coun try—but the more we can tai lor our sup port
behind the gov ern ment’s efforts to exer cise its author ity fully through out its ter ri tory, the more suc cess ful we will be.
There is no doubt that Afghan i stan pres ents NATO with its great est chal lenge. Italy’s Mil i tary Rep re -
sen ta tive to the NATO Mil i tary Com mit tee, Vice Admi ral Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte, points
out that the Afghan i stan con flict is sub ject to the same dif fi cul ties expe ri enced in coun ter-insur gency
operations elsewhere, including in Vietnam:
Unfor tu nately—and Viet nam showed this at length—the more troops you pour into a thea tre, the more the resis tance
stiff ens, and you and your allies end up exhausted, unmo ti vated, and inca pa ble of act ing alone. Coun ter ing nar cot ics traf -
fic in Afghan i stan, there fore, will require a care ful bal ance between the will to suc ceed quickly and the need to avoid trans -
form ing the Afghan oper a tion into a fight in which the locals move increas ingly to the insur gent side.
In an envi ron ment in which the oppo si tion is land-heavy, there is no point in try ing to match num bers by rely ing on supe -
rior fire power. Asym me try is at the heart of this sci ence, and the enemy’s weak spots must be tar geted. . .Send ing more
troops is a way to avoid deep think ing.
In the view of Ambas sa dor Munir Akram, Paki stan’s Per ma nent Rep re sen ta tive to the United
Nations, the U.S. rela tion ship with Paki stan is cur rently “strained.” Con se quently, suc cess in Afghan i stan
(and the tribal regions in Paki stan) will depend on rethink ing the Paki stan-U.S. rela tion ship as well as the
secu rity objec tives for the region:
The polit i cal and oper a tional chal lenges being con fronted in the cam paign to elim i nate ter ror ism and to sta bi lize Afghan -
i stan need to be addressed urgently through stra te gic dia logue between Paki stan and the United States. The U.S. and
NATO also need to review their stra te gic objec tives vis-B-vis Afghan i stan and to rede fine ‘suc cess.’ They will:
1. Not be able to trans form Afghan i stan over night into a mod ern democ racy
2. Not be able to change the con ser va tive Islamic ide ol ogy and beliefs of the peo ple of Afghan i stan
3. Not be able to elim i nate or ignore the major power com po nents in Afghan i stan, espe cially the Pashtun tribes
The new strat egy will need to be truly com pre hen sive, includ ing polit i cal, eco nomic, and mil i tary com po nents.
In Ambas sa dor Akram’s view, there need to be fun da men tal changes in the approach to the con flicts
in the region: there must be a new polit i cal strat egy, a new eco nomic strat egy, and a new mil i tary strat egy: