Global Security: in Search of a New Vision - Center for Strategic ...

Overview: In Search of a New Vision 11
Regional Secu rity
Secu rity in the Bal kans. Admi ral Mark Fitz ger ald, NATO’s Allied Joint Force Com mander in Naples and
Com mander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe, has a gen er ally pos i tive view of prog ress in the Bal kans:
When I look at what has hap pened in the Bal kans over the last few years, I think of how we have brought Croatia and
Alba nia into NATO… and how we are pretty close to get ting Skopje in there. And when I see that Bosnia is sign ing up
with PfP and try ing to gain MAP sta tus, that Montenegro is com ing along, and that Ser bia is par tic i pat ing in PfP, I see the
trend towards col lec tive secu rity on the EU side. I also see how the sign ing of Sta bi li za tion and Asso ci a tion Agree ments
(SAAs) is sup port ing eco nomic sta bil ity. . .my head quar ters is try ing to fig ure out how we can pro vide the lead er ship to
get that secu rity sec tor reform piece. . .in place.…
None the less, Admi ral Fitz ger ald remains extremely con cerned about the sit u a tion in Kosovo. His
con cerns are based in part on the stag nant eco nomic sit u a tion there, the depend ence on funds arriv ing
from the dias pora or by inter na tional mil i tary forces sta tioned in the coun try, and, espe cially, the prom i -
nent role of cor rup tion and smug gling:
. . .We have been [in Kosovo] for 10 years; the sit u a tion is what I would call stag nant on the eco nomic side of the house,
with the high est unem ploy ment in Europe—58%—and GDP growth is just start ing to come up, now at 7%. . . Infla tion
is up to about 13%. Elec tric ity is the life blood of the coun try, but there has been no new infra struc ture put in there, and
the peo ple are still liv ing with 1950s and 1960s tech nol ogy…
[How ever, the] real issue in Kosovo in my view is not whether this is going to be a Ser bian prov ince or an inde pend ent
coun try, but where are the peo ple’s next euros com ing from. . .The cor rup tion, the smug gling, every thing is eat ing into
that coun try’s quest to become an inde pend ent state. That is where I think we have failed over the last 10 years.
In assess ing the causes of the sit u a tion in Kosovo, Fin land’s Ambas sa dor Kirsti Lintonen, raises three
questions:
- Is the man date not clear enough It is true that Secu rity Coun cil Res o lu tions are often a result of com pro mises. The
now-famous res o lu tion 1244 on Kosovo is not an excep tion. Clar ity is there fore essen tial - espe cially on the oper a tional
level.
- Do the actors not have a com mon vision of the strat egy and a shared start ing posi tion If not, a com pre hen sive
approach is badly needed, as well as a com mon under stand ing of the facts relat ing to the sit u a tion.
Are the actors dupli cat ing each other’s work or leav ing things unac com plished If that is the case, coor di na tion, lead er -
ship and a clear divi sion of labour are needed.
- If the actors do not share a strat egy in the begin ning, how can they agree on tim ing and exit strat egy In today’s world,
the issues we face are com plex, and coop er a tion of var i ous orga ni za tions is des per ately needed. At the out set, the orga ni -
za tions need a com mon strat egy, a mutu ally agreed divi sion of labour and a clear exit strat egy.
Look ing back on NATO’s expe ri ence in Kosovo, SHAPE Chief of Staff Gen eral Lather’s over all
assess ment seems less harsh than Admi ral Fitz ger ald’s or Ambas sa dor Lintonen’s. Gen eral Lather
empha sizes KFOR’s suc cesses in crowd and riot con trol and in guard ing sites of reli gious and cul tural
importance:
In KFOR, and ear lier in SFOR-IFOR, the big gest chal lenge was to build up crowd- and riot-con trol units’ capa bil i ties to
deal with dem on stra tions, dis tur bances, and civil unrest. In some cases in which KFOR troops con trib uted, nations had
to change national leg is la tion to allow their forces to be equipped and trained for that task. Once achieved, this capa bil ity
became what I think is a very pow er ful and effec tive deter rent. Also in Kosovo, KFOR had to secure and has to secure
many patrimonial sites of religious and cultural significance.