Global Security: in Search of a New Vision - Center for Strategic ...

Chapter 10
Afghan i stan, Paki stan, the U.S., and NATO
Ambassador Munir Akram 1
The pres ent sit u a tion in Afghan i stan and the fron tier regions of Paki stan is the result of a num ber
of devel op ments that have taken place since Decem ber 1979. The pro cess of rad i cal iza tion in
the region was the out come of a series of stra te gic mis takes, includ ing the use of Islamic extrem -
ists in the war against Soviet inter ven tion in Afghan i stan.
EVENTS THAT HAVE LED TO THE CUR RENT SIT U A TION
After Sep tem ber 11, when the United States inter vened in Afghan i stan, Paki stan had advised against
using the North ern Alli ance (which was largely a non-Pashtun coali tion) to oust the Taliban regime from
power. Our advice was not heeded. In Octo ber 2001, the Taliban left Kabul and dis persed to the south
and the east, back to its home areas. Those in the Taliban were not mil i tarily elim i nated or defeated.
But Afghan i stan’s south and east stayed mostly dor mant and neglected until 2003. It was only after the
phys i cal ingress of NATO into the region that the insur gency seri ously com menced. Between 2003 and
2006, the insur gency became orga nized in five com mand coun tries led by, among oth ers, Mul lah Omer,
Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mul lah Dadullah, and Gulbedin Hikmatyar. The spread and inten sity of the insur -
gency was the result of sev eral fac tors:
1. Nat u ral (Pashtun) local sym pa thy for the largely Pashtun Taliban
2. Fur ther alien ation of the Pashtun tribal lead ers because of indis crim i nate bomb ing and mil i tary tac -
tics resulting in civilian casualties; political exclusion, especially after parliamentary elections; Tajik and
non-Pashtun con trol of the Afghan National Army (less now); dis en chant ment of the com mon peo -
ple/vil lages because of coun ter in sur gency tac tics; the absence of devel op ment; cor rup tion and injus tice,
espe cially at the local level; selec tive destruc tion of poppy crops; and grow ing inse cu rity (being caught in
the cross-fire).
Cross-bor der sup port from FATA (Fed er ally to the insur gency (mainly recruits, rest, and regroup ing)
was only a par tial and arbi trary cause of the insur gency. Its major loca tion and moti va tion was and
remains within Afghan i stan.
1
At the time of the workshop, Ambassador Munir Akram was Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the United Nations.