Global Security: in Search of a New Vision - Center for Strategic ...

From the Balkans to Afghanistan: Dealing with the Challenges 127
ini tial stages of oper a tions, forces must be capa ble of main tain ing a safe and secure envi ron ment if nec -
es sary, up to the use of lethal force. How ever, as oper a tions develop, the main te nance of the envi ron -
ment grad u ally must be guar an teed through the use of non-lethal means. In KFOR, and ear lier in
SFOR-IFOR, the big gest chal lenge was to build up crowd- and riot-con trol units’ capa bil i ties to deal
with dem on stra tions, dis tur bances, and civil unrest. In some cases in which KFOR troops con trib uted,
nations had to change national leg is la tion to allow their forces to be equipped and trained for that task.
Once achieved, this capa bil ity became what I think is a very pow er ful and effec tive deter rent. Also in
Kosovo, KFOR had to secure and has to secure many pat ri mo nial sites of reli gious and cul tural sig nif i -
cance. Given the sen si tiv ity of the par ties in Kosovo to these sites, we think the use of mil i tary force for
this pur pose is appro pri ate, although manpower intensive, because it helps to calm emotions and the
situation.
MISSION HANDOVER
At some point in time, we become ready for the mis sion hand over. Nor mally, peace sup port oper a -
tions fol low a sim i lar rou tine: prep a ra tion is first, deploy ment is sec ond, then exe cu tion, and then rede -
ploy ment. The cen ter of grav ity for us lies in the exe cu tion phase, which could be fur ther split into a
num ber of stages pend ing the spe cific sit u a tion. Based on the assess ment of the over all sit u a tion in the -
ater, lead ers might decide to con duct a mis sion hand over to other orga ni za tions. The best tim ing is fore -
seen at the end of the deter rent-pres ent stage—which Mark Fitz ger ald alluded to as well—just before
mov ing into what we call min i mum pres ence pos ture. The lat est exam ple of such a hand over was in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, when, at the com ple tion of SFOR, NATO handed over to EU ALTHEA and left
behind only a min i mal foot print in the coun try. Our expe ri ence tells us that such a hand over has to be
planned very care fully, includ ing the impor tant tasks of the var i ous orga ni za tions, the delin ea tion of
such tasks, intelligence sharing, and providing access to historical data.
COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
The last point is the need for coop er a tion with other orga ni za tions. Inter na tional peace forces are not
usually deployed alone; a number of international governments and non-governmental organizations
are deployed as well. Each of these orga ni za tions addresses spe cific tar get areas and devel ops its own
mostly inde pend ent lines of oper a tion. Expe ri ence tells us that there is really a need to coor di nate all
these activ i ties in the ater, to deliver a com pre hen sive and even-handed approach to the con flict ing par -
ties. NATO com mand ers are instructed to rou tinely main tain good rela tions with the heads of other
orga ni za tions in the area. Recently, we devel oped the con cept of liai son and obser va tion teams in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and liai son mon i tor ing in Kosovo. The pur pose is not only to deal with rep re sen ta -
tives of the local pop u la tions but also to coor di nate with other orga ni za tions work ing in the same area.
That is of mutual benefit to all parties concerned.