strategies to counter opiate in Afghanistan - Groupe URD

and precursor seizures, the number of
arrests is rising and some high ranking
criminals have been imprisoned.
However, progress is slow because i) the
biggest drug traffickers are often part of,
or are linked to, the government, ii) the
trafficking networks are very large and
are able to adapt rapidly to new
constraints, iii) collaboration between
states is not easy: there is a great deal of
reluctance to exchange strategic
information, iv) certain judges and
others within the judicial system do not
do their jobs properly due to the major
risks involved, v) anti-drug laws are not
appropriate: no distinction is made
between small traffickers, simple middle
men and drug barons who have
established whole networks.
Eradication has been the subject of
debate for many years. Though the
negative and even counter-productive
effects of eradication have been widely
documented – the risk of making farmers
even poorer, causing resentment against
the government and the international
community and strengthening popular
support for the insurgency, creating an
incentive for farmers to grow poppies in
order to receive compensation – this
strategy was widely used and
encouraged in Afghanistan in the 2000s,
with little success or effect on the
production of opium. Since 2005,
between 4% and 10% of the potential
production of opium has been
eradicated. In 2007, 4% of the total area
of cultivation was eradicated in a limited
number of provinces (17% in 2008 and
12% in 2009). The drop in the surface
area eradicated can be explained in part
by a change in strategy since 2007, but
also by the insecurity in the South and
West where production is concentrated.
Today, eradication, which for a long time
was promoted by the US, is no longer a
priority among actors. Eradication is
limited to areas where farmers have
clear alternatives to meet their needs.
The objective is to make sure that the
cultivation of poppies involves a certain
level of risk which is dissuasive for
farmers.
Drug abuse is a growing problem in
Afghanistan, which is spreading to new
sections of the population, such as young
people: there are approximately one
million opium users. Treatment for drug
addiction has become more common
since 2003, with the setting up of detox
centres and reintegration programmes.
However, current centres do not cover
existing needs and funding is not
guaranteed in the long term. What is
more, the treatment available is
incomplete and does not help with
reintegration by providing training or
helping people find work, despite the fact
that under-employment is the cause of
20% of relapses.
Conclusion
An impact that is difficult to measure
It is difficult at this point to measure
whether the national anti-drug strategy
as a whole has really had a positive
impact because the results for each pillar
have not been sufficiently evaluated or
are not easily available, and also because
the strategy has been implemented
essentially by individual pillar rather
than in an integrated manner.
Positive changes in strategy
Though slow, practices are changing and
there is growing recognition that there is
no one replacement crop, nor any one
“alternative” form of development, but
that only holistic socio-economic and
political development will make it
possible to reduce dependence on opium
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