strategies to counter opiate in Afghanistan - Groupe URD

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very similar to those funded by the CNTF, that is to say, essentially infrastructure (irrigation systems, schools, conference rooms, protective walls, etc.) 33 . This initiative had a positive impact and reinforced the political will to fight against opium production in certain provinces, such as Balkh, which received more than 2 million dollars. It is a way of motivating governors: the GPI is like the carrot at the end of the eradication “stick”. This initiative helped to establish a better balance between coercive strategies (eradication, interdiction) and those which encourage licit development. A positive aspect of the GPI compared to past experiences which used incentives to reduce opium poppy production, is the inclusion of provinces which have never produced opium poppy, some which had felt penalized compared to opium poppy producing provinces. However, this mechanism lacks transparency with regard to how funds are used. The director of the MCN pointed out that the GPI is a good thing “if there is transparency in the way projects are implemented and in the way they are selected. Otherwise, people will see it as a bad thing”. Certain interviewees mentioned that some governors use this resource as “their own private cheque book”. But systems are gradually being put in place to reinforce transparency and one interlocutor said that “in provinces where governors are “weaker” and really need assistance in the development of their province, but also to reinforce their own legitimacy in the eyes of the local population and the international community, the aid is generally used better. It is in provinces where governors are “strong” that the tendency to use funds for personal ends is most common. It is not certain whether the fall in opium production in the provinces which have benefited from this aid is sustainable. Many governors are involved in drug trafficking or are tied up with large local producers and traffickers. It is possible that they use the GPI for personal ends, to reinforce their alliances and their power 34 . They could very well “change sides” and start promoting opium production again if, for example, the GPI ended or the price of opium poppy went back up. Despite these weaknesses, there seems to be a great deal of political will to continue with the GPI and to improve transparency and the way it is managed. 4.4.3 The Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility, an assessment and integration tool Developed on the initiative of the United Kingdom, the Comprehensive Agriculture and Rural Development Facility is a mechanism which tries to integrate lessons learned about development in a drug production context. Funded by the World Bank and DFID, it is the result of in-depth analysis of the factors which push farmers to produce opium poppy and the kind of development programmes which could reduce opium production 35 . ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 33 GPI, INL, Project Status Database, March 2010 34 See a description of this kind of strategy in Mansfield and Pain, 2008 Counter-Narcotics in Afghanistan: the failure of success 35 Economic Incentives and Development Initiatives to Reduce Opium Production, Ward, C, et al, February 2008 54
As very little progress has been made in terms of agricultural production, income generation and jobs (in comparison to the progress made in rural infrastructure, energy, and transport) and the factors which push farmers to produce opium vary from one region to the next depending on the socio-economic characteristics of farming groups (see annex 4), the CARD aims to: - allow integrated analysis of the socio-economic and agro-ecological situation to be carried out so that the factors which influence opium production in the region can be understood properly, - identify appropriate operations which may concern several sectors or ministries, such as the MRRD and the MAIL, - finance and/or facilitate the setting up of projects within national programmes (NSP, NRAP, WatSIP, Agriculture) so that these different programmes are integrated at the local level. One of the aims is to coordinate infrastructure, agricultural development and employment initiatives. The CARD will be jointly run by the MRRD and the MAIL and is based on the Agriculture and Rural Development strategy of the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). It will be set up by the permanent staff of these two ministries at the provincial and district levels. A management mechanism is to be set up at the central level. The initial phase is due to last 3 years, during which development plans will be drawn up and implemented in 32 districts. A planned 67 million dollars should be available to finance these and 14.3 million dollars will go towards the running costs of the mechanism. Unfortunately, the implementation of this mechanism is not easy. The start-up period has had to be extended from 6 to 12 months. Three district development plans should be ready in September 2010. The first is currently being finalized. Despite the pertinence of the basic concept of the CARD, certain interlocutors were sceptical about its chances of success, notably for the following reasons: • Though the initial idea was that ministry staff would implement the CARD and that it was designed to reinforce existing programmes, there is a risk that the CARD will cause the creation of parallel mechanisms to the existing systems of the two ministries involved which could weaken, rather than strengthen them. An indicator of this risk is the high implementation and running costs (14.3 million dollars over 3 years, or 17% of the total). • Analysis and planning activities require certain human resources which are not easily available at the provincial level and particularly the district level. There is therefore a risk that these resources will be taken up to the detriment of other programmes under way. Furthermore, these activities will require a great deal of expatriate support for several years to come, which is expensive and more and more difficult because of security constraints. • Investigation methods and the preparation of district profiles allow very detailed analysis to be carried out (at significant cost). But is this detailed level of analysis accompanied by an equivalent level of precision in the design and implementation if programmes This is doubtful. What is more, whereas the MRRD is relatively well organised and able to implement its programmes in a relatively effective way, the MAIL’s capacity to provide support and implement its programmes in the field remains weak. Strategies to counter opiate production in Afghanistan Groupe URD | Juin 2010 55
Page 1 and 2:
STRATEGIES TO COUNTER OPIATE PRODUC
Page 3 and 4: CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 1. INT
Page 5 and 6: ACRONYMS ADP Alternative Developmen
Page 7 and 8: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Almost ten years
Page 9 and 10: have had a long-term impact on opiu
Page 11 and 12: poppy cultivation in a sustainable
Page 13: 11. It is important to improve the
Page 17 and 18: 2. Object, methodology and limits o
Page 19 and 20: 3. Opium in Afghanistan 3.1 The hug
Page 21 and 22: Figure 3. Distribution of opium cul
Page 23 and 24: governor and they had been impoveri
Page 25 and 26: hand, the decision not to cultivate
Page 27 and 28: • The production of opium in othe
Page 29 and 30: Table 1. Factors which influence th
Page 31 and 32: Table 2 presents the four prioritie
Page 33 and 34: 4. Opium poppies and development De
Page 35 and 36: 4.1.1 Poor competitivity of alterna
Page 37 and 38: Profit margin per hectare Ease of s
Page 39 and 40: 4.1.2 Difficulties in establishing
Page 41 and 42: Box 2. “Roses for Nangarhar” an
Page 43 and 44: Table 5. Principal characteristics
Page 45 and 46: It is also important to note that m
Page 47 and 48: eing given to agricultural programm
Page 49 and 50: implementation and involving both t
Page 51 and 52: Development Bank because it was too
Page 53: The creation of jobs in non-produci
Page 57 and 58: Box 3. An attempt to analyse the re
Page 59: full use. Though the question of la
Page 62 and 63: Eradication was the subject of deba
Page 64 and 65: 5.2 Interdiction and repression 5.2
Page 66 and 67: 5.2.3 Criminal Justice The objectiv
Page 68 and 69: However, these operations often hav
Page 70 and 71: Box 5. The Harm reduction program f
Page 72 and 73: Helmand, which was developed by the
Page 75: 6. Conclusion Considerable effort h
Page 78 and 79: political stability is a pre-requis
Page 80 and 81: deployment capacity of existing cre
Page 82 and 83: COUNTER-NARCOTICS TRUST FUND (CNTF)
Page 84 and 85: MANSFIELD, D. Water management, liv
Page 86 and 87: KARZAI, H. Stabilizing Afghanistan:
Page 88 and 89: Annex 3: Opium poppy cultivation in
Page 90 and 91: Opium poppy has been cultivated in
Page 92 and 93: Annex 4: Typology of opium-producin
Page 96: Groupe URD La Fontaine des Marins 2
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