strategies to counter opiate in Afghanistan - Groupe URD

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Eradication was the subject of debate for a number of years, with those who were in favour 39 and those who were against. Though the negative and even counter-productive effects of eradication were widely documented as a result of past experience in other drug-producing countries (cf. box 4), this strategy was widely used and encouraged in Afghanistan in the 2000s, with little success or effect on opium production Table 6. Area of opium poppy eradicated, 2005-2009 Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Governor-led eradication (ha) 4 000 13 050 15 898 4 306 2 687 Eradication by the Poppy Eradication 210 2 250 3 149 1 174 2 663 Force (ha) Total area eradicated (ha) 4 210 15 300 19 047 5 480 5 350 Area of opium poppy cultivated minus 104 000 165 000 193 000 157 000 123 000 area eradicated (ha) % of area eradicated 4% 9% 10% 3% 4% Source: UNODC opium survey 2009 Table 7. Area of opium poppy eradicated per province (ha), 2009 Province Verified eradicated area (ha) Reported number of eradicated fields Number of villages where eradication activities were reported Badakhshan 401 1 598 158 Day Kundi 27 113 24 Farah 43 75 8 Faryab 261 236 10 Hilmand 1 475 2 275 54 Hirat 67 247 31 Kabul 1 9 3 Kandahar 69 154 28 Kapisa 31 224 25 Kunar 11 152 12 Nangarhar 226 808 33 Uruzgan 74 371 26 Total 2 686 6 262 412 Source: ONUDC opium survey 2009 Since 2005, between 4 and 10% of potential opium production has been eradicated, via either Governor-led eradication (GLE) or the action of the Poppy Eradication Force (PEF) who answer to the Ministry of the Interior’s Central Eradication Planning Cell (CEPC). The main operations were carried out in 2006 and 2007. In 2009, 4% of potential opium production was eradicated. This concerned fewer provinces (12 in 2009 compared to 17 in 2008) because production became more concentrated. The reduction in the area eradicated can be explained in part by a change in strategy regarding eradication since ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 39 The USA under the Bush administration were in favour of aerial eradication by spraying crops with chemicals. 62
2007, but also by the insecurity which prevails in the South and West where production is concentrated. Nevertheless, 55% of the area eradicated in 2005 was in Helmand where the security situation is unstable (UNODC, 2005). A consensus is currently emerging between actors under the Afghan government’s leadership. This has been made possible, amongst other things, by a change in the USA’s counter-narcotics strategy since 2007. A review of U.S. counter-narcotics strategy carried out by the Strategic Studies Institute for the U.S. government in 2007 concluded that: “the current strategy disproportionately emphasizes and resources the eradication pillar at the expense of the [U.S.] strategy’s other pillars. […] While eradication may seem like a quick and easy fix, it is alienating small farmers while many of the largest drug traffickers, kingpins, and corrupt officials in Afghanistan continue to prosper. With eradication getting most of the attention and resources, the alternative livelihoods, interdiction, law enforcement and justice reform, and public information pillars of the U.S. counternarcotics strategy have been neglected, resulting in an ineffective counter-narcotics program”. (Glaze J., SSI, 2007) Eradication by means of chemical spraying has now been banned and eradication must now be limited to the areas where farmers have clear alternatives to meet their needs. The objective of eradication is to introduce a credible risk into opium poppy cultivation in order to influence farmers’ decision-making and make them more reluctant to plant opium poppy. Eradication operations involve a number of difficulties: • They require a great deal of resources either in terms of machinery (which is not always easy to get to isolated areas), or in terms of labour (to destroy the harvest manually). Furthermore, eradication needs to take place at a precise moment to be effective and the window of opportunity only lasts two or three weeks. • There is a great deal of corruption, such as the police (CNPA) taking bribes in exchange for not reporting fields which could be eradicated. In a way, this acts as a mechanism for redistributing wealth among the actors involved. • The objective of making eradication a means of introducing risk into the decision of whether or not to cultivate poppy does not appear to have been achieved: only 1% of all the farmers interviewed by UNODC mentioned fear of eradication as a reason for not cultivating opium, and only 2% of the farmers in the South (UNODC, 2009). • The relations between eradication and compensation, and the political implications of these are not easy to manage. The Afghan government and the members of the international community involved in military operations in Marjah were faced with a dilemma once the Taliban had been chased out of the area: it was full of opium poppy fields about to reach maturation. To eradicate these fields was to run the risk of turning the population against them. The US army decided to offer to pay the opium producing farmers the price of their harvest if they destroyed the crop and replaced it with licit crops. (Reuters, 21 mars 2010) Strategies to counter opiate production in Afghanistan Groupe URD | Juin 2010 63
Page 1 and 2:
STRATEGIES TO COUNTER OPIATE PRODUC
Page 3 and 4:
CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 1. INT
Page 5 and 6:
ACRONYMS ADP Alternative Developmen
Page 7 and 8:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Almost ten years
Page 9 and 10:
have had a long-term impact on opiu
Page 11 and 12: poppy cultivation in a sustainable
Page 13: 11. It is important to improve the
Page 17 and 18: 2. Object, methodology and limits o
Page 19 and 20: 3. Opium in Afghanistan 3.1 The hug
Page 21 and 22: Figure 3. Distribution of opium cul
Page 23 and 24: governor and they had been impoveri
Page 25 and 26: hand, the decision not to cultivate
Page 27 and 28: • The production of opium in othe
Page 29 and 30: Table 1. Factors which influence th
Page 31 and 32: Table 2 presents the four prioritie
Page 33 and 34: 4. Opium poppies and development De
Page 35 and 36: 4.1.1 Poor competitivity of alterna
Page 37 and 38: Profit margin per hectare Ease of s
Page 39 and 40: 4.1.2 Difficulties in establishing
Page 41 and 42: Box 2. “Roses for Nangarhar” an
Page 43 and 44: Table 5. Principal characteristics
Page 45 and 46: It is also important to note that m
Page 47 and 48: eing given to agricultural programm
Page 49 and 50: implementation and involving both t
Page 51 and 52: Development Bank because it was too
Page 53 and 54: The creation of jobs in non-produci
Page 55 and 56: As very little progress has been ma
Page 57 and 58: Box 3. An attempt to analyse the re
Page 59: full use. Though the question of la
Page 64 and 65: 5.2 Interdiction and repression 5.2
Page 66 and 67: 5.2.3 Criminal Justice The objectiv
Page 68 and 69: However, these operations often hav
Page 70 and 71: Box 5. The Harm reduction program f
Page 72 and 73: Helmand, which was developed by the
Page 75: 6. Conclusion Considerable effort h
Page 78 and 79: political stability is a pre-requis
Page 80 and 81: deployment capacity of existing cre
Page 82 and 83: COUNTER-NARCOTICS TRUST FUND (CNTF)
Page 84 and 85: MANSFIELD, D. Water management, liv
Page 86 and 87: KARZAI, H. Stabilizing Afghanistan:
Page 88 and 89: Annex 3: Opium poppy cultivation in
Page 90 and 91: Opium poppy has been cultivated in
Page 92 and 93: Annex 4: Typology of opium-producin
Page 96: Groupe URD La Fontaine des Marins 2
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