Space Acquisition - Air Force Space Command

Space Acquisition: Space and Missile Systems Center
Getting it Right:
Lessons from Failed Space Acquisitions
Mr. Douglas L. Loverro
Executive Director, Space and Missile Systems Center
Los Angeles AFB, California
It is almost inevitable—major system development programs
will get into trouble sometime during the engineering,
manufacturing and development phase (EMD)! This is not
a disease endemic to only space programs; it occurs for ships,
aircraft, tanks, and trainers. It happens in every sector of the US
government. But what makes it particularly tough for those of us
in the space business is that first, unlike most other systems, the
majority of our costs are spent during EMD; and second, due to
the real physical limitations on space system life, we are almost
always in development in any one of our mission areas. This dynamic
led to the statement several years ago by a former secretary
of the Air Force who asked, “Why are all my space programs in
trouble” Part of the answer, although not one we gave him, was,
“because they were all in development.”
But is it really inevitable It sure seems so. The names are legend;
Military Strategic and Tactical Relay System (MILSTAR),
GPS IIF, Space Based Infrared Systems, National Polar-orbiting
Operational Environmental Satellite System, Future Imagery Architecture,
Space Based Space Surveillance, and Advanced Extremely
High Frequency just to name a few. Nearly everyone
has gone through a Nunn-McCurdy certification process, or the
equivalent. The issues were so widespread that in National Security
Presidential Directive-49 (NSPD-49), US National Space
Policy, signed by President George W. Bush on 31 August 2006,
a focus was placed on space systems development costs. The
Office of Management and Budget was asked to craft rules to
monitor the space acquisition process across the federal government.
When the president has to jump in to fix things, you know
we are doing poorly.
So what’s the answer What’s a space program manager (PM)
to do In just the last 10 years we have had numerous defense
science board studies, congressional commissions, National
Academy of Science findings, and Department of Defense (DoD)
Executive Agent Independent Reviews. All prescribed a menu
of fixes from making sure everything is 80 percent funded, to
confirming all up front system engineering is completed before
starting a development, and focusing our efforts on removing all
technology risks prior to Milestone B. Unfortunately, they never
said whose job these things were… the program executive officer,
the headquarters, the Air Staff, or the Office of the Secretary
of Defense Ultimately though, only one person can be accountable—the
PM. Yet he or she does not control all the levers all
those studies told us to pull. This article outlines some levers or
guidelines that I believe the PM actually does control.
Most of these guidelines focus on processes early in the program’s
life because that’s the key timeframe to put a program on
the right track. A program that’s broken heading out of Critical
Design Review or even Preliminary Design Review (PDR)
is probably going to stay broken through development. It will
suffer from, as the 2008 Young Panel Report put it, “congenital
defects” throughout its life presuming it is allowed to live. There
is no such thing as an acquisition panacea so the steps prescribed
below are not program cure-alls; but they are also not just palliatives.
In my 30-plus years of acquisition experience, I have
observed that these seemingly common-sense changes can have
a huge impact on the eventual outcome. I have divided these
lessons into three distinct phases: failures in source selection,
failures in program initiation, and failures in program execution.
Starting Right: Lessons From Flawed Source
Selections
How Bad Do You Want It
It sure seems simple. You have a firm requirement that includes
numerous key performance parameters (KPP) signed by
the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The Pentagon has
told you how much money you have by fiscal year. The combatant
command has told you when they want initial operational
capability. All you need to do is get it on contract. So you go out
for bids and you put all that information in the request for proposal.
As a savvy manager, you hold some time and money back in
management reserve and ask for a bit more than the threshold requirements
to make sure the contractor does not “under-deliver.”
You explain that unless the contractor can meet your schedule for
the dollars laid out and with the minimum requirements satisfied,
they can’t win. Of course, every contractor who responds says
they can do it for exactly that amount of money (or less) and
exactly to your schedule (or sooner). In fact, they can actually
beat your minimum requirements. Your alarm bells should be
ringing!
Either you are uncannily omniscient, or the contractors simply
told you what they thought you wanted to hear. Good programs
begin with an achievable set of requirements bid at a realistic cost
and a realistic schedule. Given the freedom, a contractor will try
to bring you an aggressive, but doable program. But if put in a
position of either losing or having to promise an unachievable
program, he will promise the unachievable. It may not be in his
self interest to do so, but it will happen nonetheless.
Lesson 1 – An overly constrained source selection can and
will force an offerer to bid to an unachievable baseline.
Am I Being Clear
Have you ever been asked by a friend to help them shop for a
car I have. Several years ago, a relative asked me for help buying
a car. When I asked what kind, the answer was, “a Mercedes.”
When I asked what kind of Mercedes, their clear answer was,
High Frontier 12