Space Acquisition - Air Force Space Command

years late to need). It was also on course to cost over twice as
much as the vendor had been given to deliver it (turns out I actually
guessed low). Within a month of taking over, we terminated
that part of the effort for the first satellite.
Mind you, we had not had a review with this contractor yet
and no hardware had failed in test. In fact, I could barely tell you
how it worked. But a careful reading of the CPR, data that had
been available to the program team for well over a year, quickly
revealed the issues and drove a rapid decision. A nearly identical
picture emerged in two other IRTs in which I was involved.
The point here is not to suggest that all program issues can be
determined by reading a CPR—they can’t. The PM, and the program
team, has many sources of information, but they only work
if everyone knows how to use them. In an operational system,
there are many telemetry points. Some have set limits that flash
red when exceeded. Some just tell you what the value is and
you have to know what that means. Skilled operators understand
more than just the flashing reds. So do skilled PMs and the people
who work for them. If they don’t, then teach them.
Lesson 5 – Ensure your entire team understands all the tools
in their toolkit and uses them on a regular basis to track
program performance.
Never Let Them See You Sweat.
There is nothing as uncertain or tenuous as starting something
new. This is especially true for new space development programs.
The most dangerous time for a new space effort is in the
very beginning; the time before PDR. At this time, it is still not
too late (at least in theory) to go back and buy one more of the
old design before the new system gets too far down the road. So
many PMs “learn” not to cast doubt against the system’s ability
to meet the validated KPPs. Missing a KPP means having to rejustify
a program and risk cancellation.
Such a circumstance confronted the PM on a major space reconnaissance
effort soon after it began. He had been the person
who “sold” the program, and had shepherded it through the byzantine
approval process that accompanies multi-billion dollar developments.
Approaching PDR, it became apparent that the system
design was going to fall short of one of his many (too many it
turned out) KPPs. He had a choice: (A) go back to the combined
DoD and intelligence requirements boards and ask for relief, or,
(B) direct the contractor to change their design and find another
way. He chose (B) because choosing (A) would have reopened
the debate of whether this system was the right one to build.
The contractor complied. They redesigned the spacecraft to
meet the requirement. But the weight of the satellite increased by
50 percent in the process as did the cost. By the time they were
done (nearly a year later) the program was hopelessly behind
schedule, over cost, and on a nearly unrecoverable downward
spiral. As it turned out though, the requirements community had
been prepared to provide relief. The calculation was that the system
would have missed the KPP by less than 5 percent. In fact,
the calculated value was still better than any prior system had
ever delivered. But, because the PM was unwilling to risk possible
cancellation by asking for relief, he had doomed the program
by forcing a compliant design. The program was cancelled four
years later after billions more had been spent.
Lesson 6 – Never get so close to a program that you can’t
make objective trade-offs, even those that might call the program
into question.
Is That All It Takes
Behind these six lessons are hundreds more. There are obstacles
at every turn and it takes skill and persistence to overcome
them one by one. But these lessons, these six easy steps, are
some of the most important in “getting it right.” Space Acquisition
is a tough business. I hope current and future PMs will take
to heart these lessons from past space acquisitions. Having personally
experienced the ramifications from each and every one, I
assure you the mistakes are not worth repeating!
The recent GPS III acquisition at SMC instituted most of the
above steps, and they appear, so far, to be working. Our joint challenge
is to replicate that model throughout the enterprise. Doing
so provides the space community the best chance of emerging
from the “space acquisition battle” unscathed. Getting it wrong,
beginning with too little money and time, with uncertain needs
along an undefined path, with a program team not armed with
rigorous system engineering and program tools, and a program
leadership chain unwilling to make tough decisions on the program
itself, dooms us to failure.
Notes:
1
Ms. Karin Donker, proverbs and quotations, Cornell University,
http://instruct1.cit.cornell.edu/courses/ee476/Proverbs.html.
2
Adapted from the saying, “If you think good architecture is expensive,
try bad architecture,” Brian Foote and Joseph Yoder, Big Ball of
Mud, Department of Computer Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign, 1999.
Mr. Douglas L. Loverro (BS,
Chemistry, Air Force Academy;
MBA, University of West
Florida; MS, Physics, University
of New Mexico; MS,
Political Science, Auburn University,
Alabama) is a member
of the Defense Intelligence
Senior Executive Service and
is the executive director, Space
and Missile Systems Center,
Air Force Space Command,
Los Angeles AFB, California.
As executive director, he is the
senior civilian executive and
principal assistant to the commander.
His responsibilities
include Air Force research, design, development and acquisition of
space launch, command and control, and satellite systems.
Mr. Loverro has served in a variety of technical management,
leadership and staff positions in the Air Force. Previous assignments
include director of Advanced Systems, Space and Missile
Systems Center; system program director, Navigation Satellite
Timing and Ranging Global Positioning System Joint Program Office,
Space and Missile Systems Center; commander, Future Imagery
Architecture Materiel Wing, National Reconnaissance Office,
Chantilly, Virginia; and associate director, Imagery Systems Acquisition
and Operations, National Reconnaissance Office.
High Frontier 14