THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO - Studyplace

vi
PREFACE
sophy,' have shifted their meaning or acquired false associations for
English ears. One who opened Jowett's version at random and
lighted on the statement (at 549 B) that the best guardian for a
man's 'virtue' is 'philosophy tempered with music,' might run away
with the idea that, in order to avoid irregular relations with women,
he had better play the violin in the intervals of studying metaphysics.
There may be some truth in this; but only after reading
widely in other parts of the book would he discover that it was
not quite what Plato meant by describing logos, combined with
musi/{e, as the only sure safeguard of arete.
The unfortunate effect of a too literal translation may be illustrated
by some extracts from the Loeb edition:
'This then,' said I, 'if haply you now understand, is what you must
say I then meant, by the statement that of all things that are such as
to be of something those that are just themselves only are of things
just themselves only, but things of a certain kind are of things of a
certain kind' (438 D, vol. i, p. 393).
With the help of the context and some explanatory notes, the
reader, it is true, will gather that the sense of this dark saying
is as follows:
'This, then, if you understand me now, is what I meant by saymg
that, of two correlative terms, the one is qualified if, and only if, the
other is SKJ.'
But if he is more concerned to follow Plato's argument than to
relish the simplicities of Greek idiom, he may prefer the paraphrase.
Here is another passage:
'In heaven's nameI' said I, 'suppose SKJmeone had questioned him
thus: "Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and
befitting to what is called the art of medicine" What do you take
it would have been his answer' 'Obviously,' he said, 'the art that
renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks.' 'And the art that renders
to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art'
'SeaSKJning to meats.' 'Good. In the same way tell me the art that
renders what to whom would be denominated justice.' 'If we are to
follow the previous examples, Socrates, it is that which renders benefits
and harms to friends and enemies' (332 c, vol. i, p. 25).