THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO - Studyplace

52 CHAPTER V [D. 366
have not the strength to practise. This is easily seen: give such a
man the power, and he will be the first to use it to the utmost.
What lies at the bottom of all this is nothing but the fact from
which Glaucon, as well as I, started upon this long discourse. We
put it to you, Socrates, with all respect, in this way. All you who
profess to sing the praises of right conduct, from the ancient heroes
whose legends have survived down to the men of the present day,
have never denounced injustice or praised justice apart from the
reputation, honours, and rewards they bring; but what effect either
of them in itself has upon its possessor when it dwells in his soul
unseen of gods or men, no poet or ordinary man has ever yet ex~
plained No one has proved that a soul can harbour no worse evil
than injustice, no greater good than justice. Had all of you said
that from the first and tried to convince us from our youth up,
we should not be keeping watch upon our neighbours to prevent
them from doing wrong to us, but everyone would keep a far more
effectual watch over himself, for fear lest by wronging others he
should open his doors to the worst of all evils.
That, Socrates, is the view of justice and injustice which Thrasymachus
and, no doubt, others would state, perhaps in even
stronger words. For myself, I believe it to be a gross perversion of
their true worth and effect; but, as I must frankly confess, I have
put the case with all the force I could muster because I want to
hear the other side from you. You must not be content with proving
that justice is superior to injustice; you must make clear what
good or what harm each of them does to its possessor, taking it
simply in itself and, as Glaucon required, leaving out of account
the reputation it bears. For unless you deprive each of its true
reputation and attach to it the false one,- we shall say that you are
praising or denouncing nothing more than the appearances in
either case, and recommending us to do wrong without being
found out; and that you hold with Thrasymachus that right means
what is good for someone else, being the interest of the stronger,
and wrong is what really pays, serving one's own interest at the
expense of the weaker. You have agreed that justice belongs to
that highest class of good things which are worth having not only
for their consequences, but much more for their own sakes-things