THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO - Studyplace

II. 365J JUSTICE VALUED FOR ITS RESULTS 51
of our neighbours without being punished. You might object that
the gods are not to be deceived and are beyond the reach of violence.
But suppose that there are no gods, or that they do not concern
themselves with the doings of men; why should we concern
ourselves to deceive them Or, if the gods do exist and care for
mankind, all we know or have ever heard about them comes from
current tradition and from the poets who recount their family history,
and these same authorities also assure us that they can be
won over and turned from their purpose 'by sacrifice and humble
prayers' and votive offerings. We must either accept both these
statements or neither. If we are to accept both, we had better do
wrong and use part of the proceeds to offer sacrifice. By being just
we may escape the punishment of heaven, but we shall be renouncing
the profits of injustice; whereas by doing wrong we
shall make our profit and escape punishment into the bargain, by
means of those entreaties which win over the gods when we transgress
and do amiss. But then, you will say, in the other world the
penalty for our misdeeds on earth will fall either upon us or upon
our children's children. We can counter that objection by reckoning
on the great efficacy of mystic rites and the divinities of absolution,
vouched for by the most advanced societies and by the descendants
of the gods who have appeared as poets and spokesmen
Qf heavenly inspiration.
What reason, then, remains for preferring justice to the extreme
of injustice, when common belief and the best authorities promise
us the fulfilment of our desires in this life and the next, if only we
conceal our ill-doing under a veneer of decent behaviour The upshot
is, Socrates, that no man possessed of superior powers of mind
or person or rank or wealth will set any value on justice; he is
more likely to laugh when he hears it praised. So, even one who
could prove my case false and were quite sure that justice is best,
far from being indignant with the unjust, will be very ready to
excuse them. He will know that, here and there, a man may refrain
from wrong because it revolts some instinct he is graced with
or because he has come to know the truth; no one else is virtuous
of his own will; it is only lack of spirit or the infirmity of age or
some other weakness that makes men condemn the iniquities they